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1. INTRODUCTION
Witnesses called to testify as "experts" are cloaked with prestige and
authority, and are positioned to exert heavy influence on juries. This is ac-
centuated in areas of expert testimony that are highly technical or specia-
lized. The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that "'[e]xpert
3
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evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading because of the difficulty
in evaluating it."'" The Court has therefore given federal trial court judges
the important responsibility of ensuring that expert testimony is based on
reliable methodology and fits the facts of the case. 2 Trial judges are in-
structed to act as "gatekeepers" to prevent juries from being inundated with
"junk science."3
On the other hand, Florida is among a shrinking minority of states still
clinging to the antiquated "Frye test."4 This test does not provide trial judges
with the legal tools for ensuring that "expert" witnesses are qualified and that
their testimony is relevant, reliable, and appropriate for a jury. Instead, the
"test" is nothing more than a determination of whether an expert's methodol-
ogy is "generally accepted." 6  This nebulous standard of "general accep-
tance" is not an adequate check on the integrity of expert evidence. The
problem is compounded by Supreme Court of Florida precedent, holding that
the Frye test applies only to a minority of cases involving expert testimony-
those involving "new science."7 If an expert's testimony is based on science
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1. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993) (quoting Jack B.
Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is Sound; It Should Not Be Amended,
138 F.R.D. 632 (1991)).
2. Id. at 589, 592.
3. See id. at 597.
4. Spann v. State, 857 So. 2d 845, 852 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam); see Frye v. United
States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923); see also Murray v. State, 3 So. 3d 1108, 1117
(Fla.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 396 (2009); Marsh v. Valyou, 977 So. 2d 543, 547
(Fla. 2007) (per curiam).
5. See Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
6. Id.
7. Murray, 3 So. 3d at 1117 (citing McDonald v. State, 952 So. 2d 484, 498 (Fla. 2006)
(per curiam)); Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 547-48 (quoting U.S. Sugar Corp. v. Henson, 823 So. 2d
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that the court does not deem "new" or derived from a field that is not tradi-
tionally "science," then the test is not even triggered.8 So-called "pure opi-
nion" testimony purportedly based on an expert's overall experience is also
beyond the reach of the Frye test.9
This shortcoming in Florida jurisprudence undermines the integrity of
the court system and the quality of justice dispensed by trial courts. It also
threatens to diminish the state's many advantages in attracting business, par-
ticularly in light of the fact that most states in the Southeast have already
modernized their laws governing the admissibility of expert evidence, in-
cluding Georgia by legislation enacted in 2005.o
The Florida Legislature can and should solve this problem by statutorily
adopting the "Daubert test" to place Florida on equal footing with most other
jurisdictions and federal courts.
104, 109 (Fla. 2002)); Spann, 857 So. 2d at 852 (citing Henson, 823 So. 2d at 109; Brim v.
State, 695 So. 2d 268, 271-72 (Fla. 1997)).
8. See Murray, 3 So. 3d at 1117 (citing McDonald, 952 So. 2d at 498); Marsh, 977 So.
2d at 547-48 (quoting Henson, 823 So. 2d at 109); Spann, 857 So. 2d at 852.
9. Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 548, 561 (citing Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827, 828 (Fla.
1993)); Hadden v. State, 690 So. 2d 573, 579-80 (Fla. 1997) (citing Flanagan, 625 So. 2d at
828).
10. See infra notes 114, 116, 117. The Georgia Legislature first adopted the Daubert test
of admissibility in 2005. See GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-67.1(f) (2010); Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993). Subsequently, a Georgia trial court found portions
of subsections (a) and (b)(1) and subsection (f) of the statute unconstitutional, and severed
them from the statute as a whole. Mason v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. (Mason 1), No. 97-A-
5105-1, 2006 WL 6057895, at *7-9 (Ga. Cobb County State Ct. Oct. 6, 2006), vacated in
part, 658 S.E.2d 603 (Ga. 2008). On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia agreed with the
severance of sections (a) and (b)(1), but disagreed with the trial court's analysis and severance
of section (f), Mason v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. (Mason II), 658 S.E.2d 603, 608-09 (Ga.
2008), which referenced Daubert and stated:
"It is the intent of the legislature that, in all civil cases, the courts of the State of Georgia not be
viewed as open to expert evidence that would not be admissible in other states. Therefore, in
interpreting and applying this Code section, the courts of this state may draw from the opinions
of the United States Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509
U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993); General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S.
136, 118 S. Ct. 512, 139 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1997); Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S.
137, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 143 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1999); and other cases in federal courts applying the
standards announced by the United States Supreme Court in these cases."
Mason II, 658 S.E.2d at 605-06 n.1, 608-09 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-67.1(f)). In its
holding, the Supreme Court of Georgia concluded that "the trial court was mistaken in declar-
ing subsection (f) unconstitutional." Id. at 609. Most recently, the Georgia Legislature has
proposed new legislation to take the place of section 24-9-67.1. See GA. CODE ANN. § 24-7-
702 (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013). Like the previous statute, the proposed legislation
incorporates the same Daubert standard of admissibility and reaffirms Georgia's adherence to
Daubert. Id. § 24-7-702(f).
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Part II of this article discusses the inherent failings of the Frye test as
applied and interpreted by Florida courts. Part m of this article focuses on
the components of the Daubert test and the particular need for the test in
professional liability cases. Part IV of this article examines the prior legisla-
tive attempts to adopt a statutory Daubert standard in Florida. Finally, Part
V proposes a bill for the legislature to consider in the upcoming legislative
session to implement a Daubert standard in Florida state courts.
II. THE PROBLEM: FLORIDA LACKS ADEQUATE MEANS FOR ENSURING
EXPERT EVIDENCE Is TRUSTWORTHY
A. Overview
The modern jury trial is likely to feature scientific or technical issues
too complex for jurors to understand and decide solely on the basis of per-
sonal knowledge and experience. While juries usually function well using
their collective memories and assessing credibility, the same cannot be said
for understanding and deciding complex scientific or technical issues. In-
deed, for this very reason parties are permitted to offer testimony from "ex-
perts" on such issues." Jurors may place a great deal of reliance on expert
witnesses, so it is imperative that an expert witness have true expertise on the
issues at hand. 12
Our legal system has long grappled with the challenge of expert testi-
mony that does not meet minimum thresholds of reliability and relevance.13
The federal system and many states have seen excellent progress in this area
11. FLA. STAT. § 90.702 (2011). Section 90.702 of the Florida Statutes provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact in understand-
ing the evidence or in determining a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by know-
ledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify about it in the form of an opinion;
however, the opinion is admissible only if it can be applied to evidence at trial.
Id.
12. Flanagan, 625 So. 2d at 828. In the words of the Supreme Court of Florida, "[t]he
jury will naturally assume that the scientific principles underlying the expert's conclusions are
valid." Id.; see, e.g., Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 561 (Cantero, J., dissenting) (quoting Flanagan,
625 So. 2d at 828); Ramirez v. State (Ramirez III), 810 So. 2d 836, 844 (Fla. 2001) (quoting
Flanagan, 625 So. 2d at 828); Hadden, 690 So. 2d at 578 (quoting Flanagan, 625 So. 2d at
828); Holy Cross Hosp., Inc. v. Marrone, 816 So. 2d 1113, 1118 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001)
(citing Flanagan, 625 So. 2d at 828); Kaelbel Wholesale, Inc. v. Soderstrom, 785 So. 2d 539,
547 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting Flanagan, 625 So. 2d at 828).
13. See Kaminski v. State, 63 So. 2d 339, 340 (Fla. 1952) (per curiam) (applying the
Frye standard to test the reliability of the foundation of the expert's testimony); see also Cop-
polino v. State, 223 So. 2d 68, 70-71 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (establishing that Florida
officially adopted the Frye standard as a way to ensure that evidence was "sufficiently reliable
to justify [its] admission").
[Vol. 364
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within current generations of judges and lawyers.'4 A federal circuit judge
surveying the situation in 1986 made the following assessment:
[E]xperts whose opinions are available to the highest bidder have
no place testifying in a court of law. . . . We will turn to that task
with a sharp eye, particularly in those instances . . . where . . . the
decision to receive expert testimony was simply tossed off to the
jury under a "let it all in" philosophy. Our message to our able tri-
al colleagues: [I]t is time to take hold of expert testimony in fed-
eral trials.15
This call to action was followed by dramatic change at the federal level,
both in awareness of the problem and the implementation of solutions.16
Most states have followed suit." Florida has not.'8
Rather, Florida is increasingly isolated as a jurisdiction yoked to a "test"
for expert witness testimony created in 1923.'9 The Supreme Court of Flori-
da continually reaffirms the state's adherence to the 1923 test,20 and as a re-
sult the state's trial judges are bound to "let it all in" in all but the rarest of
cases.21
There are demonstrable effects of Florida's out-dated approach to ex-
pert evidence. In 2010, Florida ranked forty-second in the overall fairness of
its litigation environment, and ranked thirty-ninth in its treatment of scientif-
ic and technical evidence in a poll of state liability systems surveying nearly
1500 general counsel and senior corporate attorneys familiar with the state
14. See, e.g., Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589; United States v. Williams, 506 F.3d 151, 161 (2d
Cir. 2007); Eymard v. Pan Am. World Airways (In re Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans),
795 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir. 1986); Taylor v. State, 889 P.2d 319, 328-29 (Okla. Crim. App.
1995).
15. In re Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, 795 F.2d at 1234.
16. See, e.g., Gen. Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997); Daubert, 509 U.S. at
589.
17. See infra pp. 21-23 and notes 113-45.
18. See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 62 So. 3d 1101, 1110-11 (Fla. 2011) (per curiam); Murray
v. State, 3 So. 3d 1108, 1117 (Fla.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 396 (2009) (citing
McDonald v. State, 952 So. 2d 484, 498 (Fla. 2006) (per curiam)); Marsh v. Valyou, 977 So.
2d 543, 546-50 (Fla. 2007) (per curiam); Spann v. State, 857 So. 2d 845, 852 (Fla. 2003) (per
curiam).
19. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1013-14 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
20. See, e.g., Taylor, 62 So. 3d at 1110; Murray, 3 So. 3d at 1117; Marsh, 977 So. 2d at
546-50; Spann, 857 So. 2d at 852.
21. See, e.g., Janssen Pharm. Prods., L.P. v. Hodgemire, 49 So. 3d 767, 771-72 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (per curiam), review denied, 64 So. 3d 1260 (Fla. 2011); Gelsthorpe ex
rel. Bacus v. Weinstein, 897 So. 2d 504, 509 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Kaelbel Whole-
sale, Inc. v. Soderstrom, 785 So. 2d 539, 546 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
52011]1
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litigation environments.22 Florida annually scores well overall in business
climate and prospects for growth, but less well in regulatory/legal environ-
ment.23 In Forbes' 2007 Best States for Business rankings, for example,
Florida placed in the top ten overall but scored lower on regulatory environ-
ment and below average on business costs.24 By contrast, Georgia, which
passed expert evidence reform legislation in 2005, scored in the top five on
regulatory environment.25 Currently, Florida's rank has dropped all the way
to number twenty-six. 26  Florida-South Florida in particular-routinely
appears in business and legal interest rankings of the worst "judicial hell-
holes" in the nation. 27  For 2010-2011, according to the American Tort
Reform Foundation, South Florida ranks as one of the top six worst judicial
hellholes in the United States.28
B. Good Science Makes Good Law
It should not be controversial to suggest that judges and juries will
struggle to make fair and accurate decisions if invalid science or technical
information distorts their understanding of the facts. On the other hand, reli-
able expert testimony will increase the quality of justice. 29 Good science
makes good law. This is a point that should find broad acceptance among
the stakeholders in Florida's justice system.
Whether one starts with consideration of the rationale underpinning
federal decisions, led by the 1993 opinion of the Supreme Court of the Unit-
ed States in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,30 or the current
state of Florida common law regarding expert testimony, the conclusion is
the same: it is imperative that Florida's Legislature adopt progressive legis-
22. HARRIS INTERACTIVE, 2010 U.S. Chamber of Commerce State Liability Systems
Ranking Study, U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM 1, 7, 42 (Mar. 9, 2010),
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/sites/default/files/images2/stories/documents/pdf/laws
uitclimate2010/201 FullHarrisSurvey.pdf.
23. Kurt Badenhausen, The Best States for Business and Careers, FORBES.COM (Oct. 13,
2010, 6:30 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2010/10/13/best-states-for-business-business-beltway
-best-states-table.html.
24. Kurt Badenhausen, The Best States for Business, FORBES.COM (July 11, 2007, 6:00
AM), http://www.forbes.com/2007/07/10/washington-virginia-utah-biz-cz kb_071lbizstates-
table.html.
25. Id.
26. Badenhausen, supra note 23.
27. See, e.g., Judicial Hellholes, AM. TORT REFORM FOUND. 1, 8-10 (2010), http://www.
judicialhellholes.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/JH20 I 0.pdf.
28. Id. at 3.
29. See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 889 P.2d 319, 329 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995).
30. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
6 [Vol. 36
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lation governing the disclosure, qualifications, and reliability of expert testi-
mony in litigation. Such legislation would equip Florida trial judges with
specific benchmarks for evaluating the admissibility of expert testimony.
This would vastly improve the level of science and the quality of expert tes-
timony in Florida courts. The Supreme Court of the United States was moti-
vated by a concern for good science in Daubert, when it gave federal trial
court judges the important responsibility of ensuring that expert testimony
presented in court is based on reliable methodology and fits the facts of the
case.3' Federal trial judges are made "gatekeepers" of expert evidence to
prevent juries from being misled by junk science.32 The Supreme Court of
Florida has not followed the same path, and Florida trial judges are extreme-
ly limited in their ability to keep junk science and unreliable or irrelevant
expert evidence out of court.33
Good science makes good law, and Florida's lawmakers need to enact
legislation that will maximize the likelihood that only good science is fac-
tored into the case-by-case law made in Florida's courts.
C. Florida's 1923 Frye "General Acceptance" Test
Frye v. United StateS34 dealt with the admissibility of a blood pressure
"deception test."35 In this criminal case, the defendant appealed his convic-
tion for second degree murder based on the trial court's exclusion of expert
testimony on the result of the test on the defendant. 36 The defendant at-
tempted to convince the court to allow the expert testimony based on the
following:
It is asserted that blood pressure is influenced by change in the
emotions of the witness, and that the systolic blood pressure rises
31. Id. at 592-93.
32. See id. at 597.
33. See, e.g., State v. Demeniuk, 888 So. 2d 655, 658 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (cit-
ing Sybers v. State, 841 So. 2d 532, 542 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2003) ("Frye requires that the
judge perform the function of gatekeeper. In general terms, the gate of admissibility is not
opened unless the proponent of new scientific evidence can demonstrate by the greater weight
of the evidence that the scientific principle upon which the evidence is based, and the testing
procedures used to apply the principle to the facts of the case, have gained general acceptance
for reliability among impartial and disinterested experts within the particular scientific com-
munity to which the principle belongs.")).
34. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
35. Id. at 1013.
36. Id. at 1013-14. Ostensibly, defendant's counsel wished to introduce the results of the
test to show that the defendant was truthful on questions relating to his commission of the
crime. Id. at 1014.
2011]1 7
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are brought about by nervous impulses sent to the sympathetic
branch of the autonomic nervous system. Scientific experiments,
it is claimed, have demonstrated that fear, rage, and pain always
produce a rise of systolic blood pressure, and that conscious decep-
tion or falsehood, concealment of facts, or guilt of crime, accom-
panied by fear of detection when the person is under examination,
raises the systolic blood pressure in a curve, which corresponds
exactly to the struggle going on in the subject's mind, between fear
and attempted control of that fear, as the examination touches the
vital points in respect of which he is attempting to deceive the ex-
aminer. 37
The court summarized the defendant's theory as: "[T]ruth is spontane-
ous, and comes without conscious effort, while the utterance of a falsehood
requires a conscious effort, which is reflected in the blood pressure."3 8 The
defendant did not appear to cite to any cases, scientific studies, or medical
literature to directly support his theory.39
In ruling that the test results were not admissible, the court fashioned a
requirement of "general acceptance" for "the thing from which the [expert's]
deduction is made." 40 The Frye court's reasoning was contained in a single
paragraph lacking citation to any legal authority:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line be-
tween the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to de-
fine. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the
principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way
in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized
scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduc-
tion is made must be sufficiently established to have gained gener-
al acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.41
Frye is now almost ninety years old.42 Its general acceptance test to
guide courts in discerning trustworthiness in the "twilight zone" of science
seems to have had an appealing simplicity in simpler times.43  Florida
37. Id. at 1013-14.
38. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
39. Id. The opinion only referenced the fact that "no cases directly [o]n point have been
found." Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Frye, 293 F. at 1013.
43. See id. at 1014; infra notes 44, 113-57 and accompanying text.
8 [Vol. 36
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adopted the general acceptance test in 1952." Most other states adhered to
Frye for much of the twentieth century.45
The Supreme Court of Florida imposes four steps on trial judges in its
articulation of the Frye test:
1) [Tihe trial judge must determine whether such expert testimony
will assist the jury in understanding the evidence or in determining
a fact in issue; 2) the trial judge must decide whether the expert's
testimony is based on a scientific principle or discovery that is
"sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs;" 3) the trial judge [must] de-
termine whether a particular witness is qualified as an expert to
present opinion testimony on the subject in issue; 4) the [trial]
judge may then allow the expert to render an opinion on the sub-
ject of his or her expertise, and it is then up to the jury to deter-
mine the credibility of the expert's opinion, which it may either
accept or reject.46
In the decades since Florida adopted Frye, however, its courts have ri-
gidly upheld the general acceptance test in concept, while at the same time
narrowing its applicability to a small fraction of the cases involving expert
testimony. 47 The Supreme Court of Florida's 2007 decision in Marsh v. Va-
lyou48 exemplifies an essentially unbroken line of cases proclaiming that
Florida follows the general acceptance test but restricting the test's reach to
the point of near non-usability.49 The Frye test has been rendered an anoma-
ly by scores of Florida decisions embracing the concepts of "pure opinion"
44. See Kaminski v. State, 63 So. 2d 339, 340 (Fla. 1952) (per curiam).
45. See infra notes 112-57 and accompanying text. For example, Alaska originally
adopted the Frye test of admissibility in 1970 in Pulakis v. State, 476 P.2d 474, 478-79
(Alaska 1970), overruled by State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1999), but later found that
the Frye test was outdated and decided to replace it with the federal Daubert test in 1999. See
Coon, 974 P.2d at 402 (adopting Daubert).
46. Ramirez v. State (Ramirez II), 651 So. 2d 1164, 1166-67 (Fla. 1995) (citations omit-
ted).
47. Compare Kaminski, 63 So. 2d at 340, with Marsh v. Valyou, 977 So. 2d 543, 551
(Fla. 2007) (per curiam).
48. 977 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 2007) (per curiam).
49. See id. at 546-51; see also Taylor v. State, 62 So. 3d 1101, 1110-11 (Fla. 2011) (per
curiam); Murray v. State, 3 So. 3d 1108, 1117 (Fla.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 396
(2009); Overton v. State, 976 So. 2d 536, 550 (Fla. 2007) (per curiam) (quoting Ramirez 11,
651 So. 2d at 1168); Rodgers v. State, 948 So. 2d 655, 666 (Fla. 2006) (per curiam) (quoting
Frye, 293 F. at 1014); Zack v. State, 911 So. 2d 1190, 1197-98 (Fla. 2005) (per curiam) (cit-
ing Frye, 293 F. at 1014; Brim v. State, 695 So. 2d 268, 271 (Fla. 1997)).
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and "methodology vs. reasoning and conclusion" and "new or novel science"
as touchstones of the applicability of the general acceptance requirement.so
1. Florida's Frye Rule Does Not Apply to an Expert's "Pure Opinion"
Florida courts have held that an expert can testify to his or her "pure
opinion" without satisfying any general acceptance test." This begs the
question of when an opinion is "pure" as opposed to the alternative-
whatever that is-and a leading case offers this explanation: "'Pure opinion'
refers to expert opinion developed from inductive reasoning based on the
experts' own experience, observation, or research, whereas the Frye test ap-
plies when an expert witness reaches a conclusion by deduction, from apply-
ing new and novel scientific principle, formula, or procedure developed by
others."52 As one commentator noted, this "pure opinion" doctrine incenti-
vizes reliance on one's own "experience" and "personal observation" to the
detriment of research of actual scientific endeavor reflected in the published
50. See, e.g., Murray, 3 So. 3d at 1117; Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 548; Castillo v. E.I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co., 854 So. 2d 1264, 1276 (Fla. 2003).
51. See, e.g., Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 548 ("It is well-established that Frye is inapplicable to
'pure opinion' testimony .... ); Hadden v. State, 690 So. 2d 573, 579 (Fla. 1997) ("[Tjhe
Frye standard for admissibility of scientific evidence is not applicable to an expert's pure
opinion testimony . . . ." (citing Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827, 828 (Fla. 1993)); Flana-
gan, 625 So. 2d at 828 ("[P]ure opinion testimony ... does not have to meet Frye . . . ."); see
also Kaminski, 63 So. 2d at 340; Torres v. State, 999 So. 2d 1077, 1079 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2009) (finding "the expert's testimony to be pure opinion, not subject to Frye "); Burton
v. State (In re Commitment of Burton), 884 So. 2d 1112, 1113 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004);
Jones v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 871 So. 2d 899, 903 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003)
(citing Rickgauer v. Sarkar, 804 So. 2d 502, 504 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001)); Fla. Power &
Light Co. v. Tursi, 729 So. 2d 995, 997 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (quoting Flanagan, 625
So. 2d at 828).
52. Holy Cross Hosp., Inc. v. Marrone, 816 So. 2d 1113, 1117 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2001) (citing Kuhn ex rel. Estate of Bishop v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 14 P.3d 1170, 1179 (Kan.
2000)); Hadden, 690 So. 2d at 579-80 (stating that an expert's testimony is pure opinion when
it "is based solely on the expert's training and experience"); Flanagan, 625 So. 2d at 828
("[P]ure opinion testimony ... is based on the expert's personal experience and training.");
Torres, 999 So. 2d at 1078-79 ("[T]estimony based entirely on the expert's professional expe-
rience constituted 'pure opinion' . . . [because it] did not rely on scientific studies, syndrome
evidence, diagnostic criteria, or any other classic scientific test." The expert "limited the basis
for his testimony to his own professional experience."); Johnson v. State, 933 So. 2d 568, 570
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2006) ("An expert opinion based on personal training and experience
is not subject to a Frye analysis." (citing Herlihy v. State, 927 So. 2d 146, 147 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 2006) (per curiam))); Davis v. Caterpillar, Inc., 787 So. 2d 894, 898 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 2001) (admitting expert opinion where the expert testified how to make a dangerous
condition safer based solely on his experience).
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or reported work of others." For example, if an expert uses "scientific litera-
ture as a tool in helping form an opinion, then the court can and will scrutin-
ize that opinion under Frye," but if the expert chooses to give an expert opi-
nion without any basis in scientific literature at all, then his opinion is not
subjected to the Frye test and is likely admissible.54 It seems entirely "coun-
terintuitive to permit an expert to ignore scientific literature accepted by the
general scientific community in favor of the expert's personal experience to
reach a conclusion not generally recognized in the scientific community and
then allow testimony about that conclusion on the basis that it is pure opi-
nion." 5 Yet, despite the obvious deficiencies in the Frye exception for "pure
opinion" testimony, the Supreme Court of Florida continues to affirm alle-
giance to it."
2. Florida's Frye Rule Does Not Apply to an Expert's Reasoning or
Conclusion
Frye's application is limited to an expert's methodology and scientific
principles, and a judge is forbidden to apply the general acceptance test to an
expert's reasoning or conclusions." The Supreme Court of Florida has in
fact, more or less, prohibited judges confronted with a challenge to expert
testimony from considering the reliability of an expert's reasoning or the
connection between an expert's conclusions and the underlying principles.
53. See Neil D. Kodsi, Confronting Experts Whose Opinions Are Neither Supported nor
Directly Contradicted by Scientific Literature, FLA. B.J., June 2006, at 80; see also Tursi, 729
So. 2d at 996-97 (allowing a doctor to testify that exposure to a chemical caused a patient's
cataracts despite the fact that the expert used absolutely no scientific data to support the
theory).
54. Kodsi, supra note 53.
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 561 (Cantero, J., dissenting); Hadden, 690 So. 2d at
580-81; Flanagan, 625 So. 2d at 828.
57. See, e.g., Castillo v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 854 So. 2d 1264, 1276 (Fla.
2003) (stating that "Frye does not require the court to assess the application of the expert's raw
data in reaching his or her conclusion," but only requires that the underlying science is gener-
ally accepted); Janssen Pharm. Prods., L.P. v. Hodgemire, 49 So. 3d 767, 771 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 2010) (per curiam), review denied, 64 So. 3d 1260 (Fla. 2011); Gelsthorpe ex rel.
Bacus v. Weinstein, 897 So. 2d 504, 509 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Kaelbel Wholesale,
Inc. v. Soderstrom, 785 So. 2d 539, 547 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
58. See Castillo, 854 So. 2d at 1276 (stating that Frye looks only at the validity of the
underlying science, and derogating the court below for engaging in essentially a federal analy-
sis that questioned the expert's methodology and reasoning); see also Rodgers v. State, 948
So. 2d 655, 666 (Fla. 2006) (per curiam) (reaffirming the Castillo opinion and stating that the
Frye test only should be applied to the underlying principles or methodology and not to the
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3. Florida's Frye Rule Does Not Apply Unless the Expert's Testimony
Involves "New or Novel Science"
Finally, as applied in Florida, the Frye test is only invoked in cases in-
volving "new or novel scientific evidence."59 No Florida court has or can
reasonably define "new or novel" in the context of science, but courts have
found that enhancement of operator visibility on sophisticated construction
equipment,60 handwriting analysis, 6 1 footprint analysis, 62 tire thickness, 63
global positioning satellite technology,64 and even basic DNA analysis 65 are
not new or novel and are therefore immune from scrutiny under Frye.6 6 In-
deed, a recent decision of the Supreme Court of Florida declared that "in the
vast majority of cases, no Frye inquiry will be required."67
D. Life Under Frye-Expert Evidence Seldom Challenged, Rarely
Scrutinized
A historian might say that the Frye general acceptance test was typical
Roaring-Twenties hubris. Much closer in vintage to the flight of the Wright
brothers than to the Apollo landing, the Frye test is a Prohibition-era relic
that continues to short-change most of the stakeholders in Florida's judicial
system.68 In Florida, there is virtually no stopping a lawyer who seeks to
opinion itself because the credibility of the expert opinion does not implicate the Frye test, but
instead goes to the weight of the evidence).
59. See, e.g., Murray v. State, 3 So. 3d 1108, 1117 (Fla.) (per curiam) (quoting McDo-
nald v. State, 952 So. 2d 484, 498 (Fla. 2006) (per curiam)), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 396
(2009); Overton v. State, 976 So. 2d 536, 550 (Fla. 2007) (per curiam); Rodgers, 948 So. 2d at
666; Branch v. State, 952 So. 2d 470, 483 (Fla. 2006) (per curiam) (citing Brim v. State, 695
So. 2d 268, 271-72 (Fla. 1997)); lbar v. State, 938 So. 2d 451, 467 (Fla. 2006) (per curiam);
Zack v. State, 911 So. 2d 1190, 1198 (Fla. 2005) (per curiam) (citing Brim, 695 So. 2d at 271-
72); Still v. State, 917 So. 2d 250, 251 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Brim, 695 So. 2d
at 271-72); Jones v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 871 So. 2d 899, 902 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
2003) (citing U.S. Sugar Corp. v. Henson, 823 So. 2d 104, 109 (Fla. 2002).
60. Davis v. Caterpillar, Inc., 787 So. 2d 894, 898-99 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
61. Spann v. State, 857 So. 2d 845, 851-52 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam).
62. Ibar, 938 So. 2d at 468.
63. Jones, 871 So. 2d at 903.
64. Still, 917 So. 2d at 251.
65. Hayes v. State, 660 So. 2d 257, 264-65 (Fla. 1995).
66. Ibar, 938 So. 2d at 468; Spann, 857 So. 2d at 852; Hayes, 660 So. 2d at 264-65; Still,
917 So. 2d at 251; Jones, 871 So. 2d at 903; Davis v. Caterpillar, Inc., 787 So. 2d 894, 898-99
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
67. U.S. Sugar Corp. v. Henson, 823 So. 2d 104, 109 (Fla. 2002) (emphasis added).
68. See Marsh v. Valyou, 977 So. 2d 543, 548 (Fla. 2007) (per curiam). The exception
might be criminal defendants, for whom Frye seems to have provided a fertile appellate field;
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influence the jury with a "hired gun" expert espousing junk science-the
lawyer merely needs to aim for one of the gaping holes in Frye's applicabili-
ty:69
Challenged testimony
is "pure opinion"
Challenged testimony
is "reasoning or con-
clusion"
Challenged testimony
is not "new or novel
science"
NO
NO
Even the expert who fails to avoid the application of Frye can still satis-
fy the general acceptance test by purporting to base his or her testimony on
the principles of some recognized field.70 Such a standard, with so many
some examples in this regard include the Supreme Court of Florida's rejection under Frye of a
psychologist's "sex offender profile," Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827, 828 (Fla. 1993); a psy-
chologist's testimony on "child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome," Hadden v. State, 690
So. 2d 573, 575 (Fla. 1997); "hypnotically refreshed testimony," Stokes v. State, 548 So. 2d 188,
195-96 (Fla. 1989); and an expert on the marks made by the blade of a knife, Ramirez v. State
(Ramirez 1), 542 So. 2d 352, 355 (Fla. 1989) (per curiam).
69. See, e.g., Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 560-61 (Cantero, J., dissenting).
70. See id. at 546-47 (majority opinion).
Does the Frye general
acceptance test apply to challenged
expert testimony?
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exceptions, is really no standard at all and offers trial courts no consistent,
objective measure for admitting expert testimony. While the Frye test as
originally stated was simple, the case law eroding its application in a host of
contexts has made it very difficult to apply."
The unsurprising result of Florida being a Frye jurisdiction is that it is
all too rare for expert evidence to be subjected to rigorous scrutiny in Florida
courts.72 A party has little incentive to challenge an opponent's expert re-
gardless of how questionable the expert's opinions might be.73 Unfortunate-
ly, making a Frye challenge in Florida is usually roughly equivalent to
coaching the challenged expert-and retaining counsel-on his or her vulne-
rabilities and telegraphing the likely thrust of cross-examination at trial.
Most Florida attorneys, therefore, tend to make the pragmatic, but unsatisfy-
ing choice of forgoing Frye challenges, even when facing an expert who
should be challenged and who would be challenged under a better system.74
E. The Entrenchment of Frye in the Supreme Court of Florida
Florida's appellate courts have had several opportunities to modernize
and improve the way expert evidence is dealt with at trial, but their adhe-
rence to Frye has never wavered. Instead, as noted above, the test has been
consistently honored in name, but construed in a manner that renders it tooth-
less.76 Consequently, the harm is compounded-an evidentiary safeguard
that is woefully inadequate to begin with, becomes an open floodgate in ap-
plication.
Supreme Court of Florida decisions reflect that Frye is now so en-
trenched in Florida precedent that it is unrealistic to believe that the judicial
system will solve Florida's expert evidence problem from within. In 2007,
the Court decided Marsh with five of seven justices reaffirming Frye as the
law of Florida.78 A majority of four ruled that Frye does not even apply to
expert testimony causally linking trauma to fibromyalgia.79 More signifi-
71. See id. at 547. "The Frye test is simple to state, if not always easy to apply." Id. at
560 (Cantero, J., dissenting).
72. See id. at 547, 550 (majority opinion).
73. See Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 547-48, 550.
74. See id. at 546-47, 549.
75. Id. at 547. The Supreme Court of Florida appears to have first adopted Frye almost
sixty years ago in 1952. See Kaminski v. State, 63 So. 2d 339, 340 (Fla. 1952) (per curiam)
(applying the Frye standard to test the reliability of the foundation of the expert's testimony).
76. See Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 547.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 547, 551.
79. Id. at 549-50.
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cantly, the majority recognized that the Frye test "is inapplicable in the vast
majority of cases" because it applies only to "new or novel" science.so The
majority also stated that the test is likewise "inapplicable to 'pure opinion'
testimony," and in a medical context, for example, this exempts from the test
a causation opinion based solely on a purported expert's "experience and
training."8'
As the dissent recognized, these gaping holes in the Frye test's applica-
bility threaten to swallow the test itself, and in effect, render expert testimo-
ny "always admissible as. . . 'pure opinion."'82 But, it was not just the dis-
sent that recognized the flaws in the Frye test; the concurring opinion au-
thored by Justice Anstead-and joined by Justice Pariente-expressed the
view that Frye was superseded by the Federal Rules of Evidence and that the
Florida Supreme Court should adopt Daubert as consistent with Florida's
Rules of Evidence.83 Justice Anstead also pointed out that the Supreme
Court of Florida has "never explained how Frye has survived the adoption of
the rules of evidence."84
The Marsh decision came at a point in time when pro-business interests
probably saw the zenith of a favorable composition of the Supreme Court of
Florida. 5 Given this fact and the bulwark of unbroken adherence to Frye
emanating from the Florida Supreme Court for decades, Marsh is likely to be
the high-water mark-as close as the court is likely to come to changing this
aspect of Florida law.
1H. SOLUTION: BRING DAUBERTTO FLORIDA THROUGH LEGISLATIVE
CHANGE
A. The Daubert Approach
In its 1993 Daubert decision, the Supreme Court of the United States
created a seismic shift in the test for the admissibility of expert testimony.
Daubert held that Congress' adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence dis-
places the general acceptance test and requires the federal trial judge to en-
80. Id. at 547 (internal quotation marks omitted).
81. Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 548 (quoting Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827, 828 (Fla.
1993)).
82. Id. at 562 (Cantero, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
83. Id. at 551, 554 (Anstead, J., concurring).
84. Id. at 551.
85. The three dissenting justices in Marsh-Cantero, Wells, and Bell-are no longer on
the Supreme Court of Florida.
86. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993).
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sure that any expert testimony admitted is both reliable and relevant." The
Court has also clarified that an expert's conclusions are not beyond the reach
of the relevance/reliability test,"8 and that the relevance/reliability test is not
limited to the "scientific" and applies to all expert testimony. 9
The discussion below focuses on the reliability and relevance prongs of
the Daubert test, the trial judge's continuing role as "gatekeeper" under this
test, and the number of states that have embraced the Daubert test.
1. Reliability
Reliability is determined on the basis of flexible factors, which typically
include, at a minimum: 1) whether the conclusion or methodology being
espoused is subject to being tested; 2) whether the conclusion or methodolo-
gy has been subjected to peer review and publication, such that substantive
flaws will likely have been flushed out; 3) whether there exists standards
controlling the methodology's operation, and, if so, the known or potential
rate of error; and 4) whether the conclusion or methodology is generally ac-
cepted.90
Additionally, the Daubert approach encourages a trial judge to consider
whether an expert is offering opinions that are consistent with the expert's
work outside the courtroom.9' Consistency between what an expert has said
on a subject in litigation and non-litigation contexts is an indicator of relia-
bility; in contrast, courts are rightfully suspicious of the expert who opines
on a subject only when hired to do so in lawsuits.92
The Daubert approach also embraces the notion that given the fluidity
and complexity of science and other disciplines giving rise to expertise,
87. Id.
88. Although Daubert spoke of "theory or technique" as opposed to "conclusion," the
Court's holding in General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997), recognized that
conclusions are properly scrutinized, and that courts should not permit conclusions tied to data
only by the expert's ipse dixit (i.e., "because I said it").
89. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999).
90. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94.
91. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995).
92. See id. ("[E]xperts whose findings flow from existing research are less likely to have
been biased toward a particular conclusion by the promise of remuneration; when an expert
prepares reports and findings before being hired as a witness, that record will limit the degree
to which he can tailor his testimony to serve a party's interests."); see also McCorvey v. Bax-
ter Healthcare Corp., No. 99-1250-CIV, 2008 WL 8095712, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 2008);
Haggerty v. UpJohn Co., 950 F. Supp. 1160, 1162 (S.D. Fla. 1996); Reynard ex rel. Estate of
Reynard v. NEC Corp., 887 F. Supp. 1500, 1507 (M.D. Fla. 1995).
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courts should be able to consider a variety of factors in any given case.93
Some of the additional factors expressly recognized include: 1) "[w]hether
the expert has unjustifiably extrapolated from an accepted premise to an un-
founded conclusion;" 94 2) "[w]hether the expert has adequately accounted for
obvious alternative explanations;" 95 3) whether the expert is being as careful
93. See FED. R. EvID. 702 advisory committee's note (stating that the "standards set forth
in the amendment [to Rule 702] are broad enough to require consideration of any or all of the
specific Daubert factors where appropriate" and that other factors can and should be applied
where necessary (emphasis added)).
94. Id.; see, e.g., Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 157 (quoting Gen. Electric Co. v. Joiner,
522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997)) (following Daubert and stating that a trial court is not required to
admit "evidence that is connected to [the] data only by the ipse dixit of the expert."); Joiner,
522 U.S. at 146 (stating that a trial court may exclude evidence where it finds that "there is
simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered" for the evi-
dence to be admissible); Hendrix ex rel. G.P. v. Evenflo Co., 609 F.3d 1183, 1194 (11th Cir.
2010) (quoting Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146) (finding that there is nothing in either Daubert or the
Federal Rules of Evidence that requires the trial court to admit an expert's opinion "that is
connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert."); Guinn v. AstraZeneca Pharm.
L.P., 602 F.3d 1245, 1255 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (upholding the district court's exclu-
sion of an expert's testimony because the expert failed to show how her opinions were logical-
ly derived from the facts of the case); Cook ex rel. Estate of Tessier v. Sheriff of Monroe
Cnty., Fla., 402 F.3d 1092, 1112 (11th Cir. 2005) (affirming the trial court's exclusion of an
expert's opinion because the opinion was "unsubstantiated by any proffered facts, explanation,
or analysis."); McClain v. Metabolife Int'l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1233, 1255 (11 th Cir. 2005)
("Plaintiffs' experts took leaps of faith and substituted their own ipse dixit for scientific proof
on essential points."); Rink v. Cheminova, Inc., 400 F.3d 1286, 1292 (11 th Cir. 2005) (ex-
plaining that the expert's opinion "required the kind of scientifically unsupported 'leap of
faith' which is condemned by Daubert." (citation omitted)); Fuesting v. Zimmer, Inc., 362 F.
App'x 560, 562-63 (7th Cir. 2010); Bland v. Verizon Wireless, (VAW) L.L.C., 538 F.3d 893,
898 (8th Cir. 2008); Smith v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 232 F. App'x 780, 782 (10th Cir. 2007);
Anderson v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 406 F.3d 248, 263 (4th Cir. 2005); Ammons
v. Aramark Unif. Servs., Inc., 368 F.3d 809, 815 (7th Cir. 2004); Montgomery Cnty. v. Mi-
crovote Corp., 320 F.3d 440, 448 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146); Phelan v.
Synthes (U.S.A.), 35 F. App'x 102, 106-07 (4th Cir. 2002) (per curiam); J.B. Hunt Transp.,
Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 243 F.3d 441, 444 (8th Cir. 2001); Holesapple v. Barrett, 5 F.
App'x 177, 179-80 (4th Cir. 2001) (per curiam); Oddi v. Ford Motor Co., 234 F.3d 136, 158
(3d Cir. 2000 overruled on other grounds Soufflas v. Zimmer, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 737 (E.D.
Pa. 2007)); Cooper ex rel. Estate of Cooper v. Carl A. Nelson & Co., 211 F.3d 1008, 1021
(7th Cir. 2000); Jaurequi v. Carter Mfg. Co., 173 F.3d 1076, 1084 (8th Cir. 1999); Heller v.
Shaw Indus., 167 F.3d 146, 153-59 (3d Cir. 1999); Ruiz-Troche v. Pepsi Cola of P.R. Bottling
Co., 161 F.3d 77, 81-82 (1st Cir. 1998); Moore v. Ashland Chem., Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 279
(5th Cir. 1998); Schudel v. Gen. Electric Co., 120 F.3d 991, 997 (9th Cir. 1997); Turpin v.
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1360 (6th Cir. 1992); Washburn v. Merck & Co.,
No. 99-9121, 2000 WL 528649, at *627 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2000) (unpublished table decision).
95. FED. R. EvID. 702 advisory committee's note; see also Davis v. City of Loganville,
No. 3:04-CV-068 (CAR), 2006 WL 826713, at *11 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 28, 2006) (11th Circuit
case); Lauzon v. Senco Prods., Inc., 270 F.3d 681, 694 (8th Cir. 2001) (discussing that an
expert must "explain why other conceivable causes are excludable"); Turner v. Iowa Fire
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in paid litigation consulting as the expert is in work outside of litigation;96
and 4) "[w]hether the field of expertise claimed by the expert is known to
reach reliable results for the type of opinion" being offered."
Equip. Co., 229 F.3d 1202, 1208 (8th Cir. 2000); Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d
257, 265 (4th Cir. 1999) ("A differential diagnosis that fails to take serious account of other
potential causes may be so lacking that it cannot provide a reliable basis for an opinion on
causation."); Diviero v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 114 F.3d 851, 853 (9th Cir. 1997);
Brown v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. (In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig.), 35 F.3d 717, 760 (3d Cir.
1994), rev'd in part sub nom. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 221 F.3d 449 (3d Cir. 2000);
Claar v. Burlington N. R.R., 29 F.3d 499, 502-03 (9th Cir. 1994) (rejecting expert testimony
where the experts failed "to rule out other possible causes for the injuries plaintiffs com-
plain[ed] of, even though they admitted that this step would be standard procedure before
arriving at a diagnosis" (footnote omitted)); Paul M. da Costa & Melinda Harris, Has Expert
Adequately Accounted for Obvious Alternative Explanations?, in THE DAUBERT COMPENDIUM
301, 303-16 (D.R.I. 2011). But see Heller v. Shaw Indus., 167 F.3d 146, 156 (3d Cir. 1999)
(finding that an expert's testimony "should not be excluded because he or she has failed to
rule out every possible alternative cause of a plaintiffs illness," but should only be ruled out if
he or she fails to rule out obvious alternative explanations (emphasis added)).
96. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note; see Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152
(finding that the purpose of Daubert is to ensure that only reliable and relevant evidence is
admissible and that one way of ensuring this is to make sure that the expert "employs in the
courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the
relevant field"); Kilpatrick v. Breg, Inc., 613 F.3d 1329, 1335 (11th Cir. 2010) (adopting the
exact phraseology of Kumho Tire Co.); Wells v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 601 F.3d 375,
378 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152); Boyd v. City & Cnty. of S.F.,
576 F.3d 938, 946 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152); Best v. Lowe's
Home Ctrs., Inc., 563 F.3d 171, 181 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at
152); Jenkins ex rel. Estate of Jenkins v. Bartlett, 487 F.3d 482, 489 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing
Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152); Mariposa Farms, L.L.C. v. Westfalia-Surge, Inc., 211 F.
App'x 760, 762 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152); Nimely v. City
of New York, 414 F.3d 381, 396 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152);
Burleson v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 393 F.3d 577, 584 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Kumho
Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152); Zaremba v. Gen. Motors Corp., 360 F.3d 355, 358 (2d Cir. 2004)
(quoting Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152); Goebel v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 346
F.3d 987, 992 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152); Grp. Health Plan,
Inc. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 344 F.3d 753, 760 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting Rosen v. Ciba-
Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 318 (7th Cir. 1996)); Lantec, Inc. v. Novell, Inc., 306 F.3d 1003,
1025 (10th Cir. 2002); Amorgianos v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 303 F.3d 256, 265-66 (2d
Cir. 2002) (quoting Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152); Elsayed Mukhtar v. Cal. State Univ.,
Hayward, 299 F.3d 1053, 1063 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152),
amended by 319 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2003); Chapman ex rel. Estate of Chapman v. Maytag
Corp., 297 F.3d 682, 688 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Cummins v. Lyle Indus., 93 F.3d 362, 369
(7th Cir. 1996)); Hollander v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 289 F.3d 1193, 1205-06 (10th Cir. 2002)
(quoting Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152); Cooper v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 259 F.3d 194,
203 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152); Jahn v. Equine Servs., P.S.C.,
233 F.3d 382, 388 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152); Elcock v.
Kmart Corp., 233 F.3d 734, 746 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152);
SMS Sys. Maint. Servs., Inc. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 188 F.3d II, 25 (1st Cir. 1999) (quoting
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2. Relevance
Daubert relevance, in turn, refers to the requisite "fit" between the ex-
pert opinions being offered and the issues in the case. The focus is not the
general reasonableness of a particular methodology, but the reasonableness
of using that methodology to draw a conclusion regarding the particular sub-
ject matter of the case.99 Though it has received far less judicial and scholar-
ly attention than the twin requirement of reliability, the requirement of relev-
ance must be satisfied or expert testimony is subject to exclusion on this ba-
sis alone.'" In fact, the Supreme Court of the United States re-emphasized
Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152); Black v. Food Lion, Inc., 171 F.3d 308, 311 (5th Cir. 1999)
(quoting Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152); Sheehan v. Daily Racing Form, Inc., 104 F.3d
940, 942 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that whether an "expert is being as careful as he would be in
his regular professional work outside his paid litigation consulting" may be an important
factor (citations omitted)).
97. FED. R. EvID. 702 advisory committee's note; see also Kumiho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at
151 ("Daubert's general acceptance factor [does not] help show that an expert's testimony is
reliable where the discipline itself lacks reliability, as, for example, do theories grounded in
any so-called generally accepted principles of astrology or necromancy."); Hendrix ex rel.
G.P., 609 F.3d at 1195 ("[T]he district court must ensure that ... the expert's opinion on gen-
eral causation is 'derived from scientifically valid methodology."' (citations omitted));
McClain, 401 F.3d at 1240 (finding that the expert's testimony was inadmissible because it
was based on "questionable principles of pharmacology"); McEwen v. Bait. Wash. Med. Ctr.
Inc., 404 F. App'x 789, 791 (4th Cir. 2010) (per curiam); Happel v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 602
F.3d 820, 825-26 (7th Cir. 2010); Best, 563 F.3d at 178 (citing Hardyman v. Norfolk & W.
Ry. Co., 243 F.3d 255, 260 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Nacchio, 555 F.3d 1234, 1241
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 54 (2009); Polski v. Quigley Corp., 538 F.3d 836, 840 (8th
Cir. 2008) (quoting Polski v. Quigley Corp., No. 04-CV-4199 (PJS/JJG), 2007 WL 2580550,
*5 (D. Minn. Sept. 5, 2007); United States v. Day, 524 F.3d 1361, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 2008);
Pineda v. Ford Motor Co., 520 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting In re Paoli R.R. Yard
PCB Litig., 35 F.3d at 742); United States v. Williams, 506 F.3d 151, 161 (2d Cir. 2007);
United States v. Sandoval-Mendoza, 472 F.3d 645, 655 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Ma-
hone, 453 F.3d 68, 71-72 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Fullwood, 342 F.3d 409, 412 (5th
Cir. 2003); Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 263 (4th Cir. 1999); Sterling v.
Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1208 (6th Cir. 1988) (excluding expert testimony based
on "clinical ecolog[y]" because the field consists of "an unproven methodology lacking any
scientific basis in either fact or theory").
98. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993); see Allison v.
McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1312 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591).
99. Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 154.
100. See Allison, 184 F.3d at 1312; United States v. Batiste, No. 06-20373-CR, 2007 WL
5303052, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 26, 2007) (citing Allison, 184 F.3d at 1312) (explaining that
there must be a connection between the evidence and the expert's testimony for the testimony
to be relevant under the second prong of the Daubert test); Covas v. Coleman Co., No. 00-
8541-CIV, 2005 WL 6166740, at *1-2 (S.D. Fla. June 27, 2005) (citing Allison, 184 F.3d at
1312) (explaining that there must be a connection between the evidence and the expert's tes-
timony for the testimony to be relevant under the second prong of the Daubert test); see also
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the importance of relevance in its post-Daubert opinion in Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael.'o' In Kumho Tire Co., the Court reiterated that the Federal
Rules of Evidence impose a special obligation on judges to perform the "ga-
tekeeping" function of excluding irrelevant scientific evidence.102
Just months after Kumho Tire Co., the Eleventh Circuit followed and
reinforced this principle in Allison v. McGhan Medical Corp.10 3 There, the
court explained that the Daubert four-factor test "does not operate in a va-
cuum," and that a court's determination of whether scientific evidence is
admissible must be considered against the backdrop of whether the evidence
was also relevant under the Federal Rules of Evidence.'"3 The court empha-
sized that the relevance requirement was especially important in the Daubert
context to ensure that "a barrage of questionable scientific evidence [was not
dumped] on a jury."'05 The court supported its concern by noting that a jury
would be ill-equipped, or at least "less equipped than the judge to make [the
necessary] . .. relevance determinations."'0 Thus, it is particularly crucial
that the judge keep irrelevant scientific evidence out of the jury's purview
"because of its inability to assist in factual determinations, its potential to
create confusion, and its lack of probative value."'
3. Judge as Gatekeeper
The Daubert reforms would mean little without a mechanism of en-
forcement, and here both the Supreme Court of the United States and Con-
gress-by virtue of adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence-have com-
missioned trial judges to serve as "gatekeepers" who must exclude expert
testimony that is not sufficiently reliable or relevant.' 8 A trial judge is em-
Williams v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1360 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (stating that
expert testimony "must have a valid scientific connection to the disputed facts in the case" and
that a judge has the discretion to exclude evidence that has "too great an analytical gap be-
tween the data and the opinion proffered" (citations omitted)).
101. 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999).
102. Id. at 147.
103. 184 F.3d 1300,1311-12 (1 lth Cir. 1999).
104. Id. at 1309.
105. Id. at 1310.
106. Id.
107. Id. at l311-12.
108. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 702 advisory committee's note ("In Daubert the Court
charged trial judges with the responsibility of acting as gatekeepers to exclude unreliable
expert testimony, and the Court in Kumho clarified that this gatekeeper function applies to all
expert testimony . . . ."); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993);
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999); Surles ex rel. Johnson v. Grey-
hound Lines, Inc., 474 F.3d 288, 295 (6th Cir. 2007) ("Daubert and its progeny have placed
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powered with broad discretion in addressing the reliability and relevance of
expert testimony, and will be upheld on appeal in the absence of an abuse of
that broad discretion.'" In fact, in Allison, the Eleventh Circuit made it a
point to specifically state just how deferential the standard of review for
Daubert rulings is: "After careful but deferential review, we AFFIRM the
district court's Daubert rulings excluding Allison's causation experts, find-
ing that Allison has failed to show that the decision [was] manifestly errone-
ous."o Allison is just one example of how appellate courts generally apply a
very deferential standard of review to Daubert rulings, even if the exclusion
or inclusion of evidence may be outcome-determinative."
4. The Results
The Daubert approach has swept the nation and now controls the ad-
missibility of expert testimony in thirty-three states as well as the federal
courts in all fifty states.1 2 Currently, six states have explicitly adopted Dau-
bert by statute: Delaware,"' Georgia,'l 4 Michigan,"' Mississippi,1 16 North
the district courts in the role of 'gatekeeper,' charging them with evaluating the relevance and
reliability of proffered expert testimony with heightened care."); Schneider ex rel. Estate of
Schneider v. Fried, 320 F.3d 396, 404 (3d Cir. 2003) ("[T]he district court acts as a gatekee-
per, preventing opinion testimony that does not meet the requirements of qualification, relia-
bility and fit from reaching the jury."); Duffee ex rel. Thornton v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 91
F.3d 1410, 1411 (10th Cir. 1996) (agreeing with Daubert that judges are empowered to "act as
gatekeepers to ensure that scientific evidence is both relevant and reliable" before it is admit-
ted into evidence (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591-95)).
109. See Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152 ("[Tihe trial judge must have considerable
leeway in deciding in a particular case how to go about determining whether particular expert
testimony is reliable."); see also Gen. Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146-147 (1997);
Toole v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 235 F.3d 1307, 1312 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing Kumho Tire
Co., 526 U.S. at 142); United States v. Majors, 196 F.3d 1206, 1215 (11th Cir. 1999) ("The
trial judge is required to inquire into . . . reliability . . . [and has] 'substantial discretion in
deciding how to test an expert's reliability and whether the expert's relevant testimony is
reliable."' (quoting Forklifts of St. Louis, Inc. v. Komatsu Forklift, USA, Inc., 178 F.3d 1030,
1035 (8th Cir. 1999)).
110. Allison, 184 F.3d at 1322 (emphasis added); see FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory commit-
tee's note ("A review of the caselaw after Daubert shows that the rejection of expert testimo-
ny is the exception rather than the rule.").
Ill. Allison, 184 F.3d at 1306 ("Th[e] deferential standard is not relaxed even though a
ruling on the admissibility of expert evidence may be outcome-determinative.").
112. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597; see infra notes 113-45.
113. DEL. R. EvID. 702 (identical to FED. R. EvID. 702).
114. Mason II, 658 S.E.2d 603, 610 (Ga. 2008) ("Since OCGA § 24-9-67.1(b) was based
on Fed. R. Evid. Rule 702, which in its present form is based on the holdings in Daubert,...
the trial court's application of the standards of Daubert was proper." (citations omitted)).
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Carolina,"' and Vermont.'18  Similarly, twenty-seven states have adopted
Daubert via common law: Alabama," 9 Alaska,12 0 Arkansas,12 1 Colorado, 22
Connecticut,123  Idaho,' 24  Indiana,125  Iowa,126  Kentucky,127  Louisiana,128
115. MICH. R. EvID. 702 (nearly identical to FED. R. EvID. 702). A comment in the Michi-
gan Rules of Evidence states that the:
[A]mendment of MRE 702 ... conforms the Michigan rule to Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, as amended effective December 1, 2000, except that the Michigan rule retains the
words "the court determines that" after the word "If' at the outset of the rule. The new lan-
guage requires trial judges to act as gatekeepers who must exclude unreliable expert testimony.
The retained words emphasize the centrality of the court's gatekeeping role in excluding un-
proven expert theories and methodologies from jury consideration.
MICH. R. EvID. 702, staff comment to 2004 amendment (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579;
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999)).
116. Miss. R. EVID. 702 (identical to FED. R. EvID. 702).
117. 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 283, sec. 1.4 (H.B. 542). The North Carolina statute was
signed into law on June 24, 2011, became effective on October 1, 2011, and was codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-702(a)(2011). 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 283, secs. 1.4, 5.2. Prior to the
enactment of the statute, North Carolina had adopted its own test of admissibility. See Hower-
ton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 597 S.E.2d 674, 690 (N.C. 2004) (While "North Carolina cases share
obvious similarities with the principles underlying Daubert, application of the North Carolina
approach is decidedly less mechanistic and rigorous than the 'exacting standards of reliability'
demanded by the federal approach. Moreover, had we ever intended to adopt Daubert and
supersede this established body of North Carolina case law, we would certainly have refe-
renced the basic Daubert factors that have come to define the federal standard. But we did
not." (citations omitted)).
118. VT. R. EVID. 702 (identical to FED. R. EvID.702).
119. Turner v. State (Ex parte State of Alabama), 746 So. 2d 355, 359 (Ala. 1998). Ala-
bama has adopted Daubert for certain types of cases, but remains loyal to Frye in others, and
thus, the state of Alabama is found on both lists. Id. at 359, 361 n.7 ("[T]he Legislature chose
the more flexible admissibility standard established in Daubert" for the admissibility of DNA
evidence, but "[w]ith respect to expert scientific testimony on subjects other than DNA tech-
niques governed by § 36-18-30, Frye remains the standard of admissibility in Alabama.").
120. State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386, 402 (Alaska 1999) (adopting the Daubert test of admis-
sibility and rejecting Frye).
121. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Ark. v. Foote, 14 S.W.3d 512, 519 (Ark. 2000) (adopt-
ing the Daubert test of admissibility).
122. See People v. Shreck, 22 P.3d 68,78 (Colo. 2001) (en banc). The Colorado Supreme
Court has held that trial courts must follow Rule 702 of the Colorado Rules of Evidence
(CRE), and that when applying CRE 702, trial courts can consider the Daubert factors but are
not limited by them. Id. ("[A] trial court making a CRE 702 reliability determination may, but
need not consider any or all of these [Daubert] factors, depending on the totality of the cir-
cumstances of a given case. A trial court may also consider other factors not listed here, to the
extent that it finds them helpful in determining the reliability of the proffered evidence. Our
determination that a trial court may, but need not consider the factors listed in Daubert is
consistent with the United States Supreme Court's reasoning in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmi-
chael.").
123. State v. Porter, 698 A.2d 739, 742 (Conn. 1997) (adopting the Daubert test of admis-
sibility).
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Maine, 129 Massachusetts, 130 Montana,13' Nebraska,132 Nevada,133 New Hamp-
shire,134 New Jersey,' New Mexico, 3 6 Ohio,' Oklahoma,13 8 Oregon,139
124. See Weeks v. E. Idaho Health Servs., 153 P.3d 1180, 1184 (Idaho 2007) ("The Court
has not adopted the Daubert standard for admissibility of an expert's testimony but has used
some of Daubert's standards in assessing whether the basis of an expert's opinion is scientifi-
cally valid," and has also explicitly rejected Frye's general acceptance test of admissibility.).
125. Steward v. State, 652 N.E.2d 490, 498 (Ind. 1995) (acknowledging that although
Indiana has not explicitly adopted Daubert, "[t]he concerns driving Daubert coincide with the
express requirement of Indiana Rule of Evidence 702(b) .. . [t]hus, although not binding upon
the determination of state evidentiary law issues, the federal evidence law of Daubert and its
progeny is helpful to the bench and bar in applying Indiana Rule of Evidence 702(b).").
126. Leaf v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 590 N.W.2d 525, 532 (Iowa 1999) (en banc)
(adopting a modified/limited application of Daubert).
127. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson, II S.W.3d 575, 577 (Ky. 2000) ("After
careful review . . . we adopt the reasoning of Kumho and hold that Daubert and Mitchell ap-
ply."); Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 908 S.W.2d 100, 101 (Ky. 1995) (adopting the Daubert
test of admissibility), overruled on other grounds, Fugate v. Commonwealth, 993 S.W.2d 931
(Ky. 1999), and abrogated in part by Christian v. Commonwealth, No. 2004-SC-1055-MR,
2005 WL 3500806, at *1 (Ky. Dec. 22, 2005).
128. State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116, 1123 (La. 1993) (adopting the Daubert test of admis-
sibility).
129. See State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500, 504 (Me. 1978). Although Maine has refused to
officially adopt Daubert, the state's test of admissibility, called the Williams test, is similar to
Daubert. See id. (establishing Maine's standards for the admissibility of expert evidence and
stating that "[t]he controlling criteria regarding the admissibility of expert testimony, so long
as the proffered expert is qualified and probative value is not substantially outweighed by the
factors mentioned in Rule 403, are whether in the sound judgment of the presiding Justice the
testimony to be given is relevant and will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue.").
130. Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 641 N.E.2d 1342, 1349 (Mass. 1994) ("We accept the
basic reasoning of the Daubert opinion because it is consistent with our test of demonstrated
reliability.").
131. State v. Bieber, 170 P.3d 444, 454 (Mont. 2007) ("[T]his Court has consistently held
since Moore that the Daubert factors apply exclusively to novel scientific evidence."); State v.
Moore, 885 P.2d 457, 470-71 (Mont. 1994), overruled on other grounds, 906 P.2d 697 (Mont.
1995) (adopting the Daubert test of admissibility and acknowledging that the Supreme Court
of Montana had previously rejected the Frye test).
132. City of Lincoln v. Realty Trust Grp., Inc., 705 N.W.2d 432, 436-37 (Neb. 2005)
(reinforcing Nebraska's use of Daubert); Schafersman v. Agland Coop, 631 N.W.2d 862, 876
(Neb. 2001) (adopting the Daubert test of admissibility and rejecting Frye).
133. See Hallmark ex rel. Hallmark v. Eldridge, 189 P.3d 646, 650 (Nev. 2008) ("The
statute governing the admissibility of expert testimony in Nevada district courts is NRS
50.275, which, as we have construed it, tracks Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 702. To date,
however, this court has not adopted the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of FRE
702 in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. But, as we have stated, Daubert and
the federal court decisions discussing it may provide persuasive authority in determining
whether expert testimony should be admitted in Nevada courts." (footnotes omitted)).
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Rhode Island,140 South Dakota,'4 1 Tennessee,142 Texas, 43 West Virginia,'"
and Wyoming.145
134. Baker Valley Lumber, Inc. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 813 A.2d 409, 415 (N.H. 2002)
("Today, we apply the Daubert standard to New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 702.").
135. State v. Harvey, 699 A.2d 596, 621 (N.J. 1997). New Jersey has partially accepted
and partially rejected Daubert in different types of cases. See id. ("Even before the United
States Supreme Court decided Daubert, this Court had relaxed the test for admissibility of
scientific evidence in toxic-tort cases. We have been cautious in expanding the more relaxed
standard to other contexts. Thus, the test in criminal cases remains whether the scientific
community generally accepts the evidence." (citations omitted)).
136. State v. Alberico, 861 P.2d 192, 203 (N.M. 1993) (rejecting Frye and adopting the
Daubert factors for "assessing the validity of a particular technique to determine if it is 'scien-
tific knowledge' under [New Mexico's evidence] Rule 702" (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 597, 593-95 (1993))).
137. See Miller v. Bike Athletic Co., 687 N.E.2d 735, 741 (Ohio 1998) (citing to Daubert
when determining the admissibility of expert testimony, but never explicitly adopting the
Daubert standard); State v. Williams, 446 N.E.2d 444, 447 n.5 (Ohio 1983) (acknowledging
that Ohio never adopted the Frye test and finding that the Frye test has been widely criticized
and rejected by many commentators and courts).
138. Christian v. Gray, 65 P.3d 591, 600 (Okla. 2003) ("Our Court of Criminal Appeals
has already adopted Daubert for criminal proceedings in Oklahoma Courts. Today we like-
wise adopt Daubert and Kumho as appropriate standards for Oklahoma trial courts in deciding
the admissibility of expert testimony in civil matters."); Taylor v. State, 889 P.2d 319, 328
(Okla. Crim. App. 1995) ("We ... believe the time is right for this Court to abandon the Frye
test and adopt the more structured and yet flexible admissibility standard set forth in Dau-
bert.").
139. State v. O'Key, 899 P.2d 663, 680 (Or. 1995) (in banc) (finding that Daubert is con-
sistent with Oregon's leading case, State v. Brown, and further finding that Daubert should be
instructive to Oregon courts); State v. Brown, 687 P.2d 751, 759 (Or. 1984) (in banc) (reject-
ing Frye and outlining seven factors courts should consider when determining the admissibili-
ty of expert evidence).
140. Owens v. Silvia, 838 A.2d 881, 890 (R.I. 2003) ("Although we declined to expressly
adopt the standards outlined in the United States Supreme Court decision of Daubert v. Mer-
rell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., we drew guidance from the principles of that case." (citations
omitted)); Raimbeault v. Takeuchi Mfg. (U.S.), 772 A.2d 1056, 1061 (R.I. 2001) (per curiam)
(recognizing the applicability of Daubert in cases proposing the use of scientific evidence and
applying R.I. R. Evid. 702).
141. See Burley v. Kytec Innovative Sports Equip., Inc., 737 N.W.2d 397, 406 (S.D. 2007)
(reaffirming South Dakota's reliance on the Daubert test); State v. Hofer, 512 N.W.2d 482,
484 (S.D. 1994) (adopting the Daubert test of admissibility).
142. McDaniel v. CSX Transp., Inc., 955 S.W.2d 257, 265 (Tenn. 1997) (rejecting Frye,
and although not expressly adopting Daubert, noting that the Daubert factors are useful in
determining the admissibility of expert testimony).
143. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 556 (Tex. 1995)
(adopting Daubert and stating that "[wie are persuaded by the reasoning in Daubert and
Kelly"); Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568, 572-73 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (en banc) (rejecting
the Frye test of admissibility and providing a list of relevant factors to be considered when
determining the admissibility of expert evidence).
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Twelve states and the District of Columbia have refused to adopt the
Daubert test of admissibility and instead have chosen to follow the outdated
Frye test: Alabama, 14 6 Arizona,147 California,14 8 District of Columbia,149 Flor-
ida, Illinois,iso Kansas,151 Maryland,15 2 Minnesota,153 New York,154 North
144. San Francisco v. Wendy's Int'l, Inc., 656 S.E.2d 485, 492-94 (W. Va. 2007) (reaf-
firming West Virginia's continued use of the Daubert test of admissibility); Gentry v. Man-
gum, 466 S.E.2d 171, 179 (W. Va. 1995) (rejecting the Frye test of admissibility); Wilt v.
Buracker (In re Estate of Nickelson), 443 S.E.2d 196, 203 (W. Va. 1993) (adopting the Dau-
bert test of admissibility and concluding "that Daubert's analysis of Federal Rule 702 should
be followed in analyzing the admissibility of expert testimony under Rule 702 of the West
Virginia Rules of Evidence").
145. Cooper v. State, 174 P.3d 726, 728 (Wyo. 2008) (acknowledging the continued use of
the Daubert test of admissibility); Bunting ex rel. Bunting v. Jamieson, 984 P.2d 467, 471
(Wyo. 1999) (adopting the Daubert test of admissibility and stating that "Daubert and its
progeny [should be] guidance for the Wyoming courts' determination whether to admit or
exclude expert testimony").
146. Turner v. State (Exparte State of Alabama), 746 So. 2d 355, 359, 361 n.7 (Ala. 1998)
("[T]he Legislature chose the more flexible admissibility standard established in Daubert" for
the admissibility of DNA evidence, but "[w]ith respect to expert scientific testimony on sub-
jects other than DNA techniques governed by § 36-18-30, Frye remains the standard of ad-
missibility in Alabama.").
147. Logerquist v. McVey, I P.3d 113, 125 (Ariz. 2000) (en banc) (continuing to use the
Frye test of admissibility and stating that "we have left no doubt whether Ariz. R. Evid. 702
was intended to abolish the Frye doctrine, for we have continued to apply Frye"); State v.
Tankersley, 956 P.2d 486, 491 (Ariz. 1998) (en banc) (refusing to abandon Frye).
148. People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 323 (Cal. 1994) (in bank) (refusing to abandon the
Kelly/Frye test); People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244 (Cal. 1976) (adopting the Frye test of
admissibility and altering it slightly).
149. Jones v. United States, 990 A.2d 970, 977 (D.C. 2010) (continuing to apply the Frye
test of admissibility).
150. People v. McKown, 875 N.E.2d 1029, 1036 (111. 2007) (finding that while "[i]n Illi-
nois, the application of the Frye standard is limited to scientific methodology that is consi-
dered 'new' or 'novel,"' the test is still very much the standard); People v. Miller, 670 N.E.2d
721, 731 (Ill. 1996) ("Illinois follows the Frye standard for the admission of novel scientific
evidence.").
151. Kuhn ex rel. Estate of Bishop v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 14 P.3d 1170, 1181-82 (Kan.
2000) (listing the long lineage of Kansas cases applying the Frye test of admissibility).
152. Blackwell v. Wyeth, 971 A.2d 235, 247-48 (Md. 2009) (continuing to apply the Frye
test); Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 372 (Md. 1978) (adopting the Frye test of admissibility).
153. State v. MacLennan, 702 N.W.2d 219, 230 (Minn. 2005) (continuing to apply the
Frye standard); Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 810-14 (Minn. 2000) (thoroughly
analyzing the Frye standard as compared to the new federal Daubert standard and determining
that Minnesota still uses the Frye test of admissibility).
154. People v. LeGrand, 867 N.E.2d 374, 379 (N.Y. 2007) (continuing to apply the Frye
test of admissibility).
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Dakota, 55 Pennsylvania,'56 and Washington.'5 ' There are also five states that
have adopted their own test of admissibility: Hawaii,1 8 Missouri,'59 South
Carolina,'6 Utah,16' and Virginia.162 At this point, the only southern state
other than Florida that follows Frye is Alabama, and even Alabama has rec-
ognized the use of Daubert in certain contexts.16 3
155. State v. Hernandez, 707 N.W.2d 449, 453 (N.D. 2005) (refusing to adopt Daubert);
City of Fargo v. McLaughlin, 512 N.W.2d 700, 704 (N.D. 1994) (finding that the Frye test of
admissibility applies).
156. Grady v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 839 A.2d 1038, 1044 (Pa. 2003) (taking a careful look at
Daubert, but ultimately deciding to continue to follow Frye).
157. Anderson v. Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc., No. 82264-6, 2011 WL 3930205, at *4
(Wash. Sept. 8, 2011) (en banc) ("In civil cases, we have neither expressly adopted Frye nor
expressly rejected Daubert."); State v. Copeland, 922 P.2d 1304, 1310 (Wash. 1996) (en banc)
(adhering to the Frye test and declining to adopt Daubert); Reese v. Stroh, 907 P.2d 282, 286
(Wash. 1995) (en banc) (declining to adopt Daubert).
158. See State v. Vliet, 19 P.3d 42, 53 (Haw. 2001). Hawaii is unique, in that, it has nei-
ther rejected Frye, nor adopted Daubert, yet it follows both cases in certain types of cases.
See id. ("[T]his court has not adopted the Daubert test, and we expressly refrain from doing
so. However, because the HRE are patterned on the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE), con-
struction of the federal counterparts of the HRE by the federal courts is instructive, but ob-
viously not binding on our courts." (citations omitted)).
159. See State Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts v. McDonagh, 123 S.W.3d 146,
153 (Mo. 2003) (en banc). The Missouri Supreme Court has made it clear that Missouri fol-
lows its own unique test of admissibility. See id. (stating that the Missouri Supreme Court
"expressly holds that to the extent that cases since Lasky have suggested that the standard of
admissibility of expert testimony in civil cases is that set forth in Frye or some other standard,
they are no longer to be followed. The relevant standard is that set out in section 490.065.").
160. See State v. Council, 515 S.E.2d 508, 518 (S.C. 1999), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2770
(2009) ("While this Court does not adopt Daubert, we find the proper analysis for determining
admissibility of scientific evidence is now under the SCRE. When admitting scientific evi-
dence under Rule 702, SCRE, the trial judge must find the evidence will assist the trier of fact,
the expert witness is qualified, and the underlying science is reliable. The trial judge should
apply the Jones factors to determine reliability.").
161. See Alder v. Bayer Corp., AGFA Div., 61 P.3d 1068, 1083 (Utah 2002) (rejecting the
exclusive use of Frye, and declining to adopt Daubert, but instead adopting its own test of
admissibility governed by its rules of evidence and the case of State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d
388, 396-99 (Utah 1989)).
162. John v. Wong Shik, 559 S.E.2d 694, 698 (Va. 2002) ("[W]e have not previously
considered the question whether the Daubert analysis employed by the federal courts should
be applied in our trial courts to determine the scientific reliability of expert testimony [and],
[tiherefore, we leave this question open for future consideration.").
163. See Turner v. State (Ex parte State of Alabama), 746 So. 2d 355, 359-61 (Ala. 1998).
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B. Daubert's Utility in Professional Liability Cases
The Daubert analysis has particular significance in complex medical
malpractice cases.'6 As expert evidence becomes increasingly intricate, our
judges and juries become increasingly vulnerable to bad science. The Frye
general acceptance test exacerbates this vulnerability because of its extreme
relativism.165 Under Frye, every expert conclusion is worthy of jury consid-
eration as long as it has some underlying link to a generally accepted metho-
dology. 166 Frye has even been read by the Supreme Court of Florida as pro-
hibiting a trial judge from considering an expert's application of scientific
principles to the facts at hand, as long as the expert purports to rely on scien-
tific principles that are generally accepted. 167
Medical causation is one of the areas where the shortcomings of Frye
are most evident.'6" A causation expert only needs to attribute his or her opi-
nions to the generally accepted methodology of differential diagnosis to
avoid an admissibility issue.169 This can literally be as blatant as an expert
testifying that he or she considered other possible causes and simply finds
164. See Gelsthorpe ex rel. Bacus v. Weinstein, 897 So. 2d 504, 511 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 2005) (finding that in a medical malpractice case that the expert's pure opinion testimo-
ny does not even have to be based on his or her experience with patients suffering from the
same injuries, but that the opinion can be based on the expert's "experience treating similar
patients" (quoting FLA. STAT. § 766.102(5)(a)(1) (2003))).
165. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
166. Id.
167. See Castillo v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 854 So. 2d 1264, 1276 (Fla. 2003)
("By considering the extrapolation of the data from the admittedly acceptable experiments, the
Third District went beyond the requirements of Frye, which assesses only the validity of the
underlying science. Frye does not require the court to assess the application of the expert's
raw data in reaching his or her conclusion. We therefore conclude that the Third District
erroneously assessed the Castillos' expert testimony under Frye by considering not just the
underlying science, but the application of the data generated from that science in reaching the
expert's ultimate conclusion." (emphasis added)).
168. See, e.g., Marsh v. Valyou, 977 So. 2d 543, 548 (Fla. 2007) (per curiam); Gelsthorpe
ex rel. Bacus, 897 So. 2d at 510; Castillo, 854 So. 2d at 1271.
169. See Castillo, 854 So. 2d at 1271 ("It is well-settled that an expert's use of differential
diagnosis to arrive at a specific causation opinion is a methodology that is generally accepted
in the relevant scientific community." (citations omitted)); see also Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 549
(repeating that the Supreme Court of Florida previously held in Castillo "that differential
diagnosis is a generally accepted method for determining specific causation"); Gelsthorpe ex
rel. Bacus, 897 So. 2d at 510 ("[U]se of the technique of differential diagnosis by an expert
medical witness in determining causation does not raise concerns under Frye. Differential
diagnosis is an established scientific methodology in which the expert eliminates possible
causes of a medical condition to arrive at the conclusion as to the actual cause of the condi-
tion." (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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them inapplicable.170 It is no secret that the medical malpractice litigant who
could not otherwise meet the greater weight of the evidence (i.e. more-likely-
than-not) standard of causationl71 can likely evade this proof problem with an
expert who cloaks his or her opinions in a differential diagnosis.17 2 And if
that fails, as the dissent in Marsh recognized, an expert only needs to couch
testimony as "pure opinion," which is essentially "always admissible" based
merely on a purported expert's "training and experience."l 7 3
As discussed above, the Daubert approach would provide a much more
rigorous system for ensuring that our judges and juries decide cases involv-
ing complex professional liability issues based on good science.174 One of
the fundamental tenets of Daubert is the rejection of the ipse dixit expert
opinion.175 The phrase "because I said so" may never lose its cherished place
in the parenting lexicon, but under Daubert, it has rightfully lost any validat-
170. See, e.g., Castillo, 854 So. 2d at 1270-71 (ending discussion of the parties' experts'
"disagree[ments] about the conclusions" from available data and information on the basis that,
"[c]learly, the Castillos' experts did utilize differential diagnosis, and as amici admit, this was
a generally accepted method for addressing specific medical causation" (citations omitted)).
171. See, e.g., Gooding ex rel. Estate of Gooding v. Univ. Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d
1015, 1018 (Fla. 1984) ("Florida courts follow the more likely than not standard of causation
and require proof that the negligence probably caused the plaintiffs injury. Prosser explored
this standard of proof as follows: '[T]he plaintiff . .. has the burden of proof . .. [and] must
introduce evidence . . . that it is more likely than not that the conduct of the defendant was a
substantial factor in bringing about the result. A mere possibility of such causation is not
enough; and when ... the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the
court to direct a verdict for the defendant."' (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 41, at 241 (4th ed. 1971)) (emphasis added)); see also Jackson Cnty. Hosp. Corp. v.
Aldrich ex rel. Estate of Roddenberry, 835 So. 2d 318, 328 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2002)
("The 'more likely than not' standard is satisfied ... if a plaintiff presents evidence that estab-
lishes that the decedent had a fifty-one percent or better chance that [a loss] would not have
occurred but for the actions or lack thereof of the medical care provider." (citations omitted)).
172. See, e.g., Castillo, 854 So. 2d at 1271, 1277. The problem is further confounded by
Florida's evidence code, which makes it extremely difficult to cross-examine such an expert
with external material such as treatises or studies unless the expert recognizes the source of
the contrary material as authoritative. See FLA. STAT. § 90.706 (2011); see also Whitfield v.
State, 859 So. 2d 529, 530 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (per curiam) (disallowing the defen-
dant's use of a medical article to cross-examine the prosecution's expert witness because
although the expert conceded that the medical journal itself was generally accepted in the
medical community, the expert refused to recognize that the specific article was generally
accepted or authoritative).
173. See Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 560, 562 (Cantero, J., dissenting).
174. See supra notes 164-73 and accompanying text.
175. See McClain v. Metabolife Int'l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1233, 1244 (11th Cir. 2005) (rejecting
"expert's assurances . .. [of] utiliz[ing] generally accepted scientific methodology [as] insuffi-
cient. [Because] [s]uch statements can spring just as quickly from the ipse dixit of the expert .
. . [and] nothing in ... Daubert ... requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is
connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert" (citations omitted)).
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ing power when uttered by an expert. 176 Without intending to suggest that
medical doctors are more prone to resort to "because I said so" than other
types of experts, it is nonetheless obvious that the methodology of differen-
tial diagnosis has no built-in safeguards to catch the ipse dixit opinion and,
indeed, almost invites it.177 The Daubert approach corrects this shortcoming
and would improve the quality of expert evidence in professional liability
cases across the board.17 8
IV. CALL TO ACTION: FLORIDA'S ADOPTION OF A STATUTORY DAUBERT
STANDARD
The Florida Legislature has made two recent attempts in 2008 and 2011
to amend Florida's Evidence Code to adopt a Daubert standard.'79 In both
years, both houses filed bills which would have empowered Florida's capa-
ble trial judges with the same combination of specific guidance, procedural
tools, and gate-keeping discretion that has worked well at the federal level
and in the states following Daubert.'80 The 2011 legislation would have im-
plemented Daubert by amending sections 90.702 and 90.704, Florida Sta-
tutes in the following respects. 181
Section I engrafted the essentials of Daubert onto section 90.702 of the
Florida Evidence Code by requiring as a condition of admissibility that ex-
pert evidence be based upon sufficient facts or data, be the product of relia-
ble principles and methods, and that the principles and methods be applied
176. See id. ("The trial court's gatekeeping function requires more than simply 'taking the
expert's word for it."' (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note)); see, e.g., Hen-
drix ex rel. G.P. v. Evenflo Co., 609 F.3d 1183, 1201 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Frazi-
er, 387 F.3d 1244, 1261 (11th Cir. 2004); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311,
1319 (9th Cir. 1995); FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note.
177. See Castillo, 854 So. 2d at 1271; cf Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1315.
178. See McClain, 401 F.3d at 1244; Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1315, 1319.
179. See Fla. SB 822 (2011); Fla. HB 391 (2011); Fla. HB 645 (2008); Fla. SB 1448
(2008). The legislature has also proposed two bills for the 2012 legislative session: Florida
House of Representatives Proposed Committee Bill 243 and Florida Senate Proposed Com-
mittee Bill 378. Fla. H.R. Comm. on, PCB 243 (draft of Sept. 29, 2011) (proposed FLA. STAT.
§§ 90.702, .704); Fla. S. Comm. on, PCB 378 (draft of Sept. 29, 2011) (proposed FLA. STAT.
§§ 90.702, .704). These two 2012 bills are substantially similar and are written to take effect
on July 1, 2012. Compare Fla. H.R. Comm. on, PCB 243, with Fla. S. Comm. on, PCB 378.
The bills contain no provision for a pretrial Daubert hearing and do not require written find-
ings and conclusions. See generally Fla. H.R. Comm. on, PCB 243; Fla. S. Comm. on, PCB
378.
180. See Fla. SB 822; Fla. HB 391; Fla. HB 645; Fla. SB 1448.
181. Fla. SB 822; Fla. HB 391.
292011]
31
: Nova Law Review 36, #1
Published by NSUWorks, 2011
NOVA LAW REVIEW
reliably to the facts of the case.'82 Section 1 expressly adopted Daubert and
its significant progeny and rejected Frye and all of its Florida progeny by
adding the following language to section 90.702(2):
The courts of this state shall interpret and apply the requirements
of subsection (1) and [section] 90.704 in accordance with Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Gen-
eral Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); [and] Kumho Tire
Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) .... Frye v. United
States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) and subsequent Florida deci-
sions applying or implementing Frye no longer apply to subsection
(1) or [section] 90.704.183
Section 2 addressed the too common use of experts as conduits for evi-
dence that would otherwise be inadmissible, by amending section 90.704 to
require that before otherwise inadmissible facts or data are disclosed to a jury
through expert evidence, the trial judge must make a finding that the proba-
tive value of the facts or data in assisting the jury's evaluation of expert evi-
dence substantially outweighs the prejudicial effect of the facts or data."
This is consistent with the Daubert conceptualization of the trial judge as
gatekeeper and with ensuring the trustworthiness of evidence that reaches a
jury through an expert.185
The 2008 bills, unlike the 2011 legislation, would have also amended
sections 90.705 and 90.707, Florida Statutes.'86 Section 90.705 would have
allowed a party to have a Daubert hearing upon a timely motion, to require
the trial court to set forth its findings of facts and conclusions of law, and to
permit an interlocutory discretionary appeal of the admission or exclusion of
182. Fla. SB 822; Fla. HB 391.
183. Fla. SB 822; Fla. HB 391. This precise language was not in the 2008 legislation.
Fla. SB 1448; Fla. HB 645. The 2008 legislation included much broader language:
The courts of this state shall interpret and apply the requirements of [sections] 90.702 and
90.704 in a manner consistent with Rules 702 and 703, Federal Rules of Evidence, and with all
United States Supreme Court case law interpreting those rules in effect at the time of enact-
ment of this provision.
Fla. SB 1448; Fla. HB 645.
184. Fla. SB 822; Fla. HB 391.
185. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
186. Compare Fla. SB 1448 (2008) (amending section 90.705 and creating section 90.707
of the Florida Statutes), and Fla. HB 645 (2008) (amending section 90.705 and creating sec-
tion 90.707 of the Florida Statutes), with Fla. SB 822 (2011) (disregarding sections 90.705
and 90.707 of the Florida Statutes), and Fla. HB 391 (2011) (disregarding sections 90.705 and
90.707 of the Florida Statutes).
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expert testimony with the criteria for the appellate court to consider in
whether to grant such an appeal."'
The passages of bills similar to those proposed in 2008 and 2011 would
immediately put Florida on par with the federal system, where, incidentally,
Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703 were themselves amended in 2000 to
codify Daubert and its progeny.'88 The proposed Florida legislation would in
effect import the synthesized federal approach, i.e., amended FRE 702 and
703, into Florida law.'89 In the next part, we discuss the provisions of a pro-
posed bill should the 2012 Legislature decide to tackle Frye.
V. A STEP TOWARDS ACTION: A PROPOSED BILL
The authors set forth the following proposed bill to implement Daubert.
Words stricken are deletions; words underlined are additions.
Section 1. Section 90.702, Florida Statutes, is amended to read:
90.702 Testimony by experts.-
(1) If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will as-
sist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determin-
ing a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education may testify about it in the
form of an opinion, or otherwise, if:
(a) The testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(b) The testimony is the product of reliable principles and me-
thods;and
187. Fla. SB 1448; Fla. HB 645. Sections 4, 6, and 7 of the 2008 legislation were "nuts
and bolts" provisions relating to numbering, severability, and the act's effective date. Id. The
2011 legislation did not include severability or numbering provisions and its effective date
section-unlike the 2008 bills-was silent on its application to pending cases. Compare Fla.
SB 822 (2011), and Fla. HB 391 (2011), with Fla. SB 1448 (2008), and Fla. HB 645 (2008).
188. FED. R. EvID. 702 advisory committee's note; see FED. R. EviD. 703 advisory com-
mittee's note.
189. See Fla. SB 822; Fla. HB 391; FED. R. EvID. 702 advisory committee's note; FED. R.
EvID. 703 advisory committee's note.
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(c) The witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to
the facts of the casei b
can be applied to the evidene at tr-ial. 1 90
(2) The courts of this state shall interpret and apply the require-
ments of subsection (1) and section 90.704 in accordance with
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579
(1993) and its progeny as well as in a manner consistent with Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence 702 and 703, and all Supreme Court of the
United States case law interpreting those rules.
Section 2. Section 90.704, Florida Statutes, is amended to read:
90.704 Basis of opinion testimony by experts. -The facts or data
upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those
perceived by, or made known to, the expert at or before the trial.
If the facts or data are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts
in the subject to support the opinion expressed, the facts or data
need not be admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or infe-
rence to be admitted. Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible
shall not be disclosed to a iury by the proponent of the opinion or
inference unless the court determines that the probative value in
assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially
outweighs the prejudicial effect.192
Section 3. Section 90.705, Florida Statutes, is amended to read:
90.705 Disclosure of facts or data underlying expert opinion.-
(1) Unless otherwise required by the court, an expert may testify
in terms of opinion or inferences and give reasons without prior
190. Fla. SB 822; Fla. HB 391. The 2008 bills-HB 645, SB 1448-included a paragraph
which stated: "An expert may only offer expert testimony with respect to a particular field in
which the expert is qualified." Fla. SB 1448; Fla. HB 645. Based on the fact that current
Florida common and statutory law still upholds this bedrock principle, this provision was
superfluous and has been omitted here. See FLA. STAT. § 90.702 (2011); Fla. SB 822 (2011);
Fla. HB 391 (2011). Subparagraphs (a), (b), and (c) mirror the language used in FED. R. EVID.
702. Fla. SB 822; Fla. HB 391; FED. R. EVID. 702.
191. Fla. SB 822. The 2011 bills contained a paragraph explicitly rejecting Frye and all
Florida decisions applying or implementing Frye. See id.; Fla. HB 391. In light of the clear
language of this paragraph, such language is not necessary and has not been included here.
See Fla. SB 822.
192. Fla. SB 1448. This added language mirrors Federal Rule of Evidence 703. FED. R.
EvID. 703.
[Vol. 3632
34
Nova Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol36/iss1/1
A PLEA FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM
disclosure of the underlying facts or data. On cross-examination
the expert shall be required to specify the facts or data.'9 3
(2) Upon timely motion of a party, the court shall hold a hearing
prior to trial to determine whether an expert's proposed testimony,
including pure opinion testimony, satisfies the requirements of sec-
tions 90.702 and 90.704.194 The trial court's ruling shall set forth
written findings of fact and conclusions of law upon which the or-
der to admit or exclude expert testimony is based.195 PriEr-4E-4he
Sitet ing Ithe opinion, a paty against hom the apiion rein
f n erso fred may ancdut a heir dire examination of the wit
ness direted to the underlying fats O data fof the Witness'S pi
nion. if the party establishes pfimna facie evidence that the exper
does not have a Suffi ient baSiS fOr the Opiion, the opinions and
in.ferences of the epert are inadmissible unless the party offeving
the testimony establishes the unr'derlying facts Or data.a96
Section 6. If any provision of this act or the application thereof
to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does
not affect other provisions or applications of the act that can be
given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to
193. Fla. SB 1448.
194. Id. Pre-trial Daubert hearings will allow judges the time to closely review the relev-
ance and reliability of the proposed testimony and the expert's credentials and to make an
informed decision as to its admissibility. See id. Allowing the scheduling of a Daubert hear-
ing prior to trial reduces the risk of a trial by ambush arising from the late disclosure or non-
disclosure of experts. See Fla. H.R. Comm. on Cts., HB 645 (2008) Staff Analysis 2-4 (Mar.
10, 2008) [hereinafter Comm. on Cts., HB 645 Staff Analysis], available at http://archive
.fl senate. gov/datalsessionl2008/Houselbi s/anal ysis/pdfhO645.CTS.pdf. It also will provide
litigants with a preview of the strength of their opponents' cases, which may encourage set-
tlement or support disposition on summary judgment. See id.
195. Fla. SB3 1448. Written findings will create a sufficient record to enable and facilitate
appellate review. See id.
196. Id. The 2008 bills contained a provision establishing the standard of rcview on ap-
peal for the court's admission or exclusion of expert testimony (de novo), see e.g., Brim v.
State, 695 So. 2d 268, 274 (Fla. 1997), and a new avenue for interlocutory appeal under cer-
tain limited circumstances. Fla. SB 1448. While such a provision was certainly forward-
thinking, it ignored the current realities of the Florida court system. See id. Such a provision
could not only potentially extend the life of cases causing additional congestion of trial and
appellate court dockets, but it could also delay justice for both plaintiffs and defendants. See
id. Unless and until there is a proper vetting of this type of provision by the State Courts
Administrator, the authors would discourage such a provision. Additionally, because article
V, section 4(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution provides that courts may hear interlocutory
appeals as provided by rules adopted by the Supreme Court of Florida, such a provision may
be an unconstitutional encroachment on the exclusive rulemaking authority of the Supreme
Court of the United States. See FLA. CONST. art. 5, § 4(b)(1).
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this end the provisions of this act are declared severable and shall
remain valid and enforceable.197
Section 7. This act shall take effect July 1, 2012, and shall apply
to all actions commenced on or after the effective date. 98
VI. CONCLUSION
It is clear that Florida has spent too long on the outside of the Daubert
revolution looking in. The divergence between Florida's state court-where
Frye is still law, and federal courts-where Daubert is followed, only makes
things worse.' 99 In cases where a plaintiff needs the help of "junk science," it
is all too common for a Florida resident-be it an individual or company-to
be sued in a matter that chiefly involves an out-of-state defendant primarily
for the reason that the plaintiffs attorney wants to prevent the case from
being removed to federal court because of a preference for Frye-which is
equivalent to no standard at all-over Daubert.200 The Florida Evidence
Code was statutorily created, and it is the legislature's responsibility to see
that the judiciary properly handles expert evidence. 20 ' The legislature can
fulfill this responsibility, to the benefit of Florida's justice system and all of
its citizens, by enacting a statutory Daubert standard like the one proposed
above.
197. Fla. SB 1448.
198. The 2008 bills contained language which would have applied the Daubert standard
retroactively "to all pending actions in which trial . . . commences more than [ninety] calendar
days after that date." Fla. SB 1448 (2008); Fla. HB 645 (2011). In order to avoid any argu-
ment that this provision would be unconstitutional and to foreclose the floodgate of litigation
over this issue, the authors have dropped any language of retroactivity.
199. See Comm. on Cts., HB 645 Staff Analysis, supra note 194, at 2-3.
200. See id. at 2-4. The federal courts have "diversity jurisdiction" in matters involving
citizens of different states only if none of the defendants is a citizen of Florida. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 (2006).
201. See Comm. on Cts., HB 645 Staff Analysis, supra note 194, at 2-3.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As in prior years, this year's survey reviews Florida appellate court de-
cisions of potential and immediate interest to business owners and their
counsel. The cases include matters of first impression and decisions that
address conflict between the Florida District Courts of Appeal. In addition,
cases that clarify or expand upon existing principles of law or that appear to
be of special interest or have unusual facts are discussed.
II. AGENCY
A. Authority of Real Estate Closing Agent
Did a real estate closing agent have apparent authority to bind a seller
when the closing agent allowed the buyer to tender the real estate purchase
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price a day late?' In Denton v. Good Way Oil 902 Corp.,2 the Fourth District
Court of Appeal said no.3 Almost two years after the contract was signed,
and having given Good Way Oil 902 Corporation (Buyer) extensions for its
investigations, Mr. Denton (Seller), relying on the "time-is-of-the-essence"
provision in the contract, set a closing date and "warned that the contract
must be fully closed that day."4 The court observed that, "[a] closing agent
generally owes a duty to both contracting parties only to supervise the clos-
ing in a reasonably prudent manner."5 The agent, "ha[ving] only the authori-
ty to conduct the closing," did not have such apparent authority.6 Buyer
pointed to no conduct by Seller that would support a finding of apparent au-
thority.7 In fact, Seller's actions were to the contrary.'
B. Liability of General Contractor's Qualifying Agent
Section 489.119(2) of the Florida Statutes requires general building
contractors to have a "qualifying agent" to supervise construction activities
of the general contractor.9 Mr. Scherer (Qualifying Agent) served in that
capacity for Scherer Construction & Engineering LLC (General Contrac-
tor).'o The Villas Del Verde Homeowners Association (Association) sued
the developer and General Contractor alleging construction defects and busi-
ness code violations and sued Qualifying Agent-who was also a "principal"
in the developer LLC-under section 553.84 of the Florida Statutes, alleging
failure to properly supervise the construction of the community's buildings."
* Associate Professor of Taxation and Business Law, Master of Taxation and Master of
Accounting Programs, H. Wayne Huizenga School of Business and Entrepreneurship, Nova
Southeastern University; B.A., New York University; J.D., New York Law School; LL.M.
(Tax), New York University School of Law; Florida Supreme Court Certified Appellate,
Circuit Civil, and County Court Mediator.
1. Denton v. Good Way Oil 902 Corp., 48 So. 3d 103, 107 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2010).
2. 48 So. 3d 103 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
3. Id. at 108.
4. Id. at 105.
5. Id. at 107.
6. Id. at 108.
7. See Denton, 48 So. 3d at 108.
8. Id.
9. Scherer v. Villas Del Verde Homeowners Ass'n, 55 So. 3d 602, 603 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App.), review denied, 63 So. 3d 751 (Fla. 2011); see also FLA. STAT. § 489.119(2) (2011).
10. Scherer, 55 So. 3d at 602.
11. Id. at 602-03; see also FLA. STAT. § 553.84 (2011). Association sued the developer
and General Contractor, both of which were limited liability companies. Scherer, 55 So. 3d at
602-03. No appearance was made by the LLCs. Id. at 603.
372011]
39
: Nova Law Review 36, #1
Published by NSUWorks, 2011
NOVA LAW REVIEW
Section 553.84 provides that a civil action for damages caused by building
code violations may be brought by "'[a]ny person or party, in an individual
capacity or on behalf of a class of persons or parties, damaged."'" 2 Such
person has an action "'against the person or party who committed the viola-
tion.'" 13 The trial court entered ajudgment against Qualifying Agent, indivi-
dually, relying on section 553.84.14 The Second District Court of Appeal
reversed, noting that the Supreme Court of Florida had previously ruled "that
a qualifying agent's failure to perform his statutory duty does not give rise to
a private cause of action against him."15 The Second District Court of Ap-
peal, relying on Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp.,'6 held that even though General
Contractor could do no building without a qualifying agent, Qualifying
Agent's failure to properly supervise the construction "was not a violation of
the building code."' 7 Thus, the appellate court concluded that a private ac-
tion against Qualifying Agent under section 553.84 was not proper, stating
that "today we make explicit what is perhaps implicitly stated in Murthy:
[A] qualifying agent's breach of the duties imposed by chapter 489 does not
give rise to" a building code violation claim under section 553.84 against
such qualifying agent. 18
C. Health Care Facility Arbitration Agreements
Stalley ex rel. Estate of L'Aine v. Transitional Hospitals Corp. of Tam-
pa'9 and Lepisto v. Senior Lifestyle Newport Ltd. Partnership20 involved en-
forcement of arbitration agreements by health care facilities when sued, in
the first case, by the personal representative of the estate of a former patient,
and in the second, by a former resident and his spouse.2' Stalley did not in-
volve a power of attorney, but the hospital patient's (Patient's) spouse
(Spouse) did, as part of the admission process, sign the admission papers.22
The admission papers contained an arbitration of disputes provision, but the
arbitration agreement was separate from the admissions agreement, and the
12. Id. at 603 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 553.84).
13. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 553.84).
14. Id.
15. Scherer, 55 So. 3d at 602.
16. 644 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 1994).
17. Scherer, 55 So. 3d at 604.
18. Id. (citing Seabridge, Inc. v. Superior Kitchens, Inc., 672 So. 2d 848, 850 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (per curiam)); see FLA. STAT. § 553.84).
19. 44 So. 3d 627 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
20. 36 Fla. L. Weekly D1655 (4th Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2011).
21. Id. at D1655; Stalley, 44 So. 3d at 629.
22. Stalley, 44 So. 3d at 629.
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admissions agreement did not incorporate by reference, or even refer to the
arbitration agreement. 23 The personal representative of Patient's estate sued
the hospital (Hospital) and others alleging wrongful death. 24 On motion by
Hospital, the trial court stayed the action and ordered arbitration. 25  The
Second District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded.26 The trial court
"seemed to conclude that one spouse is always the agent of the other as a
matter of law."2 7 "[Hospital] failed to present sufficient evidence to establish
that [Spouse] was acting as [Patient's] agent when she signed the arbitration
agreement or that [Patient] was the intended third-party beneficiary of that
agreement." 28 Spouse did not have express authority to sign the arbitration
agreement. 29 Spouse testified that she had authority to sign to get Patient
admitted, but the Second District Court of Appeal said that the authority to
sign medical consents did not extend to acts not necessary for Patient's
care.30 Since the "optional" arbitration agreement was not necessary for
treatment, Spouse's right to sign Patient into the hospital was not tantamount
to the authority to "waive[] some of [Patient's] constitutional rights."31 Nor
did Spouse have apparent authority, as there was no conduct on the part of
Patient that gave rise to apparent authority.32 Hospital argued that Patient's
inaction-that is, his failure to disaffirm Spouse's authority-rather than any
actual representation by Patient, "functioned as a representation" of Spouse's
authority.33 The Second District Court of Appeal rejected this argument.34
Hospital's estoppel and ratification arguments were also rejected by the ap-
pellate court, as was its third-party beneficiary argument.35 The court distin-
guished Alterra Healthcare Corp. v. Graham ex rel. Estate of Linton36 where
the arbitration clause was part of the residency agreement, since the nursing
home resident "had accepted the benefits of the residency and the services
provided and so was the intended third-party beneficiary of that entire
agreement."37
23. Id. at 632-33.
24. Id. at 629.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 633.
27. Stalley, 44 So. 3d at 632.
28. Id. at 633.
29. Id. at 630.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Stalley, 44 So. 3d at 630-31.
33. Id. at 631.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 631-33.
36. 953 So. 2d 574 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (per curiam).
37. Stalley, 44 So. 3d at 633 (citing Alterra Healthcare Corp., 953 So. 2d at 579).
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In Lepisto, the spouse had been given a power of attorney by her hus-
band prior to his admission as a resident.38 However, the appellate court
concluded that what the spouse signed was a document regarding her own
financial responsibility with respect to her husband's nursing home admis-
sion.3 1 She did not sign the admission agreement that contained the arbitra-
tion agreement as her husband's representative, nor did her husband sign the
agreement.'
III. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
A. Third-Party Beneficiary Bound by Arbitration Clause
In Lion Gables Realty Ltd. v. Randall Mechanical, Inc.,41 the Fifth
District Court of Appeal addressed two issues; the first, being whether or not
the entity against whom arbitration was sought was a third-party beneficiary
of the arbitration agreement, and the second, being one of waiver by the mo-
vant of its arbitration claim. 42 The district court held that the status of a per-
son as an intended beneficiary of an arbitration agreement is a "threshold
issue" to be decided by the trial court.43 For a third party to be bound by a
contract containing an arbitration provision, it must be shown "'that the par-
ties clearly express, or the contract itself expresses, an intent to primarily and
directly benefit [a] third party.'" If such a showing can be made, then the
third-party beneficiary will be bound by the contract arbitration provision.45
38. Lepisto v. Senior Lifestyle Newport Ltd. P'ship, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D1655, D1655
(4th Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2011). The Fourth District Court of Appeal discussed Stalley but
noted that the facts were distinguishable because in Stalley, the spouse did not have a power of
attorney. Id. at D1656. In any case, the outcome in both cases was "no arbitration." Id. at
D1657; Stalley, 44 So. 3d at 633.
39. Lepisto, 36 Fla. L. Weekly at D1656.
40. Id. at DI655.
41. 65 So. 3d 1098 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (per curiam).
42. Id. at 1099 (citing Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633, 636 (Fla. 1999)).
43. Id. Since the first prong of the three-prong test under Seifert requires that the court
find that there is a valid agreement between the parties before the court can compel the parties
to arbitrate, there must first be a finding that the parties agreed to arbitrate, which, when there
is a non-party to the contract involved, requires a determination that the non-party is a third
party beneficiary of the arbitration agreement. Id. at 1099-1100 (citing Seifert, 750 So. 2d at
636; Infinity Design Builders, Inc. v. Hutchinson, 964 So. 2d 752, 755 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
2007); Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Rd. Rock, Inc., 920 So. 2d 201, 203 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2006)).
44. Id. at 1099 (quoting Technical Aid Corp. v. Tomaso, 814 So. 2d 1259, 1261 (Fla.5th
Dist. Ct. App. 2002)).
45. Lions Gables Realty Ltd., 65 So. 3d at 1099 (citing Technical Aid Corp., 814 So. 2d
at 1261).
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With respect to the waiver issue, the Fifth District Court of Appeal noted that
the second, third, and fourth districts, as well as the fifth district, have "con-
sistently" held that participation, "before moving to compel arbitration," in
discovery related to the merits of the case constitutes a waiver of arbitration
rights.46 In this case, one of the parties seeking arbitration had sent out two
notices to produce copies.4 ' The appellate court noted that "[e]ven if con-
ducting a minimal amount of merits discovery would be insufficient to waive
a contractual right to arbitrate, we do not view these discovery requests as
minimal."48 The Fifth District Court of Appeal then held that "[t]he law in
Florida is clear that a party's participation in merits discovery constitutes a
waiver of arbitration."4 9
46. Id. at 1100 (citing Gordon v. Shield, 41 So. 3d 931, 933 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2010); Green Tree Servicing, L.L.C. v. McLeod ex rel. Estate of McLeod, 15 So. 3d 682, 688
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2009); Olsen Electric Co. v. Winter Park Redevelopment Agency, 987
So. 2d 178, 179 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Marks ex rel. Estate of Orlanis v. Oakwood
Terrace Skilled Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., 971 So. 2d 811, 812 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007)).
47. Id. at I 101.
48. Id.
49. Id. (citing Gordon, 41 So. 3d at 933; Green Tree Servicing, L.L.C., 15 So. 3d at 694;
Olsen Electric Co., 987 So. 2d at 179; Marks ex rel. Estate of Orlanis, 971 So. 2d at 812); see
Barbara Landau, 2008-2009 Survey of Florida Law Affecting Business Owners, 34 NOVA L.
REV. 71, 75-78 (2009) [hereinafter Landau, 2008-2009 Survey of Florida Law Affecting
Business Owners] (discussing Green Tree Servicing, L.L. C, 15 So. 3d at 682); DFC Homes of
Fla. v. Lawrence, 8 So. 3d 1281, 1282-84 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009). Is any amount of
merits related discovery participation "inconsistent" with seeking arbitration under the "totali-
ty of the circumstances" test? In Green Tree Servicing, LLC, the Second District Court of
Appeal held that participation in merits related discovery "is generally inconsistent with arbi-
tration" and "considered under the totality of the circumstances-will generally be sufficient
to support a finding of a waiver of a party's right to arbitration." Green Tree Servicing,
L.L.C., 15 So. 3d at 694. In Green Tree Servicing, LLC, the discovery occurred after Green
Tree Servicing, LLC filed the motion to compel arbitration, but before the motion was heard.
See id. at 686. The Second District Court of Appeal held that "[e]ven where a party has filed a
timely motion to compel arbitration," that party may still waive its claim to arbitration by
acting in a manner that is inconsistent with that claim. Landau, 2008-2009 Survey of Florida
Law Affecting Business Owners, supra note 49, at 76 (citing Green Tree Servicing, L.L.C., 15
So. 3d at 688); Sitarik v. JFK Med. Ctr. Ltd. P'ships, 11 So. 3d 973, 974 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2009). In Lawrence, the court discussed the distinction between participating in court
proceedings after the demand has been made for arbitration rather than before, but in finding
no waiver, the court noted that the participation was "limited." Lawrence, 8 So. 3d at 1283
(citing Phillips v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 685 So. 2d 27, 29 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1996). The Fifth District Court of Appeal in Lion Gables Realty Ltd. cited Gordon, as "re-
cognizing that propounding discovery would waive [the] right to arbitrate." Lion Gables
Realty Ltd., 65 So. 3d at 1100 (citing Gordon, 41 So. 3d at 933). However, Gordon involved
mandatory pre-suit proceedings in an action alleging medical malpractice, and in that case, the
Fourth District Court of Appeal found that the doctor's participation in pre-suit proceedings
2011] 41
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B. Enforcing Arbitration in Another State
Two clients and two LLCs (Plaintiffs) in Mintz & Fraade, P.C. v. Beta
Drywall Acquisition, LLCso sued their former attorneys (two New York law-
yers and their professional corporation) alleging malpractice.5 ' The New
York law firm asked the Florida trial court to order arbitration in New York
under the arbitration clause contained in the law firm's retainer agreement
with Plaintiffs. 52 The trial court declined to do so.53  The Fourth District
Court of Appeal did not agree that the trial court lacked the power to "com-
pel arbitration in another state" in this case. 54 The fourth district quoted Da-
mora v. Stresscon International, Inc.55 where the Supreme Court of Florida
held that "'[a]n agreement to arbitrate future disputes in another jurisdiction
is outside the authority of the Florida Arbitration Code . . . and . . . renders
the agreement to arbitrate voidable at the instance of either party."' 56 How-
ever, a Florida court can compel arbitration in another jurisdiction under the
Federal Arbitration Act if the underlying transactions involve interstate
commerce. 7 The Fourth District Court of Appeal found that the matter in-
volved interstate commerce, as the parties consisted of an Arizona resident
plaintiff, Florida corporations, New York defendants, and a New York plain-
tiff-involving the creation of a Florida corporation and the acquisition by it
of another Florida corporation, and retainer agreement.58
In addition, Plaintiffs in Mintz & Fraade, P.C. argued that the mandato-
ry fee arbitration provision was against the "'strong public policy of Flori-
mandated by statute did not constitute a waiver of the doctor's right to arbitration. Gordon, 41
So. 3d at 933-34.
50. 59 So. 3d 1173 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2011). Earlier proceedings in this case were
reported in Landau, 2008-2009 Survey of Florida Law Affecting Business Owners, supra note
49, at 125 (discussing Beta Drywall Acquisition, L.L.C. v. Mintz & Fraade, P.C., 9 So. 3d
651, 652-53 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 22 So. 3d 538 (Fla. 2009)). Those pro-
ceedings challenged the trial court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over the New York law-
yers. Beta Drywall Acquisition, L.L.C., 9 So. 3d at 652. The Fourth District Court of Appeal
held that the trial court erred when it dismissed the action for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id.
51. Mintz & Fraade, P.C., 59 So. 3d at 1174.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1174-75.
54. Id. at 1175-76.
55. 324 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1975).
56. Mintz & Fraade, P.C., 59 So. 3d at 1175 (alteration in original) (quoting Damora,
324 So. 2d at 82).
57. Id. (citing Default Proof Credit Card Sys., Inc. v. Friedland, 992 So. 2d 442, 444-45
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008)).
58. Id. at 1175-76.
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da."' 59 The district court acknowledged that special requirements are im-
posed by rules of the Florida Bar when it comes to enforcing arbitration
agreements regarding legal fee disputes, but concluded that New York's
rules are similar to Florida's and held that the agreement was enforceable.
IV. ATTORNEYS' FEES
Mr. Mady (Lessee) exhausted all of the non-judicial procedures re-
quired by the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Im-
provement Act (MMWA)-a condition precedent to bringing suit against
DaimlerChrysler Corporation (Manufacturer)-and then sued Manufacturer
under the MMWA, 6' alleging breach of warranty.62 Manufacturer made a
first and then a second offer of judgment to Lessee, "pursuant to section
768.79 [of the Florida Statutes] and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442"
in the amount of $8500. Lessee accepted the second offer, the terms of
which provided for the payment to Lessee of $8500 but did not include attor-
neys' fees, did not include an admission by Manufacturer of liability, did
"acknowledge[] that [Lessee] might seek attorneys' fees," did require that
Lessee sign a release, and stated that the lawsuit be dismissed with preju-
dice. 4 Approximately six months later, Lessee asked the trial court for an
award of costs as well as attorneys' fees.65 The trial court denied the request
finding that Lessee had not met the "finally prevailed" test under the
MMWA, and Lessee appealed.66 In 2008, the Fourth District Court of Ap-
peal, in Mady v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (Mady If affirmed the trial court's
decision, but certified to the Supreme Court of Florida conflict between its
decision and Dufresne v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.,68 decided in 2008 by the
Second District Court of Appeal.69 The question before the Supreme Court
of Florida was whether or not
59. Id. at 1176 (quoting Friedland, 992 So. 2d at 444).
60. Id.
61. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (2006).
62. Mady v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (Mady II), 59 So. 3d 1129, 1130-31, 1133 (Fla.
2011).
63. Id. at 1130-31; FLA. STAT. § 768.79(2) (2011); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442.
64. Mady II, 59 So. 3d at 1131.
65. Id.
66. Id. (alteration in original).
67. 976 So. 2d 1212, 1216 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008), quashed by 59 So. 3d 1129
(Fla. 2011).
68. 975 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
69. Mady II, 59 So. 3d at 1130.
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[a] consumer who has exhausted all non-judicial [pre-litigation
conditions of the MMWA and then] secures a favorable formal
settlement offer of judgment from a defendant which is accepted in
a Florida legal action filed under the MMWA . . . 'finally prevails'
[under the MMWA and thus] may be entitled to . . . costs [and]
fees under the MMWA.70
Thus far, the Fourth District Court of Appeal said no," the Second District
Court of Appeal said yes,7 2 and shortly after the Fourth District Court of Ap-
peal's decision in Mady I, the Third District Court of Appeal, in San Martin
v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.,7 3 "aligned itself with the [s]econd [d]istrict." 74
Siding with the second district-and the third district-the Supreme Court of
Florida held that for the purposes of the MMWA, an accepted offer of judg-
ment "is the 'functional equivalent of a consent decree"' and "bears the im-
primatur of the court."7 1 Justice Canady dissented and would have denied
attorneys fees under the MMWA.76
V. BUSINESS ENTITIES AND AGREEMENTS
Mr. Berlin and Mr. Pecora each owned a fifty percent interest in several
entities, which the Third District Court of Appeal referred to as the "Signa-
ture Entities," which included Grand Partners, Inc. 7 They had entered into a
distribution agreement that, among other things, gave the survivor a preemp-
tive option-a right of first refusal-to purchase the assets of the Signature
Entities, if the personal representative of the decedent's estate found a buyer
with respect to any assets of the entities, or the shares or partnership interests
of the decedent.78 Also, if the survivor found a buyer, the personal represent-
ative of the decedent's estate would have a right of first refusal.79 Mr. Berlin
70. Id. at 1131.
71. Mady 1, 976 So. 2d at 1215.
72. Dufresne, 975 So. 2d at 557.
73. 983 So. 2d 620, 625 (Ha. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
74. Mady II, 59 So. 3d at 1131.
75. Id. at 1133-34. How would the Supreme Court of Florida have ruled, had the parties,
without resort to the offer of judgment procedure with the court retaining jurisdiction, merely
settled the dispute and dismissed the action-a situation not before the court? The court did
note a distinction between the offer of judgment situation with the court retaining jurisdiction,
on the one hand, and a settlement by the parties prior to the filing suit, on the other. Id. at
1133.
76. Id. at 1137 (Canady, J., dissenting).
77. Pecora v. Berlin, 62 So. 3d 28, 29 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
78. Id. at 31.
79. Id.
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and Mr. Pecora "died on the same day, within hours of each other," and al-
though the opinion does not state who died first, Mrs. Pecora, "as the surviv-
ing spouse of Mr. Pecora, became the owner" of his ownership interest in the
Signature Entities.o Mr. Berlin's ownership interests passed to his estate,
and his personal representative requested that a receiver be appointed to dis-
pose of the Signature Entities' assets and dissolve the entities.8 ' Eventually,
after one receiver had been appointed to replace several temporary receivers
to manage and sell the assets of the Signature Entities, Mrs. Pecora asserted
the right of first refusal set out in the distribution agreement when that re-
ceiver sought to sell Signature Grand.82 Mrs. Pecora had already lost on a
similar claim with respect to Signature Gardens Ltd., the trial court holding
that she did not have a right of first refusal under the circumstances pre-
sented, and she had not appealed any of the orders related to that ruling.83
The receiver opposed her present claim to a right of first refusal, moved for
summary judgment, and the trial court granted summary judgment in favor
of the receiver, again ruling that Mrs. Pecora did not have a right of first re-
fusal with respect to a sale by a receiver.m The issue presented to the court
was whether the right of first refusal as set out in the distribution agreement
remained effective in the face of a court-supervised sale by a court appointed
receiver.85 Describing the issue as one of first impression in Florida, the
Third District Court of Appeal, after citing numerous analogous cases in
other jurisdictions, decided that the right of first refusal did not apply. 86 "The
plain language of the Distribution Agreement compels a conclusion that the
right of first refusal does not apply in a dissolution action where the court-
appointed receiver is procuring the sale of corporate assets. The receiver, not
the survivor or the personal representative, is the procuring party . . . ."8 If
the parties wanted the right of first refusal to apply in the event of a dissolu-
tion of the corporation or to other involuntary proceedings, or where a third
party has found a buyer, the "[a]greement could have so provided."
80. Id. at 29, 34.
81. See id. at 29.
82. Pecora, 62 So. 3d at 29-30.
83. See id. at 30.
84. Id. at 31.
85. Id.
86. See id. at 31-35 (citations omitted).
87. Pecora, 62 So. 3d at 35.
88. Id.
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VI. CONTRACTS
A. Election of Remedies
Mr. Pakalski (Seller) and CFC Pasadena Golf, LLC (Buyer) entered into
a real estate contract." The "preprinted form" contract provided that Buyer
was to make a pre-closing first deposit of $5000 plus-as provided in a sec-
tion for additional terms-another deposit of $150,000.90 The additional
terms section described the $150,000 payment as a nonrefundable additional
deposit that was to be immediately released to Seller.91 After having made
both deposits, Buyer breached the contract.9 2 The contract provided that in
the event of breach by Buyer, Seller had the option of collecting and retain-
ing all deposits, "as liquidated damages," or could sue for specific perfor-
mance. 93 Seller, having left the original $5000 of the deposit in escrow, sued
Buyer for specific performance. 94 Buyer sought dismissal of the action, and
the trial court dismissed the action, with prejudice, agreeing with Buyer that
Seller's retention of the $150,000 deposit amounted to an election of reme-
dies that prevented Seller's suit for specific performance.9' Seller appealed,
and the Second District Court of Appeal, relying on Bilow v. Benoit,96 re-
versed and remanded. 97 Seller did not make an election to waive its right to
specific performance "simply by accepting and retaining the [$150,000 addi-
tional] deposit as contemplated in the provision added to ... the parties' con-
tract."98
In Plumbing Service Co. v. Progressive Plumbing, Inc.,99 another elec-
tion of remedies case, The Plumbing Service Company (Sub-subcontractor)
sued Progressive Plumbing, Incorporated, (Subcontractor), alleging that Sub-
contractor prevented Sub-subcontractor from completing work on a condo-
minium project, allowing Sub-subcontractor to finish only 15 of 230 units
89. Pakalski v. CFC Pasadena Golf, L.L.C., 42 So. 3d 869, 869 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
2010).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 870.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Pakalski, 42 So. 3d at 870.
95. See id. at 870. The trial court, in dismissing the second amended complaint with
prejudice, pointed out that based on the contract there was no point in trying to amend the
complaint. See id.
96. 519 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
97. Pakalski, 42 So. 3d at 870-71.
98. Id. at 870.
99. 46 So. 3d 144 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
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contemplated by their agreement.'" Sub-subcontractor collected in full from
Subcontractor's surety-in an action brought under chapter 713 of the Flori-
da Statutes-for Sub-subcontractor's work on the fifteen completed units.'o
In this regard, Subcontractor did not dispute that the work subject to the
chapter 713 action was completed by Sub-subcontractor. 0 2 Subcontractor
did, however, in Sub-subcontractor's suit against Subcontractor seeking to
recover lost profits on the remaining units, dispute "the existence of a bind-
ing contract" and, in addition, contended that Sub-subcontractor was barred
from collecting lost profits from Subcontractor under "[t]he election of re-
medies doctrine."1 03 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
Subcontractor on the election of remedies theory and it was this order that
was before the Fifth District Court of Appeal.'" What the trial court ruled,
was that Sub-subcontractor, by collecting "the reasonable value" of its ser-
vices and materials from the surety, had elected its remedy and could not
attempt to collect from Subcontractor.05 The Fifth District Court of Appeal
reversed.106 Pursuing one remedy does not necessarily prevent the pursuance
of others."0" There were two scenarios under which the election of remedies
doctrine could have been invoked, but neither applied here.0 s If a plaintiff
receives complete satisfaction in an earlier action, then the plaintiff cannot
get a double recovery in a later action.' 09 Here, Sub-subcontractor could not
have recovered, under chapter 713, for lost profits from the surety, so that
scenario was inapplicable."0 The other scenario would have required Sub-
subcontractor to have sued Subcontractor for the reasonable value of the ser-
vices or materials provided by Sub-subcontractor; that is, sued in quantum
meruit."' Had that been the case, the action against Subcontractor would
have been barred since Sub-subcontractor would have, under the election of
remedies doctrine, waived its right to lost profits and Sub-subcontractor
could not again have recovered what it had already recovered from the sure-
ty.112
100. See id. at 145.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. (quoting Barbe v. Villeneuve, 505 So. 2d 1331, 1332 (Fla. 1987)).
104. Plumbing Serv. Co., 46 So. 3d at 145.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 146.
107. Id.
108. See id.
109. Plumbing Serv. Co., 46 So. 3d at 146.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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B. Subcontractor as Third-Party Beneficiary of a Contract
Mustapick Companies, Incorporated (General Contractor) and Mr. and
Mrs. Esposito (Property Owners) were parties to a contract (Primary Con-
tract) for the construction of a home.113 General Contractor in turn engaged
True Color Enterprises Construction, Incorporated (Subcontractor) to do the
painting work on the house.' 14 Property Owners sued Subcontractor alleging
that Subcontractor's negligence enabled an arsonist to enter the premises
"during the night and set fires" to the home causing damage to the premis-
es.115 The trial court dismissed the action, agreeing with Subcontractor's
argument that it was the "third-party beneficiary" of the particular provision
contained in the Primary Contract under which Subcontractor "claimed pro-
tection" from the allegations against it.' 6 Property Owners appealed and
Subcontractor cited Mullray v. Aire-Lok Co."' in support of its position that
it was an intended third-party beneficiary of the Primary Contract."' The
Fourth District Court of Appeal found this case to be of no help to Subcon-
tractor.19 Although Mullray can stand for the proposition that the owners of
property can sustain an action for negligence against subcontractors, that
does not mean that subcontractors become third-party beneficiaries of the
main contract. 20 Subcontractor failed the intended third-party beneficiary
test, which requires a clearly expressed intent to that effect on the part of
both parties to the contract.'2 '
C. Enforcement of a Contract by or Against an Unlicensed Subcontractor
The numerous amendments over the past decade to several statutes
dealing with enforcement of contracts by or against unlicensed contractors
do not appear to have reduced the uncertainty in this area. For example, in
one case involving a subcontractor, the trial court declined to enforce a build-
113. Esposito v. True Color Enters. Constr., Inc., 45 So. 3d 554, 555 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2010).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. The opinion does not specify what the terms of the contract were on which Sub-
contractor relied and sought to have applied to itself as a third-party beneficiary. See id. at
556.
117. 216 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
118. Esposito, 45 So. 3d at 555-56.
119. Id. at 556.
120. Compare id. at 557, with Mullray, 216 So. 2d at 801, 803.
121. Esposito, 45 So. 3d at 555-56.
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ing subcontractor's contract against its contractor.122  The Third District
Court of Appeal reversed.123 The subcontractor did not have "a specialty
contractor's license as required by the Miami-Dade County Code of Ordin-
ances (MDCO)." 24 Failure to have the license subjected the subcontractor to
various monetary and other penalties under the MDCO, but denial of enfor-
ceability of contracts was not among them.125 Although the Third District
Court of Appeal quoted the Supreme Court of Florida as stating that
"'[w]here a statute pronounces a penalty for an act, a contract founded upon
such act is void, although the statute does not pronounce it void or expressly
prohibit it,"' 26 the Third District Court of Appeal, relying mainly on Corbin
on Contracts127 and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,12 8 decided that a
contractual party who is unlicensed-in violation of an ordinance that pro-
vides penalties but is silent as to the violation's effect on the enforceability of
the underlying contract-is not automatically precluded from a remedy for
breach of contract.129 In those cases, the trial court must engage in fact find-
ing-as detailed in this opinion-to determine if the unlicensed plaintiff
should be allowed to proceed.'3o
In another case, T & G Corporation (Contractor) sued an unlicensed
contractor, Earth Trades, Incorporated (Subcontractor), for breach of con-
tract.131 The trial judge ruled in favor of Contractor.132 Subcontractor ap-
pealed, claiming that the trial judge should have allowed it to raise, as an
affirmative defense to enforcement of the contract by Contractor, knowledge
on the part of Contractor of Subcontractor's "lack of a license." 3 3 The Fifth
District Court of Appeal noted that Contractor's knowledge of the lack of a
license was in dispute, but under the pertinent statute, section 489.128 of the
Florida Statutes, as amended effective June 25, 2003, "a contract with an
unlicensed contractor was unenforceable only by the unlicensed contrac-
tor." 13
122. MGM Constr. Servs. Corp. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., 57 So. 3d 884, 885
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 886.
126. Id. at 887 (quoting Town of Boca Raton v. Raulerson, 146 So. 576, 577 (Fla. 1933)).
127. 15 GRACE MCLANE GIESEL, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 88.3 (rev. ed. 2003).
128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 181 (1981).
129. MGM Constr. Servs. Corp., 57 So. 3d at 889.
130. See id. at 890.
131. Earth Trades, Inc. v. T & G Corp., 42 So. 3d 929, 930 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 489.128 (2011).
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However, the Third District Court of Appeal, in a case where the con-
tractor and the subcontractor each defended against claims by the other on
the ground "that the other was an unlicensed contractor under section
489.128," concluded that summary judgment was improper because of "ge-
nuine issues of material fact," and included among the list of disputed facts
was "the parties' knowledge of each other's lack of licensure."l35
In yet another case, the contractor-vendor (MMII) contracted with the
Silvesters (Buyers) for the purchase and installation of an audio entertain-
ment system in Buyers' home. 136 After the installation was completed, Buy-
ers refused to pay claiming that "MMII was an unlicensed contractor" and
the contract was thus unenforceable.137 The trial court agreed with Buyers.'
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed. 139 "[T]here is no licensure
requirement for selling and installing entertainment systems." 40 The trial
court misinterpreted sections 489.105(3) and 489.505(12) of the Florida Sta-
tutes.141 MMII was neither a contractor nor an electrical contractor in the
statutory sense.14 2 The limited electrical work performed by MMII was inci-
dental to its entertainment system sales and installation.14 3
However, in another case involving electrical work, the Third District
Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's determination that the subcontrac-
tor, an installer of a digital satellite system, did need a license and thus could
not enforce its contract against the contractor.'" It should be noted that this
was an appeal of a summary judgment and in affirming the trial court's deci-
sion, the district court agreed that the subcontractor had failed to demonstrate
there were disputed issues of material fact.145 Judge Salter dissented, relying
135. Austin Bldg. Co. v. Rago, Ltd., 63 So. 3d 31, 33 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
136. MMII, Inc. v. Silvester, 42 So. 3d 876, 877 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (per cu-
riam). This case differed from the other cases reported in this Survey in that the dispute was
not between the contractor and the subcontractor, but rather, was between the buyer and the
contractor. Compare id., with Austin Bldg. Co., 63 So. 3d at 33. It is submitted that whether
or not this is a distinction without a difference is not entirely clear. See Master Tech Satellite,
Inc. v. Mastec N. Am., Inc., 49 So. 3d 789, 795 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (Salter, J., dis-
senting) (per curiam).
137. MMII, Inc., 42 So. 3d at 877.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 878.
140. Id. at 877.
141. Id.; FLA. STAT. §§ 489.105(3), 505(12) (2011).
142. MMII, Inc., 42 So. 3d at 877.
143. Id.
144. Master Tech Satellite, Inc. v. Mastec N. Am., Inc., 49 So. 3d 789, 790-91 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (per curiam).
145. Id. at 791.
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in part on the Fourth District Court of Appeal decision 4 6 in MMII, Inc. v.
Silvester.'47
D. Implied Warranties of Habitability, Fitness, and Merchantability as
Applied to Real Estate Improvements to Common Areas
In Lakeview Reserve Homeowners v. Maronda Homes, Inc.,'148 Lake-
view Reserve Homeowners Association, Incorporated (Association) sued
Maronda Homes, Incorporated (Developer) alleging certain defects in De-
veloper's construction of a water drainage system, private roadways, reten-
tion ponds, and pipes located underground.149 The theory supporting Associ-
ation's suit was "breach of the common law implied warranties of fitness and
merchantability, also referred to as a warranty of habitability."5 o The trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of Developer, relying on Conklin
v. Hurley'5 ' and Port Sewall Harbor & Tennis Club Owners Ass'n v. First
Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n of Martin County,'52 and Association ap-
pealed.'53 Amicus curiae briefs were filed on behalf of Developer by Florida
Home Builders Association and on behalf of Association by Community
Associations Institute. 154 Developer contended that the water drainage sys-
tem, private roadways, retention ponds, and pipes located underground did
"not immediately support the residences" and that the common law implied
warranties of fitness and merchantability did not apply to structures "not
immediately support[ing] the residences."' 5 After reviewing the evolving
application of the rule of caveat emptor to home construction, and consider-
ing the facts and holdings of Conklin and Port Sewall Harbor & Tennis Club
Owners Ass'n, the Fifth District Court of Appeal announced its test for de-
termining if the common law implied warranty of habitability would apply
under the facts presented in this case as to whether "in the absence of the
146. Id. at 795 (Salter, J., dissenting).
147. 42 So. 3d 876 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (per curiam).
148. 48 So. 3d 902 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2010), review granted, 58 So. 3d 261 (Fla.
2011).
149. Id. at 904.
150. Id. at 903-04.
151. 428 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1983).
152. 463 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
153. Lakeview, 48 So. 3d at 903-04.
154. Brief for Florida Home Builders Ass'n as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellee, Lake-
view Reserve Homeowners v. Maronda Homes, Inc., 48 So. 3d 902 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
2010), review granted, 58 So. 3d 261 (Fla. 2011); Brief for Community Ass'ns Institute as
Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant, Lakeview Reserve Homeowners v. Maronda Homes,
Inc., 48 So. 3d 902 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2010), review granted, 58 So. 3d 261 (Fla. 2011).
155. Lakeview, 48 So. 3d at 904.
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service, is the home inhabitable, that is, is it an improvement providing a
service essential to the habitability of the home? If it is, then the implied
warranties apply."l5 6 The court went on to hold that the "warranties of fit-
ness for a particular purpose, habitability, and merchantability apply to struc-
tures in [the] common areas . . . [if they] immediately support the residence
in the form of essential services."' Thus, the Fifth District Court of Appeal
interpreted the Supreme Court of Florida's classification of improvements
"immediately supporting the residence" as stated in Conklin, as including
those "services essential to . .. habitability" such as a water drainage system,
private roadways, retention ponds, and pipes located underground.' 8 The
Fifth District Court of Appeal certified conflict with the Fourth District Court
of Appeal in Port Sewall Harbor & Tennis Club Owners Ass'n.'" The Su-
preme Court of Florida accepted jurisdiction and several briefs on the merits
have been filed by the parties and amicus curiae.'
VII. EMPLOYMENT LAW
A. Non-Compete Agreement Enforced with Respect to Unsolicited
Customer
In Hilb Rogal & Hobbs of Florida, Inc. v. Grimmel,161 the Fourth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal reinstated a temporary injunction that had been dis-
solved by the trial court.162 The case makes it clear that a former employee
may be prohibited by the terms of a valid non-compete agreement from "ac-
cepting an invitation from" an unsolicited customer of the former employer
to do work for the customer.16 3 The Fourth District Court of Appeal held that
the general magistrate's "finding of no legitimate business interest [under
section 542.335 of the Florida Statutes was] clearly erroneous."'6" This find-
ing was adopted by the trial court initially, and reaffirmed in its decision
after a hearing held after remand from an appeal to the Fourth District Court
of Appeal.16 5 In addition, the public interest requirement for granting of a
156. Id. at 907-09.
157. Id. at 909.
158. Conklin v. Hurley, 428 So. 2d. 654, 655 (Fla. 1983); Lakeview, 48 So. 3d at 909.
159. Lakeview, 48 So. 3d at 909.
160. See Maronda Homes, Inc. v. Lakeview Reserve Homeowners Ass'n, Nos. SC1O-
2292, SCIO-2336, 2011 WL 1537263, at *1 (Fla. Apr. 20, 2011) (unpublished table decision).
161. 48 So. 3d 957 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
162. Id. at 962.
163. Id. at 961.
164. Id. at 959, 961; FLA. STAT. § 542.335 (2011).
165. Grimmel, 48 So. 3d at 959, 962.
[Vol. 3652
54
Nova Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol36/iss1/1
FLORIDA LAW AFFECTING BUSINESS OWNERS
temporary injunction was satisfied because "'the public has a cognizable
interest in the protection and enforcement of contractual rights."" 66 Thus,
the former employee would have to have shown that public policy considera-
tions against enforcement substantially outweighed the interests established
by the former employer who sought to enforce the covenant.'67 The district
court held that "[t]he fact that the customers will have to use a different in-
surance broker does not make the enforcement of this agreement against pub-
lic policy."'
B. Temporary Injunction Denied: Grandparent Corporation Could Not
Enforce Pre-Existing Non-Compete Agreement Between Newly Ac-
quired (Sub-subsidiary) Corporation and Newly Acquired Corpora-
tion's Former Employee
Mr. Kimbler (Former Alltel Employee) was employed by AlItel Corpo-
ration (Alltel) and in 2002, signed a "nondisclosure and nonsolicitation
agreement" (Non-Compete Agreement) with "Alltel or any of its affiliated
companies."" While Alltel and Cellco Partnership (Cellco) "were competi-
tors, not affiliated companies," when the Non-Compete Agreement was
signed in 2002, in 2008, Alitel and Cellco entered into what was described as
a "merger transaction" pursuant to a "plan of merger (reverse merger
plan)."o As a result of the "merger" in 2009, Former Alltel Employee brief-
ly became a Verizon employee, but within six months, went to work for
Sprint/Nextel (New Employer).' 7' Within a short time thereafter, Cellco
instituted its action against Former Alltel Employee, alleging that Former
Alltel Employee provided New Employer with valuable Alltel customer in-
formation, and Cellco sought an injunction against Former Alltel Employee
based on the agreement with Alltel." The trial court denied the request, and
166. Id. at 962 (quoting Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Acevedo, No. 08-21808-CIV, 2008 WL
2940667, at *6 (S.D. Fla. July 28, 2008)). The Fourth District Court of Appeal stated that to
uphold a temporary injunction, the former employer would have to prove .'(1) the likelihood
of irreparable harm, (2) the unavailability of an adequate remedy at law, (3) a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits, and (4) that a temporary injunction will serve the public
interest."' Id. at 959 (quoting Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Carter, 9 So. 3d 1258, 1261 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 2009)).
167. See id. at 962 (citing Pitney Bowes, Inc., 2008 WL 2940667, at *6).
168. Id.
169. Cellco P'ship v. Kimbler, 68 So. 3d 914, 916 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
170. Id. at 915-16.
17 1. Id.
172. Id. at 916.
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the second district court affirmed.173 The Non-Compete Agreement was not
assigned by Alltel to Cellco and did not contain an assignment clause.174
Alltel still held the rights under the agreement with Former Alltel Em-
ployee.175 The second district upheld the trial court's findings that Alltel no
longer had a Florida retail cell phone business or Florida customer accounts,
and concluded that "Alltel assigned its Florida customer contracts to Cell-
co."l76 Alltel's going out of the retail cell phone business in Florida was a
defense to the alleged breach of the restrictive covenant, there no longer be-
ing a legitimate business interest to protect. 1 Cellco could not enforce the
Non-Compete Agreement because Cellco could not have been an affiliate of
Alltel when the agreement was signed because they were in fact then com-
petitors. 7 1
The Second District Court of Appeal acknowledged that section
542.335(1)(f) of the Florida Statutes does permit a nonparty to enforce a
covenant in certain circumstances.'79 A third party may enforce a restrictive
covenant when the "third-party beneficiary of the contract or an assignee or
successor ... is expressly named and authorized to enforce the [contract]."'18
The district court continued, "[a]nd here, the undisputed evidence was that
Alltel and Cellco did not merge and that Alltel did not assign the restrictive
covenant rights to Cellco. . . . Further, Cellco and Alltel are separate legal
entities, and as such, Cellco-the parent corporation-cannot 'exercise the
rights of its subsidiary. 8'
Although the mechanics and details of the transaction were not set forth
in the opinion, the Second District Court of Appeal said that at the time the
"merger" became effective in 2009, "Alltel assigned its Florida customer
contracts to Cellco."l 82 However, at the conclusion of its opinion, the Second
District Court of Appeal held that Cellco was not an "assignee, or successor
in interest to the Alltel [former employee]" and, as noted, that "Alltel and
Cellco did not merge." 83 In order to fully appreciate the court's holding, it is
important to emphasize what the district court noted in a footnote: "Cellco
173. Id. at 916, 918.
174. Cellco P'ship, 68 So. 3d at 916.
175. Id. at 917.
176. Id. at 916.
177. Id. at 917.
178. Id.
179. Cellco P'ship, 68 So. 3d at 917; FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(f) (2011).
180. Celico P'ship, 68 So. 3d at 917 (citing FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(f)).
181. Id. at 917-18 (quoting Am. Int'l Grp., Inc. v. Cornerstone Buss., 872 So. 2d 333, 336
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004)).
182. Id. at 916.
183. Id. at 917-18.
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owns AirTouch Cellular, a nonparty to this action. In turn, AirTouch is the
100% owner of Alltel. But Cellco and Alltel remain separate legal enti-
ties."'8 4 With that in mind, the reason the district court affirmed the trial
court's denial of the injunction becomes clearer.
C. Employer Held Immune from Negligence Action by Borrowed Employee
In Fossett v. Southeast Toyota Distributors, LLC,'18 Ivy Fossett (Em-
ployee) was employed by Adecco, a help supply services company.18 6 Adec-
co contracted with Southeast Toyota Distributors, LLC (SET) for Em-
ployee's services.'87  Employee was seriously injured while on the job at
SET.'18  Although Employee settled her workers' compensation claim
against Adecco, she also sued SET, alleging negligence.'89 The trial court
granted SET's motion for summary judgment, and Employee appealed.'
SET, relying on section 440.11 of the Florida Statutes, claimed immunity
"from liability for simple negligence [with respect] to any Adecco employee
injured doing SET's work," that is, immunity by virtue of the workers' com-
pensation statute.' 9' In order to be shielded from liability, SET had to show
that Employee was subject to its general supervision.192 Employee claimed
that no one at SET supervised her, that is, that "she never received instruc-
tion from SET on how to do her job."'93 She also testified that she worked at
SET under the supervision of another Adecco employee.194 However, SET
184. Id. at 916 n.1.
185. 60 So. 3d 1155 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
186. Id. at 1156.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Fossett, 60 So. 3d at 1156.
191. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 440.11(2) (2011)).
192. Id. at 157-58 (citing FLA. STAT. § 440.11(2)).
193. Id. at 1158.
194. Id. The First District Court of Appeal referred to the help supplied as being paid by
the company supplying the help "but is under the direct or general supervision of the business
to whom the help is furnished." Fossett, 60 So. 3d at 1157 (quoting St. Lucie Falls Prop.
Owners Ass'n v. Morelli, 956 So. 2d 1283, 1285 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007)). The district
court noted that "[t]he 'general supervision' section 440.11(2) contemplates, in incorporating
OSHA Standard Industry Code Industry Number 7363, is the legal power to direct." Id. at
1158. Thus, the First District Court of Appeal made it clear that the determination in the case
before it did not turn on who was in direct supervision "of the work of the help supply servic-
es company employee," as argued by Employee, but rather who had the "power to control"
and supervise the work of the Employee. Id. As stated by the district court, "[tihe present
case turns on 'general supervision,' not 'direct supervision."' Id.
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had the right to supervise and to control-and that controlled.195 The extent
of the exercise of that right was "immaterial" and the district court af-
firmed.'16
VIII. FIDUCIARY DUTY AND GOVERNANCE
The litigation that gave rise to the matter before the Supreme Court of
Florida in Wendt v. La Costa Beach Resort Condominium Ass'n, Inc. (Wendt
II),'7 was La Costa Beach Resort Condominium Association, Incorporated's
(Association's) lawsuit that alleged breach of fiduciary duty on the part of
certain directors of Association. 98 After a verdict was rendered in Associa-
tion's breach of fiduciary case, "the directors moved for a new trial," and
they also filed a separate action against Association seeking indemnifica-
tion-under section 607.0850 of the Florida Statutes-for expenses the di-
rectors had incurred in defending against Association's breach of fiduciary
claims.'" The trial court dismissed the indemnification complaint with pre-
judice, the directors appealed, and the trial court's dismissal was upheld by
the Fourth District Court of Appeal.2 00 However, the Fourth District Court of
Appeal had noted conflict 20 1 between its decision in Wendt v. La Costa Beach
Resort Condominium Ass'n, Inc. (Wendt 1)202 and the decision of the First
District Court of Appeal in Turkey Creek Master Owners Ass'n. v. Hope.203
Section 607.0850 of the Florida Statutes directs corporations, under certain
circumstances, to indemnify its officers' and directors' expenses incurred in
legal proceedings arising from their positions. 204 The issue was whether sec-
tion 607.0850 covers the situation where the corporation sues its own direc-
tors.205 The Supreme Court of Florida agreed with the First District Court of
Appeal which had answered the question in the affirmative, and the Supreme
Court of Florida thus quashed the opinion of the fourth district. 206 The plain
language of the statute does not forbid indemnification in such cases.207
195. Id.
196. Fossett, 60 So. 3d at 1158.
197. 64 So. 3d 1288 (Fla. 2011) (per curiam).
198. Id. at 1229.
199. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 607.0850 (2011)).
200. Id.
201. See id.
202. 14 So. 3d 1179 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009), quashed by 64 So. 3d 1228 (Fla. 2011).
203. 766 So. 2d 1245, 1247 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (per curiam).
204. FLA. STAT. § 607.0850.
205. Wendt 11, 64 So. 3d 1228, 1229 (Fla. 2011) (per curiam).
206. Id. at 1231.
207. Id.
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However, the court "expressly [did] not reach the merits of whether indemni-
fication is applicable under the facts of [the] case."208 Justice Quince dis-
sented.20
On June 9, 2011, the same day as the Supreme Court of Florida issued
its opinion in Wendt 11,210 the court rendered its decision in Banco Industrial
de Venezuela C.A. v. de Saad.2 1' The decision of the Third District Court of
Appeal, discussed in the 2009-2010 Survey of Florida Law Affecting Busi-
ness Owners, in some detail, was quashed.212 There were two main issues
involved; one, the indemnification issue, and the other, a breach of contract
issue.213 With respect to the indemnification claim by de Saad (Offic-
er/Employee)-as she was referred to in the 2009-2010 Survey of Florida
Law Affecting Business Owners-the Supreme Court of Florida set forth
several reasons why the indemnification by Banco Industrial De Venezuela
C.A., Miami Agency (Bank) was not available to Officer/Employee.2 14 First,
the court held that section 607.0850 of the Florida Statutes did not apply to
the corporate entity against which Officer/Employee made the claim since
Bank was a foreign corporation-a Venezuelan bank that had been autho-
rized to do business in the state of Florida.215 The court pointed out that even
though foreign corporations authorized to do business in Florida have sub-
stantially the same rights and obligations as domestic corporations, there are
exceptions, and one exception is that under section 607.1505(3) of the Flori-
da Statutes, Florida may not regulate the "internal affairs of a foreign corpo-
ration" even though the corporation has been authorized to do business in
Florida.2 16 The Supreme Court of Florida held that "[c]orporate indemnifica-
tion is one such matter of internal affairs." 2 17 Officer/Employee argued that
208. Id.
209. Id. (Quince, J., dissenting).
210. Wendt 11, 64 So. 3d at 1228.
211. 68 So. 3d 895, 901 (Fla. 2011).
212. Id. at 901; see Barbara Landau, 2009-2010 Survey of Florida Iaw Affecting Business
Owners, 35 NOVA L. REV. 1, 9-11 (2010) [hereinafter Landau, 2009-2010 Survey of Florida
Law Affecting Business Owners].
213. Banco, 68 So. 3d at 897. The summary judgment awarding Officer/Employee
$1,058,023.82 was quashed, and the Supreme Court of Florida held that Bank "did not breach
the employment contract by keeping [Officer/Employer] on unpaid suspension." Id. at 901.
The court quashed the third district's decision, and remanded "for entry of final judgment in
favor of [Bank]." Id.
214. Id. at 898-900; see Landau, 2009-2010 Survey of Florida Law Affecting Business
Owners, supra note 212, at 9-11.
215. Banco, 68 So. 3d at 898-99.
216. Id. at 898 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 607.1505(3) (2011)).
217. Id. (citing Chatlos Found., Inc. v. D'Arata, 882 So. 2d 1021, 1023 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 2004)).
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Bank made section 607.0850 applicable to itself when it entered into an em-
ployment agreement with Officer/Employee that contained a Florida choice
of law provision.218 The Supreme Court of Florida dealt with that argument
by pointing out that in making Florida law the applicable law, Bank, as a
foreign corporation was under the express language of the Florida statute and
"not subject to regulation" by Florida with respect to its internal affairs.2 19
The court did not end its analysis of the indemnification issue there, howev-
er.22 0 Rather, the court held that even if the foreign corporation was subject
to the indemnification statute, Officer/Employee did not satisfy the statutory
requirements for indemnification. 22' The court emphasized the "by reason of
the fact" language of section 607.0850(1); that is, that the person must have
been a party "by reason of the fact" of his status as an officer or employee.22 2
The court noted that Officer/Employee "was not prosecuted 'by reason of the
fact' that she was a corporate officer . . . . [S]he was prosecuted for her con-
duct, not on account of her position. This conduct was not required by her
position as a corporate officer and was, in fact, contrary to corporate poli-
cy." 22
3
IX. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
A. Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet
Two Worlds United (Plaintiff) had its principal place of business in
Tampa.224 Plaintiff sued a California resident, Mr. Zylstra (Defendant), and
others, claiming that Defendant "posted defamatory statements [about Plain-
tiff] on a website owned and operated by [Defendant]."225 Defendant con-
tested the Florida court's personal jurisdiction over him by filing an affidavit
stating that his solely owned corporation owned the website and that he did
not personally post anything on the website regarding Plaintiff.2 26 Plaintiff
did not rebut Defendant's affidavit, and Defendant was thus protected by the
corporate shield doctrine.227 Plaintiff relied on Internet Solutions Corp. v.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 898-99.
220. Banco, 68 So. 3d at 899.
221. Id.
222. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 607.0850(1) (2011).
223. Banco, 68 So. 3d at 900 (citations omitted).
224. Two Worlds United v. Zylstra, 46 So. 3d 1175, 1176 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1177-78.
227. Id. at 1178 (citing Doe v. Thompson, 620 So. 2d 1004, 1006 (Fla. 1993)).
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Marshall,2 8 but the Second District Court of Appeal found Plaintiffs re-
liance on Internet Solutions Corp. misplaced because there, "the nonresident
owner and operator of the website personally posted defamatory statements
regarding the plaintiff" in that case.229 In addition, the district court pointed
out that the corporate shield doctrine was not addressed in the Internet Solu-
tions Corp. decision.230 Plaintiff also lost on the issue regarding section
48.193(2) "'substantial and not isolated activity"' in Florida because Defen-
dant "testified that he ha[d] not lived in Florida since 1994" and visited "only
a few times a year to [see] family and friends." 2 3' These, under Radcliffe v.
Gyves,232 the court said, were insufficient contacts to satisfy personal juris-
diction requirements under section 48.193(2).233 Finally, Defendant's at-
tempt to recover his attorney fees under section 57.105 of the Florida Sta-
tutes did not amount to a waiver of the defense of lack of personal jurisdic-
tion.234 The motion for fees "was defensive and did not seek affirmative re-
lief."235
In a case involving a complaint for violation of the Florida Securities
and Investor Protection Act,236 Mr. Elias (Plaintiff) alleged that Enzyme En-
vironmental Solutions, Inc. (Defendant Corporation) was "a Nevada corpora-
tion, located in . . . Indiana, [but] conducting business in . . .Florida." 2 37 The
individual defendants were officers of the Defendant Corporation.238 One of
the individual defendants stated "that he live[d] in Indiana and ha[d] never
resided, worked, or operated a business in Florida." 239 He also stated that
"[h]e [did] not have a telephone, post office box, or office in Florida."2 40 The
other individual defendant's declaration was similar, but, "he lived in Florida
from 1988 until 1990.",241 Plaintiff alleged that he was the victim of a securi-
ties "pump and dump" fraud perpetrated via the Internet. 242 The individual
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
197-98
235.
236.
237.
2011).
238.
239.
39 So. 3d 1201 (Fla. 2010).
Two Worlds United, 46 So. 3d at 1178.
Id.
Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 48.193 (2) (2011)).
902 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
Two Worlds United, 46 So. 3d at 1178 (citing Radcliffe, 902 So. 2d at 972 n.4).
Id. at 1177; FLA. STAT. § 57.105 (2005); see Heineken v. Heineken, 683 So. 2d 194,
(Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
Two Worlds United, 46 So. 3d at 1177.
FLA. STAT. § 517.011 (2011).
Enzyme Envtl. Solutions, Inc. v. Elias, 60 So. 3d 1158, 1159 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
Id. at 1159-60.
Id. at 160.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Elias, 60 So. 3d at 1160.
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defendants argued that they did not have sufficient minimum contacts with
Florida "to comport with due process," and the appellate court agreed with
them.243
In the instant case, there is no evidence that the false state-
ments were purposefully directed toward the residents of Florida.
Assuming the defendants were actually trying to "pump and
dump" their stock, they were targeting anyone and everyone who
might go on the Internet to read about stocks on websites that pub-
lish information about stocks. 24
The two cases just discussed involved jurisdiction and the Internet.245
The next case also involved the Internet, and even though the appellant had
"filed a notice of voluntary dismissal," the Fourth District Court of Appeal
stated it decided not to dismiss "[b]ecause we believe that this case involves
an issue of great public importance." 246 Instead of dismissing, the Fourth
District Court of Appeal, in Caiazzo v. American Royal Arts Corp.,247 re-
viewed the subject of personal jurisdiction under Florida law and then dis-
cussed the application of the law to the Internet.248 The court cited Zippo
Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.,249 as a leading case dealing with
how an internet site affects personal jurisdiction.250 Zippo Manufacturing
Co.'s analysis placed the site owner on a spectrum of commercial interactivi-
ty ranging from passive to active and/or clearly doing business. 25' However,
the Fourth District Court of Appeal, while acknowledging that "a clear ma-
jority of federal courts ha[ve] adopted the Zippo [Manufacturing Co.] analyt-
ical framework," rejected it as controlling in Florida.252 The district court
concluded that doing business over the Internet did not fundamentally
change Florida's analysis under section 48.193(1)-as to specific jurisdic-
tion-and section 48.193(2)-as to general jurisdiction-in determining the
existence of minimum contacts for due process purposes as applied to specif-
ic jurisdiction determinations or in determining the existence of minimum
243. Id. at 1161.
244. Id. at 1162.
245. See Two Worlds United v. Zylstra, 46 So. 3d 1175, 1176 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
2010); Elias, 60 So. 3d at 1160.
246. Caiazzo v. Am. Royal Arts Corp., 36 Ha. L. Weekly D 1l74, D1174 (4th Dist. Ct.
App. June 1, 2011) (per curiam).
247. 36 Fla. L. Weekly D 1174 (4th Dist. Ct. App. June 1, 2011) (per curiam).
248. See id. at DI 174-77.
249. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
250. Caiazzo, 36 Fla. L. Weekly at DI 176 (citing Zippo Mfg. Co., 952 F. Supp. at 1124).
251. Id. (citing Zippo Mfg. Co., 952 F. Supp. at 1124).
252. Id.
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contacts in the general jurisdiction context.253 The district court stated that
with respect to minimum contacts, "we choose to continue to apply a tradi-
tional minimum contacts analysis in personal jurisdiction questions, whether
or not the [I]nternet is involved." 254
B. Venue-Joint Residency Rule Did Not Apply
In Pill ex rel. Estate of Bassali v. Merco Group of the Palm Beaches,
Inc.,255 there were corporate and individual defendants located in Miami-
Dade County.256 The defendants were sued in Palm Beach County where the
cause of action accrued. 257 The defendants successfully moved the trial court
to transfer venue to Miami-Dade County citing the joint residency venue
rule.258 The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that venue
was properly laid in Palm Beach County.259 Section 47.011 of the Florida
Statutes allows the plaintiff to choose as venue "'the county where the de-
fendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property
[subject to] litigation is located."' 260 The joint residency rule requires venue
"in the county where . . . individual . . . and corporate defendant[s] share a
residence, [provided that it] is also the [county] where the cause of action
accrued."26' In other words, "the joint residency rule applies only when ve-
nue is based upon residency."262 In this case, the cause of action accrued in
Palm Beach County, which the plaintiff was permitted to choose as the venue
under section 47.011, notwithstanding the joint residency of the defen-
dants.263
253. See id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 48.193 (2011); Internet Solutions Corp. v. Marshall, 39
So. 3d 1201, 1216 n.11 (Fla. 2010); Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So. 2d 499, 502
(Fla. 1989); Renaissance Health Publ'g, L.L.C. v. Resveratrol Partners, L.L.C., 982 So. 2d
739, 742 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008)).
254. Id. at DI177.
255. 56 So. 3d 890 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
256. Id. at 891.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 892.
260. Pill ex rel. Estate of Bassali, 56 So. 3d at 891 (emphasis omitted) (quoting FLA. STAT.
§ 47.011 (2011)).
261. Id. at 892 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Brown v. Nagelhout, 33 So. 3d 83, 84 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 48 So. 3d 835 (Fla. 2010)).
262. Id. at 891.
263. Id. at 891-92; FLA. STAT. § 47.011.
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X. MORTGAGES
A. Constructive Notice Was Given Despite Property Description Error in
Mortgage
Fidelity Bank of Florida (Bank) took back a first mortgage on certain
real estate. 264 This mortgage document, the "first-recorded mortgage," was
correct as to the identity of the owner of the property, and the lot and subdi-
vision were correctly stated.265 While the plat book was also correctly de-
scribed, the mortgage incorrectly stated the plat book page as page three; the
correct page, however, was page eight. 26 6 Bank filed a foreclosure action and
joined another mortgagee (Other Mortgagee) as a defendant.267 On motion
for summary judgment, the trial court agreed with Other Mortgagee that
Bank's error put Other Mortgagee in a superior position. 268 The Fifth District
Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's entry of summary judgment in fa-
vor of Other Mortgagee, holding that notwithstanding Bank's error, Other
Mortgagee had constructive notice of Bank's earlier recorded mortgage.269
The district court "direct[ed] the trial court to enter summary judgment" in
favor of Bank which judgment was to declare the superior position of
Bank.270
B. Florida's Recording Statute is Still a Notice Statute
Mr. and Mrs. Burkes (Borrowers) owed money to Argent Mortgage
Company, LLC (Argent) and Wachovia Bank, N.A. (Wachovia) on notes
and mortgages they had given to each lender. 271 The Wachovia mortgage
was signed on August 31, 2004, but was not recorded until January 5,
2005 .272 The Argent mortgage was signed on December 10, 2004, and the
date of recording was January 31, 2005.273 Borrowers defaulted on the mort-
264. Fid. Bank of Fla. v. Nguyen, 44 So. 3d 1238, 1239 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2010),
review denied, 57 So. 3d 846 (Fla. 2011).
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Fid. Bank of Fla., 44 So. 3d at 1239 (citing Sickler v. Melbourne State Bank, 159 So.
678, 679 (Fla. 1935); Merrell v. Ridgely, 57 So. 352, 353 (Fla. 1912)).
270. Id.
271. Argent Mortg. Co. v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 52 So. 3d 796, 798 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 2010).
272. Id.
273. Id.
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gages and in consolidated foreclosure actionS274 the issue became which
lender had priority. 275 The trial court ruled for Wachovia, but the Fifth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal reversed.276 The trial court accepted Wachovia's argu-
ment that Florida's recording statute, section 695.01 of the Florida Statutes,
had to be read together with section 695.11 of the Florida Statutes, which
deals with the sequence of recording, and "determining the time at which an
instrument [is] deemed to be recorded," which the argument went, made
Florida's statute a statute of the race-notice variety rather than a notice sta-
tute.277 The Fifth District Court of Appeal summarized the differences be-
tween a notice statute, a race statute, and a race-notice statute. 278 The district
court noted that commentators and a long line of cases in Florida have con-
cluded that section 695.01 is a notice statute, so that a lender taking for value
and without notice takes priority over an earlier lender for value who fails to
record loan documents prior to the loan by the second lender, even if the
second lender's recording took place after the first lender's recording, that is,
regardless of the order of recording.279 In order for Wachovia to have pre-
vailed, it would have been necessary to prove that Argent had actual notice
of Wachovia's loan at the time it loaned money to Borrowers, and "the trial
court [had] made findings on facts not in dispute, including ... Argent's lack
of actual or constructive notice" of the Wachovia mortgage when the Argent
mortgage was executed.280
C. Municipal Ordinance Creating Lien Priority Violates Priority of Re-
cording Statute
The next case, City of Palm Bay v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 28 1 involves
section 695.11 of the Florida Statutes. 282 The Fifth District Court of Appeal
held that a local ordinance that gave the city's code enforcement liens priori-
ty over all other nongovernmental liens, regardless of the order of recording
in accordance with the provisions of section 695.11, was in violation of that
statute, and thus, the statute controlled.2 83 The district court referred to "the
common law principle of first in time, first in right" noting that "instruments
274. Id. at 798 n.1.
275. Id. at 798.
276. Argent Mortg. Co., 52 So. 3d at 797, 801.
277. Id. at 798, 800; see also FLA. STAT. §§ 695.01, 695.11 (2011).
278. Argent Mortg. Co., 52 So. 3d at 798-99.
279. Id. at 799-801 (citations omitted); FLA. STAT. § 695.01.
280. Argent Mortg. Co., 52 So. 3d at 798.
281. 57 So. 3d 226 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 61 So. 3d 410 (Fla. 2011).
282. Id. at 227; FLA. STAT. § 695.11.
283. City of Palm Bay, 57 So. 3d at 227; FLA. STAT. § 695.11.
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such as mortgages and liens will generally follow the first in time rule."284
The district court concluded that "[t]he only way ordinance 97-07 can be
effective is by violating [the Florida statute]."285 Thus, the Fifth District
Court of Appeal ruled in favor of the holder of a prior recorded mortgage.286
It should be noted that unlike the situation in Argent Mortgage Co. v. Wa-
chovia Bank, N.A.,287 this was not a "notice" case.288 This was a case of a
city enacting an ordinance that created priority for certain liens. 2 89 The Fifth
District Court of Appeal granted the City of Palm Bay's motion to certify the
following question to the Supreme Court of Florida:
Whether, under Article VIII, section 2(b), Florida Constitution,
section 166.021, Florida Statutes and Chapter 162, Florida Sta-
tutes, a municipality has the authority to enact an ordinance stating
that its code enforcement liens, created pursuant to a code en-
forcement board order and recorded in the public records of the
applicable county, shall be superior in dignity to prior recorded
mortgages? 290
D. Mortgage Documents Could Not Override Requirements of Civil Pro-
cedure Rule for Ex Parte Appointment of Receiver
In DeSilva v. First Community Bank of America,291 First Community
Bank of America (Lender) began proceedings to foreclose the mortgage it
owned on Mr. DeSilva's (Borrower's) property.29 2 As part of the proceed-
ings, the trial court, ex parte, upon request of Lender for expedited appoint-
ment, appointed a receiver for the property.293 This was accomplished by
Lender filing "an unverified motion to appoint a receiver on an expedited
basis."294 Lender alleged in the motion that a receiver could "avoid com-
plaints from neighbors, and . . . possible code violations," that a receiver
would facilitate the eventual sale of the property to "unidentified potential
buyers," and that the loan documents called for a receiver if Borrower de-
284. City of Palm Bay, 57 So. 3d at 227.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 228.
287. 52 So. 3d 796 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
288. Compare id. at 799, with City of Palm Bay, 57 So. 3d at 227.
289. City of Palm Bay, 57 So. 3d at 227.
290. City of Palm Bay v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., 67 So. 3d 271, 271 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App.) (per curiam), review granted, 61 So. 3d 410 (Fla. 2011).
291. 42 So. 3d 285 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
292. Id. at 287.
293. Id.
294. Id.
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faulted.295 The Second District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded.296
Lender failed to comply with Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.610 so as to
allow the trial court to appoint a receiver without notice or hearing on its
motion.297 That rule requires, among other things, that the movant show in
an affidavit or a verified pleading by "'specific facts . . . that immediate and
irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the ad-
verse party can be heard in opposition.' 298  That was not done here.2 99
Lender failed to "affirmatively assert[] that the actual value of the property
[is] insufficient to cover the debt," and there was "no evidence that this was
the case." 300 The case also reminds us that even if the mortgage documents
provide for the appointment of a receiver in the event of default, that does
not mean that the requirements of the procedural rule do not apply.30'
E. Statute of Limitations Applicable to Assignor Applies to Assignee of
Mortgage
Ms. Tucker (Guarantor) guaranteed mortgage loans made by the U.S.
Small Business Association to some companies.302 LPP Mortgage Ltd. (As-
signee) was the assignee of the loans. 30 3 When the companies defaulted,
Assignee sued to foreclose, apparently against Guarantor's property. The
trial court ruled that the foreclosure action was barred by the six-year statute
of limitations. 305 Assignee appealed, and the Third District Court of Appeal
reversed.306 An assignee enjoys "the rights and benefits" of the assignor,
including "the benefit of the statute of limitations applicable to the assignor's
295. Id. at 287-88.
296. DeSilva, 42 So. 3d at 287.
297. Id. at 288 (citing FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.610).
298. Id. (quoting FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.610(a)(1)(A)). The other requirements of the rule in-
clude "the movant's attorney certifies in writing [as to] why notice should not be required"
and the court's inclusion in its order its findings and reasons as to what the irreparable harm
may be, and why the receiver was appointed ex parte. Id. (quoting FLA. R. Civ. P.
1.61 0(a)(1)(B)).
299. Id.
300. DeSilva, 42 So. 3d at 288.
301. Id. (citing Seasons P'ship I v. Kraus-Anderson, Inc., 700 So. 2d 60, 61 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1997)).
302. LPP Mortg. Ltd. v. Tucker, 48 So. 3d 115, 116 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (per
curiam), review denied, 60 So. 3d 1055 (Fla. 2011).
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 116-17.
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foreclosure action."o30  Under section 2415 of the United States Code308 and
United States v. Thornburg,3" the federal government has an unlimited time
to foreclose on mortgaged property. 31 0 Assignee stepped into the shoes of the
federal government with respect to unlimited time to foreclose.3 1'
XI. TAXES
In Boca Airport, Inc. v. Florida Department of Revenue,312 Boca Air-
port, Inc., Galaxy Aviation, Inc., and Aviation Center, Inc. (Companies)
were fixed base operators (FBOs).313 They "lease[d] government-owned
airport properties" and "provide[d] goods and services to the general aviation
public." 314 "In 2008, the [Florida] Department of Revenue issued notices of
its intent to [levy] intangible personal property taxes on the leasehold interest
[of each company]." 15 Companies claimed "exempt[ion] from [the] intangi-
ble . . . tax under sections 196.199(2)(a) and 196.012(6) [of the] Florida Sta-
tutes."3 16 The Fourth District Court of Appeal acknowledged that Compa-
nies, as FBOs, were exempt from ad valorem taxation under those sections,
but Companies were not exempt from intangible taxation under section
199.023(1)(d) of the Florida Statutes. 3 17
XII. TORTS
A. Defamation
NITV, LLC and Mr. Baker were competitors in the voice stress analysis
business whereby they distributed the software and provided training to law
enforcement agencies on the use of these programs.18 In 2005, "NITV pre-
pared two documents entitled 'Law Enforcement Alert' and 'Law Enforce-
307. Tucker, 48 So. 3d. at 116 (citations omitted).
308. 28 U.S.C. § 2415 (2006).
309. 82 F.3d 886 (9th Cir. 1996).
310. Tucker, 48 So. 3d at 117; Thornburg, 82 F.3d at 894; 28 U.S.C. § 2415(c).
311. Tucker, 48 So.3d at 117.
312. 56 So. 3d 140 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
313. Id. at 140-41.
314. Id. at 141.
315. Id. The years involved were 1998 through 2007 for one company, 1994 through
2007 for another, and 1985 through 2007 for another. Id.
316. Boca Airport, Inc., 56 So. 3d at 142; see FLA. STAT. §§ 196.199(2)(a), 196.012(6)
(2011).
317. Boca Airport, Inc., 56 So. 3d at 144; see FLA. STAT. § 199.023(1)(d) (2005) (repealed
2006).
318. NITV, L.L.C. v. Baker, 61 So. 3d 1249, 1250-51 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
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ment Scam Alert."'3 19 These documents were published to more than 300
law enforcement agencies in Illinois "and as many as 8500 other depart-
ments" in the United States.320 Mr. Baker sued NITV, LLC alleging defama-
tion, and the jury returned a verdict in his favor in the amount of $575,000,
consisting of $225,000 for "loss of ability to earn money in the past,"
$100,000 for "loss of ability to earn money in the future," and $250,000 for
damage to reputation. 321 The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed in
part and reversed in part.322 Mr. Baker did not submit competent substantial
evidence to support the jury's verdict with respect to damages for past and
future loss of ability to earn money, and the appellate court found that Mr.
Baker's testimony was "vague and ill defined."323 In addition, in 2006, his
business income increased substantially. 324 The appellate court vacated the
judgment as to $325,000 in damages. 325 However, the $250,000 award for
damage to reputation was not disturbed. 326 "'Words which are actionable in
themselves, or per se, necessarily import general damages and need not be
pleaded or proved but are conclusively presumed to result."'
32 7
B. Suit by Former Employee Against Supervisor for Tortious Interference
with Business Relationship
After her employment was terminated, a former employee (Employee)
sued her former supervisor (Supervisor) "for tortious interference with an
advantageous business relationship." 3 28 Employee alleged that Supervisor's
"hostile statements and . . . hostile acts" directed against Employee led to her
job termination.329 Supervisor's motion to dismiss on the ground that she and
Employee were co-employees of the business was granted. 3 30 Employee
appealed.3 ' The Third District Court of Appeal noted that it was necessary
for Employee to allege: 1) "a relationship between [Employee] and her em-
319. Id. at 1251.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 1250.
322. Id.
323. NITV, L.LC, 61 So. 3d at 1253.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 1254.
326. Id.
327. Id. (quoting Bobenhausen v. Cassat Ave. Mobile Homes, Inc., 344 So. 2d 279, 281
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977)).
328. Alexis v. Ventura, 66 So. 3d 986, 987 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id.
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ployer, under which [she] ha[d] legal rights;" 2) that Supervisor had "know-
ledge of the relationship;" 3) "intentional and unjustified interference with
that relationship;" 4) "[b]y a third party;" and 5) that Employee suffered
damages that were "caused by the [Supervisor's] interference." 332 The appel-
late court said the appeal turned on whether Supervisor was a "third party"
under the circumstances.333 The appellate court also said the general rule is
that an employee's action against a supervisor/co-employee for tortious inter-
ference will not lie because the supervisor/co-employee is not considered a
third party but rather "'is considered a party to the employment relation-
ship."' 34 However, there is an exception, and the third party requirement is
satisfied if it is alleged that the supervisor/co-employee "was not acting on
the employer's behalf or was acting to its detriment. "335 The court explained
that "an allegation" of "malicious motivation" does not automatically mean
that the co-employee is acting beyond the scope of employment. 336 "'How-
ever, the privileged interference enjoyed by a party ... to [a] business rela-
tionship is not absolute. The privilege is divested when [a party to the rela-
tionship] 'acts solely with ulterior purposes and . .. not in the principal's best
interest."' 3 37 In this case, "the allegation that [Supervisor] acted with the sole
ulterior purpose" of causing Employee's job to be terminated-thus not act-
ing on the employer's behalf-kept Employee's complaint from being dis-
missed.3
C. Negligent Misrepresentation v. Fraudulent Misrepresentation
Specialty Marine & Industrial Supplies (Purchaser) was considering en-
tering into a contract with Venus (Seller) and others to purchase certain real
estate.339 Purchaser learned of a boundary dispute concerning the property,
but when questioned, Seller assured Purchaser that the boundary issue "was
'not a big deal' and that there was a survey [to] support[] [Seller's] posi-
tion." 34 0 The contract was signed, and Purchaser hired a surveyor who con-
332. Id.
333. Alexis, 66 So. 3d at 987.
334. Id. at 988 (quoting Rudnick v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 358 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1206
(S.D. Fla. 2005)).
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 988 (quoting O.E. Smith's Sons, Inc. v. George, 545 So. 2d 298, 299 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1989)).
338. Alexis, 66 So. 3d at 988.
339. Specialty Marine & Indus. Supplies, Inc. v. Venus, 66 So. 3d 306, 308 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 2011).
340. Id.
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firmed Seller's statement about the property's boundary.341 The deal closed
for $450,000, but it turned out that the property boundary was in fact not as
represented and the actual boundary made the property unsuitable for use by
Purchaser for the purpose intended.3 2 Purchaser sued Seller for damages,
alleging among other things, that Seller was liable for its negligent misrepre-
sentation of the property boundary.343 The jury, on a comparative negligence
basis, found that Seller was the cause of ninety percent of Purchaser's dam-
ages and awarded Purchaser $360,000, that is, the cause of ninety percent of
the $400,000 claimed damages. 34 The trial court ruled for Seller on its mo-
tion for judgment notwithstanding the jury verdict.345 Purchaser appealed,
Seller cross-appealed, and the First District Court of Appeal reversed in
part, reinstating the jury verdict in favor of Purchaser and ruling that Pur-
chaser was entitled to an award of prejudgment interest.3 47 The First District
Court of Appeal discussed the differences between negligent misrepresenta-
tion alleged by Purchaser and fraudulent misrepresentation.34 8 With respect
to negligent misrepresentation, a plaintiff must allege that:
"1) the defendant made a misrepresentation of material fact that he
believed to be true but which was in fact false; 2) the defendant
was negligent in making the statement because he should have
known the representation was false; 3) the defendant intended to
induce the plaintiff to rely and [sic] on the misrepresentation; and
4) injury resulted to the plaintiff acting in justifiable reliance upon
the misrepresentation." 349
On the other hand, a fraudulent misrepresentation claim will be sustained
only if the plaintiff can show: "1) a false statement concerning a material
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id. Purchaser also sued the surveyor for negligence and that claim was settled before
trial. Specialty Marine & Indus. Supplies, Inc., 66 So. 3d at 308.
344. Id. at 308, 311.
345. Id. at 309.
346. Id. at 307. There was an award to Purchaser on another ground, a ground not raised
by Purchaser. Id. at 309. The trial court awarded Purchaser damages of $35,000 for breach of
warranty, but when Purchaser asked for prejudgment interest on this award, the trial court said
no. Specialty Marine & Indus. Supplies, Inc., 66 So. 3d at 309. The cross-appeal of the
breach of warranty holding was apparently one of "[tihe remaining issues raised on appeal and
cross-appeal [that was] rendered moot by [the court's] reversal of the judgment under review."
See id. at 312.
347. See id. at 309-10.
348. Id. at 309.
349. Id. (quoting Simon v. Celebration Co., 883 So. 2d 826, 832 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
2004)).
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fact; 2) the representor's [sic] knowledge that the representation is false; 3)
an intention that the representation induce another to act on it; and 4) conse-
quent injury by the party acting in reliance on the representation."350 An
important difference between negligent misrepresentation and fraudulent
misrepresentation is that the former requires proof of justifiable reliance
while the latter does not.35 ' The trial court found that Purchaser did not justi-
fiably rely on Seller's reliance, thus improperly usurping the jury findings
and verdict to the contrary, which were sustained by competent substantial
evidence. 35 2 Even though the surveyor was also at fault, "there [was] no re-
quirement that [Purchaser's] reliance on [Seller's] misrepresentations be the
sole or even the predominant cause of [Purchaser's] decision to purchase the
property" as long as the "'reliance [was] a substantial factor in determining
the course of conduct that result[ed] in [Purchaser's] loss.' 35 3 Comparative
negligence applies to claims of negligent misrepresentation, and the element
of justifiable reliance does not, under Florida law, fail as a matter of law, just
because, as argued by Seller, Purchaser undertakes an investigation.354
D. Waiver of Liability and Indemnification for Claim of Minor Child
A mother (Mother) took her thirteen-year-old daughter (Daughter), to a
boutique (Defendant) to have Daughter's ears pierced.355 As part of the pro-
cedure, Mother signed "a release from liability" on behalf of herself and her
minor Daughter and agreed to indemnify Defendant and its employees from
,,156AfethprcdrDutrliability for "negligent acts or omissions. After the procedure, Daughter
developed an infection in one ear that "required hospitalization and extensive
medical treatment" and resulted in permanent damage.357 Mother, as parent
and natural guardian of her child, sued Defendant for negligence resulting in
a jury verdict and judgment amount of $69,740.31' Defendant, nevertheless,
then obtained a judgment from the trial court against Mother individually,
350. Specialty Marine & Indus. Supplies, Inc., 66 So. 3d at 310 (emphasis omitted) (quot-
ing Butler v. Yusem, 44 So. 3d 102, 105 (Fla. 2010) (per curiam)); Johnson v. Davis, 480 So.
2d 625, 627 (Fla. 1985)).
351. Specialty Marine & Indus. Supplies, Inc., 66 So. 3d at 310.
352. Id.at310-11.
353. Id. at 311 (quoting Stev-Mar, Inc. v. Matvejs, 678 So. 2d 834, 838 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1996)).
354. Id.at310-11.
355. Claire's Boutiques, Inc. v. Locastro, 36 Fla. L. Weekly 31001, 31001 (4th Dist. Ct.
App. May 11, 2011).
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Id.
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"but not in her capacity as [Daughter's] mother," that was based on the re-
lease of liability/indemnity agreement for more than $200,000, which in-
cluded Defendant's attorney fees and the judgment against it.359 The Fourth
District Court of Appeal upheld the judgment against Defendant for negli-
gence, but reversed the judgment against Mother on the indemnification
claim.3so The appellate court, based on the rationale of Kirton v. Fields,3 6 1
ruled the release of liability/indemnification agreement to be in violation of
public policy. 36 2 In Kirton, the Supreme Court of Florida determined that
public policy prevented the enforcement of a pre-injury release executed by a
minor's parents on behalf of the minor, for a tort arising from the minor's
injuries suffered while participating in a commercial activity. 36 3 The court
found that there was even more reason in this case to cite public policy con-
cerns 3  and quoted Johnson ex rel. Estate of Gillespie v. New River Scenic
Whitewater Tours, Inc. :365 '"[A]llowing a parent to indemnify a third party
for its tortious conduct towards the parent's minor child would result in a
serious affront to the doctrine of parental immunity."' 36 6 The Fourth District
Court of Appeal held that indemnification agreements by a guardian create a
conflict between parent and child.367 Quoting the Court of Appeals of New
York in Valdimer ex rel. Valdimer v. Mount Vernon Hebrew Camps, Inc.,368
the Fourth District Court of Appeal said "'[c]learly, a parent who has placed
himself in the position of indemnitor will be a dubious champion of his in-
fant child's rights."' 369 Judge Levine concurred as to the affirmance on the
negligence award, but dissented on the indemnification issue.370
359. Id.
360. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 36 Fla. L. Weekly at D1003.
361. 997 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 2008).
362. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 36 Fla. L. Weekly at D1002-03 (citing Kirton v. Fields, 997
So. 2d 349, 357-58 (Fla. 2008).
363. Kirton, 997 So. 2d at 358.
364. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 36 Fla. L. Weekly at D1002-03.
365. 313 F. Supp. 2d 621 (S.D. W. Va. 2004).
366. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 36 Fla. L. Weekly at D1002 (alteration in original) (quoting
Johnson ex rel. Estate of Gillespie, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 632).
367. See id. at D1003 (citing Childress ex rel. Childress v. Madison Cnty., 777 S.W.2d 1,
7 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989)).
368. 172 N.E.2d 283 (N.Y. 1961).
369. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 36 Fla. L. Weekly at D1003 (quoting Valdimer ex rel. Val-
dimer, 172 N.E.2d at 285).
370. Id. (Levine, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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E. Respondeat Superior
Mr. Graf (Employee) worked as a driver for a limousine service (Em-
ployer). 7 On the date in question, Employee drove his car to work, parked
it on a ramp outside the business office while he went inside to turn in his
paperwork for the day, but left his keys in the ignition.372 A thief stole Em-
ployee's car, and while driving the car, injured Mr. Allan (Plaintiff) in an
auto accident.373 Plaintiff sued Employee for negligence and also sued Em-
ployer under the theory of respondeat superior.374 Employer prevailed on a
motion for summary judgment. 375 The Fourth District Court of Appeal af-
firmed.376 The appellate court held that Employer could not be held vica-
riously liable for Employee's negligence in leaving keys in the ignition of his
own car.377 Although the car owner, that is Employee, could be held respon-
sible, the court refused to extend the law to cover the owner's employer.378
Xm. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE AND DEBTOR/CREDITOR RIGHTS
A. Prejudgment Writ of Replevin
PNCEF, LLC v. South Aviation, Inc.7 is a prejudgment writ of replevin
case under section 78.055 of the Florida Statutes.380 The underlying action
was brought by PNCEF, LLC (Lender) against the borrowers (Borrowers) in
Illinois to recover a certain aircraft.38 ' Borrowers responded by alleging that
the aircraft had been leased to a Florida lessee (Lessee), and the aircraft was
located in Broward County.3 82 In addition, Borrowers alleged that "[L]essee
[had] filed liens against the aircraft and [was] refus[ing] to return the aircraft
because of the liens."383 Lender then sued Lessee in Broward County for
replevin seeking a prejudgment writ of replevin. 384 Lessee raised several
371. Allan v. Graf, 43 So. 3d 151, 152 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Allan, 43 So. 3d at 152.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 153.
379. 60 So. 3d 1120 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
380. Id. at 1121; FLA. STAT. § 78.055 (2011).
381. PNCEF, LL.C., 60 So. 3d at 1121.
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Id. The verified complaint contained allegations of conversion and sought injunctive
relief. Id.
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defenses, including lack of jurisdiction over three of the aircrafts because of
their absence from Broward County during all or part of the day that Lender
filed its verified complaint, and that since Illinois had already asserted its
jurisdiction over the aircraft, it was improper for the Florida court to also
exercise jurisdiction over the planes.3"' The Fourth District Court of Appeal
held that none of these alleged jurisdictional issues would constitute an im-
pediment to the issuance of a writ of replevin as long as the court had in per-
sonam jurisdiction over the possessor or person entitled to possession of the
item to be replevied, that is, Lessee.386 Having in personam jurisdiction gave
the court the authority to order the possessor to return the item to Florida.387
However, the appellate court noted that the lower court could not issue fur-
ther orders that act directly on the aircraft until its physical location in Flori-
da was confirmed.8
B. Sale of Collateral
Southern Developers & Earthmoving, Inc. v. Caterpillar Financial Ser-
vices Corp.389 addresses the necessity and methods of proving the "commer-
cial reasonableness" of the sale of collateral by the lender in order to obtain a
deficiency judgment against the defaulting debtor on the debtor's promissory
note under section 679.610(2) of the Florida Statutes.3 90 If the debtor raises
the issue of commercial reasonableness, then the secured party must show
"that every aspect of [the] disposition was commercially reasonable." 391 if
the debtor can prove that the "sale of [its] collateral [was] commercially un-
reasonable, a presumption arises that 'the fair market value of the collateral
at the time of repossession was equal to the [full] amount of the . .. debt."' 39
2
C. Possessory Lien
The next case deals with a possessory lien under section 713.58 of the
Florida Statutes.393 Commercial Jet, Inc. (Commercial) made repairs and did
385. PNCEF, LL.C., 60 So. 3d at 1122.
386. Id. at 1125.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. 56 So. 3d 56 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
390. Id. at 60; FLA. STAT. § 679.610(2) (2011).
391. S. Developers & Earthmoving, Inc., 56 So. 3d at 60 (citing Weiner v. Am. Petrofina
Mktg., Inc., 482 So. 2d 1362, 1364-65 (Fla. 1986).
392. Id. at 61 (quoting Weiner, 482 So. 2d at 1365).
393. Commercial Jet, Inc. v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 45 So. 3d 887, 887 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
2010), review granted, 61 So. 3d 410 (Fla. 2011); FLA. STAT. § 713.58(3) (2011).
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maintenance work on a jet owned by U.S. Bank, N.A. (Owner) and operated
by Silver Jet.394 However, before Commercial had been paid the balance
claimed to be due,395 Commercial returned the airplane to Silver Jet.396
Commercial recorded a claim of lien-under both section 713.58 and section
329.51 of the Florida Statutes-and brought suit to foreclose its purported
lien.397 Owner moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Commer-
cial did not have possession of the plane when it filed its claim of lien.
Owner successfully argued that the claim to a section 713.58 lien was lost
when possession was given up. 39 9 Commercial contended that section 329.51
amended section 713.58 and that a valid lien could "be created simply by
recording a claim of lien within ninety days" after the services are pro-
vided.40 The Third District Court of Appeal rejected Commercial's argu-
ment and concluded that section 329.51 was only "a notice statute" and
"[did] not create any new lien rights."40 1 Judge Schwartz dissented, conclud-
ing that section 329.51, which deals with repairs to aircraft, was more than a
notice statute.402
D. Right of Set-Off
BankAtlantic v. Estate of Glatzer40 3 presented an unusual issue. Dr.
Glatzer's 100% owned professional association (Borrower) owed BankAt-
lantic (Bank) money as evidenced by a promissory note and mortgage. 404 Dr.
Glatzer (Decedent) guaranteed the debt.405 In addition to the note, mortgage,
and Decedent's personal guarantee, the promissory note contained "a right of
setoff' that allowed Bank to collect its debt by taking funds from-and even
freezing-any accounts that Borrower maintained at Bank.4 06 Decedent died,
and his death was "an event of default under [the] note." 40 7 Borrower's ac-
count at Bank apparently was not frozen by Bank at the time of, or after De-
394. Commercial Jet, Inc., 45 So. 3d at 887-88.
395. See id. at 887. The opinion does not indicate if Owner or Silver Jet contested that
there were monies due, or the amount thereof. Id. at 887-88.
396. Id. at 887.
397. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 713.58(3); Id. § 329.51(2009).
398. Commercial Jet, Inc., 45 So. 3d at 888.
399. Id.; § 713.58(3) (2011).
400. Commercial Jet, Inc., 45 So. 3d at 888.
401. Id. (construing FLA. STAT. § 329.51 (2009)).
402. See id. at 889 (Schwartz, J., dissenting) (construing FLA. STAT. § 329.51).
403. 61 So. 3d 1222 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
404. Id. at 1222.
405. Id. at 1223.
406. Id. at 1222-23.
407. Id. at 1223.
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cedent's death, and the personal representative of Decedent's estate obtained
probate court orders allowing the transfer by the personal representative of
funds in Borrower's accounts to an estate depository account. 408 Bank ap-
pealed, and the Third District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded.40
Bank's "possessory and contractual rights to set-off [were] impaired" when
funds were transferred to the estate depository account at another bank.410
Decedent's stock was an estate asset, but Borrower's bank accounts, being
assets of the corporate Borrower, were "a step removed from the Estate."''
The Third District Court of Appeal concluded that the estate "essentially
ignored the separate corporate existence of the professional association and
that entity's obligations to its own creditors."412
E. Re-recording of Judgment (Debtor-Creditor)
The holding in Sun Glow Construction, Inc. v. Cypress Recovery
Corp. 4 1 3 is straightforward and to the point. The Fifth District Court of Ap-
peal held "that the re-recording of a certified copy of a judgment after the
expiration of the original judgment lien imposes a new lien on real property
held by the judgment debtor" even though "[t]he statute is silent" on the is-
sue.4 14 The holding applies when the judgment creditor fails to affect an ex-
tension of the judgment lien under section 55.10(1) of the Florida Statutes
prior to the expiration of the lien. 415 The Fifth District Court of Appeal
quoted the Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision in Franklin Financial,
Inc. v. White,4 16 saying "'[1]ike a child that wanders out of a queue, the newly
rerecorded judgment lien has lost its place and must go to the back and stand
behind all previously recorded judgment liens.' 4 17
F. Garnishment
Caproc Third Avenue, LLC (Judgment Creditor) obtained a writ of gar-
nishment against Donisi Insurance's (Judgment Debtor's) account with Bank
408. See Estate of Glatzer, 61 So. 3d at 1222-23.
409. Id. at 1223.
410. Id.
411. Id.
412. Id.
413. 47 So. 3d 371 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
414. Id. at 372-74.
415. FLA. STAT. § 55.10(1) (2011); Sun Glow Constr., Inc., 47 So. 3d at 372, 374.
416. 932 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
417. Sun Glow Constr., Inc., 47 So. 3d at 373 (quoting Franklin Fin., Inc., 932 So. 2d at
437).
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of America.4 18 Judgment Debtor moved to have the writ dissolved and filed
an affidavit claiming the "wages exception" exemption under section 222.12
of the Florida Statutes from garnishment.419 Judgment Creditor's attorney
filed an affidavit in the proceedings contesting Judgment Debtor's claimed
wages exemption.420 The trial court dissolved the writ finding the attorney's
affidavit insufficient.42 1 Judgment Creditor appealed, and the Fourth District
Court of Appeal affirmed.422 Section 222.12 of the Florida Statutes requires
that the affidavit in opposition be made "by the party who sued out the
process."423 An affidavit by the attorney for that party does not qualify. 42 4
On the other hand, in the next case-which came before the Second
District Court of Appeal on a motion for summary judgment and which the
appellate court reversed, finding that there was a genuine issue of material
fact unresolved-the issue was how much the garnishee, Cortez Community
Bank, owed the garnishor pursuant to four writs of garnishment served on the
bank on October 2, 2008.425 On the same date, the bank filed responses to
the writ in letter form, and the letters were signed by the bank's senior vice
president and chief operating officer.426 It was not until more than four
months later, on February 12, 2009, that the bank's counsel filed answers to
the writs. 427 Section 77.06(1) of the Florida Statutes states that "[s]ervice of
the writ shall make garnishee liable for all debts due by him or her to defen-
dant . . . at the time of the service of the writ or at any time between the ser-
vice and the time of the garnishee's answer." 42 8 The writ response letters
filed by the bank's senior vice president and chief operating officer were
ignored because a corporation cannot represent itself pro se.4 29 Therefore,
the amount owed by the garnishee bank was calculated with liability to the
date the bank's counsel filed answers-February 12, 2009.430
418. Caproc Third Ave., L.L.C. v. Donisi Ins., Inc., 67 So. 3d 312, 312(4th Dist. Ct. App.
2011).
419. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 222.12.
420. Caproc Third Ave., LLC., 67 So. 3d at 313.
421. Id.
422. Id. at 315.
423. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 222.12).
424. Id.
425. Cortez Cmty. Bank v. Cobb, 56 So. 3d 80, 81(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. FLA. STAT. § 77.06(1).
429. Cobb, 56 So. 3d at 81 (citing Nicholson Supply Co. v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n
of Hardee Cnty., 184 So. 2d 438, 440 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966)).
430. Id.
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In another garnishment case, Baker v. Storfer,43 1 the issue was whether
or not commissions paid by an employer to "a commissioned employee"
constituted "salary or wages" for purposes of the garnishment statute-
section 77.0305 of the Florida Statutes. 43 2 The Fourth District Court of Ap-
peal ruled "that commissions are 'wages,' for purposes of section
77.0305."43
XIV. CONCLUSION
Hundreds of Florida appellate opinions issued in the past year might be
said to affect the conduct of business by Florida business owners. Of course,
this survey deals only with some of those cases. It is not surprising, howev-
er, that after several years of difficult economic times, there was a plethora of
breach of contract, mortgage foreclosure, and other debtor creditor decisions
rendered by Florida's appellate courts in the past year. Therefore, a greater
number of such decisions were included in this year's survey than in prior
years. That, however, should not detract from the other significant appellate
decisions in the past year that continued to clarify and refine Florida law in
many areas affecting business owners, as reflected in this year's survey. One
particularly important area in which there were substantial developments
over the prior few years, as well as in the past year, involves the enforceabili-
ty of releases signed by parents on behalf of their minor children. Another
involves the question of when a Florida court may properly exercise personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident whose contacts with Florida are, in whole or
in part, through the Internet. While important guidance has been provided in
both of these areas, numerous questions remain, and undoubtedly additional
guidance will be forthcoming.
431. 51 So. 3d 652 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (per curiam).
432. Id. at 652; see FLA. STAT. § 77.0305.
433. Baker, 51 So. 3d at 653; see FLA. STAT. § 77.0305.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Confidentiality is the bedrock of mediation, the firm foundation that
supports and sustains the mediation process.' "One of the fundamental
* Professor of Law and Director of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Clinic, Shepard
Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern University. Past Chair, Mediator Ethics Advisory
Committee, Florida Supreme Court. Member, Committee on Alternative Dispute Resolution
Rules and Policy, Florida Supreme Court. B.A., Magna Cum Laude, Hunter College; J.D.,
Magna Cum Laude, Nova Southeastern University Law Center. The author gratefully thanks
Susan Dubow, Kimberly Kosch, Professor Michael Richmond, and Chris Shulman for their
kind insightful attention to the manuscript, and Evan Fish, Anupum Grewal, Kendra Stephen,
and Kate Vazzana for their research assistance.
80
Nova Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol36/iss1/1
NOVA LAW REVIEW
axioms of mediation is the importance of confidentiality. It is deemed neces-
sary to foster the neutrality of the mediator and essential if parties are to par-
ticipate fully in the process." 2 "[T]he challenge of communicating with an
adversary, the presence of a neutral intermediary, and the potential for in-
formation informally reaching a judge all make confidentiality especially
important for mediation."' The security and predictability of statutory medi-
ation confidentiality and privilege are critical to the efficacy of the mediation
process.
Florida has had a statutory mediation privilege for court-ordered media-
tion since 1987. In 2004, the Mediation Confidentiality and Privilege Act
(the Act) came into effect, broadening the scope of mediation confidentiality,
clarifying the privilege, defining covered mediation communications, deli-
neating exceptions, and providing statutory sanctions for breaching the Act.'
Additionally, the Act serves to codify the significant body of mediation case
law, and provides clearly stated law to guide judges, attorneys, mediators,
parties, and mediation participants.
This article will summarize the Act and highlight areas in which case
law has been established, as well as areas of emerging case law. It will also
identify and discuss current confidentiality conundrums. The term confiden-
tiality will generally be used to reference both confidentiality and privilege,
unless privilege is specifically addressed. The exceptions delineated in the
Act apply to both mediation confidentiality and privilege.
The author dedicates this article to the Florida Dispute Resolution Center, and thanks
its dedicated professionals for their steadfast vision and leadership. The Dispute Resolution
Center along with the Alternative Dispute Resolution Policy and Rules Committee, Mediator
Ethics Advisory Committee, Mediator Qualifications Board, and Mediation Training Review
Board have led Florida's court-connected alternative dispute resolution programs to a place of
well-deserved prominence.
1. Ellen E. Deason, Enforcing Mediated Settlement Agreements: Contract Law Collides
with Confidentiality, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 33, 35 (2001).
2. Id.
3. Ellen E. Deason, The Quest for Uniformity in Mediation Confidentiality: Foolish
Consistency or Crucial Predictability?, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 79, 83-84 (2001) [hereinafter Dea-
son, The Quest for Uniformity in Mediation Confidentiality].
4. Act effective Jan. 1, 1988, ch. 87-173, § 2, 1987 Fla. Laws 1202, 1202 (codified at
FLA. STAT. §§ 44.301-.306 (1988)).
5. See FLA. STAT. §§ 44.401-.406 (2011).
6. See id.
7. FLA. STAT. § 44.405(1)-(4)(a). While the distinction between mediation confidential-
ity and privilege is often blurred, it is significant. All things confidential are not privileged.
See id. Privilege prevents testimony of mediation communications at subsequent legal pro-
ceedings. Id. § 44.405(2). Confidentiality is far broader. See id. § 44.405(1). "A mediation
participant shall not disclose a mediation communication to a person other than another medi-
ation participant or a participant's counsel." Id.
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II. THE MEDIATION CONFIDENTIALITY AND PRIVILEGE ACT
The statutory definition of mediation remains unchanged since 1990:
"Mediation" means a process whereby a neutral third person
called a mediator acts to encourage and facilitate the resolution of
a dispute between two or more parties. It is an informal and non-
adversarial process with the objective of helping the disputing par-
ties reach a mutually acceptable and voluntary agreement. In med-
iation, decision-making authority rests with the parties. The role
of the mediator includes, but is not limited to, assisting the parties
in identifying issues, fostering joint problem-solving, and explor-
ing settlement alternatives.8
The description of mediation privilege, as amended, makes clear the
privilege covers testimony at subsequent proceedings, and reads: "A media-
tion party has a privilege to refuse to testify and to prevent any other person
from testifying in a subsequent proceeding regarding mediation communica-
tions."9
A. Scope
Prior to the enactment of the Act in 2004, only court-ordered mediation
cases were confidential by statute.'o Confidentiality coverage has been great-
ly expanded to include any mediation: 1) conducted by agreement of the
parties under the Act;" 2) facilitated by a Supreme Court of Florida certified
mediator, unless the parties agree otherwise;12 and 3) "[r]equired by statute,
court rule, agency rule or order, oral or written case-specific court order, or
8. Compare FLA. STAT. § 44.1011(2) (1990), with FLA. STAT. § 44.1011(2) (2011). The
definition is not found in the Act. See FLA. STAT. §§ 44.401-406 (2011). It is located in
Florida Statutes, chapter 44, Mediation Alternatives to Judicial Action. Id. § 44.1011(2).
9. Id. § 44.405(2). The prior statutory definition read: "Each party involved in a court-
ordered mediation proceeding has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent any person
present at the proceeding from disclosing, communications made during such proceeding."
FLA. STAT. § 44.102(3) (2003).
10. Id.
11. FLA. STAT. § 44.402(1)(b) (2011).
12. Id. § 44.402(l)(c).
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court administrative order." 3 However, the parties may agree in writing that
selected provisions of the Act will not apply to their mediation.14
B. Parameters of Confidentiality
The Act provides when mediation begins and ends for confidentiality
purposes.' 5 Court-ordered mediation begins as soon as the court issues a
referral to mediation.16 In all other mediations to which the Act applies, "the
mediation begins when the parties agree to mediate or as required by agency
rule, agency order, or statute, whichever occurs earlier." 7 Mediation confi-
dentiality does not necessarily end when the parties and other participants
leave the mediation room. If the law requires court approval of the settle-
ment agreement, the mediation-for confidentiality purposes-is considered
to end upon the required court approval. 6 Mediation is also properly deter-
mined to end when "the mediator declares an impasse," or "the mediation is
terminated."" Nonetheless, the obligation to maintain confidentiality ex-
tends beyond the conclusion of the mediation session.20
All mediation communications are confidential unless they fit within an
exception delineated in the Act.2 1 Covered communications must occur dur-
ing the mediation or before the mediation commences "if made in further-
ance of [the] mediation." 22 "'Mediation communication' means an oral or
written statement, or nonverbal conduct intended to make an assertion, by or
to a mediation participant .... 23 Significantly, the Act specifically excludes
"the commission of a crime during . . . mediation" from the definition of
mediation communication. 24
The mediation parties hold the "privilege to refuse to testify and to pre-
vent any other person from testifying in a subsequent proceeding regarding
mediation communications."25 Mediation participants are prohibited from
13. Id. § 44.402(l)(a).
14. Id. § 44.402(2). "Notwithstanding any other provision, the mediation parties may
agree in writing that any or all of . .. s[ection] 44.405(2), or s[ection] 44.406 will not apply to
all or part of a mediation proceeding." Id.
15. FLA. STAT. § 44.404(1).
16. Id.
17. Id. § 44.404(2).
18. Id. § 44.404(1)(a).
19. Id. § 44.404(1)(b)-(c), (2)(b)-(c).
20. See FLA. STAT. §§ 44.404(1)-(2), .405(4)(b).
21. Id. § 44.405(1).
22. Id. § 44.403(1).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. FLA. STAT. § 44.405(2).
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disclosing communications to anyone other than participants' counsel or
other participants. 6 In addition to and consistent with the Act, the Florida
ethical rules for certified and court-appointed mediators provide, "[a] media-
tor shall maintain confidentiality of all information revealed during media-
tion except where disclosure is required or permitted by law or is agreed to
by all parties."'
C. Exceptions to Confidentiality
The mediation parties, the only mediation participants who hold the sta-
tutory privilege, may waive their privilege.28 By statute, signed mediated
agreements are not confidential, unless the parties otherwise agree.29 Signifi-
cantly and specifically excluded from confidentiality is a mediation commu-
nication "[t]hat is willfully used to plan a crime, commit or attempt to com-
mit a crime, conceal ongoing criminal activity, or threaten violence."o
As with any person within Florida, all mediation participants are re-
quired to make mandatory reports of abuse and neglect of children and vul-
nerable adults pursuant to chapter 39 or 415 respectively.3' The mandatory
reports are solely for the purpose of providing information to the entity that
requires the report.32 Reporting abuse and neglect of children and vulnerable
adults is the Act's only mandatory reporting requirement.33 All other excep-
tions to confidentiality are permissive.34
If professional malpractice or professional misconduct occurs during the
mediation, the communication may be "[o]ffered to report, prove, or dis-
prove" the misconduct or malpractice "solely for the purpose of the . .. mal-
practice [or grievance] proceeding." Additionally, parties retain access to
the court to seek relief in terms of voiding or reforming a mediated agree-
26. Id. § 44.405(1).
27. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS R. 10.360(a). The Mediator Ethics Advisory
Committee advises that when mediators are subpoenaed, they should "file a motion for a
protective order or notify the judge" that they are statutorily obligated to "maintain the confi-
dentiality of mediation." Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, Advisory Op. 99-012
(2000) (citing Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, Advisory Op. 96-005 (1997)).
28. FLA. STAT. § 44.405(4)(a)(1). Unlike the Uniform Mediation Act, mediators do not
hold the privilege. See id. § 44.405(2); UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 4(b)(2) (2001) (providing a
mediator has a privilege regarding mediation communications made by the mediator).
29. FLA. STAT. § 44.405(4)(a).
30. Id. § 44.405(4)(a)(2).
31. See id. §§ 39.201(1)(a), 44.405(4)(a)(3), 415.1034(1)(a).
32. Id. § 44.405(4)(a)(3).
33. See id.
34. FLA. STAT. § 44.405(4)(a)(1)-(2), (4)-(6).
35. Id. § 44.405(4)(a)(4), (6).
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ment.36 Communications may be "[o]ffered for the limited purpose of estab-
lishing or refuting legally recognized grounds for voiding or reforming a
settlement agreement reached during a mediation." Should a party disclose
a privileged mediation communication, the party would be deemed to have
waived the privilege to allow the other party to respond.
The Act clarifies the interplay of mediation communications with dis-
covery and admissibility. 39 Information disclosed during mediation does not
become protected from discovery or inadmissible in court if it is otherwise
subject to discovery or admissible.40
Additionally, information disclosed pursuant to confidentiality excep-
tions "remains confidential and is not [otherwise] discoverable or admissible
for ... other purpose[s], unless otherwise permitted by th[e]" Act. 4 1
D. Civil Remedies
A mediation participant may be subject to remedies if the participant
"knowingly and willfully discloses a mediation communication in violation
of [the Act]."42 Remedies include compensatory damages, equitable relief,
fees for attorneys and mediators, as well as "costs incurred in the mediation
proceeding" and in applying for remedies. 4 3 Application for relief must be-
gin within two years after the date "the party had a reasonable opportunity to
discover the [confidentiality breach]." The application may not be com-
menced "more than four years after the date of the breach" of confidentiali-
ty.45 In addition to statutory sanctions, if the mediation is ordered by the
court, participants are subject to court sanctions, including fees for attorneys
and mediators and costs. 46
36. Id. § 44.405(4)(a)(5).
37. Id.
38. Id. § 44.405(6).
39. FLA. STAT. § 44.405(5).
40. Id.
41. Id. § 44.405(4)(b).
42. Id. § 44.406(1).
43. Id. § 44.406(1)(a)-(d).
44. FLA. STAT. § 44.406(2).
45. Id.
46. Id. § 44.405(1).
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m. MEDIATION CASE LAW
A. Settled Confidentiality Issues
Despite an umbrella of mediation confidentiality and privilege, parties
seek court intervention to enforce, interpret, reform, and overturn mediated
agreements. Florida has almost two decades of mediation case law, much of
which is clearly established.47
1. Agreements Must Be in Writing with Required Signatures
A series of cases display parties' attempts to allege that they have me-
diated agreements that should be enforced by the courts." By asserting the
existence of a mediated agreement, they seek to get information to the court
about mediation communications that would otherwise be covered by media-
tion confidentiality.4 9
The Act provides: "there is no confidentiality or privilege attached to a
signed written agreement reached during a mediation, unless the parties
agree otherwise."o
Early mediation cases questioned whether courts should admit evidence
of the existence of mediated agreements." Dating back to the 1990s, the
cases clearly establish that mediated agreements must be in writing.5 2 Courts
do not recognize oral agreements purporting to be mediated agreements.
Nor will the courts hear testimony alleging the existence of oral mediated
agreements. 54 "The confidentiality of the [mediation] negotiations should
remain inviolate until a written agreement is executed by the parties."
47. See, e.g., City of Delray Beach v. Keiser ex rel. Estate of Menachem, 699 So. 2d 855,
855-56 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Gordon v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., 641 So. 2d
515, 517 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (per curiam); Cohen v. Cohen, 609 So. 2d 785, 786
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Hudson v. Hudson, 600 So. 2d 7, 9 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1992) (per curiam).
48. See, e.g., Keiser ex rel. Estate of Menachem, 699 So. 2d at 855; Gordon, 641 So. 2d
at 516; Cohen, 609 So. 2d at 786; Hudson, 600 So. 2d at 8.
49. See Keiser ex rel. Estate of Menachem, 699 So. 2d at 855; Gordon, 641 So. 2d at 516;
Cohen, 609 So. 2d at 786; Hudson, 600 So. 2d at 8; see also FLA. STAT. § 44.405(4)(a).
50. FLA. STAT. § 44.405(4)(a).
51. See Gordon, 641 So. 2d at 517; Cohen, 609 So. 2d at 786; Hudson, 600 So. 2d at 9.
52. See Gordon, 641 So. 2d at 517; Cohen, 609 So. 2d at 786; Hudson, 600 So. 2d at 9.
53. See, e.g., Hudson, 600 So. 2d at 8-9.
54. See, e.g., id.
55. Cohen, 609 So. 2d at 786 (quoting Hudson, 600 So. 2d at 9).
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"[T]he reasons for confidentiality are not as compelling" once parties have
signed a mediated agreement.56
Mediation agreements must also bear the requisite signatures to be rec-
ognized by the courts . Courts consistently have required that parties sign
their mediated agreements as directed by the applicable rules of procedure.58
In City of Delray Beach v. Keiser ex rel. Estate of Menachem," the court
determined there was no mediated agreement to enforce, as neither party had
signed the alleged agreement.' The signature of party's counsel was insuffi-
cient to satisfy the signature requirement of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure
1.730.61 However, in Jordan v. Adventist Health System/Sunbelt, Inc.,62 the
court enforced the mediated agreement signed by the parties, but not their
counsel, when the parties had operated under the terms of the agreement.6 3
Courts continue to decide cases regarding agreements allegedly reached
during mediation that are not memorialized in writing and signed by the par-
ties. 4 In 2008, a defendant in a personal injury lawsuit filed to enforce a
settlement agreement allegedly reached during mediation. 65 "[T]he alleged .
agreement was [never] reduced to writing and signed by the parties .... 66
Accordingly, the court concluded "that the lack of a written agreement
signed by both parties was more than a mere technical deficiency, and that
the alleged mediation [agreement] is unenforceable." 67 In 2009, a law firm
moved for final judgment against a client, attaching a purported mediated
agreement. 68 The trial court erred in granting the attorney's motion and or-
dering the client to perform based on the purported agreement that the client
never signed.69 As in Gordon v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd. ,70 the "'attor-
ney's signature alone . . is wholly insufficient"' to execute a mediated
56. DR Lakes, Inc. v. Brandsmart U.S.A. of W. Palm Beach (DR Lakes 1), 819 So. 2d
971, 974 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
57. City of Delray Beach v. Keiser ex rel. Estate of Menachem, 699 So. 2d 855, 856 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (citing Gordon, 641 So. 2d at 517).
58. Id.
59. 699 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
60. Id. at 856.
61. Id. (citing Gordon, 641 So. 2d at 517); see also FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.730.
62. 656 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
63. Id. at 201-02.
64. See, e.g., Mastec, Inc. v. Cue, 994 So. 2d 494, 495 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Dean v. Mulhall, 16 So. 3d 284, 285 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
69. Id. at 286.
70. 641 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (per curiam).
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agreement." "Florida courts consistently have held that a supposed settle-
ment agreement resulting from mediation cannot be enforced absent the sig-
natures of all parties."72
2. Courts Enforce Established Mediated Agreements as Written
True to contract law, once a mediated agreement is established, courts
will enforce it as written. 73 Courts are not in the business of rewriting par-
ties' agreements or relieving them from bad bargains. 74 Further, "[t]he medi-
ation rules create an environment intended to produce a final settlement of
the issues with safeguards against the elements of fraud, overreaching, etc.,
in the settlement process." 75 "The decision to engage in mediation and to
settle at mediation means that remedies and options otherwise available
through the judicial system are foregone. The finality of it once the parties
have set down their agreement in writing is critical." 7  To reach such finali-
ty, courts routinely enforce the mediated agreements as written by the par-
ties.7 Nonetheless, the Act provides an exception to confidentiality to estab-
lish or refute recognized grounds for reforming or voiding a mediated
agreement.78 The mediated agreement would be neither confidential nor
privileged, unless the parties specifically decided otherwise.79
An agreement in principle reached at mediation is not binding on the
parties when one of the express conditions precedent was never met.80 "To
ignore one term of the agreement, but uphold the others, would be tanta-
mount to the creation of a new contract."8 ' Similarly, a conditional mediated
71. Dean, 16 So. 3d at 286 (quoting Gordon, 641 So. 2d at 517).
72. Id. Rules of Procedure govern who must attend mediation. See FLA. R. Juv.
P. 8.290(1)(2); FLA. R. App. P. 9.720(a); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.720(b); FLA. R. Civ. P.
1.750(e); FLA. R. CIv. P. 7.090(f); FLA. FAM. L. R. P. 12.740(d). For small claims
actions, an attorney who has full authority to settle without consultation may appear
on behalf of a party. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.750(e). A nonlawyer representative, who has
the party's signed authority to appear and has full settlement authority without con-
sultation, may also appear on behalf of a party. Id. When an authorized representa-
tive appears, the party is not required to appear in person. Id.
73. Andersen Windows, Inc. v. Hochberg, 997 So. 2d 1212, 1213-14 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 2008).
74. Id. at 1214.
75. Trowbridge v. Trowbridge, 674 So. 2d 928, 931 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
76. Sponga v. Warro, 698 So. 2d 621, 625 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
77. See, e.g., id.
78. FLA. STAT. § 44.405(4)(a)(5) (2011).
79. Id. § 44.405(4)(a).
80. Racing Props., L.P. v. Baldwin, 885 So. 2d 881, 883 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
81. Id.
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agreement will not be enforced if the condition on which it is based fails to
occur.8 2 In a 2011 dissolution of marriage case, the trial court erred in enter-
ing a final judgment when it was based on a "void" mediated agreement.83
At mediation, the parties entered into a comprehensive settlement condi-
tioned upon the husband paying the wife $130,000 from a refinancing de-
scribed in the agreement.' The agreement further provided that should the
husband not pay the wife as described, "'this agreement shall be a nullity and
have no force and effect whatsoever.""' Therefore, the appellate court, other
than affirming the dissolution of marriage, reversed all other settlement pro-
visions.86
Courts continue to enforce clear and unambiguous provisions in me-
diated agreements. In O'Neill v. Scher," the court held that the mediated
agreement's language was unambiguous.89 Therefore, the trial court did not
err when it refused to consider parol evidence. 90 Similarly, in Gowni v. Ma-
kar,91 the court concluded that because the contract, as a whole, was not am-
biguous, an evidentiary hearing at which parol evidence 92 was considered
would be inappropriate.93 However, the appellate court reversed the specific
portion of the trial court's order that instructed the appellant to execute a
"general release" as it did not reflect the claims or interests released in the
agreement, and was overly broad.94 Consistently, in Johnson v. Bezner,95 the
appellate court affirmed the enforcement of the mediated agreement, but
reversed the portion of the court's order that exceeded the court's authority
and the scope of the mediated agreement entered into by the parties. 96 The
trial court had erred in requiring the appellant to hire counsel experienced in
82. Schlifstein v. Schlifstein, 52 So. 3d 841, 842 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., O'Neill v. Scher ex rel. Estate of Scher, 997 So. 2d 1205, 1207 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
88. 997 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
89. Id. at 1207.
90. Id.
91. 940 So. 2d 1226 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
92. The parol evidence rule is "[t]he common law principal that a writing intended by the
parties to be a final embodiment of their agreement cannot be modified by evidence of earlier
or contemporaneous agreements that might add to, vary, or contradict the writing." BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 1227 (9th ed. 2009).
93. Gowni, 940 So. 2d at 1230.
94. See id. at 1228-30.
95. 910 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
96. Id.at399,401.
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county zoning law and awarding attorney's fees, when the agreement neither
required appellants to hire an attorney, nor provided for the reimbursement
of the awarded fees.17 "An order enforcing a settlement agreement must con-
form with the terms of the agreement and may not impose terms that were
not included in the agreement."98 The court's authority to enforce the terms
of the parties' "agreement is circumscribed by the express terms of that
agreement.""
3. Courts Overturn or Reform Agreements for Recognized Bases
Recognized legal bases to overturn or reform mediated agreements pre-
date the 2004 Act.'" As with other settlement agreements, parties have
access to the courts to seek rescission or reformation.'' "After all, the 'right
to go to court to resolve our disputes is one of our fundamental rights.""'0 2
Early cases brought to overturn or reform mediated agreements dealt
primarily with party wrongdoing.103 These cases would now likely fit within
the current statutory exception allowing parties to establish or refute recog-
nized bases to void or reform their mediated agreement.'" Some cases
would also fit within the exclusion for any mediation communication "will-
fully used to plan a crime, commit or attempt to commit a crime, conceal
ongoing criminal activity, or threaten violence."o For example, in Cooper v.
Austin,106 the court addressed allegations of extortion.'0o The wife in a disso-
lution of marriage mediation sent a note to her husband reading: "If you
can't agree to this, the kids will take what information they have to whomev-
er to have you arrested, etc. Although I would get no money if you were in
jail-you wouldn't also be living freely as if you did nothing wrong." 108
97. Id. at 401.
98. Id.
99. Garcia v. Rambo Sec. Patrol, Inc., No. 08-22303-Civ., 2010 WL 750296, at *2 (S.D.
Fla. Mar. 3, 2010) (citing Paulucci v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 842 So. 2d 797, 803 (Fla. 2003)).
100. See DR Lakes, Inc. v. Brandsmart U.S.A. of W. Palm Beach (DR Lakes1), 819 So. 2d
971, 974 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
101. See id.
102. Id. (quoting Psychiatric Assocs. v. Siegel, 610 So. 2d 419, 424 (Fla. 1992) (con-
struing FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 21)).
103. See, e.g., Cooper v. Austin, 750 So. 2d 711, 711 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
104. FLA. STAT. § 44.405(4)(a)(5) (2011).
105. Id. § 44.405(4)(a)(2).
106. 750 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
107. Id. at 711.
108. Id.
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Shortly after the husband received this note, the parties settled with the
wife receiving $128,000 in marital assets to the husband's $10,000.'09 The
trial court had adopted the mediated agreement in its final judgment and de-
nied the husband relief from final judgment."o The appellate court held that
the note was "extortionate and [the] presentation of the extorted agreement to
the court [constituted] a fraud on the court."'"' Therefore, it could not allow
the wife to benefit from her actions and held that the husband was entitled to
relief from the agreement.' 12
Courts have also set aside agreements based on false statements made
with knowledge that the representation was false and with the intention to
induce reliance on the representation and the party who relied on the false
information was injured by the reliance."' Similarly, when a party properly
pleads specific allegations of fraud constituting a 'colorable entitlement to
relief,"' the party is entitled to an evidentiary hearing.1 4 An exculpatory
clause in a mediated agreement does not bar the court from considering
"whether the [a]greement was procured by fraud, duress, or coercion."" 5
Notably, courts will not enforce mediated agreements that violate the
law."' A key benefit to mediation is the self-determination of the parties
who have the opportunity to create resolutions that will specifically address
and meet their needs."' Nonetheless, parties do not have free rein in their
decision-making."' Courts deciding family law matters may set aside
agreements, consistent with statutory law, if they are "not in the best interest
of the children" and will admit evidence relevant to the best interest stan-
dard." 9 In these cases, the settlement provisions "must be reviewed and ap-
proved by the trial court as being in the best interest of the children." 20 Ad-
109. Id. at 711-12.
110. Id. at711.
Ill. Cooper, 750 So. 2d at 713.
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., Still v. Still, 835 So. 2d 376, 376 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Lo-
pez-Infante v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 809 So. 2d 13, 15 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2002)).
114. Hinson v. Hinson, 985 So. 2d 1120, 1121 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting
Schindler v. Schiavo (In re Guardianship of Schiavo), 800 So. 2d 640, 645 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 2001)); see also Gostyla v. Gostyla, 708 So. 2d 674, 675 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
115. Marjon v. Lane, 995 So. 2d 1086, 1087 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
116. Cooper, 750 So. 2d at 713.
117. See FLA. STAT. § 44.1011(2) (2011).
118. See FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(c); Feliciano v. Feliciano, 674 So. 2d 937, 937 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (per curiam); see also FLA. FAM. L. R. P. 12.540; FLA. R. Civ. P.
1.540(b)(3).
119. Feliciano, 674 So. 2d at 937; FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(c).
120. Griffith v. Griffith, 860 So. 2d 1069, 1071 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Feli-
ciano, 674 So. 2d at 937); see also FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(c).
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ditionally, parties may neither decide bankruptcy matters based on state con-
tract law,12' nor decide all the federal income tax exemptions in their marital
settlement agreement.122
4. Judicial Sanctions for Breach of Confidentiality
In 1997, seven years before the Act, a trial judge struck a party's plead-
ings and dismissed her case with prejudice because the party violated media-
tion confidentiality when she disclosed a settlement offer to a newspaper.123
In the case of Paranzino v. Barnett Bank of South Florida,'24 the trial judge
found that the disclosure was a willful and deliberate breach of the confiden-
tiality provision in the Mediation Report and Agreement.'12  The appellate
court affirmed.12 6 The Paranzino decision was based on language in the
Mediation Report and Agreement, executed by parties and their counsel,
which provided in relevant part:
[T]his report and agreement is the result of a confidential pro-
ceeding and all signers agree to be bound by such confidentiality
and shall not disclose any discussions unless agreed to in writing
by all signators or unless ordered by the court; that this mediation
is governed by the provisions of Chapter 44, Florida Statutes and
Rule 1.700 et. seq. which shall be binding.127
Eleven years after Paranzino, and four years after the Act took effect,
the issue of willful and deliberate breach by a mediation party had a different
result.128 In Hill v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.,'129 a worker's compensation clai-
mant violated confidentiality by questioning his doctor about information
defense counsel attributed to the claimant's doctor during mediation. 30 The
Judge of Compensation Claims dismissed the case with prejudice, finding
121. See In re Ellertson, 252 B.R. 831, 833 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2000); see also Dehart v.
Miller (In re Miller), 424 B.R. 171, 174 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2010).
122. See Hoelzle v. Shapiro, 736 So. 2d 1207, 1209 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
123. Paranzino v. Barnett Bank of S. Fla., N.A., 690 So. 2d 725, 726, 729 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1997).
124. 690 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
125. Id. at 729.
126. Id. at 730.
127. Id. at 726.
128. Hill v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 988 So. 2d 1250, 1252 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2008)
(per curiam).
129. 988 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (per curiam).
130. Id. at 1251.
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that claimant's violation was willful and deliberate.13' The case was reversed
and remanded with a finding that the severe sanction was unwarranted.132
This case underscores the importance of attorneys advising their clients
about confidentiality and specifically addressing what clients can and cannot
communicate to whom.3 3 Here, the claimant sought information from his
treating doctor and clarification as to what was in the doctor's report. 34
However, by repeating to his physician the statement made by the attorney
during mediation, the claimant had breached mediation confidentiality.'3 1
With the specter of harsh sanctions, by virtue of the Act's provisions 36
or court order,137 all mediation participants need to keep the boundaries of
mediation confidentiality in mind. While mediators have an ethical obliga-
tion to include information about confidentiality in their opening statements,
they are not obligated to include information about sanctions. Lawyers
seem best suited to discuss in detail the confidentiality requirements and
sanctions with their clients to prevent unfortunate results.
B. Developing Confidentiality Case Law
1. Mediator Misconduct
In a significant departure from general contract law, the Fourth District
Court of Appeal held in 2001 that mediator misconduct in a court-ordered
mediation may be the basis for setting aside the parties' mediated agree-
ment.'39 The trial judge rightly denied the wife's motion to set aside the me-
diated agreement for, at that time, there was no legal basis to do so premised
on duress or coercion exerted by a third party, such as the mediator.140
131. Id. at 1250.
132. Id. at 1252.
133. See id. at 1251.
134. Hill, 988 So. 2d at 1251.
135. Id.
136. FLA. STAT. § 44.406(1) (2011). All mediation participants who willingly and kno-
wingly disclose a mediation communication in violation of the Act are subject to sanctions,
including attorney's fees, mediator's fees, compensatory damages, and equitable relief. Id.
137. FLA. STAT. § 44.405(1). For court-ordered mediation, a participant may be sanc-
tioned by the court, to include attorney's fees, mediator's fees and costs. Id.
138. Fla. R. Cert. & Ct.-Apptd. Mediators R. 10.420(a)(3) (2011). The mediator shall
advise the mediation participants that "communications made during the process are confiden-
tial, except where disclosure is required or permitted by law." Id.
139. Vitakis-Valchine v. Valchine (Vitakis-Valchine 1), 793 So. 2d 1094, 1099 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
140. Id. at 1095.
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In Vitakis-Valchine v. Valchine (Vitakis-Valchine 1)," the wife testified
that the mediator told her: 1) the couple's frozen embryos were not "lives in
being," and the judge would not grant her child support, if after the divorce,
she was impregnated with the embryos; 2) the judge would order the em-
bryos destroyed and not give her custody of them; 3) "that's it, I give up"
and would tell the judge that she caused the settlement to fail if no agreement
was reached at mediation; 4) she was not entitled to the husband's federal
pension, and that it was not worth litigating; and 5) she could protest provi-
sions of the agreement she did not like at the final hearing after she signed
the mediated agreement. 14 2 The wife also testified that "time pressure"
caused her to sign the agreement, and that the mediator warned her that they
only had five minutes to hurry up and get out because his family was more
important. 143
The mediation began at 10:45 a.m. and continued for eight hours.'"
The wife attended with her brother and attorney, and her husband attended
with his attorney.145 The parties' mediation resulted in a comprehensive
twenty-three page agreement. 146 Nonetheless, the wife filed a motion to set
aside the mediated agreement, in part, based on coercion and duress by the
mediator.147 The appellate court addressed whether the wife's claim of me-
diator misconduct was an exception to the rule that third party duress and
coercion will not invalidate an agreement between two contracting parties.148
The court believed "it would be unconscionable for a court to enforce a set-
tlement agreement reached through coercion or any other improper tactics
utilized by a court-appointed mediator." 49 It held "the court may invoke its
inherent power to maintain the integrity of the judicial system and its
processes by invalidating a court-ordered mediation settlement agreement
obtained through violation and abuse of the judicially-prescribed mediation
procedures."'
141. 793 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
142. Id. at 1097.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1096.
145. Id. See information provided by wife's testimony. Vitakis-Valchine 1, 793 So. 2d at
1096.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1099.
150. Vitakis-Valchine 1, 793 So. 2d at 1099. The court noted that pursuant to Florida
Rules for Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators, Rule 10.500, mediators remain 'accoun-
table to the referring court[s] with ultimate authority over the case[s]."' Id. at 1099 n.3 (quot-
ing FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORs R. 10.500).
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Accordingly, the appellate court remanded to the trial court to deter-
mine "whether the mediator substantially violated the Rules for Mediators,
and whether that misconduct led to the settlement agreement in this case."'
On remand, the trial judge did not find mediator misconduct, duress, or coer-
cion on the part of the mediator, and therefore, upheld the mediated agree-
ment.15 2 The appellate court affirmed that ruling.'53
Mediator misconduct was also alleged as a basis for setting aside me-
diated agreements in two more recent cases.'54 In neither case was the
agreement overturned.155 In a probate case questioning whether the mediated
agreement determined the property distribution when one party died before
the final judgment of dissolution of marriage was entered, the opinion did not
state that the conduct of the mediator constituted misconduct. 15 6
In Clark v. School Board of Bradford County, Florida,157 the plaintiff
filed a Motion to Set Aside the Mediated Agreement claiming that she was
"pressured, threaten[ed], and coerce[d] into signing the agreement" at media-
tion. 5 1 She specifically alleged that the mediator told her she could file a
motion with the court, and that this remained her only recourse, as she had
already signed the agreement.'59 Interestingly, the plaintiff violated the con-
fidentiality provision in the parties' agreement when she attached their set-
tlement agreement to her Motion to Set Aside Mediation Agreement.'60 This
however, was not an issue before the court, and consequently, breach of con-
fidentiality was not addressed in the opinion.161
The plaintiff did not dispute the terms of the agreement or the existence
of an executed valid agreement.162 The mediator testified that he would nev-
er give a party legal advice during mediation, and if a party were showing
151. Id. at 1100. The appellate court did not make any findings regarding whether the
mediator had committed misconduct. Id.
152. Vitakis v. Valchine (Vitakis-Valchine III), 987 So. 2d 171, 171 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2008) (interpreting Valchine v. Valchine (Vitakis v. Valchine 11), 923 So. 2d 511, 511
(Fla. 4th. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (unpublished table decision)).
153. Vitakis-Valchine III, 987 So. 2d at 171 (interpreting Vitakis v. Valchine II, 923 So. 2d
at 511).
154. Clark v. Sch. Bd. of Bradford Cnty., Fla., No. 3:09-cv-901-J-34TEM, 2010 WL
4696063, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 13, 2010); Marlowe ex. rel. Estate of Brown v. Brown, 944 So.
2d 1036, 1038 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
155. Clark, 2010 WL 4696063, at *6; see Brown, 944 So. 2d at 1038.
156. See Brown, 944 So. 2d at 1037-38, 1040.
157. No. 3:09-cv-901-J-34TEM, 2010 WL 4696063 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 13, 2010).
158. Id. at *1.
159. Id.
160. Id. at *2.
161. See id. at *3-6.
162. Clark, 2010 WL 4696063, at *3.
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signs of duress, he would never have the party sign the mediated agree-
ment.163 The court did not find any evidence that the mediator coerced or
exerted undue pressure on the plaintiff or somehow forced her to sign the
mediated agreement.'" Accordingly, the court dismissed the case with pre-
judice and ordered the removal of the mediated agreement that the plaintiff
had attached to her motion.165
Not yet a decade old, the law of mediator misconduct is still in its in-
fancy. Case law does not provide the answer to what constitutes mediator
misconduct rising to the level required to set aside or reform a mediated
agreement. Proving mediator misconduct would likely be challenging.
While one party looks to overturn or reform the mediated agreement, the
other party seeks to enforce it. The mediator would likely deny violating
ethical rules and testify as to facts consistent with the party looking to en-
force the mediated agreement. Additionally, counsel who accompanied the
parties to mediation will also likely testify that they did not stand idly by as
the mediator coerced, threatened, or otherwise violated ethical rules. Yet,
alleging mediator misconduct may be attractive as a means to reform or set
aside a mediated agreement. Given the limited number of options, it remains
a viable cause of action to consider.
2. Mutual Mistake
In 2002, the Fourth District Court of Appeal addressed whether the
mediation privilege applies where a mutual mistake was made by the parties
in their mediated agreement.16 6 The appellant, seller, sought relief from a
$600,000 clerical error he claimed was made in the mediated agreement.167
The trial court determined that the seller was left without the means to prove
the alleged error because the mediation privilege precluded admission of
evidence of what transpired at mediation.'16 In this case of first impression,
the appellate court held that the statutory mediation privilege did not apply:
"Although it may be difficult for [the] seller to prove that [the] mistake was
mutual, given the position of the buyer, seller should still have the opportuni-
ty to put on all of its evidence. We therefore reverse."' 69
163. Id. at *5.
164. Id.
165. Id. at *6.
166. DR Lakes 1, 819 So. 2d 971, 973 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
167. Id. at 972.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 973-75.
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The court reasoned that "the reasons for confidentiality are not as com-
pelling" once the parties have signed a mediated agreement.170 It did not
believe that the Florida Legislature meant to deny a party who reached an
agreement at mediation the same access to the courts to correct a mutual mis-
take, as a party who reached agreement through means other than media-
tion.'7 1
On remand, at a non-jury trial, the parties "presented conflicting evi-
dence [as to] what occurred [at] mediation." 72 The trial judge ruled in favor
of DR Lakes, the seller, finding that the seller had shown "by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the parties agreed" the seller would receive a $600,000
credit for its contribution to the construction. 73 The credit "was implicit in
the incorporation of [a section] of the Purchase Agreement into the Stipula-
tion" which dealt with the credit and was read in connection with the
changed provision "that DR Lakes [either] construct or pay for [the road]
construction." 74
Following remand, Brandsmart appealed, challenging the trial court's
finding of fact as unsupported by competent substantial evidence.'7 ' The
appellate court affirmed, determining that the seller's witnesses' testimony
regarding the mediated agreement supported the trial court's ruling.176 "The
parties' conflicting stories at trial do not preclude a finding that a mutual
mistake was established by clear and convincing evidence."' 77 "'A mistake
is mutual when the parties agree to one thing and then, due to either a scri-
vener's error or inadvertence, express something different in the written in-
strument."" 7 It results in litigation when the parties do not agree.179
Mutual mistake was also alleged in a 2011 dissolution of marriage
case. 80 In Moree v. Moree,'"' the husband requested reformation of the me-
170. Id. at 974.
171. DR Lakes 1, 819 So. 2d at 974. "It is well-established in Florida that statutes, even
where clear, should not be interpreted to produce absurd results." Id. (citing Holly v. Auld,
450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984)).
172. Brandsmart U.S.A. of W. Palm Beach, Inc. v. DR Lakes, Inc. (DR Lakes II), 901 So.
2d 1004, 1005 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1006.
176. Id.
177. DR Lakes II, 901 So. 2d at 1006.
178. Id. at 1005-06 (quoting Circle Mortg. Corp. v. Kline, 645 So. 2d 75, 78 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (per curiam)).
179. Id. at 1006.
180. Moree v. Moree, 59 So. 3d 205, 206 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
181. 59 So. 3d 205 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
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diated agreement so it would accurately reflect the parties' intentions.182 He
claimed that the mediated settlement agreement contained errors and did not
reflect the value of accounts held by the parties due to tax factors.8 3 The
trial court denied the husband's motion to reform or set aside the agreement,
determining that the husband did not "allege fraud, misrepresentation in dis-
covery, coercion, or allegations sufficient under Florida Family Law Rule of
Procedure 12.540."'" The appellate court reversed and remanded for an
evidentiary hearing on the husband's motion, concluding that the trial court
erred in determining the husband's motion based on mutual mistake to be
facially insufficient.'
Curiously, in another dissolution of marriage case, the parties agreed
there had been a mutual mistake, yet the trial judge did not rescind the par-
ties' mediated agreement.'8 6 Prior to the entry of an order of dissolution of
marriage, the husband filed a "'Motion for Reformation of Agreement and
Motion for Reconsideration.'" 87 Although the wife joined in the motion, the
trial court denied their joint motion.'88  The appellate court found the
''agreement was entered into based [on] mutual mistake . . . [and] the trial
court [had] erred in not rescinding the [mediated agreement]." 89
Courts have distinguished mutual mistake from unilateral mistake.' 90 In
Feldman v. Kritch,19' State Farm filed a motion to set aside the mediated
agreement, alleging there was a misunderstanding as to whether the $40,000
it had already paid should be deleted from the $75,000 referenced in the
agreement.19 2 "[F]inding that there was no meeting of the minds," the trial
court set aside the mediated agreement.193 Distinguishing Brandsmart U.S.A
of West Palm Beach, Inc. v. DR Lakes, Inc. (DR Lakes II),194 the appellate
court did not find any evidence that an offset of $40,000 was ever mentioned
during the parties' mediation.'95 "Thus, any mistake was a unilateral mistake
on the part of State Farm." 96
182. Id. at 206.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 207.
185. Id. at 207-08.
186. Barber v. Barber, 878 So. 2d 449, 451 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (per curiam).
187. Id. at 450-51.
188. Id. at 451.
189. Id.
190. Feldman v. Kritch, 824 So. 2d 274, 277 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
191. 824 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
193. Id. at 276.
193. Id.
194. 901 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
195. Feldman, 824 So. 2d at 277.
196. Id.
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In this case predating the Act, the court cites to DR Lakes II's recogni-
tion of mutual mistake as a basis for considering evidence without violating
confidentiality.19 7 "Because State Farm claimed that there was a mutual mis-
take, the statutory privilege protecting the confidentiality of all oral and writ-
ten communications, other than the executed settlement agreement, should
not apply."'
The doctrine of mutual mistake will not apply when parties seek relief
from agreements they entered into improvidently.' 99 For a party to prevail on
the basis of mutual mistake:
[T]he party must. .. show he did not bear the risk of a mistake. A
party to an agreement bears the risk of a mistake when "he is
aware, at the time the contract is made, that he has only limited
knowledge with respect to the facts to which the mistake relates
but treats his limited knowledge as sufficient."200
A plaintiff who reaches agreement at mediation despite not knowing the
applicable policy limits may not avoid his or her agreement by claiming mu-
tual mistake.20' Similarly, a plaintiff s failure to determine the severity of his
or her condition before settling at mediation will not have the agreement set
aside based on "mistake." 20 2 "[C]ases settled in mediation are especially
unsuited for the liberal application of a rule allowing rescission of a settle-
ment agreement based on unilateral mistake." 203 "[M]ore stringent principles
of law apply in setting aside a contract than in setting aside a judgment."20
Mutual mistake is easy to allege, but difficult to prove.205 The burden of
proof is clear and convincing evidence.20 Conflicting testimony will be the
norm as one party looks to overturn or reform, while the other seeks to en-
197. Id.
198. Id. at 276. "[T]he court agreed to hear testimony, including that of the mediator
himself, regarding the settlement negotiations." Id.
199. Leff v. Ecker, 972 So. 2d 965, 966 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (per curiam).
200. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Rawson v. UMLIC VP, L.L.C., 933 So. 2d 1206, 1210
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2006)).
201. See id.
202. Sponga v. Warro, 698 So. 2d 621, 624-25 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
203. Id. at 625.
204. Tilden Groves Holding Corp. v. Orlando/Orange Cnty. Expressway, 816 So. 2d 658,
660 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Smiles v. Young ex rel. Estate of McCutcheon, 271
So. 2d 798, 801 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
205. See DR Lakes II, 901 So. 2d 1004, 1005-06 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
206. Id. at 1006.
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force.207 Even if the parties were to agree on a mistake, 208 chances are good
they do not agree on the resolution or they would not be seeking court de-
termination. In DR Lakes II, there was a document other than the mediated
agreement, which added credibility to DR Lakes's position.209 Proving the
case by clear and convincing evidence will likely prove difficult if the only
evidence is the mediation participants' conflicting testimony.2t o
Mutual mistake was first considered in the context of mediation less
than a decade ago.2 1 1 Although case law does provide guidance distinguish-
ing mutual mistake from unilateral mistake, these cases remain problematic.
Mere allegation of mutual mistake allows the party to introduce evidence to
attempt to prove the allegation.2 12 The utterance of the allegation serves to
open the door to admitting evidence of mediation communications that were
expected to be confidential and would otherwise be confidential.213 It de-
stroys the mediation privilege and confidentiality for purposes of proving the
mistake.2 14 As courts balance preserving mediation confidentiality with pro-
viding parties access to the courts, perhaps there is a way of making a thre-
shold determination of the existence of mutual mistake before holding a full-
blown trial. That would serve to preserve mediation confidentiality until
there is a determination that a party made a credible allegation.215
IV. CONFIDENTIALITY CONUNDRUMS AFTER THE ACT
A. Identifying Mediation Communications
The statutory definition is broad and the exceptions are often hazy.216
Courts are determining what is and what is not a confidential mediation
communication. 2 17 They are determining what is discoverable and what is
207. See id. (citing Steffens v. Steffens, 422 So. 2d 963, 964, n.1 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1982)).
208. See Barber v. Barber, 878 So. 2d 449, 451 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (per curiam).
209. DR Lakes II, 901 So. 2d at 1005.
210. See id. at 1006.
211. DR Lakes I, 819 So. 2d 971, 973 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
212. See id. at 974-75.
213. See id. at 972, 974.
214. See id. at 974-75.
215. See Deason, The Quest for Uniformity in Mediation Confidentiality, supra note 3, at
95. Some "states provide a mechanism, such as an in camera hearing, to ensure that confiden-
tiality is maintained while courts decide whether an exception to confidentiality provisions is
appropriate." Id.
216. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 44.403(1), .405 (2011).
217. See, e.g., Polanco v. McNeil, No. 09-60448-Civ-COHN, 2010 WL 3027798, at *2
(S.D. Fla. Apr. 19, 2010).
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admissible.2 18 Written statements are included within the definition of medi-
ation communication.219 In Chabad House-Lubavitch of Palm Beach Coun-
ty., Inc. v. Banks,220 mediation confidentiality and privilege extended to phys-
ical evidence that "was a direct product of [the] mediation."22' Similarly, an
apology written during mediation, which was not part of the mediated
agreement, would be a mediation communication.222 Mediation communica-
tions may also be in the form of nonverbal assertions made by or to a media-
tion participant. 223
In Polanco v. McNeil,224 the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of Florida distinguished between mediation communications and
observations made during mediation.225 Petitioner, charged with first degree
murder, sought to prevent testimony from her divorce mediation at her mur-
der trial.226 The court permitted testimony of observations made at her di-
vorce mediation, which took place one day before the murder.227 Both the
petitioner's mediator and attorney testified about the observations they made
during the mediation.228 For instance, the mediator testified that the petition-
er was appropriately dressed and spoke properly. 229 The mediation commu-
nications, however, were considered confidential and not admitted into evi-
dence. 230 Attorney-client privilege did not prevent the attorney from testify-
ing about observations he made.23 1
An Indiana civil case sheds additional light on the communication-
observation distinction. 232 In Bridges v. Metromedia Steakhouse Co. 233 the
trial judge allowed an insurance adjuster who attended appellant's mediation
218. See, e.g., Altheim v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., No. 8:10-cv-156-T-24TBM, 2010 WL
5092721, at *1-2 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 8, 2016); Fluor Intercontinental, Inc. v. IAP Worldwide
Servs., Inc., No. 5:09CV331/RS-EMT, 2010 WL 2366482, at *1-2 (N.D. Fla. June 14, 2010).
219. FLA. STAT. § 44.403(1).
220. 602 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
221. Id. at 672.
222. FLA. STAT. § 44.403(1); Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Advisory Op. 2004-010
(2005).
223. FLA. STAT. § 44.403(1).
224. No. 09-60448-Civ-COHN, 2010 WL 3027798 (S.D. Fla. Apr.19, 2010).
225. Id. at *26.
226. Id. at *2.
227. Id. at *26.
228. Id.
229. Polanco, 2010 WL 3027798, at *5.
230. Id. at *2, *26.
231. Id. at *26 (citing Clanton v. United States, 488 F.2d 1069, 1071 (5th Cir. 1974).
232. See Bridges v. Metromedia Steakhouse Co., 807 N.E.2d 162, 166-67 (Ind. Ct. App.
2004).
233. 807 N.E.2d 162 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
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to testify about observations she made during the mediation.23 The adjuster
testified during trial that she did not see scarring, redness, or blisters on
Bridges' injured hand.235 On appeal, "Bridges state[d] that she 'display[ed]'
her hand . . . and 'point[ed] to the scars."' 236 She maintained that the adjus-
ter's testimony was based on "Bridges' 'nonverbal conduct' during media-
tion," which was privileged, confidential, and inadmissible.237
Considering this issue of first impression for the Indiana courts, the
court of appeals checked the record to see if the adjuster was asked to view
Bridges' hand or simply observed her hand.238 The analysis is critical in de-
termining whether the testimony was based on protected mediation state-
ments or conduct, or simply on observation occurring during the media-
tion.2 39 The court found nothing in the record to support Bridges' assertion
that she displayed her hand. 240 Therefore, the testimony was deemed to be
based on personal observation, and the trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion.24' Florida, like Indiana, distinguishes between confidential and privi-
leged mediation communications, and discoverable and admissible observa-
tions that take place during mediation.2 2 The Florida courts' determination
would also turn on whether there was "nonverbal conduct [by the party] in-
tended to make an assertion, by or to a mediation participant." 24 3
A federal judge who had ordered a Florida case to mediation deter-
mined that communications during the alleged mediation were not confiden-
tial because the "'mediation' was a sham."24 In his Order on Motion to Dis-
qualify or Recuse himself from the case, the judge noted his reasons for de-
ciding that mediation had not occurred, and therefore mediation confidential-
ity did not apply.245 The case at bar was a suit against Joseph R. Francis and
Girls Gone Wild, in which the plaintiff alleged that the defendant and the
defendant's employee coerced her to expose her breasts for their film. 246
234. Id. at 164.
235. Id. at 164, 166.
236. Id. at 166.
237. Id. at 165.
238. Bridges, 807 N.E.2d at 165-66.
239. See id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 166-67.
242. See id. at 166; Fisk Electric Co. v. Solo Constr. Corp., 417 F. App'x 898, 902 (11th
Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
243. FLA. STAT. § 44.403(1) (2011).
244. Pitts v. Francis, No. 5:07CV169-RS-EMT, 2007 WL 4482168, at *13 (N.D. Fla. Dec.
19, 2007).
245. See id. at *I 1-13.
246. Id. at *1.
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Sixteen years of age at the time, the plaintiff contended she had not con-
sented to be filmed.247
According to evidence and testimony from an evidentiary hearing,
Francis was four hours late for the mediation. He proceeded to place his
bare and dirty feet on top of the conference table facing plaintiffs counsel
and interrupted him when the plaintiffs counsel had only said four words.249
He repeatedly yelled, "Don't expect to get a fucking dime-not one fucking
dime!" and shouted, "I hold the purse strings. I will not settle this case at all.
I am only here because the court is making me be here!"25 0 As plaintiffs
counsel was leaving, Francis added, "We will bury you and your clients! I'm
going to ruin you, your clients, and all of your ambulance-chasing part-
ners!" 251' Francis then charged at plaintiffs counsel, appearing poised to
physically assault him. 25 2 His parting words to plaintiffs counsel were
"Suck my dick." 253 Based on this behavior, the judge determined that Fran-
cis was not engaged in mediation, and that his behavior was violent.254 Fur-
ther, the judge found that Francis used the court's mediation order as "a con-
duit through which he could threaten and assault the other party and its attor-
neys under the cloak of confidentiality."2 55
In response to the plaintiff's motion for sanctions against Joe Francis,
the judge found Francis in civil contempt for failing to mediate in good faith,
and ordered his incarceration.256 The court's order provided that once the
mediator certified Francis had mediated in good faith and complied with the
court's order, Francis would be released. 257 This placed the mediator in the
awkward position of reconciling his obligation to obey the court's order with
his obligation to abide by the Florida Rules for Certified and Court-
Appointed Mediators. 258 The Mediator Ethics Advisory Committee (MEAC)
has advised mediators that they are "not able to comply with both the Florida
247. Id.
248. Id. at *11.
249. Pitts, 2007 WL 4482168, at *11.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. "Francis' own attorney had to position himself between Francis and plaintiffs
counsel to prevent a brawl." Id. at * 12.
253. Pitts, 2007 WL4482168 at *12.
254. Id. at *ll-13.
255. Id. at *12. See Meet Joe Francis, MEETJOEFRANCIS.COM, http://www.meetjoefrancis.
com/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2011) for Francis' position on this and related matters.
256. Pitts, 2007 WL 4482168, at *13-16. Plaintiffs motion alleged that Francis' behavior
at mediation was threatening and abusive toward the plaintiffs and their attorneys. Id. at * 10.
257. Id. at *15. The judge stayed the order to allow Francis the opportunity to mediate in
good faith. Id. at *15-16.
258. See Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Advisory Op. 2004-006 (2005).
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Rules for Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators and a court order to re-
port a party who fails to mediate in good faith." 25 9 "[M]ediators ... may not
report to a court that a party has failed to negotiate in good faith for the prin-
cipal reasons that the mediator's report would: 1) constitute a breach of con-
fidentiality; 2) impair parties' right to self-determination; and 3) destroy me-
diator impartiality, in appearance and in reality."260 Whether the mediator is
reporting that the party failed to mediate in good faith or mediated in good
faith, the ethical analysis remains the same: the mediator is required to
maintain confidentiality except where disclosure is required or permitted by
law.261 MEAC clarifies the mediator's obligation by interpreting it in light of
the Mediation Confidentiality and Privilege Act, which provides that media-
tion communications are confidential unless the Act provides otherwise.26 2
Mediation communications include nonverbal conduct intended to make an
assertion by or to a mediation participant, as well as written and oral state-
ments. 263 The Act does not contain an exception for reporting whether a par-
ty mediated in good faith.2 6
Local court rules for the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Florida provide that mediators are governed by the ethical rules
adopted by the Supreme Court of Florida for circuit civil mediators. 265 They
also provide that unless the parties settle or agree otherwise, the mediator
may only report to the judge that the case settled, was adjourned, continued,
or terminated.266 Given the mediator's ethical obligation to comply with
local rules, court rules, administrative orders, and statutes governing media-
tion, the mediator's allowable communication to the court regarding media-
tion is limited.267
Notably, if the parties do not engage in mediation, there would be no
mediation communications to be confidential and privileged. Determining
whether mediation took place becomes a conundrum-a catch twenty-two.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. FLA. R. CERT. & CT-APPTD. MEDIATORs R. 10.360(a).
262. FLA. STAT. § 44.405(1), (4)(a) (2011).
263. Id. § 44.403(1).
264. MEAC Advisory Op. 2004-006, supra note 258. MEAC advises that parties are not
required to negotiate in good faith. Id. (citing Avril v. Civilmar, 605 So. 2d 988, 989-90 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App 1992) (quashing order imposing sanctions for failure to negotiate in good
faith at mediation as departure from essential requirements of law and stating that "[t]here is
no requirement that a party . .. make an offer at mediation, let alone offer what the opposition
wants to settle")).
265. N.D. FLA. Loc. R. 16.3(D). The referenced rules are the Florida Rules for Certified
and Court-Appointed Mediators. See id. 16.3.
266. Id. 16.3(A).
267. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS R. 10.520.
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To determine whether mediation occurred, information about what did or did
not happen would be necessary. As mediation communications are confiden-
tial and privileged, mediators are not permitted to report them to the court,
absent a statutory exception or agreement of all parties.268 Consequently,
protected mediation communications could not be utilized to determine if
mediation took place unless and until there had been a determination that
they were not mediation communications because mediation never occurred.
In significant contrast, mediators are permitted to report to the court
whether parties and attorneys physically appear for mediation, and other mat-
ters based on observation are, likewise, not mediation communications.269
Additionally, the commission of a crime during mediation would not consti-
tute a mediation communication,270 and there is no confidentiality or privi-
lege for a mediation communication "willfully used to plan a crime, commit
or attempt to commit a crime, conceal ongoing criminal activity, or threaten
violence."2 71 Therefore, if Joe Francis's behavior constituted an exclusion
from the definition for mediation communication or a delineated exception
within the Act, the behavior would be neither confidential nor privileged.272
B. Discovery and Admissibility
Federal courts in Florida have addressed whether communications at or
arising from mediation are admissible or discoverable.273 In so doing, they
have applied the Act, Federal Rules of Evidence, and local court rules.274 A
recent Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals case reviewed the district court's
application of the Act in its decision to admit testimony of mediation pro-
ceedings.275 The district court stated that the appellant, by arguing that it had
not been paid and by raising an affirmative defense, opened the door to ad-
mission of evidence showing the mediation resulted in payment to the appel-
lant.276 The Act specifically provides that a party who "makes a representa-
268. Id. 10.360(a).
269. See FLA. STAT. § 44.403(1) (2011); see also Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Advi-
sory Op. 2006-008 (2007); Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Advisory Op. 2007-001 (2007).
270. FLA. STAT. § 44.403(1).
271. Id. § 44.405(4)(a)(2).
272. See Pitts v. Francis, No. 5:07cvl69-RS-EMT, 2007 WL 4482168, at *12 (N.D. Fla.
Dec. 19, 2007). This analysis is premised on the applicability of the Mediation Confidentiali-
ty and Privilege Act. See FLA. STAT. § 44.403.
273. See, e.g., Fisk Electric Co. v. Solo Constr. Corp., 417 F. App'x 898, 902 (11th Cir.
2011) (per curiam).
274. See, e.g., id. at 902 n.7.
275. Id. at 902 n.7.
276. Id. at 902.
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tion about a privileged mediation communication waives the privilege . . . to
the extent [needed] for the other party to respond" properly. 277 The appellate
court affirmed.278 It did not find error in the district court's application of the
Act.279
In Altheim v. GEICO General Insurance Co.,2 80 the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Middle District of Florida applied the Act to find that the
requested discovery was not precluded by the Act. 281 The plaintiff sought an
order compelling GEICO to produce all of the documents on its privilege log
for a given period of time.282 The defendant maintained that the mediation
privilege applied.283 The court found it did not.2 84 "By definition, the privi-
lege contemplates protecting disclosure of communications that were made
during mediation to others outside the mediation process."285 Therefore,
since the plaintiff and the defendant were both mediation participants who
were not disclosing the communications to persons not mediation partici-
pants, the privilege did not apply.286 Further, the privilege could not be in-
voked for communications occurring outside the mediation process. 2 87
Parties seek to quash protective orders and compel responses to discov-
ery requests regarding otherwise confidential and privileged mediation
281 289communications.288 In In re Denture Cream Products Liability Litigation,
the appellant sought production of mediation materials and the mediation
agreement from a case with the same defendant, but different plaintiff, to
show that the defendant was on notice of claims against its product.290 The
plaintiff and plaintiffs counsel for the other case did not object to the dis-
277. FLA. STAT. § 44.405(6) (2011).
278. Fisk Electric Co., 417 F. App'x at 902.
279. Id. at 902 n.7. The court noted that it "generally appl[ies] federal evidentiary rules in
diversity cases." Id. (citing Flury v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 427 F.3d 939, 944 (11th Cir.
2005)). "But state substantive law may provide additional protection for evidence beyond
what the federal evidentiary rules provide." Id. (citing Ungerleider v. Gordon, 214 F.3d 1279,
1282 (11 th Cir. 2000)).
280. No. 8:10-cv-156-T-24TBM, 2010 WL 5092721 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 8, 2010).
281. Id. at *1.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Altheim, 2010 WL 5092721, at *1. "'[A] mediation participant shall not disclose a
mediation communication to a person other than another mediation participant or a partici-
pant's counsel."' Id. at *1 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 44.405(1) (2011)).
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. In re Denture Cream Prods. Liab. Litig. No. 09-2051-MD, 2011 WL 1979666, at *1
(S.D. Fla. May 20, 2011).
289. No. 09-2051-MD, 2011 WL 1979666 (S.D. Fla. May 20, 2011).
290. Id. at *2.
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covery. 291' The court ruled that Federal Rule of Evidence 408 did not bar
discovery, and the Confidentiality Agreement in the other case did not prec-
lude discovery of its agreement.292 Accordingly, the appellees/defendants
were ordered to produce the non-privileged mediation materials in question
with the settlement amounts redacted.293
In contrast, in Fluor Intercontinental, Inc. v. IAP Worldwide Services,
Inc.,294 another federal case applying Federal Rule of Evidence 408, state-
ments were not found to be discoverable or admissible.2 95 The statements
were communicated at the mediation of a different case that "was part of
[the] settlement of a common claim," which was also at issue in the case at
bar.296 During the mediation, Fluor's attorney gave a PowerPoint presenta-
tion.297  RMS, a subsidiary of IAP, sought to compel discovery responses
regarding Fluor's presentation made at the mediation of the other case.298
The district court determined that "any statements made by Fluor during the
[other] mediation, including the PowerPoint presentation, [were] not admiss-
ible" based on Rule 408.299 "The focus on a lawyer's statements made while
he was in the role of an advocate in mediation is not appropriate or admissi-
ble under the Federal Rules of Evidence."3"
291. Id. at *3.
292. Id. at *5. Federal Rule of Evidence 408, Compromise and Offers to Compromise,
provides:
(a) Prohibited Uses.-Evidence of the following is not admissible on behalf of any party, when
offered to prove liability for, invalidity of, or amount of a claim that was disputed as to validity
or amount, or to impeach through a prior inconsistent statement or contradiction: (1) furnish-
ing or offering or promising to furnish-or accepting or offering or promising to accept-a
valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise the claim; and (2) con-
duct or statements made in compromise negotiations regarding the claim, except when offered
in a criminal case and [when] the negotiations related to a claim by a public office or agency in
the exercise of regulatory, investigative, or enforcement authority.
FED. R. EvID. 408. Please note the Supreme Court of the United States approved amendments
to Rule 408, effective December 1, 2011, by order dated April 26, 2011. Order Amending
Federal Rules of Evidence, Rules 101-1103 (effective Dec. 1, 2011).
293. In re Denture Cream Prods. Liab. Litig., 2011 WL 1979666 at *5. The opinion does
not address the Mediation Confidentiality and Privilege Act. In re Denture Cream Prods.
Liab. Litig., 2011 WL 1979666.
294. No. 5:09CV331/RS-EMT, 2010 WL 2366482 (N.D. Fla. June 14, 2010).
295. Id. at *1.
296. Id. at *2.
297. Id. at *1.
298. Id.
299. Fluor Intercontinental, Inc., 2010 WL 2366482, at *2. The court noted it would
reach the same result applying Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Id.
300. Id.
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In another recent case, Facebook, Inc. v. Pacific Northwest Software,
Inc., 301 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed that
the district court was correct in excluding proffered evidence.30 2 The appel-
late court based its decision on the parties' signed Confidentiality Agreement
that provided:
All statements made during the course of the mediation or in me-
diator follow-up thereafter at any time prior to complete settlement
of this matter are privileged settlement discussions . . . and are
non-discoverable and inadmissible for any purpose including in
any legal proceeding . . .. No aspect of the mediation shall be re-
lied upon or introduced as evidence in any arbitral, judicial, or
other proceeding.303
The court noted that "[a] local rule, like any court order, can impose a
duty of confidentiality" regarding mediation. 304 However, the parties had
used a private ADR procedure, which was not subject to the court's ADR
Local Rules.305 Nonetheless, the parties' clearly worded Confidentiality
Agreement precluded the appellants from introducing evidence of "what
Facebook said, or did not say, during the mediation." 30 Without this evi-
dence, the appellants' securities claims failed.0
In addition to rules of evidence and statutory law, courts' local rules and
parties' confidentiality agreements weigh heavily in the courts' determina-
tion of mediation confidentiality and privilege.308 Carefully drafting confi-
dentiality agreements and keeping track of local rules are essential to protect-
ing both confidentiality and access to the courts. The District Court for the
301. 640 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 2011).
302. Id. at 1041.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 1040. On the contrary, "privileges are created by federal common law." Id. at
1041 (referencing FED. R. EvID. 501).
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by Act
of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the
privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be go-
verned by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the
United States in ... light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings,
with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of deci-
sion, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall
be determined in accordance with State law.
FED. R. EVID. 501.
305. Facebook, Inc., 640 F.3d at 1041. The district court had reached its decision based
on a Local ADR Rule, which the appellate court determined did not apply to this case. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. See id.
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Southern District of Florida has a strong local rule restricting the use of in-
formation derived during mediation, specifically referencing the Act:
All proceedings of the mediation shall be confidential and are pri-
vileged in all respects as provided under federal law and Florida
Statutes § 44.405. The proceedings may not be reported, recorded,
placed into evidence, made known to the Court or jury, or con-
strued for any purpose as an admission against interest. A party is
not bound by anything said or done at the [mediation] conference,
unless a written settlement is reached, in which case only the terms
of the settlement are binding.309
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, applying Ore-
gon law, also excluded evidence that a party needed to prove his case.31 o In
Fehr v. Kennedy,311 the plaintiffs filed a diversity action against Kennedy for
legal malpractice alleging they rejected an offer made at mediation because
they relied on Kennedy's advice.312 Subsequently, they received a less fa-
vorable outcome at trial and filed suit in federal court. 313 The district court
granted Kennedy's summary judgment motion.314 Prohibited from disclosing
confidential mediation communications, the Fehrs were not able to prove
their case.31 Although the Oregon Legislature had provided exceptions to
the nondisclosure requirement for mediation, it had not provided an excep-
tion covering actions between a party to a mediation and the party's attor-
ney.316 This case highlights the importance of statutory exceptions specifi-
cally drafted to cover intended exceptions to mediation confidentiality and
privilege.3 17 The federal court applied Oregon state law, which did not pro-
vide an exception for legal malpractice actions.318 In contrast, Florida law
specifically provides an exception for malpractice and professional miscon-
duct.3 19 In Nova Casualty Co. v. Santa Lucia,320 the plaintiff alleged that his
attorney negligently negotiated a High-Low Agreement during mediation,321
309. S.D. FLA. Loc. R. 16.2(g)(2).
310. Fehr v. Kennedy, 387 F. App'x 789, 791 (9th Cir. 2010).
311. 387 F. App'x 789 (9th Cir. 2010).
312. Id. at 790.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Fehr, 387 F. App'x at 791.
317. See id.
318. See id. at790-91.
319. FLA. STAT. § 44.405(4)(a)(4 ), (6) (2011).
320. No. 8:09-cv-1351-T-30AEP, 2010 WL 2367208 (M.D. Fla. June 14, 2010).
321. Id. at *1.
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and in Shepard v. Florida Power Corp.,322 the plaintiff alleged he was
coerced into settling at mediation by his attorney.3 23 The statutory exception
applies in both cases because the alleged wrongdoing took place during the
mediation.324
C. Appearance with Authority to Settle
The Act and Florida Rules of Procedure for Juvenile,325 Appellate, 6
Civil,327 and Family3 28 matters that govern required appearance at mediation,
have inconsistent and incompatible provisions. The Florida Rules of Proce-
dure and Mediation Referral Orders identify who is required to appear at
mediation.3 29 Generally, the requirement is to attend the mediation and have
full authority to settle.330 There is no requirement that parties mediate in
good faith, for parties have self-determination and may decide not to make
an offer and not to settle.33' Nonetheless, party representatives are required
to appear with full settlement authority:
[A] party [to a circuit civil mediation] is deemed to appear .. . if
the following ... are physically present:
(1) The party or its representative having full authority to settle
without further consultation.
(2) The party's counsel of record, if any.
(3) A representative of the insurance carrier for any insured party
who is not such carrier's outside counsel and who has full authori-
322. No. 8:09-cv-2398-T-27TGW, 2011 WL 1465995 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 18, 2011).
323. Id. at *2.
324. FLA. STAT. § 44.405(4)(a)(4), (6).
325. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.290(1)(5).
326. FLA. R. App. P. 9.720(b).
327. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.720(b).
328. FLA. FAM. L. R. P. 12.741(b)(2).
329. See FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.290(1)(2); FLA. R. App. P. 9.720(a); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.720(b);
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.750(e); FLA. R. Civ. P. 7.090(f); FLA. FAM. L. R. P. 12.740(d).
330. See FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.290(1)(2); FLA. R. App. P. 9.720(a); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.720(b);
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.750(e); FLA. R. Civ. P. 7.090(f); FLA. FAM. L. R. P. 12.740(d).
331. See Avril v. Civilmar, 605 So. 2d 988, 989-90 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Carol
L. Izumi & Homer C. La Rue, Prohibiting "Good Faith" Reports Under the Uniform Media-
tion Act: Keeping the Adjudication Camel Out of the Mediation Tent, J. Disp. RESOL. 67, 74-
75 (2003).
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ty to settle up to the amount of the plaintiff's last demand or policy
limits, whichever is less, without further consultation. 332
The Act does not provide an exception to confidentiality for reporting
lack of authority to settle.333 Therefore, if lack of settlement authority is
learned during mediation, it is a confidential mediation communication.334
Consequently, mediation participants are prohibited from communicating it
to the judge, unless the parties waive their privilege.
Following passage of the Act, the MEAC, a standing committee of the
Supreme Court of Florida, advised that if mediators learned of parties' lack
of full settlement authority during the mediation proceeding, they were not
ethically permitted to report the lack of authority to the judge.336 Prior to the
Act, MEAC had opined that appearance with full authority was required by
Rule 1.720(b), and mediators could report failure to appear.337 However, as
the information conveyed during the mediation falls within the statutory de-
finition of mediation communication, mediators are now prohibited from
communicating this nonappearance.338 Mediators may continue to report
failure to appear when individuals fail to physically appear.339 The mediator
would be reporting a permitted observation, not a prohibited mediation
communication."o
Rules of procedure provide for sanctions should parties fail to appear
with the requisite settlement authority.34 1 Yet, lack of authority to settle will
not reach the judge if the information is learned in mediation.3 2 This creates
332. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.720(b).
333. See FLA. STAT. § 44.405 (2011).
334. See id.
335. See id. § 44.405(1), (4)(a)(1).
336. Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Advisory Op. 2006-003 (2006).
337. Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, Advisory Op. 99-002 (1999); Mediator
Ethics Advisory Comm., Advisory Op. 2001-010 (2002).
338. See FLA. STAT. § 44.405(1).
339. MEAC Advisory Op. 2006-008, supra note 269; MEAC Advisory Op. 2007-001,
supra note 269.
340. MEAC Advisory Op. 2006-008, supra note 269; MEAC Advisory Op. 2007-001,
supra note 269.
341. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.720(b) (providing mandatory sanctions); FLA. R. APP. P.
9.720(b) (providing permissive sanctions).
342. See FLA. STAT. § 44.405. Previously, information was reported to judges, and they
would sanction parties for failing to appear without full settlement authority. See, e.g., Physi-
cians Protective Trust Fund v. Overman, 636 So. 2d 827, 829 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994);
Western Waste Indus. v. Achord, 632 So. 2d 680, 681-82 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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a conundrum. 4 3 Parties, parties' counsel, and mediators are prohibited from
apprising judges of the information needed to sanction." The rule of proce-
dure and statutory provision are undisputedly inconsistent.
The inconsistency may not have much impact on the vast majority of
mediations held throughout the state. Parties may, of course, choose not to
settle. Parties' representatives may not state that they do not have full set-
tlement authority. They may also make a phone call to get increased authori-
ty based on the mediation discussion.346 Regardless, at this time the rule
stands, and information is not coming to the court's attention.347 Judges are
unable to sanction and deter failure to appear because the Act prohibits the
information from reaching them. 34
To address this conundrum, the Supreme Court Committee on Alterna-
tive Dispute Resolution Rules and Policy (ADR R&P Committee) petitioned
the Supreme Court of Florida to revise the appearance segment of Florida
Rule of Civil Procedure 1.720(b).349
Prior to doing so, the ADR R&P Committee studied the problem and
devised three possible options to address the inconsistency between the Act
and the rule.350 Option one was to amend the Act to extend the scope of the
exceptions to mediation confidentiality and privilege.351 The ADR R&P
Committee rejected this possibility, reasoning "that having mediators assume
responsibility for reporting non-compliance would place mediators in a posi-
tion that could compromise the mediator's impartiality, violate the Act, and
inhibit party communication during mediation."352 Option two had parties
filing a pre-mediation form with the court identifying the party representa-
tives who would attend the mediation, and confirming that the representa-
343. See, e.g., In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, Case No. SCI0-
2329 1, 2 (Fla. filed Dec. 6, 2010) available at http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/decisions
/probin/scI0-2329_Petition.pdf.
344. FLA. STAT. § 44.405(1).
345. Compare FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.720, with FLA. STAT. § 44.405(1).
346. E.g., Achord, 632 So. 2d at 68 1.
347. FLA. STAT. § 44.405.
348. Id.
349. In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, Case No. SC10-2329 1, 1
(Fla. filed Dec. 6, 2010) available at http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/decisions
/probin/sc10-2329_Petition.pdf.
350. Id. at 2-3.
351. Id. at 3.
352. Id. at 3; see Samara Zimmerman, Note, Judges Gone Wild: Why Breaking the Med-
iation Confidentiality Privilege for Acting in "Bad Faith" Should be Reevaluated in Court-
Ordered Mandatory Mediation, 11 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 353, 368-71 (2009) (dis-
cussing the importance of mediator impartiality and the destruction to the mediation process
should the mediator's facilitative role become a "quasi-policing" role).
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tives had the required settlement authority.353 Option three would require
party representatives to file a post-mediation notice with the court if the med-
iation resulted in impasse.354 The notice would confirm that the party repre-
sentatives had full settlement authority while participating in the media-
tion.355
The committee sought and received public comment on the options.356
The majority of those responding to the survey and proposal drafts preferred
the pre-mediation confirmation of settlement authority.357  Pre-mediation
filing of confirmation of settlement authority places a document in the court
file "unrelated to confidential 'mediation communications."' 358 This may
afford a court the opportunity to later consider the imposition of sanctions
based on matters of record, rather than mediation communications. 35 9 Addi-
tionally, the advance notice may cause parties and attorneys to more serious-
ly consider mediation in terms of benefits and responsibility. 360 The petition
before the Supreme Court of Florida represents "a good balance in streng-
thening the potential of resolution in circuit court civil mediations, without
compromising confidentiality or self-determination." 36 1
V. CONCLUSION
Florida has earned its position as a respected leader in the field of medi-
ation. After the Act, attorneys, mediators, parties, and other participants are
better able to plan for and participate in meaningful mediation. Additionally,
the courts are in a better position to make consistent rulings on questions of
mediation confidentiality. The Act provides needed clarity as to the breadth
353. In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, Case No. SC10-2329, at
3. The Supreme Court of Florida adopted this option after this article was drafted and at the
end of the article's editing process. In re: Amendments to the Florida Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 1.720, Case No. SCIO-2329 1, 2 (Fla. filed Nov. 3, 2011) (per curiam), available at
www.floridasupremecourt.org/decisions/201 1/scl0-2329.pdf. The Court adopted "the
amendments to rule 1.720 as proposed by the Committee, with the minor modification to new
subdivision (e) (Certification of Authority)." Id. The amendment provides that the parties
serve written notice of the Certification of Authority on all parties attending the mediation. Id.
354. In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, Case No. SC 10-2329, at
3.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 4.
358. Id.
359. In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, Case No. SC10-2329, at
4.
360. Id. at 4-5.
361. Id. at 8.
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312of mediation confidentiality, as well as the exceptions. The progeny of
Vitakis-Valchine I and DR Lakes, Inc. v. Brandsmart U.S.A. of West Palm
Beach (DR Lakes I)363 Will serve to clarify the law of mediator misconduct
and mutual mistake. Court determination of what constitutes mediation
communication will prove key to future discovery requests and determina-
tions as to the admissibility of evidence. The incompatibility of statutory
confidentiality and procedural rules requiring parties to "appear" for media-
tion will, no doubt, be addressed. The state's honored tradition of serving
parties by respectfully giving them an opportunity to structure agreements
that meet their needs, and serving the courts by recognizing their heavy ca-
seloads and providing a means to have parties resolve matters without trial,
continues. The Florida courts and conflict resolvers should be proud of how
far mediation has come, and should look forward to continuing leadership to
determine where it has yet to go.
362. See generally FLA. STAT. §§ 44.401-.406 (2011).
363. 819 So. 2d 971, 973 (Fla.4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Golfer John Daly had an exceptional year in 2001.' Since 1995, when
he won the British Open, Daly had not won a tournament.2 In 1999, "Daly's
career was at a low point, when he struggled on the course, returned to drink-
ing and blew a lucrative endorsement deal with Callaway that prohibited him
from drinking and gambling." 3 By the end of 2000, free from drinking for a
few months, Daly signed a three-year endorsement with Hippo Golf Compa-
ny (Hippo)4 and another with 84 Lumber Company. In 2001, Daly won the
* Professor of Law, Shepard Broad Law Center of Nova Southeastern University. J.D.,
Duke University; M.S.L.S., The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; A.B., Hamilton
College. Portions of this article were prepared for a panel discussion presented by the NSU
Sports and Entertainment Law Society.
1. See Gerry Dulac, Daly's Buick Win Boosts 84 Classic, PITrSBURGH POST-GAZETTE,
Feb. 17, 2004, at B7 [hereinafter Dulac, Daly's Buick Win Boosts 84 Classic].
2. Jim Gordon, The Anti-Fan: John Daly Is Only Fooling John Daly, SANTA FE NEW
MEXICAN, July 17, 2000, at B2.
3. Clifton Brown, Daly's Swing and His Life Straighten Out, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2001,
at D2.
Daly's drinking has cost him . . . his endorsement with Wilson Golf. It cost him a $3 million
deal with Callaway Golf, more money than his combined earnings on the PGA Tour. It proba-
bly didn't help any of his three marriages, the last of which ended in divorce in 1997 after Daly
trashed a hotel room and wound up in a hospital, unsure where he had been or how he had got-
ten there.
Gordon, supra note 2.
4. John Daly Enters., L.L.C. v. Hippo Golf Co., 646 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1348 (S.D. Fla.
2009). The agreement began on January 1, 2001. Id. A 2002 agreement licensed "Daly's
name, likeness, and marks to [Hippo] for use in the sale of golf clubs and related equipment."
Id.
5. Gerry Dulac, Daly's Drive Helps Fulfill Hardy's Wish For Top-Notch Field,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 22, 2004, at Cl [hereinafter Dulac, Daly's Drive Helps
Fulfill Hardy's Wish].
115
: Nova Law Review 36, #1
Published by NSUWorks, 2011
NOVA LAW REVIEW
BMW International Open, a tournament on the European Tour.6 Daly
seemed on his way back from a nightmarish spiral of alcohol and gambling.'
Yet, in 2003, another reverse found Daly "carted off the course during the
second round of the 84 Lumber Classic because of what was termed dehy-
dration."
Joe Hardy, founder and owner of 84 Lumber Company, kept faith in
Daly and saw him through the hard times of 2003, finally rejoicing when
Daly won the 2004 Buick Invitational Tournament-his first win on the PGA
tour in nine years. 9 In contrast, Hippo and Daly did not renew their con-
tract.'o By September of 2004, Daly's second recovery had netted him a
sponsorship with Dunlop and saw him ranked nineteenth on the tour's money
list."
Yet Daly's dramatic turn of fortune had one negative result: Hippo con-
tinued using Daly's name and picture on its website and products well after
the end of its contracts with Daly, without Daly's permission. 2 Needless to
say, with Daly promoting Dunlop's clubs, the continuing use of his name by
Hippo created a conflict uncomfortable at best.' 3 To make matters worse,
Daly received nothing by way of royalties from Hippo.14 Daly sued Hippo,
seeking damages on several counts, including a violation of Florida Statutes
section 540.08,1 alleging that Hippo had used his name and likeness for ad-
vertising and commercial purposes. 6
6. Dulac, Daly's Buick Win Boosts 84 Classic, supra note 1.
7. See Brown, supra note 3. Fellow golf pro, Hal Sutton, said of Daly: "[W]hen you're
on the way down, you don't know where rock bottom is until you get there. It takes a lot
inside to climb back up. John's a good guy." Id.
8. Dulac, Daly's Buick Win Boosts 84 Classic, supra note 1.
9. Id.; Dulac, Daly's Drive Helps Fulfill Hardy's Wish, supra note 5.
10. John Daly Enters., L.L.C. v. Hippo Golf Co., 646 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1349 (S.D. Fla.
2009). "The contract period ended on December 31, 2003, but because [Hippo] had inventory
remaining, [Daly] gave it until March 31, 2004, to divest itself of all John Daly-branded mer-
chandise in its possession." Id.
11. Dulac, Daly's Buick Win Boosts 84 Classic, supra note 1; Dulac, Daly's Drive Helps
Fulfill Hardy's Wish, supra note 5.
12. John Daly Enters., L.L.C., 646 F. Supp. 2d at 1348-49.
13. See Dulac, Daly's Buick Win Boosts 84 Classic, supra note 1.
14. John Daly Enters., L.L.C., 646 F. Supp. 2d at 1349, 1352.
15. FLA. STAT. § 540.08 (2004).
Unauthorized publication of name or likeness:
(1) No person shall publish, print, display or otherwise publicly use for purposes of trade or
for any commercial or advertising purpose the name, portrait, photograph, or other likeness of
any natural person without the express written or oral consent to such use given by:
(a) Such person; or
(b) Any other person, firm or corporation authorized in writing by such person to license the
commercial use of her or his name or likeness; or
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In 1967, the Florida Legislature passed an expansive actl 7 dealing with
the branch of privacy known as "commercial appropriation."' The statute
prohibited non-consensual publication of a natural person's "name, portrait,
photograph or other likeness" "for purposes of trade or for any commercial
(c) If such person is deceased, any person, firm or corporation authorized in writing to license
the commercial use of her or his name or likeness, or if no person, firm or corporation is so au-
thorized, then by any one from among a class composed of her or his surviving spouse and
surviving children.
(2) In the event the consent required in subsection (1) is not obtained, the person whose name,
portrait, photograph, or other likeness is so used, or any person, firm, or corporation authorized
by such person in writing to license the commercial use of her or his name or likeness, or, if
the person whose likeness is used is deceased, any person, firm, or corporation having the right
to give such consent, as provided hereinabove, may bring an action to enjoin such unautho-
rized publication, printing, display or other public use, and to recover damages for any loss or
injury sustained by reason thereof, including an amount which would have been a reasonable
royalty, and punitive or exemplary damages.
(3) The provisions of this section shall not apply to:
(a) The publication, printing, display, or use of the name or likeness of any person in any
newspaper, magazine, book, news broadcast or telecast, or other news medium or publication
as part of any bona fide news report or presentation having a current and legitimate public in-
terest and where such name or likeness is not used for advertising purposes;
(b) The use of such name, portrait, photograph, or other likeness in connection with the resale
or other distribution of literary, musical, or artistic productions or other articles of merchandise
or property where such person has consented to the use of her or his name, portrait, photo-
graph, or likeness on or in connection with the initial sale or distribution thereof; or
(c) Any photograph of a person solely as a member of the public and where such person is not
named or otherwise identified in or in connection with the use of such photograph.
(4) No action shall be brought under this section by reason of any publication, printing, dis-
play, or other public use of the name or likeness of a person occurring after the expiration of
40 years from and after the death of such person.
(5) As used in this section, a person's "surviving spouse" is the person's surviving spouse un-
der the law of her or his domicile at the time of her or his death, whether or not the spouse has
later remarried; and a person's "children" are her or his immediate offspring and any children
legally adopted by the person. Any consent provided for in subsection (1) shall be given on
behalf of a minor by the guardian of her or his person or by either parent.
(6) The remedies provided for in this section shall be in addition to and not in limitation of the
remedies and rights of any person under the common law against the invasion of her or his pri-
vacy.
Id. Compare FLA. STAT. § 540.08 (2004), with FLA. STAT. § 540.08 (2011).
16. John Daly Enters., L.L.C., 646 F. Supp. 2d at 1348-49. John Daly Enterprises, LLC,
also joined Daly as a plaintiff in the suit for claims other than those under Florida Statutes
section 540.08. See id. at 1348. This article will refer only to Daly himself, as the statute only
protects natural persons, and the corporation is not a natural person. Id. at 1351 (quoting FLA.
STAT. § 540.08(1) (2011)).
17. See generally Act effective July 1, 1967, ch. 67-57, § 1, 1967 Fla. Laws 135 (codi-
fied as amended at FLA. STAT. §§ 540.08-.10 (1967)).
18. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 20, at
851 (5th ed. 1984).
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or advertising purpose."' 9 A later amendment in 1997 did nothing more than
change certain language to make the statute gender-neutral.20 A second
amendment ten years later added the present subsection three relating to the
military.21 The title of the statute, as originally passed, indicates rather clear-
ly the legislature's intent to protect natural persons from unwanted commer-
cial exposure: "An act . . . prohibiting the unauthorized publication of ...
name . . . or other likeness; authorizing action to enjoin such unauthorized
publication; authorizing action to recover damages; [and] providing limited
exemptions from such liability . . . .22
Daly moved for summary judgment arguing that Hippo's continued use
of his name and likeness beyond the contract date and agreed extension vi-
olated the statute.23  Hippo countered by arguing that its website postings
constituted "fair use."24 Hippo's website listed several golfers, among them
Daly, who had previously endorsed Hippo products. 25 However, it posted a
picture of Daly accompanied by the following text:
The twice major winner and golfing superstar, John Daly, will
continue to be synonomous [sic] with Hippo. Renowned as the
longest hitter in the professional game, Daly truly had the power of
Hippo behind his game, working closely with the Hippo design
teams over the years to produce some of the most technologically
advanced woods to hit the golf market.26
19. FLA. STAT. § 540.08(1) (1967); John Daly Enters., L.L.C., 646 F. Supp. 2d at 1351.
The statute also provided that the prohibition transcended the death of the person and licen-
sees or the person's immediate family could assert the rights created by the statute for forty
years subsequent to the person's death. FLA. STAT. §§ 540.08(1)(c), .08(4). It provided for
causes of action both legal and equitable, including punitive damages. Id. § 540.08(2). It also
provided for situations in which the statute would not apply, including newsworthy publica-
tions and publications "in connection with the initial sale or distribution" of the otherwise
offending use. Id. § 540.08(3)(b). Significantly, the statute also provided that it did not cur-
tail the common law right of privacy. Id. § 540.08(6).
20. Act effective May 24, 1997, ch. 97-103, §§ 751-52, 1997 Fla. Laws 1756, 2120-21
(amending FLA. STAT. §§ 540.08-.09 (1967)).
21. Act effective July 1, 2007, ch. 2007-164, § 2, 2007 Fla. Laws 1528, 1528 (amending
FLA. STAT. § 540.08(3) (1997)); see also FLA. STAT. § 540.08(3) (2011).
22. Act effective July 1, 1967, ch. 67-57, § 1, 1967 Fla. Laws 135.
23. John Daly Enters., LL.C., 646 F. Supp. 2d at 1351.
24. Id. The statute does not include "fair use" in its list of exempted uses. FLA. STAT. §
540.08(4). However, as the court found Hippo's act to fall well outside of any possible "fair
use" at common law, it did not discuss whether "fair use" is indeed a common law defense
that might apply to causes of action under the statute. See John Daly Enters., L.LC., 646 F.
Supp. 2d at 1351.
25. Id.
26. Id. (citations omitted).
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The court rejected Hippo's argument, finding that claiming Daly "will
continue to be synonymous with [Hippo] directly promotes [Hippo's] prod-
ucts." 27 Thus, the court effectively concluded that the nonconsensual use to
promote products constituted a "'use for purposes of trade or for any com-
mercial or advertising purpose,"' and as Hippo had violated the statute, the
court granted partial summary judgment to Daly on the issue of liability. 28
John Daly's case, only one of several discussing the meaning of "any
commercial or advertising purpose," involved a blatant attempt to capitalize
on the fame of a well-known and well-liked public person.29 The court had
no trouble in rejecting out of hand Hippo's claim that it simply stated the
truth-that Daly formerly endorsed its products.30 Other cases involving
Florida substantive law, however, found it more difficult to interpret the lan-
guage of the statute. 3' This article discusses them and determines when the
statute will sustain a cause of action and when courts will reject the statutory
action.
The cases seem to fall into clearly defined categories whose boundaries
follow closely those governing defamation cases. The first, like that involv-
ing Daly, deals with people whose identity commands the interest of con-
sumers.32 These individuals all satisfy the public figure analysis found in
Curtis Publishing Co. v. ButtS3 3-whether general purpose or limited pur-
pose, all have become persons of interest. 34 The second category of cases
deals with everyday people who found themselves embroiled in "public is-
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1351, 1354 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 540.08(1)). As the court found questions
remained regarding the extent of Daly's damages, it did not grant Daly's motion for full sum-
mary judgment. John Daly Enters., L.L. C., 646 F. Supp. 2d at 1353. The court also granted
partial summary judgment finding liability on Daly's claims of trademark infringement and
breach of contract. Id. at 1348.
29. See id. at 1351. "Even in his darkest days, John Daly was always loved by the galle-
ries." Brown, supra note 3.
30. John Daly Enters., L.L.C., 646 F. Supp. 2d at 1351.
31. See, e.g., Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
32. Id. at 154-55.
33. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
34. See id. at 155. One may attain the status of general purpose public figure:
[B]y position alone and [one may attain the status of limited purpose public figure] by his pur-
poseful activity amounting to a thrusting of his personality into the "vortex" of an important
public controversy, but both [must command] sufficient continuing public interest and [have]
sufficient access to the means of counterargument to be able "to expose through discussion the
falsehood and fallacies" of the defamatory statements.
Id. (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
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sues", as the concept first appeared in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.3 5 The
final category involves neither persons nor concerns of any particular public
interest, much like the litigants in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc.36 In all cases which resulted in victories for the plaintiffs, the
defendants involved the plaintiffs' names and/or pictures in commercial ven-
tures-whether directly or in a promotional context. The commercial exploi-
tation for profit present in these cases makes the comparison with defamation
cases particularly relevant, for these publications, like those in Dun & Brad-
street, Inc., are "solely motivated by the desire for profit, which, we have
noted, is a force less likely to be deterred than others."37
II. PUBLIC FIGURES
Other than John Daly, the most recognizable plaintiff in cases interpret-
ing Florida Statutes section 540.08 was Cecil Fielder, the Hall of Fame first
baseman for the Detroit Tigers. 38 Fielder had sued a former interior designer
for using Fielder's name in advertising materials without his consent.39 Al-
though the designer, Robert Weinstein, agreed to an injunction prohibiting
him from using Fielder's name, an article in Florida Design regarding
Weinstein mentioned that he had worked for the Fielder family.40 Further,
Weinstein had brochures printed containing the Florida Design article, but
never distributed them. 41 At trial, the judge refused Weinstein's motion for a
directed verdict and the jury found for Fielder.42 The Fourth District Court
of Appeal considered whether, given Weinstein's admission that he violated
the provisions of section 540.08, the jury should have been allowed to con-
sider the article and the brochures in determining the extent of the violation.43
Without question, Florida Design as a quarterly trade magazine quali-
fied as a media outlet, and the evidence showed that the article was classified
35. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). "Thus we consider this case against the background of a pro-
found national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unplea-
santly sharp attacks on government and public officials." Id. at 270 (emphasis added).
36. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
37. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at 762.
38. See Cecil Fielder, BASEBALL-REFERENCE.cOM, http://www.baseball-reference.com/
players/f/fieldce0l.shtml (last visited Nov. 13, 2011).
39. Weinstein Design Grp., Inc. v. Fielder, 884 So. 2d 990, 993 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2004).
40. Id. at 993, 998.
41. Id. at 996, 999.
42. Id. at 993, 999.
43. See id. at 993, 998-99. Weinstein did not dispute that other publications of his vi-
olated the statute. Weinstein Design Grp., Inc., 884 So. 2d at 996.
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as an editorial and written by a Florida Design reporter." On the other hand,
Weinstein was given a proof of the article to approve, and "use of Fielder's
name in the article came about exclusively through information supplied by
Weinstein, not from any independent research by the article's author."45
Thus, the court agreed that the trial court properly placed before the jury the
question of whether the article represented inappropriate advertising under
section 540.08 and thus fell outside the exception of section 540.08(3)(a).4 6
As to the brochures, the court found that even though not a single one had
ever left Weinstein's hands, since they were patently advertising and since
the statute prohibits printing a person's name in violation of the statute, the
trial court properly allowed "the jury to consider them in determining any
damage award."4 7
Weinstein Design Group, Inc. v. Fielder"* represents two truly unusual
results. At first, the case recognizes that the finder of fact may determine
that an article placed in a legitimate media outlet nonetheless constitutes ad-
vertising purposes even where the article is of public concern.4 Second,
merely printing material to be used in advertising will violate section 540.08
even when the material has not reached a single person.50 Taken together,
these results demonstrate the commitment of the Fourth District Court of
Appeal to interpret the statute as protecting individuals from deliberate at-
tempts to improperly cloak advertising material in the garb of newsworthi-
ness. 51
Courts from other jurisdictions have had occasion to interpret Florida
law.52  A federal district court in Ohio granted a preliminary injunction
44. See id. at 998.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 999. At the time of the case, the language exempting a "bona fide news report
or presentation having a current and legitimate public interest and where such name or like-
ness is not used for advertising purposes" was found in subsection (3)(a). FLA. STAT. §
540.08(3)(a) (2004) (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. § 540.08(4)(a) (2011)).
47. Weinstein Design Grp., Inc., 884 So. 2d at 999.
48. 884 So. 2d 990 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
49. See id. at 998-99. The New York Court of Appeals has indicated in dicta that given
proper proof, a plaintiff may have a jury consider whether an article nevertheless constitutes
advertising. Stephano v. News Grp. Publ'ns, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580, 586 (N.Y. 1984). Al-
though the Florida and New York statutes are very similar ("[t]he Florida statute relied upon is
quite similar to Sections 50 and 51 of the New York [civil rights law]." Messenger ex rel.
Messenger v. Gruner & Jahr USA Publ'g, 994 F. Supp. 525, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), vacated,
208 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2000)) as the New York statute is in derogation of common law, it is
strictly construed. See, e.g., Stephano, 474 N.E.2d at 584-85.
50. See Weinstein Design Grp., Inc., 884 So. 2d at 999.
51. See id. at 998-99.
52. See, e.g., Bosley v. Wildwett.com, 310 F. Supp. 2d 914, 919 (N.D. Ohio 2004).
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against further publication in the case of a well-known television reporter
who was filmed engaging in a wet t-shirt competition in Florida.53 Unbek-
nownst to her, the competition was filmed and her performance found its
way to the Internet and into two versions of a video.54 The defendants pro-
moted both the websites and the video by "emphasizing the appearance of
Catherine Bosley or the 'naked anchor woman.'" 5 5  Bosley's picture and
name appeared on the video's cover as well as on the website which sold her
performance to its subscribers. 6 The court had little trouble in finding the
defendants liable under the Florida statute, which the court found prohibited
''using a person's name or likeness to directly promote a product or service.
Indeed, Defendants are using the images of Catherine Bosley to directly
promote the sale of videos and memberships." 57
The court continued to find that the promotional material did not consti-
tute "expressive works, as they do not contain any creative components or
transformative elements."58 The court also discussed the question of Bos-
ley's consent to the filming of the contest, noting that the defendants intro-
duced evidence which might have cast doubt on her protestation that she had
no idea cameras were present and rolling.59 However, as the statute requires
"express written or oral consent,"' and the defendants introduced no evi-
dence of Bosley having expressly given consent, their argument failed.61
Sony Music Entertainment Incorporated (Sony) issued eight CD record-
ings of the music of Harold Melvin and the Blue Notes.62 The outside covers
of three of the CDs displayed the picture of Jeremiah Cummings.6 3 Sony had
not received Cummings' consent for the use of his picture, and when Cum-
mings sued Sony, he moved for judgment on the pleadings.64 Applying Flor-
ida law, the court held "by placing Plaintiffs likeness on merchandise mar-
53. Id. at 917, 936.
54. Id. at 917.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 922.
57. Bosley, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 921-22 (citations omitted).
58. Id. at 922. Compare id., with infra notes 134-44 and accompanying text.
59. Bosley, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 931. Signs abounded in the areas of the contest, and some
pictures showed Bosley scant feet from the camera looking directly at it. Id.
60. FLA. STAT. § 540.08(1) (2011).
61. Bosley, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 931.
62. Cummings v. Sony Music, No. OlCiv.4375RCCKNF, 2003 WL 22271189, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2003).
63. Id. at *3. The court held that the cause of action as it related to five of the CDs was
time barred. Id. at *1. Cummings was the lead tenor of the Blue Notes and today is a well-
known evangelical preacher. Jeremiah Cummings, For His Glory International, RIGHT BRAIN
MEDIA, http://wicctv.org (last visited Nov. 13, 2011).
64. Cummings, 2003 WL 22271189, at *1.
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keted by Defendant, without Plaintiffs permission, Defendant has publicly
used Plaintiffs photograph for commercial purposes."
Thus, John Daly Enterprises, LLC v. Hippo Golf Co.,66 Bosley v. Wild-
wett.com, 67 and Cummings v. Sony MusiC68 establish that, under the Florida
Statutes, one cannot seek to capitalize on the associative value of a well-
known personality in marketing a product. Unquestionably, consumers will
purchase products based on celebrity endorsements even where the endorser
may have no apparent relation to the product itself.70 Equally obvious, con-
sumers rush to buy and view pictures and videos of the famous.71 Clearly,
section 540.08 of the Florida Statutes in part exists to protect "celebrities and
other public figures [who] have come to rely on the right of publicity to pro-
tect them from the intrusion of others."72 It should come as no surprise that
the same protection extends to those who have not achieved substantial pub-
65. Id. at *3.
66. 646 F. Supp. 2d 1347 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
67. 310 F. Supp. 2d 914 (N.D. Ohio 2004).
68. No. 0lCiv.4375RCCKNF, 2003 WL 22271189, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2003).
69. Weinstein Design Grp., Inc. v. Fielder, 884 So. 2d 990, 997-98 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2004); see FLA. STAT. § 540.08; see John Daly Enters., LL.C., 646 F. Supp. 2d at 1351;
see also Bosley, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 920; Cummings, 2003 WL 22271189, at *3. "[T]he right
of publicity is a proprietary right based on the identity of a character or defining trait that
becomes associated with a person when he gains notoriety or fame." McFarland ex rel. Estate
of McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 923 (3d Cir. 1994) (applying New Jersey law). Another
suit involving a well-known personality and the Florida Statutes was brought by Anna Kour-
nikova, the tennis player, against the publisher of Penthouse Magazine for printing a photo-
graph falsely purporting to represent her sunbathing in the nude. Kournikova v. Gen. Media
Commc'ns, Inc., No. CV 02-3747 GAF (AJWx), 2002 WL 31628027, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug.
9, 2002). Her first amended complaint included a count alleging violation of the Florida
Statutes. Id. at *4. Plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction was denied. Id. at *10.
However, a later complaint appeared to have abandoned the Florida claim, and the case pro-
ceeded under a theory involving the Lanham Act. Kournikova v. Gen. Media Commc'ns,
Inc., 278 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1114-15 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
70. Ramson v. Layne, 668 F. Supp. 1162, 1166 (N.D. 1Il. 1987). For example, in Ram-
son, an investor sued movie actors Lloyd Bridges and George Hamilton, who had endorsed
the purchase of a mortgage note which she had never received. Id. at 1163.
71. See, e.g., Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 800-01 (Cal.
2001). For instance, well after the demise of the members of the popular film trio, the Three
Stooges, litigation proliferated seeking to prohibit the use of their images on various commer-
cial products. Id.
72. Fla. S. Comm. on Commerce, CS for SB 116 (2007) Staff Analysis 2 (Mar. 7, 2007)
[hereinafter Mar. 7, 2007 Staff Analysis], available at http://archive.flsenate.gov/datal
session/2007/senate/bills/analysis/pdf/2007s0 116.cm.pdf (discussing an amendment to section
540.08 of the Florida Statutes to include members of the armed forces in its protection).
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lic recognition, but have garnered sufficient notice in their fields to make
their name or image influential in marketing products to others.73
Dr. Jey Jeyapalan was the proverbial big fish in a very small pond.74 A
renowned expert in a very narrow field of engineering, he received offers to
consult and speak around the globe. In 1991, he agreed to work with a
Florida engineering firm on designing a specific project for a pipeline system
in Florida. 6 When the firm used his name without his consent as part of a
proposal for a different project in Broward County, he sued claiming viola-
tion of section 540.08 of the Florida Statutes and sought partial summary
judgment on the issue of liability.77 The court granted his motion, finding
that, "'commercial trade or advertising purposes' is precisely the type of
action in which [the defendant] has engaged here."78 Thus, the court adopted
an expansive, albeit logical, interpretation of "advertising purposes" to in-
clude bidding to secure a contract.79 Dr. Jeyapalan's name would have en-
hanced the ability of the firm to win the bid, and so the defendant had sought
80to capitalize on his professional persona without his consent.
Professional models effectively thrust themselves into the limelight
simply by performing their jobs."' This does not make them general purpose
public figures, nor does it accord them any particular degree of fame.8 2
Nothing points this out more forcefully than the case of Ting Ji, who sued
Bose Corporation pursuant to the Florida statute. In a preliminary matter,
the trial court found:
Ji has provided no direct evidence that she enjoys any fame what-
soever. In support of her claim, she refers to her full-time work as
a professional model and to the fact that she has appeared on mul-
tiple occasions in other advertisements for high-end electronic
products. Bose counters that her income from modeling ($19,500
73. See Am. Ventures, Inc. v. Post, Buckley, Schuh, & Jernigan, Inc., No. C92-1817Z,
1993 WL 468643, at *5-6 (W.D. Wash. May 18, 1993).
74. See id. at *4.
75. Id.
76. Id. at *1.
77. See id. at *2-3.
78. Am. Ventures, Inc., 1993 WL 468643, at *8.
79. See id.
80. See id. at *6.
81. See Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967). The Supreme Court has
defined a limited purpose public figure as one who has "thrust himself into the 'vortex' of the
controversy." Id. at 146.
82. See Ting Ji v. Bose Corp. (Ting Ji 1), 538 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351 (D. Mass. 2008),
aff'd, 626 F. 3d 116 (1st Cir. 2010).
83. See id. at 349, 353.
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per year) and the dearth of news accounts mentioning her name
demonstrate that she has no meaningful public identity.8
The plaintiff later won a jury verdict in an action brought pursuant to
the Florida statute, but only for a fraction of the damages she had claimed."
Evidently the jury agreed that she had not achieved any particular degree of
fame.86 On the other hand, her lack of substantial name or face recognition
did not bar her action under the statute.87 Bose had used her picture beyond
the scope of their contract in displaying it on the packaging of one of their
products. In response to an interrogatory verdict, the jury found that Bose
had violated her rights under the statute.89
In another case involving a model claiming rights under the statute, An-
heuser Busch (A-B) continued to use her picture subsequent to the expiration
of their agreement. 90 Although the model, Jennifer Miller, had signed a re-
lease until January of 2003, the defendant continued to use her picture after
that date.9' "Regardless of any prior consent Miller granted A-B, therefore,
the evidence in the record indicates that A-B did not have Miller's authoriza-
tion to use her likeness from and after January 2003, as required by [section
540.08 of the Florida Statutes.]" 9 2 Both Ting Ji v. Bose Corp. (Ting Ji I)93
and Miller v. Anheuser Busch, Inc.,94 involve plaintiffs whose stock in trade
is their picture, and it should come as no surprise that they, like the famous,
require the protection of the statute.95 Indeed, the use of a model's likeness
will almost inevitably involve advertising purposes.
Sports figures, actors, politicians, and others whose personae can serve
as a trigger to convince others to purchase a seller's product are particularly
susceptible to commercial exploitation.9 6 Similarly, advertisers will find
models easy prey for commercial abuse, for the very purpose of a model's
career is promotion of the products of another. As a result, the common law
84. Id. at 351 (emphasis added).
85. Ting Ji v. Bose Corp. (Ting Ji II), 626 F.3d 16, 120-21 (1st Cir. 2010).
86. See id. at 120.
87. See id.
88. Id. at 119.
89. Id. at 120-21.
90. Miller v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 348 F. App'x 547, 549-50 (11th Cir.2009) (per cu-
riam), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 2387 (2010).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 550; See FLA. STAT. § 540.08 (2011).
93. 538 F. Supp. 2d 349 (D. Mass. 2008), aff'd, 626 F.3d 116 (1st Cir. 2010).
94. 348 F. App'x 547 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 2387 (2010).
95. See Miller, 348 F. App'x, at 550-51; Ting Ji ll, 626 F.3d at 119-21; Ting Ji , 538 F.
Supp. 2d at 349-51.
96. See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 931 (6th Cir. 2003).
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tort cause of action for invasion of publicity developed to protect the com-
mercial value of a person's persona, and the Florida Legislature enacted sec-
tion 540.08 to clarify and enhance judge-made law. 97 That said, the legisla-
ture also intended the statute to protect those, whose names and images did
not command the attention of the buying public." This article now focuses
on those "private persons."
III. "PRIVATE PERSONS" IN MATTERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN
While celebrities seek to prevent others from capitalizing on the reputa-
tions they have built over the years, those who have established no such as-
sociative monetary values still have a vital concern to protect: the right to
privacy." The Florida Legislature unquestionably intended to protect this
right, as evidenced by the Senate Staff Analysis of the 2007 amendment to
section 540.08: "The right to privacy is a long cherished American tradition.
The Florida Constitution addresses the right of every natural person to be let
alone and free from governmental intrusion into the person's private life."'"
On the other hand, just as with the ability to sue for defamation, the
right to privacy must yield to the freedom of the press to report on matters of
public concern.'o' Accordingly, the Florida Legislature incorporated into the
publicity statute an exception for:
The publication, printing, display, or use of the name or likeness of
any person in any newspaper, magazine, book, news broadcast or
telecast, or other news medium or publication as part of any bona
fide news report or presentation having a current and legitimate
97. See FLA. STAT. § 540.08 (1997). For example, at common law, courts frequently
struggled with the question of whether the right of publicity will descend to a person's heirs.
See Loft v. Fuller, 408 So. 2d 619, 623 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981). Subsection 1(c) of the
statute clearly establishes the right can devolve on the heirs and assigns of a decedent. FLA.
STAT. § 540.08(1)(c).
98. Mar. 7, 2007 Staff Analysis, supra note 72, at 2. "Florida Statutes explicitly prohibit
the last form of an invasion of privacy-appropriation-and provide a civil remedy for a
violation of the statute." Id.
99. See id.
100. Fla. S. Comm. on Commerce, CS for SB 116 (2007) Staff Analysis 1 (Feb. 8, 2007)
[hereinafter Feb. 8, 2007 Staff Analysis], available at http://archive.flsenate.gov/
datalsession/2007/senatelbills/analysis/pdfl2007s0116.ms.pdf (discussing an amendment to
section 540.08 of the Florida Statutes to include members of the armed forces in its protec-
tion).
101. Mar. 7, 2007 Staff Analysis, supra note 72, at 2-3.
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public interest and where such name or likeness is not used for ad-
vertising purposes.102
Hence, all the cases discussed in the preceding section dealt with
whether the defendant had capitalized on the persona of the plaintiff for ad-
vertising purposes."o3 Of necessity, any other mention of a celebrity's name
would be a question of interest to the public by definition."0 Cases involving
private persons do not carry with them the automatic cachet of public inter-
est, and thus fall into three categories: those which relate to matters of public
concern, those which do not relate to matters of public concern but where the
plaintiff has consented to the use by the defendant, and those which do not
relate to matters of public concern and where the defendant has failed to se-
cure the plaintiff s consent.os
A significant difference between defamation cases and cases brought
under section 540.08 occurs when dealing with private persons embroiled in
matters of public interest.' Only where a defendant is at fault for publish-
102. FLA. STAT. § 540.08(4)(a) (2011).
103. See supra Part 1.
104. See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 938 (6th Cir. 2003). It is also
possible that the picture of a celebrity can be sold specifically for its commercial value, rather
than used for advertising purposes. Id. at 918, 938. In a case involving Tiger Woods, an artist
painted a portrait of Woods after his first victory at the Masters Golf Tournament. Id. at 918.
The artist then sought to market prints of the portrait, and the company to which Woods had
licensed his right of publicity sued. Id. at 918-19. The artist won, but only because the por-
trait carried sufficient "transformative value" to qualify as a permissive use. Id. at 938 (apply-
ing Ohio law). The "transformative value" test has not always protected defendants, however.
See, e.g., Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 811 (Cal. 2001).
105. See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Ane, 423 So. 2d 376, 385-86 n.3 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1982); see, e.g., ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 929-31.
106. See, e.g., Thomas v. Quintero, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 619, 636 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
Perhaps worthy of noting, Florida courts have not squarely confronted the question of what
matters might be considered of "public interest." See, e.g., Miami Herald Publ'g Co., 423 So.
2d at 384 (citing Firestone v. Time, Inc., 271 So. 2d 745, 747 (Fla. 1972), quashed by 305 So.
2d 172 (Fla. 1974), vacated, 424 U.S. 448 (1976)). Of substantial guidance in this regard is a
five-prong test put forward by a California appellate court in a defamation case:
First, "public interest" does not equate with mere curiosity. Second, a matter of public interest
should be something of concern to a substantial number of people. Thus, a matter of concern
to the speaker and a relatively small, specific audience is not a matter of public interest. Third,
there should be some degree of closeness between the challenged statements and the asserted
public interest; the assertion of a broad and amorphous public interest is not sufficient. Fourth,
the focus of the speaker's conduct should be the public interest rather than a mere effort "to
gather ammunition for another round of [private] controversy ..... Finally, those charged
with defamation cannot, by their own conduct, create their own defense by making the clai-
mant a public figure.
Thomas, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 634-35 (citations omitted).
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ing defamatory material relating to a private person' may the defamed
plaintiff recover damages. 08 In contrast, a plaintiff claiming a violation of
section 540.08 need only prove the use of name or likeness for public "use
for purposes of trade or for any commercial or advertising purpose . . ..
The defendant would bear the burden of raising and proving any statutory
defenses." 0 For example, the statute provides a defense to the publisher
when the use is "part of any bona fide news report or presentation having a
current and legitimate public interest and where such name or likeness is not
used for advertising purposes.""' Hence, the question of what constitutes a
commercial or advertising purpose becomes crucial where the plaintiff is a
private person." 2
The leading Supreme Court of Florida case involving a private person
and a matter of public interest involved the relatives of Billy Tyne, who was
presumed to have died aboard a ship named the Andrea Gail in a storm in
1991.113 The magnitude of the storm received extensive media coverage and
in 1997, a book entitled The Perfect Storm appeared chronicling the author's
version of what might have happened to Tyne and the rest of the crew."14
Three years later, the Warner Brothers movie, The Perfect Storm, was re-
leased.' "Unlike the book, the Picture presented a concededly dramatized
107. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974). "[S]o long as they do not
impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of
liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individu-
al." Id. at 347.
108. Id. at 338-39. Florida has adopted a negligence standard as the test for a defendant's
liability in defamation cases involving private individuals: "The prevailing First Amendment
and Florida law . .. is supported by the overwhelming weight of authority in the country on
this subject which has followed a . . . standard of negligence in defamation actions where the
plaintiff is neither a public official nor a public figure." Miami Herald Publ'g Co., 423 So. 2d
at 385.
109. FLA. STAT. § 540.08(1) (2011).
110. See id. § 540.08(4)(a)-(c).
111. Id. § 540.08(4)(a).
112. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 334. One might also note that in section 540.08 cases, plain-
tiffs do not claim the use of name or image did not portray them falsely; in defamation cases,
however, an essential element of the plaintiffs case is the falsity of the publication. See Phila.
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 768-69 (1986). "Here, we hold that, at least where
a newspaper publishes speech of public concern, a private-figure plaintiff cannot recover
damages without also showing that the statements at issue are false." Id.
113. Tyne v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 901 So. 2d 802, 803 (Fla. 2005).
114. See SEBASTIAN JUNGER, THE PERFECT STORM: A TRUE STORY OF MEN AGAINST THE
SEA (W.W. Norton & Co., 1997).
115. THE PERFECT STORM (Warner Bros. 2000), available at http://perfectstorm.warner
bros.com/cmp/flash-thefilm-fr.html.
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account of both the storm and the crew of the Andrea Gail."I16 The movie
contained the actual names of the crew, and consequently, Tyne's surviving
children, along with family members of the remaining crew, sued Warner
Brothers for violation of section 540.08 of the Florida Statutes."7 The suit
began in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida
and the plaintiffs appealed that court's granting the defendants' motion for
summary judgment." 8 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit certified a question of Florida law to the Supreme Court of Florida."'
The question as rephrased read: "Does the phrase 'for purposes of trade or
for any commercial or advertising purpose' in section 540.08(1), Florida
Statutes, include publications which do not directly promote a product or
service?" 20 After discussing earlier cases from the lower Florida courts, the
Supreme Court of Florida answered the question in the negative. 2'
The court first reviewed the First District Court of Appeal decision in
Loft v. Fuller.12 2 Loft involved a suit brought under section 540.08 by the
survivors of a man who perished in a plane crash-a crash that formed the
basis of a later book and motion picture, both of which used the name of the
decedent. 23 1In upholding an order dismissing the complaint, the court rea-
soned so cogently that the Supreme Court of Florida approved of its opinion
from which it quoted extensively:
In our view, section 540.08, by prohibiting the use of one's name
or likeness for trade, commercial or advertising purposes, is de-
signed to prevent the unauthorized use of a name to directly pro-
mote the product or service of the publisher. Thus, the publication
is harmful not simply because it is included in a publication that is
sold for profit, but rather because of the way it associates the indi-
vidual's name or his personality with something else . . . . We
simply do not believe that the term "commercial," as employed by
[sjection 540.08, was meant to be construed to bar the use of
people's names in [media discussions of public interest].124
Significantly, the Loft court based its conclusion on whether the name
of the plaintiff was directly used to promote the sale of a product, and the
116. Tyne, 901 So. 2d at 804.
117. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 540.08 (2011).
118. Tyne, 901 So. 2d at 804-05.
119. Id. at 803.
120. Id. at 806 (emphasis omitted).
121. Tyne, 901 So. 2d at 810.
122. 408 So. 2d 619, 620 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981); see Tyne, 901 So. 2d at 806.
123. Tyne, 901 So. 2d at 806.
124. Id. at 806 (second and third emphasis added) (quoting Loft, 408 So. 2d at 622-23).
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Supreme Court of Florida agreed. 25 Unlike cases involving celebrities, the
use of Loft's name would not make it any more probable that potential view-
ers would rush to see the movie-the interest of the public lay in the plane
crash and its aftermath, not the identity of the individual decedent.126
The court next discussed Valentine v. C.B.S., Inc.,127 in which Patty Va-
lentine's name appeared in Bob Dylan's song about the arrest and conviction
of Rubin "Hurricane" Carter.128 "[Patty] Valentine testified as a witness at
the highly publicized 1967 trial of prizefighter Rubin 'Hurricane' Carter and
John Artis."l 29 She sued the producer of the record on which the song ap-
peared for violating the Florida statute.130 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed a
summary judgment for C.B.S., holding that the Carter trial continued to be of
public interest and that "an interpretation that the statute absolutely bars the
use of an individual's name without consent for any purpose would raise
grave questions as to constitutionality."l31
Finally, the court addressed Lane v. MRA Holdings, LLC,132 in which a
young woman in Panama City consented to receive a strand of beads in time-
honored Mardi Gras fashion-by exposing her breasts,133 this time to the lens
of a video camera.' The producers of Girls Gone Wild then used segments
of Lane in their video and advertised it on paid television by showing brief,
censored clips of Lane and others.' Lane sued for violation of section
125. Id.; Loft, 408 So. 2d at 622-23.
126. See FLA. STAT. § 540.08 (2011); Loft, 408 So. 2d at 621.
127. 698 F.2d 430 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
128. Tyne, 901 So. 2d at 806-07; Valentine, 698 F.2d at 431. "Pistol shots ring out in the
barroom night. Enter Patty Valentine from the upper hall. She sees the bartender in a pool of
blood. Cries out, 'My God, they killed them all!' Valentine, 698 F.2d at 432 n.1.
129. Id. at 431.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 433.
132. 242 F. Supp. 2d 1205 (M.D. Fla. 2002).
133. Tyne, 901 So. 2d at 807; see generally Mardi Gras History & Traditions, MARDI
GRAS NEW ORLEANS, http://www.mardigrasneworleans.com/quartermardi.html#breasts (last
visited Nov. 13, 2011).
134. Tyne, 901 So. 2d at 807; Lone, 242 F. Supp. 2d at 1209. In point of fact, Lane's
companion having received beads in the same manner during Mardi Gras in New Orleans two
years previously, recited the encounter to Lane, adding that her photograph from the New
Orleans venture later appeared in a men's magazine. Lane, 242 F. Supp. 2d at 1209.
135. Id. at 1210. "Girls Gone Wild, [is] a video that depicts a variety of young women
exposing their buttocks and genitals in public places." Id. Lane argued that she had con-
sented to the videotaping, but not to its use in Girls Gone Wild. Id. The trial court found her
argument unpersuasive. Id. at 1220.
[Tihe interactions between Lane and the cameraman were not private in nature. Lane exposed
herself on a public street while several pedestrians were in the general vicinity. . .. Lane did
not know the cameraman before whom she exposed herself. It is unreasonable to expect that a
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540.08, but the trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgment, stating:
In this case, it is irrefutable that the Girls Gone Wild video is
an expressive work created solely for entertainment purposes. Si-
milarly, it is also irrefutable that while Lane's image and likeness
were used to sell copies of Girls Gone Wild, her image and like-
ness were never associated with a product or service unrelated to
that work. Indeed, in both the video and its commercial adver-
tisements, Lane is never shown endorsing or promoting a product,
but rather, as part of an expressive work in which she voluntarily
participated.136
The point in Lane not directly addressed by the Supreme Court of Flori-
da in Tyne v. Time Warner Entertainment Co.,137 is that an advertisement for
a work protected under the First Amendment has the same protection as the
work itself.'3 8  Thus, the advertisements for the Girls Gone Wild movie,
which depicted Lane, could not form the basis of an independent cause of
action.13 9 Tyne does, however, address the issue in relation to a different case
involving a movie representing the history of the Black Panther Party."'0 The
court in that case held:
Moreover, use of a person's name and likeness to advertise a
novel, play, or motion picture concerning that individual is not ac-
total stranger would limit the viewing of a video with shots of young women publicly exposing
themselves to only those persons present at the time of the filming.
Lane, 242 F. Supp. 2d at 1220.
136. Id. at 1213. The trial court's conclusion that the video irrefutably constituted an
expressive work invited the scorn of a later judge:
Lane is an anomalous case which holds that "it is irrefutable that the Girls Gone Wild video is
an expressive work created solely for entertainment purposes." This Court cannot similarly
hold that the images in question are expressive works, as they do not contain any creative
components or transformative elements.
Bosley v. Wildwett.com, 310 F. Supp. 2d 914, 922 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (citation omitted) (quot-
ing Lane, 242 F. Supp. 2d at 1213). See also the implicit scathing criticism of the result in
Lane by the recent Eleventh Circuit case, Plaintiff B v. Francis, 631 F.3d 1310, 1317-19 (11th
Cir. 2011) (holding that minors in suits against the producers of Girls Gone Wild movies
should be permitted to proceed anonymously).
137. 901 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 2005).
138. See Lane, 242 F. Supp. 2d at 1212-13; see also Groden v. Random House, Inc., 61
F.3d 1045, 1048, 1050 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding no violation of publicity right by the publisher
of a book on the assassination of John F. Kennedy, which advertised the book by comparing it
to theories of other authors and displaying their pictures).
139. Lane, 242 F. Supp. 2d at 1215.
140. Tyne, 901 So. 2d at 809 (citing Seale v. Gramercy Pictures, 949 F. Supp. 331, 337
(E.D. Pa. 1996).
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tionable as an infringement of the right of publicity. For example,
the use of another's name and likeness in the title of a movie does
not infringe on the right of publicity since such use "is clearly re-
lated to the content of the movie and is not a disguised advertise-
ment for the sale of goods or services or a collateral commercial
product."141
Thus, the advertisements in Lane did not violate the Florida statute. 142
Before moving on, it is well to note a problem with the Tyne opinion.
Surprisingly, the court misinterprets the California case involving the T-
shirts with the sketch of the Three Stooges.143 The Tyne court erroneously
stated: "[T]he California Supreme Court held that an artist who sold litho-
graphs and T-shirts bearing the image of the Three Stooges did not violate
the plaintiffs' right of publicity because the case did not concern commercial
speech."'" Quite to the contrary, the Supreme Court of California created "a
balancing test between the First Amendment and the right of publicity based
on whether the work in question adds significant creative elements so as to
be transformed into something more than a mere celebrity likeness or imita-
tion." 45 In accordance with this test, the court then held:
Turning to Saderup's work, we can discern no significant
transformative or creative contribution. His undeniable skill is
manifestly subordinated to the overall goal of creating literal, con-
ventional depictions of The Three Stooges so as to exploit their
fame. Indeed, were we to decide that Saderup's depictions were
protected by the First Amendment, we cannot perceive how the
right of publicity would remain a viable right other than in cases of
falsified celebrity endorsements.
Moreover, the marketability and economic value of Saderup's
work derives primarily from the fame of the celebrities depicted.
While that fact alone does not necessarily mean the work receives
no First Amendment protection, we can perceive no transformative
elements in Saderup's works that would require such protection.146
141. Seale, 949 F. Supp. at 336 (citing Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004-05 (2d
Cir. 1989)).
142. Lane, 242 F. Supp. 2d at 1215.
143. See Tyne, 901 So. 2d at 809.
144. Id.
145. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 799 (Cal. 2001).
146. Id. at 811.
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Accordingly, the Supreme Court of California upheld a judgment for
damages, attorney's fees, and costs based on stipulated facts presented at
trial.147
Although Florida courts have not passed directly on the matter, as noted
earlier, occasionally the image of a celebrity is marketed for its very com-
mercial value.148 Although truly unusual, the same can be true of the image
of a private person.149 Should such a case arise, it is likely the court will
have to retreat from its present position that: "the term 'commercial pur-
pose' as used in section 540.08(1) does not apply to publications, including
motion pictures, which do not directly promote a product or service."' 50 Ra-
ther, the court will in all probability, have to expand its holding to encompass
cases of the direct sale of an image of an individual. That said, as Tyne also
demonstrates, once people become embroiled in a matter of public concern,
the "newsworthiness" provision of section 540.08(4) will continue to bar
them from asserting a cause of action based on the right of publicity.''
147. Id. at 801, 811.
148. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
149. Jenkins ex rel. Jenkins v. Dell Publ'g Co., 251 F.2d 447, 450 (3d Cir. 1958). The sale
of a high-quality print of the very famous Eisenstadt photograph of the "kissing sailor" as a
collector's item was held to create a jury issue on violation of the publicity rights of the sailor
in the photograph under Rhode Island law. Mendonsa v. Time, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 967, 968,
973 (D.R.I. 1988). The Second Circuit reversed the grant of a defense motion for summary
judgment in a case alleging that a publication entitled Wrestling All-Stars Poster Magazine
violated the publicity rights of the wrestlers. Titan Sports, Inc. v. Comics World Corp., 870
F.2d 85, 86, 89 (2d Cir. 1989). The publication contained no textual material, and only post-
ers bearing the pictures of the wrestlers stapled together inside the cover A Ia Playboy play-
mate pin-ups. See id. at 86. In each case, the court held the claim of First Amendment protec-
tion would not withstand the blatant use for trade purposes under statutes similar to Florida's.
Id. at 87, 89; Mendonsa, 678 F. Supp. at 971.
150. Tyne v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 901 So. 2d 802, 810 (Fla. 2005).
151. Id. at 808; see Ewing v. A-I Mgmt., Inc., 481 So. 2d 99, 99 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1986) (per curiam) (holding that the use of a name on a wanted poster is newsworthy); see,
e.g., Sidis v. F-R Publ'g Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 807, 809 (2d Cir. 1940) (holding a "where are
they now" article regarding a former child prodigy is in the continuing public interest). On the
other hand, in construing its own statute, the New York Court of Appeals held that a young
girl's picture used to illustrate an article on teenage sex fell within the newsworthiness excep-
tion even though the girl had engaged in none of the activity claimed in the article: "Notably,
if the newsworthiness exception is forfeited solely because the juxtaposition of a plaintiffs
photograph to a newsworthy article creates a false impression about the plaintiff, liability
under [the statute] becomes indistinguishable from the common-law tort of false light invasion
of privacy." Messenger ex rel. Messenger v. Gruner & Jahr Printing & Publ'g, 727 N.E.2d
549, 550, 556 (N.Y.) (per curiam), vacated, 208 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2000). The common law
tort of privacy was not recognized in New York's jurisprudence. Id. at 551. However, Judge
Bellacosa wrote a scathing dissent:
In sum, the practical and theoretical consequence of the negative answer justifies a too-
facile escape valve from the operation of the statute, one that is also unilaterally within the
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IV. "PRIVATE PERSONS" IN PRIVATE MATTERS
Where the picture or name of a private person is used outside of a mat-
ter involving the public interest, the cases involving section 540.08 do not
differ in theory from defamation cases.152 The delicate balance between the
First Amendment and private rights now tips more in favor of the plaintiff.153
Typical of these cases is Baucom v. Haverty,15 4 in which Ms. Baucom had
retained attorneys to represent her after a fall at a restaurant.'55 The company
that prepared a medical report for her attorneys later used that report when
promoting itself to other law firms."' The report not only contained her pic-
ture, but confidential psychiatric information relating to her.157  The trial
court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment based on the
statute of limitations, but the Second District Court of Appeal reversed, hold-
ing that "a new cause of action accrued, and the statute of limitations began
to run anew, the first time the report was read or shown to someone at each
new potential employer."' 8  While Baucom deals more with a procedural
matter than the substance of the statute, 159 the facts parallel those in Ameri-
can Ventures, Inc. v. Post, Buckley, Schuh, & Jernigan, Inc.W In this in-
stance, the identity of the plaintiff did not serve as an inducement for law
control of the alleged wrongdoer.. . . When an aggrieved person like Messenger reaches for
the statutory lifeline, the newsworthiness notion dissipates it into a dry mirage. That is not fair
or right.
Id. at 562-63 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
152. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 778 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). "[D]efamation law does not differ from state efforts to control ob-
scenity, ensure loyalty, protect consumers, oversee professions, or pursue other public welfare
goals through content-based regulation of speech." Id. (citations omitted).
153. See, e.g., Baucom v. Haverty, 805 So. 2d 959, 960-61 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
We have never considered whether the Gertz balance obtains when the defamatory
statements involve no issue of public concern. To make this determination, we must employ
the approach approved in Gertz and balance the State's interest in compensating private indi-
viduals for injury to their reputation against the First Amendment interest in protecting this
type of expression.
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at 757. As noted earlier, Florida has steadfastly maintained
the strong state interest in protecting privacy rights. See Mar. 7, 2007 Staff Analysis, supra
note 72, at 2.
154. 805 So. 2d 959 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
155. Id. at 960.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 960-61.
159. See Baucom, 805 So. 2d at 960-61.
160. No. C92-1817Z, 1993 WL 468643, at *1-2 (W.D. Wash. May 18, 1993); see supra
note 73 and accompanying text.
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firms to hire the defendant.' 6 ' Baucom thus demonstrates that the mere tan-
gential use of a person's name or picture in connection with advertising may
serve to violate the statute.162
Yet another case found the producer of a Girls Gone Wild video defend-
ing a lawsuit when he placed a picture of a young woman at Mardi Gras on
the cover of and in the advertisements for one of his videotapes. 63 The court
had little trouble denying the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint:
"Plaintiff has squarely alleged that defendant published her photograph in
Florida for commercial and advertising purposes-specifically on the pack-
age of defendant's videotape and in advertisements therefor[e]-and that
defendant did so without her permission. This states a claim under [section]
540.08."'64
Although beyond this article's scope, it is noteworthy that the court also
upheld a cause of action under Florida's Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practic-
es Act (DUTPA).1 65 Thus, plaintiffs suing under section 540.08 may also be
able to raise claims under DUTPA as well as the Federal Lanham Act.166 For
instance, in Florida, the Lanham Act formed a count of the complaint in Bo-
sem v. Musa Holdings, Inc.,67 in which an eye doctor successfully moved for
161. See Baucom, 805 So. 2d at 960.
162. See id. at 960-61.
163. Gritzke v. M.R.A. Holding, L.L.C., No. 4:01CV495-RH, 2002 WL 32107540, at *1
(N.D. Fla. Mar. 15, 2002). The operating procedure of the producer of the Girls Gone Wild
videos is described in the Eleventh Circuit's factually accurate yet thinly-veiled contemptuous
critique:
Joseph Francis is the creator and effective controlling officer of companies-including the
three other named defendants in this case-that maintain the "Girls Gone Wild" franchise.
Francis has made millions of dollars by going to places crowded with young, enthusiastic, and
often-intoxicated women and filming them exposing their breasts, fondling each other, kissing
each other, and sometimes engaging in more explicit sexual acts. Francis and his agents typi-
cally have the filmed women sign a release form affirming that they are over the age of eigh-
teen and that the Girls Gone Wild franchise can use the footage. He and his companies then
edit the films to create short scenes of women in various stages of undress and engaged in dif-
ferent types of sexual activities. Francis and his companies bunch the scenes together on por-
nographic DVDs that they sell online and through advertisements on television.
Plaintiff B v. Francis, 631 F.3d 1310, 1312 (11th Cir. 2011); see also Pitts v. Francis, No.
5:07cvl69-RS-EMT, 2007 WL 4482168, at *1, *3, *26 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 19, 2007) (denying
motion that judge recuse himself and discussing the modus operandi of the Girls Gone Wild
producer).
164. Gritzke, 2002 WL 32107540, at *1.
165. See id. at *1, *4; FLA. STAT. § 501.201 (2011).
166. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006); FLA. STAT. § 501.201; see, e.g., Allen v. Nat'l Video, Inc.,
610 F. Supp. 612, 617-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (video club using Woody Allen look-alike in its
advertising); White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1396 (9th Cir. 1992) (Sam-
sung using a robot dressed like Vanna White in a commercial for a videocassette recorder).
167. 46 So. 3d 42 (Fla. 2010) (per curiam).
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partial summary judgment finding the defendant liable for using his name
and likeness in its advertising. 168
What may well have proved the most blatant violation of the statute oc-
curred in Coton v. Televised Visual X-Ography, Inc.,'69 where a young pho-
tographer posted a photograph of herself on a website "which [was] an on-
line artistic community where photographers receive[d] feedback about, and
s[old], their photographs."" 0 The photograph, still present on-line, shows the
photographer fully dressed in a vest, long skirt and top hat, with her left
shoulder bare."' The defendant--or someone associated with the defen-
dant-lifted the picture from the website and, without permission, used the
picture on the cover of a pornographic film.'72 The photographer sued for
violation of the statute, 173 and received a default judgment in which the court
found: "The undisputed evidence shows that the plaintiffs self-portrait was
placed, without her permission, prominently on the packaging of the Body
Magic DVD for the purpose of marketing a pornographic movie with which
she had no association. These facts constitute a violation of this statute."1 74
She recovered almost $130,000 in damages, including compensatory damag-
es of $100,000 on the defamation claim. 75
Coton should serve as the harbinger of a new breed of cases-those
which arise during the computer age.' 71 Social networking sites mean photo-
graphs, names, and personal information are available to virtually anyone-
or anyone virtual, for that matter.177 We can expect the statute to be tested
far more frequently where unscrupulous individuals simply take private per-
sonae from the internet and use them for commercial gain.
168. Id. at 43, 46 (affirming the trial court's grant of motion for summary judgment and
reinstating the award of prejudgment interest).
169. 740 F. Supp. 2d 1299 (M.D. Fla. 2010).
170. Id. at 1303.
171. No Easy Way Out, DEVIANTART, available at http://larafairie.deviantart.com/gallery
/?q=no+easy+way+out (last visited Nov. 13, 2011).
172. Coton, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 1303; Teen Sues Over XXX-Video "Debut", THE SMOKING
GUN, http://www.thesmokinggun.com/documents/crime/teen-sues-over-xxx-video-debut (last
visited Nov. 13, 2011).
173. Coton, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 1310. She also put forward claims for "copyright in-
fringement . .. defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress." Id. at 1302.
174. Id. at 1310.
175. Id. at 1314, 1316. Although beyond the scope of this article, the court engaged in a
meticulous discussion of the damages it awarded for each count of the complaint. Id. at 1311-
16.
176. See Coton, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 1303.
177. See, e.g., SAUL LEVMORE & MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET:
SPEECH, PRIVACY, AND REPUTATION (2010).
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An unusual case spawned by the Internet was Almeida v. Amazon.com,
Inc.,"' where the Internet retailer Amazon offered for sale a book entitled
Anjos Proibidos.17 9 A picture of the book's cover appeared together with a
description of the book and its price, and the cover featured a picture of Al-
meida. 80 When she was a minor, Almeida's mother signed a release form
permitting the use of Almeida's photograph in a gallery exhibition and in a
book of photographs based on the exhibition."' Nine years later, a second
edition of the book appeared, but this time Almeida's photograph was repro-
duced on the cover of the book, which Amazon then offered for sale.'82 The
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Almeida's statutory cause of ac-
tion against Amazon. 183
The instant section 540.08 action is brought against Amazon,
an internet bookseller that provides services similar to a traditional
bookseller. Amazon provides its online customers with a searcha-
ble book database with links to product detail pages for each book
in its database. Each product detail page provides the book's cover
image, the publisher's description of the book, and in many in-
stances editorial and customer content. From the product detail
page, customers may link to an order placement page, where they
may complete their purchase and specify the shipping method. In
this manner, Amazon's role as an internet bookseller closely paral-
lels that of a traditional bookseller. Because internet customers are
unable to browse through shelves of books and observe the actual
book cover photos and publisher content, Amazon replicates the
bookstore experience by providing its customers with online cover
images and publisher book descriptions.1
The court rejected Almeida's suit, for it recognized that the Internet re-
quired the rethinking of traditional rules.'18  While Amazon unquestionably
sought to sell the book, the display was not of Almeida but instead of the
book itself."8
178. 456 F.3d 1316 (11 th Cir. 2006).
179. Id. at 1319.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1318-19.
182. Id. at 1319.
183. Almeida, 456 F.3d at 1328.
184. Id. at 1325.
185. See id. at 1326.
186. See id. at 1325.
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Amazon's use of book cover images is not an endorsement or pro-
motion of any product or service, but is merely incidental to, and
customary for, the business of internet book sales.
Under the allegations of Almeida's complaint, we discern no
set of facts by which an internet retailer such as Amazon, which
functions as the internet equivalent to a traditional bookseller,
would be liable for displaying content that is incidental to book
sales, such as providing customers with access to a book's cover
image and a publisher's description of the book's content. Accor-
dingly, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment as
to Amazon's right of publicity claim, but we do so on the ground
that Amazon did not use Almeida's image for the purpose of di-
rectly promoting a product or service in violation of section
540.08. 187
Almeida thus represents an Internet version of Tyne: where the underly-
ing product is protected, advertisements for sale of the product will share the
protection.' 88 We can expect courts to modify law established under tradi-
tional rules of commerce for the internet era.
V. DEFENSES UNDER THE STATUTE OTHER THAN PUBLIC INTEREST
Subsection four of the statute provides for three instances in which the
statute will not apply: a) legitimate public interest or newsworthiness; b)
consent; and c) incidental use of members of the public.' The first of these
was discussed earlier, where newsworthiness would trump privacy concerns,
but not if the defendant used the persona for advertising purposes. 90 As to
consent, established case law regarding consent applies to the statute as
well.'9 For example, when restaurants intercepted private satellite broad-
casts of Miami Dolphins football games, the court dismissed the team's
claims under the statute.' 92 "Even if a prohibited use had occurred, the play-
187. Id. at 1326 (citation omitted).
188. See Almeida, 456 F.3d at 1324-25; see also Tyne v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 901
So. 2d 802, 808-09 (Fla. 2005).
189. FLA. STAT. § 540.08(4)(a)-(c) (2011).
190. Id. § 540.08(4)(a).
191. See Nat'l Football League v. Alley, Inc., 624 F. Supp. 6, 10 (S.D. Fla. 1983).
192. Id.
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ers' contractual consent to appear in game telecasts constituted waiver of
their rights under the Florida statute." 93
The incidental use provision came into play where a plaintiff in a copy-
right action used a picture of the defendant in a marketing brochure.194 The
plaintiff had neither used the name of the defendant, nor displayed the pic-
ture with such definition that he could readily be recognized from among the
three men portrayed.'9 5 When the defendant filed a cross-claim under the
statute, the court granted the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, hold-
ing:
Moreover, this photograph falls within the statutory "member
of the public" exception. The three men in the photograph are not
named, are not in uniform, and are not otherwise connected with
the use of the photograph. Defendant Souliere appearing in the
photograph is merely fortuitous. Therefore, this Court finds that
no reasonable juror could find that the photograph of defendant
Souliere in plaintiffs brochure constituted commercial exploitation
or that it does not fall within the member of the public excep-
tion.
VI. CONCLUSION
Based on cases which have interpreted section 540.08 of the Florida
Statutes, plaintiffs who live in the public eye cannot expect to recover under
the statute for the use of their name or likeness unless the defendant has
usurped their personae to promote a product or service. Similarly, private
plaintiffs will lose their suits when the defendant has used them in connec-
tion with the public interest, when they have consented to the use, or when
they happen to be just another "face in the crowd." However, when the de-
fendant uses the plaintiffs name or likeness for promotional purposes, the
plaintiff will be able to recover.
Two areas seem ripe for further development. First, we can expect the
courts to continue to modify existing law to suit new problems raised by in-
ternet, e-marketing, and social networking. Second, it will be interesting to
see how firmly the courts are wedded to the promotional language of Tyne
193. Id. The court also found the defendants protected under the statute as the matter was
of legitimate public interest. Id. However, the court did find that the defendants had violated
section 605 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934. Id. at 10-11.
194. Epic Metals Corp. v. Condec, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 1009, 1014-15 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
195. Id. at 1016.
196. Id. at 1017 (citation omitted).
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I. INTRODUCTION
In law, one frequently recited axiom is that a party may not do indirect-
ly that which the party is precluded from doing directly.' That may no long-
er be an accurate statement with respect to the appointment of a personal
representative of a Florida decedent's estate. A variety of methods appear to
exist to avoid the statutory restrictions under Florida law on appointment of a
personal representative of a Florida decedent's estate.2 The first two sections
of this article review the statutory limitations on priority of appointment of a
personal representative in Florida of both a testate and an intestate decedent's
estate. The third section of the article addresses the proof required to satisfy
the applicable test, standing, and procedural issues that may arise. The
fourth section explains the statutory eligibility requirements and possible
loopholes providing means to avoid the statutory restrictions.
II. STANDARD IN TESTATE ESTATES
In testate estates, the statute specifies that the personal representative
named in the decedent's will is to be appointed if the person is qualified. If
* Jani E. Maurer is a professor at the Shepard Broad Law Center at Nova Southeastern
University.
1. E.g., Church v. Lee, 136 So. 242,246 (Fla. 1931).
2. See Hill v. Davis (Hill II), 70 So. 3d 572, 577 (Fla. 2011); Padgett v. Estate of Gil-
bert, 676 So. 2d 440, 443-44 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
3. See FLA. STAT. § 733.301(l)(a)(1) (2011). To be eligible and qualified to serve as a
personal representative of a testate or intestate estate in Florida, an individual must be a com-
petent adult as of decedent's death, id. § 733.302, not a convicted felon, id. § 733.303(1)(a),
mentally and physically able to perform tasks required of a personal representative, id. §
733.303(1)(b), and either a Florida resident, id. § 733.302, or a relative of decedent described
in FLA. STAT. § 733.304, or the spouse of a qualified person. Id. § 733.304(4).
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the first nominee in the will is not qualified and willing to serve, the alter-
nates named in the will are entitled to preference.' The word "shall" in the
statute has been interpreted to mean that preference "must" be given to the
personal representative named in the will.' Where no nominee in the will is
qualified and willing to serve, the person selected by those entitled to receive
a majority of the decedent's probate estate may be designated as a qualified
personal representative.6 Should there be no agreement, any beneficiary un-
der the will may be appointed personal representative, and if more than one
applies, the court may select the most qualified person.' In addition, the sta-
tute allows the guardian of a person who, if competent, would be eligible
either to be appointed personal representative or to select the personal repre-
sentative, to exercise the ward's right to select the personal representative or
to be appointed personal representative. 8 To illustrate, if a decedent's surviv-
ing spouse is nominated personal representative in the decedent's will but is
incompetent, and a guardian of her property is serving, the guardian may
seek appointment if the guardian is otherwise qualified.9 If the surviving
spouse is entitled to a majority of the decedent's probate assets, the guardian
may also select another qualified person to serve as personal representative.10
Should the foregoing provisions not yield a personal representative, the court
may appoint any qualified person, other than one who works for, is em-
4. See id. § 733.301(1)(a)(1).
5. See Werner v. Estate of McCloskey, 943 So. 2d 1007, 1008 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
2006); Pontrello v. Estate of Kepler, 528 So. 2d 441, 442-43 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
6. FLA. STAT. § 733.301(1)(a)(2).
7. Id. § 733.301(1)(a)(3).
8. Id. § 733.301(2).
9. Id. A not-for-profit corporation serving as guardian, which is not a bank or trust
company, qualified to serve as a personal representative under id. § 733.305 may not appoint
itself to serve as personal representative under this provision. Didiego v. Crockett, Franklin &
Chasen, P.A. (In re Estate of Montanez), 687 So. 2d 943, 945-46 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997)
(per curiam). In In re Estate of Montanez, the court held that the appointment as personal
representative of a Florida corporation that previously served as guardian of the deceased was
a reversible error. Id. at 946. The case also illustrates one reason why appointment of a de-
ceased ward's former guardian as personal representative may be imprudent, even if the guar-
dian is otherwise qualified. See id. at 945-46. During the deceased ward's life, the guardian
had a duty to assure the ward's proper care. Id. at 946. After the ward's death, questions
arose about whether he received proper care and whether the nursing home in which he re-
sided should be held liable in damages for neglect of the decedent. Id. A settlement entered
into by the former guardian-while serving as personal representative-and the nursing home
about sums owed to the nursing home for the decedent's care, purported to protect both the
guardian and the nursing home from liability. In re Estate of Montanez, 687 So. 2d at 946.
The former guardian was removed as personal representative and the settlement was set aside.
Id.
10. See FLA. STAT. § 733.301(2).
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ployed by, or holds office under the court or the judge exercising probate
jurisdiction."
Generally, Florida courts "have no discretion [in a testate estate] but to
issue letters [of administration] to the person nominated in [decedent's] will,
unless [the] person is . . . disqualified or such discretion is granted by sta-
tute."12 In domiciliary and ancillary proceedings in Florida, the initial per-
sonal representative nominated in the will, or if he is not qualified, the suc-
cessor or alternate named in the will, should be appointed. 3 Since at least
1947, Florida courts recognized the right of a testator to have his choice of a
qualified personal representative appointed.14
Persons given priority to serve as a personal representative under sec-
tion 733.301 of the Florida Statutes do not have an absolute right to serve."
Florida courts may decline to appoint the personal representative nominated
in a decedent's will where "exceptional circumstances" exist. 6 Two alterna-
tive tests have been enunciated to determine if exceptional circumstance are
present.' 7  The first test requires circumstances to arise after the testator
11. Id. § 733.301(3)(a)-(b). "[A]n employee of the clerk of a circuit court," including the
circuit court in which probate proceedings are commenced, "is not an employee of 'the court"'
within the meaning of FLA. STAT. § 731.301(3)(a). Long v. Willis ex rel. Estate of Long, No.
2D10-2104, 2011 WL 3587411, at *6 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2011). Hence, an em-
ployee of the clerk's office is eligible to serve as a personal representative. Id. The court
reasoned that "[tihe Florida Probate Code defines 'court' as 'the circuit court."' Id.; FLA.
STAT. § 731.201(7). "The clerk of the circuit court is a separate constitutional officer elected
by the voters and not selected by the judges of the circuit." FLA. CONST. art. V, § 16; FLA.
CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d).
12. Kenton v. Kenton (In re Estate of Kenton), 423 So. 2d 531, 532 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1982) (citing State v. North, 32 So. 2d 14, 18 (Fla. 1947)); Pontrello v. Estate of Kepler,
528 So. 2d 441, 442-43 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (citing North, 32 So. 2d at 18; In re
Estate of Kenton, 423 So. 2d at 532). In In re Estate of Kenton, the court appointed the dece-
dent's widow as personal representative, even though the decedent and his widow were sepa-
rated at the decedent's death, and the decedent and his spouse had signed a separation agree-
ment waiving "all rights and claims of every nature whatsoever to the other's estate." In re
Estate of Kenton, 423 So. 2d at 532. The decedent's father's claim that he should be ap-
pointed as the alternate personal representative named in the will because the surviving spouse
waived her right to serve, was rejected. Id. at 532-33.
13. Jose v. Jose (In re Estate of Jose), 164 So. 2d 888, 890 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
The court therein stated "unless plainly prohibited by law the courts will honor the wishes of
the testator." Id.
14. See North, 32 So. 2d at 18.
15. FLA. STAT. § 733.301 (2011); Schleider v. Estate of Schleider, 770 So. 2d 1252, 1254
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (citing In re Estate of Snyder, 333 So. 2d 519, 520 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1976)).
16. Hernandez v. Hernandez, 946 So. 2d 124, 126 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting
Schledier, 770 So. 2d at 1253).
17. See, e.g., Schleider, 770 So. 2d at 1253-54; Pontrello, 528 So. 2d at 443.
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signed his or her will, which clearly would have caused the testator to change
the nominee in his or her will had he or she been aware of the circumstances
and "the testator had no reasonable opportunity . .. to change the designation
of the personal representative in his will."18 As long as the testator remains
unaware of the unforeseen circumstances, he or she might lack the chance to
change the person nominated as the personal representative in his or her
will.1 9 This is a very narrow exception. 20 The second test purports to allow
the court to refuse to appoint the personal representative nominated in the
will if the person named by the decedent is unsuitable to administer to the
estate.2' A person may be unsuitable if the person has an interest adverse to
those interested 2 2 in the estate, an interest adverse to the estate, or hostility to
persons interested in the estate.23 While the tests are enunciated, no reported
Florida appellate court decision has applied the tests to preclude the ap-
pointment of an eligible individual nominated in a decedent's will.
Courts reserve the right to determine that a person with priority should
not be appointed if the nominee's "'character, ability, and experience to
serve as personal representative"' causes the court to conclude that the nomi-
nee does not possess the necessary qualities.24 This authority was previously
found in a statute, which prior to 2001, provided in pertinent part, that "[a]
person who . . . from sickness, intemperance, or want of understanding, is
18. Hernandez, 946 So. 2d at 126 (quoting Schleider, 770 So. 2d at 1253-54); Schleider,
770 So. 2d at 1253-54 (quoting Pontrello, 528 So. 2d at 443); Pontrello, 528 So. 2d at 443
(citing Maxcy v. Citizens Nat'l Bank of Orlando (In re Estate of Maxcy), 240 So. 2d 93, 95
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1970)).
19. See Pontrello, 528 So. 2d at 443. An example of such a situation is where a nominee
in the decedent's will planned or procured the testator's demise. In re Estate of Maxcy, 240
So. 2d at 95. In In re Estate ofMaxcy, a dispute arose about payment of legal fees to separate
counsel for two co-personal representatives, one of whom was the decedent's widow. Id. at
94. The court opined "that the widow should never have been appointed," despite her nomi-
nation in the will, as she was involved in planning her husband's death. Id. at 95.
20. Pontrello, 528 So. 2d at 443.
21. See Schleider, 770 So. 2d at 1254 (citing In re Estate of Snyder, 333 So. 2d 519, 520
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976)); see also Hernandez, 946 So. 2d at 126 (citing Schleider, 770
So. 2d at 1254).
22. FLA. STAT. § 731.201(23) (2011) defines interested person to mean "any person who
may reasonably be expected to be affected by the outcome of the particular proceeding in-
volved." Interested persons include beneficiaries under a will, heirs in intestacy, creditors of
the decedent and possibly others. Id. A beneficiary under a will who has not yet actually
received her gift is an interested person, even if the estate is clearly of adequate value to dis-
tribute the gift in the future. Cason v. Hammock, 908 So. 2d 512, 514 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
2005).
23. Hernandez, 946 So. 2d at 127 (citing Schleider, 770 So. 2d at 1254).
24. Schleider, 770 So. 2d at 1254 (quoting Padgett v. Estate of Gilbert, 676 So. 2d 440,
443 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996)).
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incompetent to discharge the duties of a personal representative is not quali-
fied."2 The statute was amended in 2001 to omit this wording. 26 What those
qualities were has not yet been clearly disclosed in case law. Section
733.303(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes currently provides that a person who
"[i]s mentally or physically unable to perform the duties" of a personal rep-
resentative is not qualified to serve and should not be appointed.27 However,
the court's discretion is not limited to a situation in which a nominee is phys-
ically or mentally unable to attend to tasks required of a personal representa-
tive.28 After amendment of section 733.302 of the Florida Statutes in 2001,
courts continue to recognize that "the probate court has the inherent authority
to consider a person's character, ability, and experience to serve as personal
representative." 29 Reported cases in which the courts rely on this inherent
authority to date primarily involve intestate, rather than testate decedents.30
Presumably this test is applicable in a testate estate. Confusion arises be-
cause although courts acknowledge that a different standard applies in testate
as opposed to intestate estates, when ruling in a testate estate, courts cite cas-
es involving intestate estates without always adequately distinguishing
them.3' While the court cases set forth the foregoing principles, no Florida
case was located in which they were applied in a testate decedent's estate to
cause an appellate court to conclude that the nominee in a decedent's will
should be denied appointment.
There is a distinction between a court's refusal to appoint a personal
representative named in a will, as opposed to a refusal to appoint as personal
32
representative an individual with priority under statute in an intestate estate.
This difference, acknowledged in some of the reported cases, arises due to
the right of a testator to name any eligible, qualified person to serve.33 "The
distinction between [a personal representative] named in a will and [one]
appointed by the court is significant because the [former] derives his powers
25. FLA. STAT. § 733.302 (1993). No such provision appears in the current statutes. See
id. § 733.302 (2011).
26. Compare FLA. STAT. § 733.302 (2001), with FLA. STAT. § 733.302 (1993).
27. FLA. STAT. § 733.303(1)(b) (2011).
28. See Garcia v. Morrow, 954 So. 2d 656, 658 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (citing
DeVaughn v. DeVaughn, 840 So. 2d I128, 1132 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2003)).
29. DeVaughn, 840 So. 2d at 1133 (quoting Padgett, 676 So. 2d at443).
30. See, e.g., id.
31. See, e.g., Schleider v. Estate of Schleider, 770 So. 2d 1252, 1254-55 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 2000) (involving a testate decedent where the court relied on Padgett, 676 So. 2d at
442 (involving an intestate decedent)).
32. See Pontrello v. Estate of Kepler, 528 So. 2d 441, 442-43 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1988).
33. Id. at 442.
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from the appointment of the testator and not from appointment by the
court." 34 "A judge treads on sacred ground .. . when he overrides the testa-
tor's directions regarding the appointment of the person in whom the dece-
dent placed his trust to administer his estate according to the powers given in
the will."35 Thus, the court in a testate estate may refuse to appoint the per-
sonal representative named in the will only in rare and extreme cases.36 The
court has greater latitude when refusing to follow the statutory preference in
appointment of a personal representative in an intestate estate. However,
the distinction is difficult to quantify.
Further investigation is warranted to ascertain when circumstances justi-
fy a court's refusal to appoint the qualified personal representative named in
a decedent's will. As the courts in reported cases rarely find that the refusal
is justified under the applicable test, it is necessary to examine what facts do
not justify a refusal to appoint the personal representative nominated in a
decedent's will.
The fact that a person seeking appointment, other than the nominee
named in the will, had extensive knowledge of the decedent's assets, debts,
and estate when the nominee did not possess such knowledge, failed to sup-
port a decision not to appoint the nominee in the decedent's will. 8 This is
true, although it would be more costly to the estate for the nominee in the
will to be appointed.39 The fact that decedent and his spouse were separated
and had signed a separation agreement waiving rights to each other's estate
did not prevent the appointment of the widow as personal representative,
where she was named by the decedent in his will.40 "[1]11 feelings, disputes,
and strained relationships between" those entitled to the decedent's estate
and the person nominated personal representative in the will do not generally
34. Id. at 443; cf Comerford v. Cherry, 100 So. 2d 385, 390 (Fla. 1958). Even in cases
involving removal of a personal representative, where a different standard applies, the courts
acknowledge that the right of a personal representative not named in a will is less than one
appointed in a will. Vaughn v. Batchelder ex rel. Estate of Odem, 633 So. 2d 526, 529 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994); see also Murphy v. Pace (In re Estate of Murphy), 336 So. 2d 697,
699 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976). "The removal of a personal representative chosen by the
deceased is a drastic action and should only be resorted to when the administration of the
estate is endangered." In re Estate of Murphy, 336 So. 2d at 699.
35. Pontrello, 528 So. 2d at 443.
36. Id.
37. See id.
38. Id. at 444.
39. Id.
40. In re Estate of Kenton, 423 So. 2d 531, 532-33 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
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justify a court's refusal to appoint the nominee; nor does the fact that estate
beneficiaries do not like the nominee.4 1
Strained relationships between estate beneficiaries, one of whom is no-
minated personal representative in the will, do not permit a court to decline
to appoint the nominee and do not permit a court to appoint an independent
or neutral third party.42 Where the decedent's son was an attorney in a state
other than Florida, delayed depositing the original will with the court, and it
was wrongly claimed that he withdrew sums from the decedent's account,
the evidence was insufficient to prevent the son's appointment as personal
representative, in conformity with his nomination in the decedent's will."
For a dispute between the beneficiaries and the nominee to constitute
grounds for a court to deny appointment to the decedent's chosen fiduciary,
the dispute must at least be one which "will cause unnecessary litigation and
impede the estate's administration, and either the person [nominated in the
will] lacks the character, ability, and experience to serve or exceptional cir-
cumstances exist."4
The trial court's conclusion that a nominee in the decedent's will
"would not be objective and neutral and would not serve the best interest of
the estate" because he previously took sides in estate disputes, did not allow
the court to decline to appoint him.45 The fact that a decedent's spouse
41. See Pontrello, 528 So. 2d at 444. In Pontrello, the decedent named his attorney to
serve as personal representative of his estate. Id. at 442. The decedent's widow, who had
served as the decedent's court appointed guardian and was familiar with his financial affairs,
and the decedent's adult daughter, both objected to appointment of the attorney as personal
representative. Id. The hostility between the parties stemming from prior disputes in the
decedent's guardianship proceeding, the widow's knowledge of the decedent's finances, the
additional expense likely to result from appointment of the attorney as fiduciary necessary for
him to become familiar with the decedent's estate and affairs, taken together, did not justify a
refusal to appoint the attorney. Id. at 444.
42. Hernandez v. Hernandez, 946 So. 2d 124, 126 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting
Schleider v. Estate of Schleider, 770 So. 2d 1252, 1253 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000)). In
Hernandez, the decedent's will designated his son, Ruben, to serve as personal representative,
and his son, Raul, to serve if Ruben did not survive. Id. Ruben was an attorney. Id. at 127.
Raul sought appointment and was opposed by his brother, Ruben, and their mother, who was
the decedent's former spouse. Id. at 126. Both of the decedent's sons sought appointment as
personal representative. Id. The disputes between them arose after their father's death, due to
Ruben's actions and inaction. See Hernandez, 946 So. 2d at 126-27. The appointment of the
decedent's selected nominee was required. Id. at 127.
43. Id. at 125, 127.
44. Id. at 127.
45. Brake v. Murphy ex rel. Estate of Murphy, 591 So. 2d 1025, 1026 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1991) (per curiam). In that case, the first person nominated personal representative in
the decedent's will was appointed and then removed. Id. Upon her removal, the second per-
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claimed entitlement to the decedent's estate as a pretermitted spouse did not
alone authorize a court to appoint her personal representative rather than the
nominee in the decedent's will. 46 A testator's marriage after he or she ex-
ecutes his or her will is not an unforeseen exceptional circumstance.4 ' The
fact that a nominee is alleged to have a conflict of interest with the estate
does not alone support a decision declining to appoint the nominee.4 8
It may also be useful to understand what tests have been rejected as not
a proper basis for a court to determine if a personal representative named in a
will should be denied the position. A refusal to appoint a personal represent-
ative named in the decedent's will may not be based solely on cost to the
estate. 49 The test in section 733.504 of the Florida Statutes for removal of a
personal representative is not the test applicable to determine if a personal
representative should be initially appointed.o A court cannot refuse to ap-
son nominated in the decedent's will sought appointment and was held entitled to be ap-
pointed. Id.
46. Mindlin v. Mindlin (In re Estate of Mindlin), 571 So. 2d 90, 91 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1990) (per curiam). The testator signed a will prior to his marriage. Id. at 90. The will
named the testator's father to serve as personal representative. Id. Absent evidence that the
testator's father was not qualified to serve, or of unforeseen circumstances that would have
changed the testator's decision about the fiduciary, the father was entitled to appointment as
personal representative. Id. at 91. The fact that the decedent's widow claimed entitlement to
all estate assets did not change the outcome. Id.
47. See In re Estate of Mindlin, 571 So. 2d at 90-91.
48. Werner v. Estate of McCloskey, 943 So. 2d 1007, 1008 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
In that case, the decedent's son, named personal representative in his mother's will, sought
appointment. Id. His sister, who was named alternate personal representative in the will,
opposed his petition and sought the position based on an alleged conflict of interest between
the son and the estate. Id. The details of the alleged conflict were not disclosed. Id. The
appellate court reversed the trial judge's appointment of the testatrix's daughter as personal
representative. Id. The appellate court's decision was based on both the absence of proof that
a conflict existed, and the law that a conflict was not legally sufficient to prevent appointment
of the testatrix's selected fiduciary. Werner, 943 So. 2d at 1008.
49. See Pontrello v. Estate of Kepler, 528 So. 2d 441, 444 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988),
where the trial court erroneously denied appointment of the personal representative named in
the will, based principally on the trial judge's finding that there would be added expense to the
estate if the nominee was appointed.
50. See Hunter v. Johnson (In re Estate of Bell), 573 So. 2d 57, 60 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1990). A personal representative already serving may be removed if she has or develops a
conflict between her personal interests and the estate. FLA. STAT. § 733.504(9) (2011); In re
Estate of Bell, 573 So. 2d at 60. In In re Estate of Bell, the personal representative used the
decedent's durable power of attorney during the decedent's life to open accounts for the per-
sonal representative's personal benefit, despite the absence of the express right to do so in the
power of attorney. Id. at 58, 60. The dispute, which developed when she personally claimed
the rights to funds in the accounts after her appointment as personal representative, was a
conflict requiring her removal. Id. at 60. The conflict did not, however, prevent her initial
appointment as personal representative in conformity with the decedent's will. Id. at 58;
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point the personal representative nominated in a decedent's will based on
speculation that he or she may be subject to removal in the future."
III. STANDARD IN INTESTATE ESTATES
In an intestate estate, the decedent's surviving spouse has the best right
to serve as personal representative.52 Where the decedent is not survived by
a spouse, or where the spouse is not eligible and willing to serve as personal
representative, the person selected by the heirs entitled to receive a majority
of the decedent's probate estate has priority under statute. Where heirs
accord Vaughn v. Batchelder ex rel. Estate of Odem, 633 So. 2d 526, 527 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1994); Duncan v. Davis (In re Estate of Gainer), 579 So. 2d 739, 740 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1991) (per curiam); Pontrello, 528 So. 2d at 442. But see Werner, 943 So. 2d at 1008,
where the appellate court remanded the case and suggested that if a conflict existed between
the personal representative named in the decedent's will and the estate the trial court could
consider FLA. STAT. § 733.504(9) pertaining to removal. It is not clear from the opinion if the
court was suggesting that the grounds for removal would or would not be relevant to initial
appointment of a personal representative. See Werner, 943 So. 2d at 1008.
51. Pontrello, 528 So. 2d at 444.
52. FLA. STAT. § 733.301(1)(b)(1).
53. Id. § 733.301(1)(b)(2). Where a court appointed guardian of the property of minor
heirs is in place when intestate estate administration is commenced, the guardian's nominee
must be appointed, unless he or she is ineligible or lacks "the qualities and characteristics
necessary to properly perform the duties" of a personal representative. Stalley v. Williford ex
rel. Estate of Williford, 50 So. 3d 680, 681 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2010). Unless this test is
satisfied, the court lacks discretion to avoid the preferences in appointment set forth in the
statute. Id. Where a majority of the heirs of an intestate decedent are minors, attention needs
to be paid to who has the authority to represent them, in both objecting to a petition for admin-
istration and in seeking appointment of a personal representative nominated on behalf of the
minor heirs. Long v. Willis ex rel. Estate of Long, No. 2D10-2104, 2011 WL 3587411, at *3-
4 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2011). The parent of the minor child may have limited
authority, on behalf of a minor child, to object to a petition for administration seeking ap-
pointment of a personal representative. Id. However, only a court appointed guardian of the
minor's property has authority to select a personal representative in an intestate estate on
behalf of a minor heir. Id. In Long, a father died intestate and single, survived by two adult
children born of his first marriage and three minor children born of his second marriage. Id. at
*1. The decedent's sister filed a petition for administration seeking her own appointment as
personal representative. Id. Her petition and formal notice were served on Ms. Long, the
mother of the three minor heirs. Long, 2011 WL 3587411, at *1. After the twenty day time
limit specified in the formal notice expired, Ms. Long filed an objection to the sister's petition
and appointment. Id. at *2. Ms. Long thereafter also filed pleadings seeking her own ap-
pointment as personal representative. Id. The parent of a minor heir does not, as natural
guardian, have the right to select a personal representative under FLA. STAT. § 733.301 on
behalf of the minor heir. Only a court appointed guardian of the property of the minor child
has this right. Long, 2011 WL 3587411, at *3-4. The probate court may extend the twenty
day time limit for filing a response to a petition for administration to enable a guardian of the
property of a minor heir to be appointed. Id. at *3-5. In this case, the appellate court held
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entitled to a majority of the decedent's probate estate do not agree on a per-
sonal representative, the heir having the closest blood relationship to dece-
dent is entitled to be appointed.54 Should two heirs with the same degree of
relationship to decedent seek appointment as personal representative, "the
court may select the one best qualified." 5 Where none of the foregoing per-
sons are willing, able and qualified to serve as personal representative, the
same preferences apply as in a testate estate.
Courts have recognized in intestate estates that an otherwise qualified
person, who has the best right to serve as personal representative of an intes-
tate decedent's estate under statute, does not have an absolute right to ap-
pointment." "'[A]ppointment [by the court] of a personal representative [of]
an intestate [decedent's] estate is a discretionary act of the probate courts. '"58
If a court determines that the person with the best right to serve as personal
representative in an intestate estate is not fit to serve, the record must ex-
pressly reflect that the person lacks the necessary characteristics.9 To avoid
appointing as personal representative of an intestate estate the person with
priority under the statute, the court must find that the individual is not fit to
,,60
serve based on the person's "character, ability, and experience.
In intestate estates as in testate estates, the courts continue to refer to
and rely on the circuit court's
that the probate court should have afforded a reasonable opportunity for a guardian of the
property of the minor children to be appointed so the children were not denied their statutory
right to a say in who was to serve as personal representative. Id. at *6.
54. FLA. STAT. § 733.301(l)(b)(3). In one case, the decedent died intestate and the for-
mer daughter-in-law sought appointment as personal representative. Garcia v. Morrow, 954
So. 2d 656, 657 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007). However, decedent's adult grandson also
sought to be appointed as personal representative and filed a disclaimer of interest executed by
his incarcerated father. Id. The former daughter-in-law claimed that the adult grandson tried
to "work a fraud on the court by securing and filing [his father's] disclaimer of interest." Id.
Therefore, the trial court, without an evidentiary hearing, appointed the former daughter-in-
law as personal representative. Id. The appellate court reversed the determination based on
FLA. STAT. 733.301 which provides that the heir nearest in degree to the decedent is the pre-
ferred representative. Garcia, 954 So. 2d at 657-58.
55. FLA. STAT. § 733.301(1)(b)(3).
56. Id. § 733.301(3).
57. Garcia, 954 So. 2d at 658 (citing In re Estate of Snyder, 333 So. 2d 519, 520 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1976)).
58. Id. (quoting DeVaughn v. DeVaughn, 840 So. 2d 1128, 1132 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
2003)); In re Estate of Snyder, 333 So. 2d at 520.
59. Garcia, 954 So. 2d at 658; DeVaughn, 840 So. 2d at 1133.
60. Garcia, 954 So. 2d at 658; Padgett v. Estate of Gilbert, 676 So. 2d 440, 443 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting DeVaugh, 840 So. 2d at 1133).
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inherent authority to consider a person's character, ability and ex-
perience to serve as personal representative and, if the record sup-
ports the conclusion that the person lacks the necessary qualities
and characteristics, the discretion to refuse to appoint even a per-
son ... of statutory preference who is not specifically disqualified
by the statute.6'
The question which arises is what facts would justify a court in determining
that a person with priority is not entitled to appointment in an intestate estate.
A review of case law reflects repeated recitation by the courts of the stan-
dard, but no explanation or examples of facts which would prevent appoint-
ment.6 2 Instead, cases demonstrate a variety of facts asserted by those oppos-
ing appointment of the personal representative with priority under statute, all
of which were eventually held to be inadequate to prevent appointment. 63 As
in testate estates, each case is dependent on its own facts and circumstances.
Ill feelings, strained relationships and disputes between heirs, even be-
tween the heirs closest to the decedent and presumptively entitled to ap-
pointment as personal representative, do not authorize the court to appoint a
neutral party rather than a person with priority under the statute.6 Merely
submitting another heir's disclaimer to the court where that disclaimer might
61. Padgett, 676 So. 2d at 443 (citing In re Estate of Snyder, 333 So. 2d at 521). Prior to
the change in the statute, the court stated its reasoning as follows:
Where the record supports the conclusion that a person occupying the position of statutory pre-
ference does not have the qualities and characteristics necessary to properly perform the duties
of an administrator, it would be an anomaly to hold that a probate court, which has historically
applied equitable principles in making its judgments, does not have the discretion to refuse to
appoint him simply because he did not fall within the enumerated list of statutory disqualifica-
tions.
In re Estate of Snyder, 333 So. 2d at 521. Therein, the decedent died intestate. Id. at 519.
Her spouse sought appointment as personal representative, having met all eligibility require-
ments. Id. at 519-20. Her children opposed his appointment, presumably because his con-
duct, the details of which were not disclosed in the opinion, gave rise to an estoppel. See id. at
519-20. Without disclosing the pertinent facts, the appellate court held that there was suffi-
cient evidence to support the trial court's decision that decedent's "husband was not qualified
by character, ability and experience to serve." Id. at 520. This case was decided under a prior
version of FLA. STAT. § 733.302. See In re Estate of Snyder, 333 So. 2d at 519; Act effective
July 1, 1975, ch. 74-106, § 1, 1974 Fla. Laws 212, 212-13, 243-44 (repealing FLA. STAT. §
732.45 (1973)).
62. See DeVaughn, 840 So. 2d at 1133; Padgett, 676 So. 2d at 443; In re Estate of Snyd-
er, 333 So. 2d at 520.
63. See DeVaughn, 840 So. 2d at 1134; see also Padgett, 676 So. 2d at 443; In re Estate
of Snyder, 333 So. 2d at 520.
64. Harper v. Estate of Harper, 271 So. 2d 40, 42 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1973). In Har-
per, the decedent died intestate survived by no spouse and by four adult children. Id. at 41.
One child, with the consent of a second, sought appointment as personal representative with-
out notice to the other two children. Id.
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be invalid is alone insufficient to prevent appointment in an intestate estate
of the personal representative with priority under section 733.301(1)(b) of
the Florida Statutes.65
Where a decedent died intestate, his mother was entitled to appointment
as personal representative, in preference to his uncle who raised him and
66
with whom the decedent resided, where the mother was qualified to serve.
That the uncle was allegedly more bereaved by the decedent's death or was
found more "morally worthy" by the court did not alter the outcome.67 Even
a convicted felon whose civil rights were restored after the governor granted
clemency was not automatically precluded from serving as personal repre-
sentative when he had priority under the statute.
The courts' rulings in cases involving contests about appointment of
personal representatives in intestate estates cite to and rely on cases involv-
ing similar disputes in testate estates. 69 They adopt tests applicable in testate
estates while acknowledging the difference between avoiding appointment of
a personal representative named by the decedent and avoiding appointment
of one selected by the legislature.70
IV. PROCEDURE AND STANDING
The procedure to be followed to contest appointment of the personal
representative apparently entitled to priority under a will or under statute in
an intestate estate depends on the status of the court probate proceeding at
the time the contestant raises an objection." If no petition for administration
has been filed when the contestant knows he or she will object to appoint-
ment of the person with priority, a caveat should be filed.72 Absent the filing
of a caveat, the person with apparent priority may be appointed personal rep-
resentative without notice to the contestant.7 3 Filing of a caveat before a pro-
65. FLA. STAT. § 733.301(1)(b) (2011); Garcia, 954 So. 2d at 658.
66. DeVaughn, 840 So. 2d at 1132-33.
67. Id. at 1133-34.
68. Padgett, 676 So. 2d at 443-44.
69. See, e.g., Garcia, 954 So. 2d at 657-58.
70. See, e.g., id.
71. See FLA. STAT. § 733.212 (2011).
72. See id. §§ 731.110(1), 733.202.
73. Id. §§ 733.201(1), .301(1). Id. § 733.201(1) allows a self-proving will to "be admit-
ted to probate without further proof." "Any interested person may [file a] petition for admin-
istration." Id. § 733.202. A person nominated personal representative in a decedent's will is
an interested person for this purpose under FLA. STAT. § 731.201(23). While id. § 733.2123
allows a petitioner with priority to serve the Petition for Administration and Formal Notice on
interested persons before a personal representative is appointed, it does not require the peti-
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bate proceeding is commenced assures the caveator of an opportunity to ob-
ject to the appointment of a personal representative prior to that appoint-
ment.7 4 It is preferable to contest the appointment of a personal representa-
tive before that appointment, both to prevent the individual appointed from
taking actions the contestant may find objectionable, and to avoid duplication
of effort and additional cost to the estate.
If a caveat is filed and ignored so that the caveator is not served with the
Petition for Administration and Formal Notice and is denied an opportunity
to object to appointment of the personal representative, the appointment may
be reversed.76 Where no caveat is filed but the Petition for Administration
and Formal Notice are nevertheless served on the contestant, the contestant
needs to timely file an objection to the appointment of the personal repre-
sentative.7 Failure to do so may bar the contestant from contesting thereaf-
ter. Where the contestant is not served with a Petition for Administration
and Formal Notice prior to the appointment of the personal representative,
and was not entitled to notice,79 a petition to revoke the letters of administra-
tion should be filed promptly.80 The deadline for objecting to the appoint-
ment of the personal representative is generally three months after the inter-
tioner to do so. However, when a caveat is filed by the contestant, a personal representative
cannot be appointed without prior notice to the caveator. Id. § 731.110(3).
74. See id.; Powell v. Eberhardt (In re Estate of Hartman), 836 So. 2d 1038, 1039 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002); Grooms v. Royce, 638 So. 2d 1019, 1021 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1994).
75. See, e.g., McCormick v. McCormick, 991 So. 2d 437, 438-39 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
2008). Where a decedent's will is properly admitted to probate, the personal representative
nominated therein (if eligible) is entitled to appointment. Id. at 439. In McCormick, one son
of the decedent filed a petition to commence probate claiming his father died intestate, and he
was appointed personal representative. Id. at 438. His half-brother thereafter produced a will
naming him personal representative. Id. Once the initial petitioner stipulated to the admission
of the will to probate, the nominee named therein was entitled to appointment as fiduciary. Id.
at 439.
76. See FLA. STAT. § 731.110(3); In re Estate of Hartman, 836 So. 2d at 1040.
77. FLA. STAT. §§ 733.212(3),.2123.
78. Id. § 733.2123. Section 733.2123 of the Florida Statutes provides that no "person
who is served with [formal] notice" of the petition for administration prior to the "issuance of
letters . . . may . . . challenge the validity of the will, testacy of the decedent, [or] qualifica-
tions of the personal representative . .. except in the proceedings before issuance of letters."
79. A contestant may be entitled to notice prior to issuance of Letters of Administration
due to a contestant's filing of a caveat or because a contestant has a better right than a peti-
tioner to serve as personal representative. FLA. STAT. § 731.110(3); FLA. PROB. R. 5.201.
80. See Hill v. Davis ex rel. Estate of Davis (Hill 1), 31 So. 3d 921, 924 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 2010), aff'd, 70 So. 3d 572 (Fla. 2011). Where the personal representative appointed
was not initially eligible and qualified to serve under FLA. STAT. §§ 733.302-.304, there may
be a time limit on contesting his appointment or removal. See, e.g., Hill 1, 31 So. 3d at 922-
24; see also Angelus v. Pass, 868 So. 2d 571, 573 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
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ested person is served with a Notice of Administration." The deadline may
be extended if, after probate is commenced, a later will or codicil not initially
offered for probate is located.82 The deadline may also be extended if the
personal representative appointed was not qualified and that fact was not
disclosed to the court and other interested persons within the three-month
period.83 If either a timely Objection to a Petition for Administration seeking
appointment of a personal representative or a timely Petition to Revoke Let-
ters of Administration is filed, the court is required to hold an evidentiary
hearing prior to appointment of the personal representative, if an objection is
filed before any appointment,84 or prior to revoking letters. It is important
to have the evidentiary hearing transcribed by a court reporter. Absent a
complete record, the trial court's determination is less likely to be reversed
on appeal.
There are limitations on who may contest the appointment of a personal
representative. 87 Any interested person may seek or oppose the appointment
81. FLA. STAT. § 733.212(2)(c). That deadline is applicable even if litigation is pending
contesting the validity of the will in which the personal representative was nominated, and the
pendency of that litigation does not appear to extend the deadline for separately objecting to
the appointment of the personal representative. See Hill 1, 31 So. 3d at 923-24.
82. Hyland v. DiPietro (In re Estate of DeLuca), 748 So. 2d 1086, 1089 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2000) (per curiam). In In re Estate of DeLuca, probate of the decedent's estate was
commenced based on a will. Id. at 1087. After the deadline to file claims or objections to the
validity of the will or appointment of a personal representative expired, an addendum to the
Petition for Administration was filed offering two codicils signed by the decedent for admis-
sion to probate. Id. No new Notice of Administration was served. Id. Thereafter, revocation
of probate of the will and two codicils was sought. Id. Because the beneficiaries were not
served with another Notice of Administration, they remained entitled to institute a contest
based upon the two codicils. In re Estate of DeLuca, 748 So. 2d at 1089.
83. See Hill I, 31 So. 3d at 924; Angelus, 868 So. 2d at 573.
84. In re Estate of Hartman, 836 So. 2d 1038, 1040 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
85. See Garcia v. Morrow, 954 So. 2d 656, 657, 659 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
86. See Padgett v. Estate of Gilbert, 676 So. 2d 440, 442 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
In Padgett, a minor decedent's mother was removed as personal representative of the intestate
estate by the trial court and she appealed the decision. Id. The appellate court affirmed her
removal, because no record of the trial court hearing was provided to the appellate court. Id.
Absent a record, the appellate court was unable to determine if the trial court committed re-
versible error, ruling improperly on the facts or the law. Id. But see Pontrello v. Estate of
Kepler, 528 So. 2d 441, 444 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988). In Pontrello, there was no court
reporter at the trial court hearing on the contest about appointment of a personal representative
and the record could not be reconstructed. Id. The court on appeal accepted the findings of
fact in the trial court's order to determine if a reversible error occurred in applying the law.
Id. The court determined that such an error existed, and reversed the trial court's ruling. Id.
87. Wheeler v. Powers, 972 So. 2d 285, 287-88 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
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of a personal representative. An interested person is anyone who could
"reasonably be expected to be affected by the outcome of [a] ... proceed-
ing."8 9 A person contesting appointment of a personal representative must
affirmatively allege standing.90 Thus, in this context, standing is not an af-
firmative defense which is waived if not pled.9'
The person seeking appointment as personal representative may claim a
right to serve by virtue of the decedent's will or codicil.92 In that situation, a
beneficiary under a prior will of the decedent has standing to contest a later
will, if a successful contest to the later will would result in financial benefit
to the beneficiary under the earlier will. 93 Similarly, a person who would be
a decedent's heir in intestacy has standing to challenge the decedent's will, if
a successful contest would result in the decedent dying intestate. 94 The same
standard is applied to determine if a person is interested in the estate, wheth-
er the contest is to avoid initial appointment of the personal representative or
88. FLA. STAT. § 733.202 (2011). In other probate disputes, any person who would gain
financially from a contest has standing, even if the person was specifically disinherited in the
decedent's will. Shriners Hosp. for Crippled Children v. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d 64, 66 (Fla.
1990). Zrillic involved a challenge by the decedent's daughter to a gift to charity set forth in
the decedent's will. Id. at 65-66. The daughter asserted that the gift to charity was invalid, as
it violated the Mortmain Statute, FLA. STAT. § 732.803 (1989), then in effect. Zrillic, 563 So.
2d at 65, 68. Other than a nominal gift of tangible personal property, the will disinherited
decedent's daughter in caustic language. Id. at 65. The charitable beneficiary named in the
will and the personal representative claimed that the decedent's daughter lacked standing due
to the disinheritance provisions in the will. Id. at 66. Because the daughter was the dece-
dent's lineal descendant who would take in intestacy if the gift to charity was avoided, she had
standing. Id.
89. FLA. STAT. § 731.201(23) (2011).
90. Wehrheim v. Golden Pond Assisted Living Facility, 905 So. 2d 1002, 1006 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
91. See id., in which the court held that this rule applies in a will contest and in an action
to remove the personal representative designated in the decedent's will. Id. While FLA. PROB.
R. 5.270 does not apply to an objection to a Petition for Administration, only interested per-
sons may object; hence analogous reasoning should lead to the same conclusion. See Wehr-
heim, 905 So. 2d at 1006.
92. See id. at 1006, 1008-10.
93. See id. at 1006.
94. See In re Estate of Ballett, 426 So. 2d 1196, 1199 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983). The
decedent's brother, as sole heir, had standing to challenge the appointment of a personal rep-
resentative nominated in the decedent's will where he challenged the will based upon undue
influence. See id. at 1197-99. His challenge sought to revoke probate of the will and ap-
pointment of the personal representative nominated therein, even though he previously stipu-
lated to admission of the will and the appointment of personal representative, because he had
not expressly waived his right to seek to revoke probate. See id. at 1198.
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to revoke the letters of administration previously issued.95 Whether a contes-
tant has standing to question appointment of the personal representative in a
testate or an intestate estate depends on the facts and circumstances, and the
contestant's ability to prove his or her interest in the decedent's estate.96
Where the personal representative claims to have the best right to serve
under intestacy statutes, any heir may have standing to contest the appoint-
ment.9 7 Statute and case law recognize that natural persons and fiduciaries
may have standing to dispute appointment of a personal representative. A
"trustee of a trust [named a beneficiary under decedent's will] is an interest-
ed person" possessing standing." The contingent beneficiary of a testamen-
tary trust has standing, even if he may never actually receive a financial ben-
efit due to the contingency.1" An attorney named personal representative
and trustee in a decedent's prior will has standing to contest both the validity
of the decedent's later will offered for probate and appointment of the fidu-
ciary named in that later will.'o' A personal representative nominated in a
95. See In re Estate of Watkins, 572 So. 2d 1014, 1015 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (per
curiam).
96. See FLA. STAT. § 731.201(23) (2011); Wehrheim, 905 So. 2d at 1006.
97. See In re Estate of Ballett, 426 So. 2d at 1198-99.
98. See FLA. STAT. § 731.201(23); Wheeler v. Powers, 972 So. 2d 285, 287 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 2008); In re Estate of Ballett, 426 So. 2d at 1199.
99. FLA. STAT. § 731.201(23).
100. In re Estate of Watkins, 572 So. 2d at 1015 (quoting Richardson v. Richardson, 524
So. 2d 1126, 1127 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988)). This case involved a petition to revoke
probate, rather than a contest filed before admission of the will and appointment of the per-
sonal representative. Id. The decedent's will nominated his widow to serve as personal repre-
sentative, and directed that she receive income for her life. Id. On the death of the widow, the
petitioner, the decedent's son, was a beneficiary. Id. The son sought to revoke probate based
on undue influence, and despite his mother's claim to the contrary, the court held that he had
standing as an "interested person." Id.
101. See Wheeler, 972 So. 2d at 286. In that case, the attorney, Wheeler, drafted a will for
the decedent approximately four years prior to her death. Id. The will named Mr. Wheeler to
serve as personal representative of the estate and as a trustee of her trust. Id. The trust was
the beneficiary named in the will. Id. at 286 n.1. The following year, Mr. Wheeler drafted a
codicil disinheriting the testatrix's stepson, naming her spouse personal representative and
naming Mr. Wheeler to serve as alternate personal representative, and a trust amendment
naming Mr. Wheeler as a successor co-trustee of her trust to serve on her death. Id. at 286.
Thereafter, the testatrix went to a different attorney and signed documents revising her will
and trust, eliminating any reference to Mr. Wheeler. Wheeler, 972 So. 2d at 286. Within two
months after signing these documents, the testatix was involuntarily hospitalized and diag-
nosed as suffering from late stage Alzheimer's disease. Id. After the testatrix's death, Mr.
Wheeler contested the appointment of her spouse as personal representative pursuant to her
last signed will based on lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence. Id. at 287. Be-
cause the court clerk failed to honor Mr. Wheeler's caveat, the petition he filed thereafter
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decedent's last will, as well as one nominated in a prior will when the last
signed will is contested has standing.'0 2 This does not mean that all persons
named personal representative in a decedent's prior wills have standing.'03 It
is only where the nominee in a prior will may be appointed if he or she suc-
ceeds in proving a later signed will is invalid that the facts justify a finding of
standing.'O
A beneficiary under a decedent's will has standing to contest the ap-
pointment of a personal representative, either appointed or seeking appoint-
ment, based on a claim that the decedent died intestate.' This is true even if
counsel for the beneficiary files a petition asserting that the beneficiary
seeks, as a beneficiary entitled to a majority of the estate, to designate the
attorney to serve as personal representative.' a If a decedent has no heirs and
his or her estate would escheat in the absence of a valid will, the State of
Florida has standing to contest the will and the appointment of a personal
representative nominated therein. 07
The same person may have standing in one capacity, and lack it in
another capacity.' 8 For example, a beneficiary who is appointed personal
representative under a will generally lacks standing as personal representa-
tive to contest provisions in the will, although he or she may have the right to
contest a will provision as a beneficiary.'09 As soon as a personal representa-
tive contests provisions in the will, he or she is disqualified from continuing
sought revocation of probate. Id. The court held that Mr. Wheeler had standing to contest the
appointment of the personal representative nominated in the later will. Id. at 289.
102. See Wheeler, 972 So. 2d at 288; Engelberg v. Bimbaum, 580 So. 2d 828, 830 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (per curiam).
103. See Wheeler, 972 So. 2d at 288.
104. See id.
105. See Magnolia Manor, Inc. v. Siegel, 866 So. 2d 142, 143 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
2004).
106. See id. After a hearing, the court determined that the decedent's last signed will was
invalid due to incapacity and undue influence. Id. (citing First Union Nat'l Bank v. Estate of
Mizell, 807 So. 2d 78, 79 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001)). Thus, the last signed will did not
revoke an earlier will under which Magnolia Manor, Inc. was named a beneficiary. See id.;
see Estate of Mizell, 807 So. 2d at 80. Because the trial court erroneously determined that the
invalidity of the last signed will caused the decedent to die intestate, the court appointed a
personal representative. See Siegel, 866 So. 2d at 143 (citing Estate of Mizell, 807 So. 2d at
79). Counsel for the beneficiary under the decedent's earlier will was held to have standing,
as representative of the beneficiary, to contest appointment of the personal representative. Id.
107. See Hays v. Ernst, 13 So. 451, 453-54 (Fla. 1893).
108. See In re Estate of Lewis, 411 So. 2d 368, 370-71 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
109. See id. 369-71. In In re Estate of Lewis, the decedent's widow was appointed per-
sonal representative in accordance with the decedent's will. Id. at 369. She then sought to
invalidate a gift set forth in the will to a named beneficiary. Id. at 369-70.
1572011]1
157
: Nova Law Review 36, #1
Published by NSUWorks, 2011
NOVA LAW REVIEW
to serve as personal representative."o This rule may bar a personal repre-
sentative, appointed by virtue of a nomination in a decedent's will admitted
to probate, from contesting the appointment of an eligible co-personal repre-
sentative similarly nominated."' Thus, one nominated personal representa-
tive in a will who wishes to contest the validity of provisions in that will may
be forced to choose between serving as personal representative and forgoing
the contest, or contesting the will provisions and relinquishing the position as
personal representative." 2 An individual who held a decedent's durable
power of attorney and who filed a petition for administration seeking to pro-
bate the decedent's will, but was not a personal representative or estate bene-
ficiary, was held to not be an interested person.113
A person who is not a beneficiary under a decedent's last will, who is
also neither a beneficiary under the decedent's prior will claimed to be valid,
or if no prior valid will exists, the decedent's heir in intestacy, would gener-
ally have no interest in the estate, and thus lacks standing to question ap-
pointment of the personal representative."l4 For example, a court appointed
guardian of a testate decedent who is not named a fiduciary in the will gener-
ally lacks standing in the probate proceeding."' A person who would qualify
as an heir at law had the decedent died intestate will not be an heir where the
decedent's valid last signed will and prior wills disinherited the would-be-
heir, and the disinherited individual cannot establish that the decedent died
110. Id. at 370.
Ill. See In re Estate of Lewis, 411 So. 2d at 370.
112. Seeid.at370.
113. See Galego v. Robinson, 695 So. 2d 443, 444 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997). This
case involved an action to recover for alleged mismanagement of the decedent's assets prior to
death. Id. The holder of the decedent's durable power of attorney claimed he was not an
interested person, and thus could not be served by formal notice. Id. The court agreed, even
though he was nominated personal representative in the decedent's will and actively partici-
pated in the will contest. Id. This case differs from others cited in that the individual in ques-
tion was claiming he lacked standing rather than asserting that he was an interested person
with standing. Compare id., with Hays v. Ernst, 13 So. 451, 453 (Fla. 1893); Magnolia Ma-
nor, Inc. v. Siegel, 866 So. 2d 142, 143 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2004); First Union Nat'l Bank
v. Estate of Mizell, 807 So. 2d 78, 80 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001); In re Estate of Lewis, 411
So. 2d at 370. He was successful in persuading the court that the probate court had not ac-
quired personal jurisdiction over him. See Galego, 695 So. 2d at 444.
114. Wehrheim v. Golden Pond Assisted Living Facility, 905 So. 2d 1002, 1010 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
115. See SunTrust Bank v. Guardianship of Nichols, 701 So. 2d 107, 109-10 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1997). After the decedent's daughter-in-law submitted a will for probate, the
decedent's court appointed guardian located a later will and submitted it to the probate court.
Id. at 109. The guardian's request for attorney's fees for this service was denied on the basis
that he lacked standing, and was a mere "interloper" in probate "because neither the guardian
nor the ward had an interest in the outcome of the estate case." Id. at 109-10.
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intestate. 116 Where a decedent's last will and prior will do not provide for the
heir and "an at least facially valid previous will is before the court, the bur-
den is on the potential heir at law who wishes to contest a will to show that
the previous will which excluded the contestant was invalid or that the doc-
trine of dependent relative revocation did not apply.""' Absent this showing,
the disinherited heir lacks standing."
The same conclusion was reached, that a disinherited heir lacked stand-
ing, even where a literal reading of the decedent's will might have led to a
contrary conclusion." 9 An heir may not institute a contest to challenge the
validity of a will and appointment of the personal representative nominated
therein merely to cause delay, and then attempt to obtain a benefit from the
estate due to that delay.120 A prior will leaving an heir one dollar was recog-
nized as equal to a prior will disinheriting the heir.121
116. See Newman v. Newman ex rel. Estate of Newman, 766 So. 2d 1091, 1093-94 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000); see also Cates v. Fricker, 529 So. 2d 1253, 1254-55 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1988).
117. Cates, 529 So. 2d at 1254-55. In Cates, the decedent's disinherited daughter at-
tempted to contest the validity of his will. Id. at 1254. The testator's last will and two prior
wills disinherited the decedent's daughter. Id. Because she failed to allege or prove that all
earlier wills were also invalid, she was denied standing. Id. at 1254-55. See also Coukos-
Semmel v. Mitchell (In re Estate of Coukos), 947 So. 2d 1290, 1290 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
2007), in which the testator's grandchildren and great-grandchildren were not interested per-
sons and lacked standing, because the testator's last will and presumptively valid prior will
made no provisions for them. In Wehrheim, the testatrix's children contested the validity of
the decedent's last signed will and the appointment of the personal representative named
therein. Wehrheim, 905 So. 2d at 1005. The last signed will left the decedent's estate to the
facility in which the decedent resided. Id. at 1004-05. The decedent's earlier will likewise
named beneficiaries other than the testatrix's children. Id. at 1005. The court agreed that, for
the children to have standing, they needed to prove that all wills were invalid. See id. at 1010.
The decedent's children successfully argued that, if only the gifts in the decedent's last signed
will, rather than the entire will, were invalid due to undue influence, the revocation clause in
that will remained valid. Id. at 1008-10. If these assertions were proved, the result would be
that the decedent died partly testate, but her will failed to dispose of her wealth, and thus
distribution through intestacy was required. Wehrheim, 905 So. 2d at 1008, 1010. Hence, that
court determined the children were interested persons and had standing. Id. at 1010; see
Newman, 766 So. 2d at 1094.
118. See Cates, 529 So. 2d at 1254-55.
119. See Newman, 766 So. 2d at 1094.
120. Id. In Newman, the testator's will left his estate to his surviving spouse and nomi-
nated her as personal representative. Id. at 1092. The will further provided that if the widow
failed to survive distribution of the estate, the decedent's son bom of a prior marriage was to
receive half of the estate. Id. After the testator's death, his son instituted a will contest, alleg-
ing that the testator's signature on the will was a forgery. Id. The will contest continued until
the decedent's widow died. Newman, 766 So. 2d at 1092. The son thereafter claimed en-
titlement to half the estate under the terms of the will he previously opposed. Id. Because the
decedent's son was not a beneficiary of the decedent's last signed will, and was left one dollar
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The appointment of a personal representative may also be questioned in
the Florida ancillary probate of the estate of a non-resident decedent.122 Be-
neficiaries under an earlier will, signed by the decedent prior to his alleged
last will admitted to probate in another state, have standing to contest the
validity of the will and the appointment of a personal representative nomi-
nated therein on substantive grounds, even if the will was signed following
proper procedure.12 3
The first three sections of this article might lead one to conclude that
there is no way to avoid the outcomes dictated by the applicable statutes.
The balance of this article reveals that conclusion to be erroneous.
V. STATUTORY ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS
As noted at the outset, the Florida Probate Code provides that a person
must be eligible to serve as personal representative before a court may ap-
point him or her.124 Several requirements determine eligibility.'2 First, only
adults are eligible to serve.126 Second, a person must be "mentally or physi-
cally [able] to perform the duties" of a personal representative to be eligible
to serve.127 Third, a person convicted of a felony is, according to statute, not
qualified to serve.'28 Fourth, if the person seeking appointment is not a resi-
dent of Florida, the person must bear a certain familial relationship to the
in an earlier will, the validity of which was not questioned, the son lacked standing. Id. at
1094.
121. Id. at 1093.
122. See Baird v. Larson (In re Estate of Swanson), 397 So. 2d 465, 465-66 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1981).
123. Id. at 466. The decedent's will was admitted to probate in Georgia. Id. at 465. The
personal representative nominated in the will was appointed by the court in Georgia. Id. at
465-66. The personal representative commenced ancillary administration in Florida, as the
decedent owned Florida real property. Id. at 465. The beneficiaries under the decedent's
earlier will had standing to object based on allegations that the decedent lacked testamentary
capacity when the later will was signed, and that the decedent was unduly influenced to sign
the will admitted to probate. In re Estate of Swanson, 397 So. 2d at 465-66. The fact that the
will was properly executed did not prevent a contest. Id. at 466.
124. See FLA. STAT. § 733.302 (2011).
125. Id. §§ 733.302-.303.
126. Id. § 733.303(l)(c). An adult for this purpose is anyone who attained age eighteen.
Id.
127. Id. § 733.303(l)(b).
128. FLA. STAT. § 733.303(l)(a). The term felony is defined as "any criminal offense that
is punishable under the laws of this state, or that would be punishable if committed in this
state, by death or imprisonment in a state penitentiary." Id. § 775.08(1).
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decedent to be eligible to serve as personal representative. 129 These require-
ments may not be absolute and are considered separately herein.
The first requirement for qualification, that the nominee be an adult, is
perhaps the most secure. An individual seeking appointment as personal
representative must be age eighteen as of the decedent's death. 30 Where an
individual with priority did not attain the age of eighteen until after the dece-
dent's death and after another person was appointed personal representative,
she did not have the right to either remove the personal representative ap-
pointed or to assume the position on attaining the age of majority.13 '
Where a convicted felon has been granted clemency and his or her civil
rights have been restored, he or she may be appointed personal representative
despite the apparent bar in section 733.303(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes.132 It
would be an unconstitutional infringement on the governor's right to grant
pardons and restore civil rights under article IV, section 8(a) of the Florida
Constitution for the statute to be interpreted as an absolute bar preventing a
convicted felon who received a pardon from serving as a personal representa-
tive.133 When a convicted felon who was pardoned by the governor seeks
appointment, the court may consider his "character, ability, and experience to
act as a personal representative, . . . any conflicting interests, . .. [and] 'the
circumstances surrounding his prior conviction"' to determine if it is appro-
priate to appoint him.'34 Section 733.304 of the Florida Statutes states that
129. Id. § 733.304.
130. Id. § 733.303.
131. Gilmore v. Ragans (In re Estate of Fisher), 503 So. 2d 962, 963-64 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1987). In that case, a young adult died intestate and his mother was appointed personal
representative of his estate. Id. at 963. During the decedent's life he fathered a child. Id.
Both the decedent's child and the child's mother were under age eighteen as of the decedent's
death. Id. Two months after the decedent's death, his child's mother attained age eighteen.
Id. She then sought to remove the decedent's mother as personal representative of the estate
and sought her own appointment. In re Estate of Fisher, 503 So. 2d at 963. Because the
decedent's girlfriend had not attained the age of eighteen as of his death, she was unsuccess-
ful. Id. at 964.
132. Padgett v. Estate of Gilbert, 676 So. 2d 440, 443 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996); see
also FLA. STAT. § 733.303(1)(a). In that case, a child died intestate. See Padgett, 676 So. 2d
at 442. Both her mother and her father sought appointment as personal representative of her
estate. Id. Her father was a convicted felon who had been granted clemency by the governor.
Id.
133. Id. at 442-43; see also FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 8(a); FLA. STAT. § 733.303(1)(a).
134. Padgett, 676 So. 2d at 443-44 (quoting G.W. Liquors of Collier, Inc. v. Dep't of Bus.
Regulation, 556 So. 2d 464, 465 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (per curiam). "[T]he legisla-
ture, by statute, may neither preempt nor overrule the clemency rules without violating the
separation of powers doctrine expressly set forth in the [Florida] Constitution." 15B FLA. JUR.
2D Criminal Law-Procedure § 2942 (2009).
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only certain individuals may qualify as personal representatives when they
reside outside of Florida.135 The eligible persons include a person who is:
1) [a] legally adopted child or adoptive parent of the decedent; 2)
[rielated by lineal consanguinity to the decedent; 3) [a] spouse or a
brother, sister, uncle, aunt, nephew, or niece of the decedent, or
someone related by lineal consanguinity to any such person; or 4)
[t]he spouse of a person otherwise qualified under this section.136
The validity, meaning, and application of these provisions have been ques-
tioned.'37 The wills of Florida domiciliaries at times name ineligible persons
to fiduciary positions. 138 Because those persons frequently desire to serve,
there is objection to enforcement of the statute.139
Even if the statute is constitutional, disputes exist about whether the
phrase 'or someone related by lineal consanguinity to any such person"'.
refers only to the decedent's blood relatives referenced in the statute (broth-
er, sister, etc.) and to the decedent's surviving spouse, or whether it also au-
thorizes a person related by lineal consanguinity to a decedent's predeceased
spouse to serve.14 0 Further, when and how an objection to a disqualified per-
son need be asserted merits investigation. The recent answer from the Su-
preme Court of Florida about when and how to object may create an avenue
for appointments of unqualified persons.
There is authority for the proposition that a person related by blood to
the decedent's predeceased spouse, rather than to the decedent, is not eligible
to serve as a personal representative of the decedent's estate, despite his or
her nomination in the decedent's will, where the nominee is not a Florida
resident. 4' Where a woman died testate and her will nominated her former
spouse's nephew-a non-Florida resident-as co-personal representative, he
had no right to serve.'42 As he had been appointed based on his erroneous
representation to the court that he was eligible, having informed the court
that he was the decedent's nephew, his removal was warranted.143 The fact
135. FLA. STAT. § 733.304.
136. Id.
137. E.g., In re Estate of Greenberg, 390 So. 2d 40, 42 (Fla. 1980).
138. E.g., id.
139. E.g., id.; see also Fain ex rel. Estate of Fain v. Hall, 463 F. Supp. 661, 665-66 (M.D.
Fla. 1979).
140. E.g., Angelus v. Pass, 868 So. 2d 571, 572 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting
FLA. STAT. § 733.304(3)).
141. E.g., id. at 573.
142. Id. at 572-73.
143. Id. The petitioner failed to inform the court that he was not the decedent's blood
relative but was merely a relative by marriage. Id. at 572.
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that there was no objection to him serving "filed within the three month time
period" specified in section 733.212(3) of the Florida Statutes did not alter
the outcome.'" The court recognized that to rule otherwise would render
Florida Probate Rule 5.310, which requires notice when a personal repre-
sentative is or becomes ineligible to serve, a nullity.14 5 Angelus v. Pass'4
and other precedent" recognized that the court had an implicit obligation to
assure that the statute was complied with, despite the actions of the parties in
the case.'48 Absent an objection to a petitioner's lack of qualification, the
court still would not appoint a personal representative ineligible under sec-
tion 733.304 of the Florida Statutes.149
Today, in addition to Florida Probate Rule 5.3 10,150 section 733.3101 of
the Florida Statutes requires a personal representative to promptly file and
serve a notice any time he or she knows or should know that he or she is no
longer qualified to serve as personal representative."' Absent adherence to
the rule, statute, and decision in Angelus, the interested parties in an estate
could easily conspire to have an unqualified individual appointed personal
representative. 152 Such action may now be possible.'
In Hill v. Davis (Hill II),154 a Florida resident died testate, and the will
nominated the decedent's step-son, a New York resident, as personal repre-
sentative.'55 When he sought appointment, he clearly and accurately dis-
closed his relationship to the decedent to the court and other persons interest-
ed in the estate.15 6 The decedent's husband (the step-son's father) died be-
fore the decedent, and thus was claimed to not be the decedent's spouse at
her death.' The decedent's mother sought to remove the step-son as per-
sonal representative of her daughter's estate.'58  However, despite being
served with a Notice of Administration, she did not file the motion within
144. Angelus, 868 So. 2d at 572.
145. Id. at 572-73.
146. 868 So. 2d 571 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
147. See In re Estate of Greenberg, 390 So. 2d 40, 42 (Fla. 1980).
148. See Angelus, 868 So. 2d at 573 (citing In re Estate of Greenberg, 390 So. 2d at 42).
149. See id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 733.304 (2011).
150. FLA. PROB. R. 5.3 10.
151. FLA. STAT. § 733.3101 (2011). See id., enacted before Angelus was decided.
152. See id.; FLA. PROB. R. 5.3 10; Hill II, 70 So. 3d 572, 574 (Fla. 2011); Angelus, 868 So.
2d at 573.
153. See Hill II, 70 So. 3d at 578.
154. 70 So. 3d 572 (Fla. 2011).
155. Id. at 574.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 575.
158. Id. at 574-75.
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three months after service was accomplished.'"9 The trial court denied the
motion, finding that the son of the decedent's predeceased spouse was quali-
fied to serve under the statute and that the objection was barred due to un-
timely filing, and the decedent's mother appealed." The district court of
appeal affirmed and certified a conflict with Angelus.'6 ' The district court of
appeal declined to address whether the step-son was qualified to serve under
section 733.304(3) of the Florida Statutes on the basis that he was related by
lineal consanguinity to the decedent's spouse and that the statute did not ex-
pressly require decedent's spouse to be living.162 Instead, the court decided
that the step-son was entitled to retain his position as personal representative,
solely due to the absence of a timely objection.'63 The court's stated aim was
to give effect to all the words in section 733.212(3) of the Florida Statutes,
requiring objections to qualifications of a personal representative not filed
within three months after service of the Notice of Administration to be "for-
ever barred."'6
The Supreme Court of Florida approved the district court's decision. 6 1
It too did not rule on the merits of the underlying dispute about whether a
159. Hill II, 70 So. 3d at 574 n.3. In Hill II, the decedent's mother contested the validity
of the will appointing the personal representative. Id. Perhaps because that contest was pend-
ing, she did not timely file a specific objection to the appointment of the personal representa-
tive under the will. See id. at 574 n.3. The will contest was ultimately unsuccessful. Id. at
578.
160. Id. at 575; see FLA. STAT. § 733.304(3) (2011).
161. Hill 1, 31 So. 3d 921, 924 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2010), affd, 70 So. 3d 572 (Fla.
2011).
162. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 733.304(3).
163. Hill I, 31 So. 3d at 924.
164. Id. at 923.
165. Hill II, 70 So. 3d at 574. In Hill II, several questions faced the court. See id. at 576.
One was whether the court should decline to exercise jurisdiction despite the district court's
certification of a conflict with Angelus on the basis that the cases were not in conflict. Id. at
573. The argument favoring the court's exercise of jurisdiction was that in both Angelus and
Hill I, a person not related to the decedent by lineal consanguinity, but related to the dece-
dent's predeceased spouse by lineal consanguinity, was appointed personal representative of
the Florida decedents' estates. Id. at 576; Angelus v. Pass, 868 So. 2d 571, 572 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 2004). In both cases, the objection to the unqualified personal representative serving
was filed after the time to object to the appointment of the personal representative expired.
Hill II, 70 So. 3d at 575; Angelus, 868 So. 2d at 572. Whereas the court in Angelus relied on
FLA. STAT. § 733.304(3) and the policy behind the statute, the court in Hill I placed greater
reliance on FLA. STAT. § 733.212(3). Hill 1, 31 So. 3d at 923-24; Angelus, 868 So. 2d at 573.
It was thus argued that the factual similarity in the cases and the different interpretation and
application of the law in the two cases warranted the exercise of jurisdiction by the Supreme
Court of Florida to resolve the issue. See Hill II, 70 So. 3d at 576-77.
In opposition to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Supreme Court of Florida, the
argument was advanced that the cases were factually distinguishable and consistent with each
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relative of a Florida decedent's predeceased spouse is eligible to serve as a
personal representative of a Florida decedent's estate, when that relative by
marriage is not a Florida resident although he or she is nominated to serve in
the decedent's will.166 Instead, the sole issue addressed by the court was
"whether an objection to the qualifications of a personal representative of an
estate is barred by the three-month filing deadline set forth in section
733.212(3) [of the Florida Statutes in 2007] . . . when the objection is not
filed within that statutory time frame." 6 7 The question was answered in the
affirmative.168 Exceptions to this general rule exist "where fraud, misrepre-
sentation, or misconduct with regard to the qualifications is not apparent on
the face of the petition or discovered within the statutory time frame." 69
Because the personal representative in Hill II accurately disclosed his rela-
tionship to the decedent in his Petition for Administration, the exception did
not apply to bar him from serving or continuing to serve as personal repre-
sentative.170 The court declined to follow Angelus to the extent of its holding
that section 733.212(3) of the Florida Statutes did not bar an untimely objec-
tion to the qualifications of a personal representative."' Instead, to give
other, and thus there was no irreconcilable conflict. See id. at 576. Emphasis was placed on
the fact that in Angelus the personal representative stated under oath that he was the dece-
dent's nephew, without disclosing that he was actually the decedent's spouse's nephew and
was not related to the decedent by lineal sanguinity. See id.; Angelus, 868 So. 2d at 572. The
implication was that in Angelus the interested parties were unaware of the facts supporting the
personal representative's lack of eligibility to serve. See Angelus, 868 So. 2d at 572. In con-
trast, in Hill 1, the exact nature of the personal representative's family relationship to the dece-
dent was disclosed and known to the objecting party from the outset of probate. Hill 1, 31 So.
3d at 922. Hence, the cases were distinguished as Angelus applies only when an unqualified
personal representative procures his appointment by concealing his true relationship to the
decedent, whereas Hill II applies when the true relationship was known to the court and inter-
ested parties. See Hill II, 70 So. 3d at 577-78. In the former case, the three-month deadline in
FLA. STAT. § 733.212(3) would not bar a late petition to remove the personal representative,
whereas in the latter case it would. See Hill II, 70 So. 3d at 578. Florida law imposes the
burden of proving eligibility on the person seeking appointment. See, e.g., Lander v. Busch
(In re Estate of Chadwick), 309 So. 2d 587, 588 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
While the court exercised jurisdiction in Hill II based on the similarities between the
cases, adopting the former argument, it ultimately ruled based on the latter argument, due to
the factual distinctions between the cases. Hill II, 70 So. 3d at 578.
166. See id. at 573-74; Hill I, 31 So. 3d at 924; see also FLA. STAT. § 733.304(3).
167. Hill 11,70 So. 3d at 573 (citing FLA. STAT. § 733.212(3)).
168. Id. at 578.
169. Id. at 573-74.
170. Id. at 578 (citing FLA. STAT. § 733.212(3)). The court distinguished Angelus on the
basis that Angelus involved a situation in which the requisite disclosure of the lack of blood
relationship between the personal representative and the decedent was not made. Id.; see also
Angelus, 868 So. 2d at 572-73.
171. Hill II, 70 So. 3d at 577-78 (citing FLA. STAT. § 733.212(3)).
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meaning to the time limit in section 733.212(3) of the Florida Statutes re-
quiring objections to the appointment of a personal representative to be filed
within three months, at least where the basis for any objection due to lack of
qualifications is known within that time, the court barred an untimely-filed
objection.17 2 Absent such a ruling, the court feared it would have been im-
properly creating an exception to section 733.212(3) of the Florida Statutes
not authorized by the legislature.17 3
One outcome of the court's decision in Hill II may be the judicial crea-
tion of an exception to section 733.304 of the Florida Statutes not authorized
by the legislature.174 A correct interpretation may now be that the statute
bars persons living outside of Florida, and not having the requisite relation-
ship to the decedent, from serving as personal representative of a Florida
decedent's estate, unless they disclose their lack of eligibility, and no one
objects in a timely fashion.'7 1 In light of the court's decision in Hill II, there
would appear to be little impediment to all interested parties in an estate con-
senting to the appointment of a disqualified person as personal representative
by failing to file objections.'76 As long as full disclosure of the facts causing
the nominated personal representative to be ineligible to serve are disclosed
in the petition, both to the court and to all interested parties once the deadline
to object to the disqualified person's appointment expired, the parties would
have successfully circumvented the Florida statutory requirement.'77  One
questions whether that is what the legislature had in mind in drafting the qua-
lifications provisions of the statute, and the effect of the decision in Hill II on
section 733.3101 of the Florida Statutes.78
Previously, Florida courts have strictly construed the statutory provi-
sions limiting the class of nonresidents eligible to serve as a personal repre-
sentative of a Florida decedent's estate.179 A grand-nephew of the dece-
172. Id. at 578 (citing FLA. STAT. § 733.212(3)).
173. Id. at 577-78 (citing FLA. STAT. § 733.212(3)); see Angelus, 868 So. 2d at 573 (citing
FLA. STAT. § 733.212(3)). While both Angelus and Hill II involved personal representatives
related to the decedent's predeceased spouse, the same reasoning might apply to a decedent's
attorney, accountant, friend, or advisor residing outside Florida. See Hill II, 70 So. 3d at 574;
Angelus, 868 So. 2d at 572. Unless the circuit court will, on its own initiative, scrutinize
petitions for administration, inquire into the relationship of the nominee and the decedent, and
prevent appointment of ineligible persons despite the absence of an objection from an interest-
ed party, conspiratorial appointment of unqualified personal representatives is possible. See
Hill II, 70 So. 3d at 576-78.
174. Id. at 576-77.
175. See id. at 576-78.
176. See id. at 577.
177. See id. at 576-78.
178. See Hill II, 70 So. 3d at 576, 578.
179. Angelus v. Pass, 868 So. 2d 571, 572-73 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
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dent-the decedent's sister's grandson-who resided outside of Florida was
not qualified to serve as personal representative.'8" The term "nephew" in
the statute was held not to include a "grand-nephew."'"' Since the grand-
nephew was not related to the decedent by lineal consanguinity he was in-
eligible to serve, and was removed on the request of a creditor of the es-
tate.'82 Similarly, a nephew of the decedent's predeceased wife was ineligi-
ble to serve as personal representative of the decedent's estate.' The court
again stated that the term "nephew" includes only the decedent's blood rela-
tives.'
Historically, in at least one case, the Supreme Court of Florida recog-
nized that an unqualified person should not be removed as personal repre-
sentative, despite the fact that he was never eligible to serve, when estate
administration was nearly concluded at the time his removal was sought, no
other improprieties in estate administration were asserted, and the person
seeking his removal both had no interest in the estate and had accepted com-
pensation from the personal representative for assisting him.'
The State of Florida undoubtedly has an interest in assuring that person-
al representatives of deceased Florida residents' estates attend to their as-
signed tasks and administer estates promptly and efficiently. 8 6 The histori-
cal justification for limiting who may serve is amply documented.'18  Yet, at
least one Florida court, in upholding literal application of the statute, noted
"that the rationale behind the rather expansive statutory scheme of excep-
tions set out in section 733.304 is difficult to comprehend."8
Hill II addressed only a situation involving appointment of a personal
representative.189 Removal of a personal representative, governed by sepa-
rate statutes, was not a focus of the court's opinion.' 90 Removal of a personal
representative is justified when a personal representative moves outside the
180. In re Estate of Chadwick, 309 So. 2d 587, 588 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
181. Id. (interpreting FLA. STAT. § 732.47(1) (1973)).
182. Id.
183. In re Estate of Angeleri, 575 So. 2d 794, 794-95 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
184. Id. at 794.
185. Rosenbaum v. Spitler (In re Sherman's Estate), I So. 2d 727, 729 (Fla. 1941). The
party seeking removal of the personal representative in that case was the alternate personal
representative nominated in the decedent's will. Id. at 728. This case was not relied on in Hill
II. See Hill II, 70 So. 3d 572, 573-78 (Fla. 2011).
186. David T. Smith, The Potential Personal Representative: Ready, Willing, but Perhaps
Unable to Act in Florida, 48 FLA. L. REv. 675, 689 (1996).
187. See, e.g., In re Estate of Greenberg, 390 So. 2d 40, 42-46 (Fla. 1980); Smith, supra
note 186, at 675-89.
188. In re Estate ofAngeleri, 575 So. 2d at 795.
189. Hill II, 70 So. 3d at 573.
190. See id. at 574 n.1.
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state and thus is no longer qualified to serve,"' or during the probate, at any
time he or she would not be entitled to appointment.'92 The statute does not
mandate or require removal in these situations, but instead states that a per-
sonal representative may be removed. 193
In addition to the possibility that all interested parties may now secure
appointment of an unqualified personal representative in Florida, it is at
times possible to probate a testate Florida decedent's estate elsewhere and
thus to have the personal representative nominated in the decedent's will
appointed, despite her ineligibility to serve in Florida.1 94 This opportunity
may exist because other states view Florida's statutory restrictions prevent-
ing many non-residents from serving as personal representative as discrimi-
natory.' 9 One such state is New York.' 96
191. FLA. STAT. § 733.504(11) (2011).
192. Id. § 733.504(12).
193. Id. § 733.504.
194. See In re Estate of Siegel, 373 N.Y.S.2d 812, 814 (Sur. Ct. Erie Cnty. 1975).
195. See id. But see Estate of Nevai, 788 N.Y.S.2d 843, 844-45 (Sur. Ct. Westchester
Cnty. 2005). In Estate of Nevai, the testator was a resident of Florida at her death. Id. The
vast majority ($28,000,000) of her considerable wealth ($38,000,000), including New York
real estate, was located in New York State. Id. Florida counsel drafted the decedent's will.
Id. However, the will was signed and witnessed in New York, and nearly thirty percent of the
beneficiaries named in the will, including two charities, were in New York. Id. Four fiducia-
ries were named in the will to serve as personal representative, only two of whom would
qualify in Florida. Estate of Nevai, 788 N.Y.S.2d at 844. By the time the two ineligible no-
minees sought to institute probate administration in New York, a probate proceeding and
litigation about the estate were already pending in Florida. Id. The two nominees in the will
eligible to serve as personal representatives in Florida had been appointed curators by the
Florida court, rather than personal representatives. Id. In Estate of Nevai, the court declined
to commence original probate in New York, merely due to the inability of two nominees in the
decedent's will to qualify as fiduciaries in Florida. Id. at 845. The court set forth the test to
be applied to permit original probate under section 1605 subdivision 2(c) of the New York
Surrogate's Court Procedure Act as follows:
In determining whether to accept an application for original probate of a will of a non-
domiciliary which has not yet been admitted to probate in the decedent's domicile, this court
should examine the nature of New York's contacts with the decedent and his/her estate, includ-
ing: (i) the location of decedent's assets; (ii) the residence of the nominated fiduciaries and
beneficiaries; (iii) the expense of proving the will in the decedent's domicile; (iv) the dece-
dent's request, if any, for New York probate, and (v) the good faith of the proponents. The
court should also consider what weight should be given to the fact that the decedent's domicile
has already assumed jurisdiction over the decedent's estate.
Id. (citations omitted); N.Y. SuRR. CT. PROC. ACT § 1605(2)(c) (McKinney 1995 & Supp.
2011). Considering these factors the court found that the two persons selected by the testator
were eligible to serve as personal representatives in Florida, probate litigation was already
instituted in Florida, it would be prejudicial to compel interested parties to litigate in both
Florida and New York and inconsistent outcomes might result, and petitioners did not assert
how they would be unable to defend the will in Florida. Estate of Nevai, 788 N.Y.S.2d at 845.
These findings justified the court's decision not to permit original probate in New York. Id.
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New York law allows the original probate of a non-resident decedent's
estate where no probate administration is pending in the state of the dece-
dent's domicile. 1 97  Even if a Florida probate proceeding is pending for a
deceased Florida resident's estate, New York law authorizes original probate
in New York Surrogate's Court in three situations.' The statute provides:
2. A will which has been admitted to probate or established in the
testator's domicile shall not thereafter be admitted to original pro-
bate in this state except:
(a) in a case where the court is satisfied that ancillary probate
would be unduly expensive, inconvenient or impossible under the
circumstances,
See also In re Estate of Harrison, 366 N.Y.S.2d 755, 756-57 (Sur. Ct. Bronx Cnty. 1974),
wherein the Surrogate stated:
At best, the Florida statute is inequitable. It is the opinion of this court that the residency
restrictions it places upon its citizens in naming executors is not only inequitable but is offen-
sive to the spirit and letter of the U.S. Constitution.
The understandable desire of the State of Florida to promote its economy by insuring the
maximum of business for both its banking institutions and attorneys should not be enhanced by
interference with the right of new residents who migrate to seek the benefit of its gentle cli-
mate to select the executors of their choice. It is hoped that Legislative wisdom will correct
this unfortunate restriction without the necessity for some estate to assume the burden of a
search for judicial relief that may extend from the courts of Florida into our Federal system.
Id.
196. E.g., id. at 756.
197. N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 1605(l); see, e.g., In re Estate of Siegel, 373 N.Y.S.2d at
814. In this case, the testator's will named as fiduciary a New York bank which could not
qualify as personal representative in Florida. Id. The decedent's widow caused the will to be
admitted to probate in Florida and secured her appointment as personal representative. Id. at
813. Thereafter, to give effect to the decedent's wishes, she sought and obtained probate of
the non-domiciliary testator's estate in New York. Id. at 814. The case did not reflect that
ancillary administration was otherwise required. See id.; Estate of Brown, 436 N.Y.S.2d 132,
132-33 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1981). The decedent, a Florida resident, previously lived in New
York. Estate of Brown, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 132. When she was a New York resident, she signed
a will in New York drafted by a New York attorney. Id. The New York attorney was nomi-
nated personal representative in the will and was not related to the decedent Id. At her death,
half of the testator's wealth was in New York, and she was buried in New York. Id. "[N]o
probate proceeding [was] commenced in Florida." Id. at 133. The attorney successfully
sought original probate in New York, solely on the basis that he would be ineligible to serve
as personal representative in Florida. See Estate of Brown, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 133. Alleged
discrimination under Florida law against non-domiciliary personal representatives was also a
factor in In re Estate of Gadway, where the primary dispute was about the decedent's domi-
cile. In re Estate of Gadway, 510 N.Y.S.2d 737, 739 (App. Div. 1987).
198. N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 1605(2).
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(b) where the testator has directed in such will that it shall be of-
fered for a probate in this state or
(c) where the laws of testator's domicile discriminate against do-
miciliaries of New York either as a beneficiary or a fiduciary.199
Where Florida statutes deny the nominee in a testator's will the right to
serve as personal representative because the nominee is a New York resident,
the New York Surrogate has considerable discretion" under the statute to
allow probate and estate administration to occur in New York to effectuate
testator's wishes.20 1
Different standards are applied by the New York courts to determine
whether original probate administration should be allowed in New York de-
pending on whether estate administration is or is not pending in the state of
decedent's domicile or elsewhere.202 The New York courts are more recep-
tive to original probate of a nonresident's estate when administration is not
pending elsewhere. 203 This should not cause a rush to the court in New York,
as filing there before filing elsewhere does not guaranty a favorable outcome.
If after a petition is filed in New York, probate is commenced in the state of
the decedent's domicile, the New York courts will consider that fact in de-
termining whether to permit original probate in New York.2 04
A prerequisite to the original probate of a non-resident's estate in New
York is that there be assets owned by the decedent within New York.205 This
requirement may not be difficult to satisfy. At least one case held that when
the only asset in New York was intangible personal property owned solely
by the decedent and brought into the jurisdiction after the decedent's death,
199. Id.
200. See Estate of Nevai, 788 N.Y.S.2d at 845.
201. See Wolfe v. Groswald (In re Goldstein's Will), 310 N.Y.S.2d 602, 603 (App. Div.
1970) (per curiam). After a Florida resident died, her will was offered for probate in New
York. See id. The decedent's will was drafted and signed in New York, the drafting attorney
was in New York, as were the decedent's assets, and the majority of beneficiaries resided in
New York. Id. The fiduciaries nominated in the will would have been ineligible to serve in
Florida due to the residency and family relation requirements. See id. As a consequence, an
objection to probate in New York and the jurisdiction of the New York court was denied. Id.
At the time of the court's ruling, no probate had been commenced in Florida. See In re
Goldstein's Will, 310 N.Y.S.2d at 603.
202. In re Estate of Baer, 849 N.Y.S.2d 143, 145-46 (App. Div. 2007).
203. See id. at 146.
204. See id. After proceedings were filed in New York, probate was commenced in Ver-
mont, the state of the decedent's domicile at death. Id. at 145-46.
205. Id. at 145.
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the requirement was met.206 As long as estate administration in New York is
not sought for fraudulent purposes, the New York Surrogate's Court may
exercise jurisdiction where property is brought to New York for the purpose
of conferring jurisdiction.20 7
Assuming a decedent owned wealth in New York and no estate admin-
istration is pending elsewhere, various factors are to be taken into account by
a surrogate to determine whether original probate of a non-resident's estate is
appropriate based on the decedent's contacts with New York State.208 These
factors include: "'i) the location of decedent's assets; ii) the residence of the
nominated fiduciaries and beneficiaries; iii) the expense of proving the will
in the decedent's domicile; iv) the decedent's request, if any, for New York
probate; and v) the good faith of the proponents."' 209
In evaluating where a decedent's assets are located, the New York court
focuses on probate property.21 o Where a decedent's only potential probate
property in New York consisted of intangible personal property constituting
twenty-three percent of the estate, the state of the decedent's domicile did not
discriminate against New York domiciliaries as personal representatives or
beneficiaries, the executor nominated in the will and one of three beneficia-
ries lived in New York, and there was no indication that New York probate
206. Will of Nelson, 475 N.Y.S.2d 194, 196-97 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1984). At the dece-
dent's death, he lived in Pennsylvania. Id. at 195. There was no indication that he owned
anything of value in New York on that date. See id. After the testator's death, one executor
nominated in his will brought stock, owned by the decedent in a closely held Delaware corpo-
ration, into New York. Id. at 196. The stock was the estate's primary asset. Id. Of relevance
were the facts that the decedent and his estranged spouse had entered into a separation agree-
ment in New York conferring jurisdiction on the New York courts in the event of a dispute
about the agreement, that the decedent commenced an action for divorce in New York court,
that the divorce action remained pending at the decedent's death, and that his widow contested
the validity of the separation agreement. Will of Nelson, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 196.
207. Id. at 196-97.
208. In re Estate of Baer, 849 N.Y.S.2d at 145-46 (quoting Estate of Nevai, 788 N.Y.S.2d
843, 845 (Sur. Ct. Westchester Cnty. 2005)).
209. Id. at 146 (quoting Estate of Nevai, 788 N.Y.S.2d at 845).
210. See id. Assets in New York trusts created by someone other than the decedent, where
the decedent had and exercised a power of appointment in favor of trusts the decedent created,
did not constitute New York probate property for this purpose. Id. A life insurance policy in
New York owned by the decedent on which the named beneficiary survived was also recog-
nized as not constituting probate property and thus not influencing a decision about whether
original probate in New York was appropriate. Estate of Brunner, 339 N.Y.S.2d 506, 509
(Sur. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1973).
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would save costs, the court declined to allow original New York probate
although the will was drafted and signed in New York.21 1
When no probate is instituted in Florida, the decedent owned assets in
New York, and the personal representative nominated in the decedent's will
would not qualify under section 733.304 of the Florida Statutes, original
probate of a Florida decedent's estate in New York may be granted.2 12 For
example, where a deceased Florida resident was buried in New York, her
will was drafted and signed in New York years earlier when she was a New
York resident, half of her wealth was in New York at her death, and her will
named her New York attorney (not a relative) as personal representative,
original probate in New York was permitted on the basis that Florida would
not have allowed counsel to be appointed.213 Similarly, New York original
probate was permitted over an objection, where a deceased Florida resident's
assets were in New York, her will was drafted and signed in New York and
stated that the testatrix was a New York resident, the vast majority of benefi-
ciaries resided in or near New York, no Florida probate was commenced, and
the personal representative named in the will would not qualify in Florida. 214
211. In re Estate of Baer, 849 N.Y.S.2d at 146-47. The decedent in that case was domi-
ciled in Vermont at death. Id. at 145. Her will did not include a request that estate adminis-
tration occur in New York. Id. at 146.
212. Estate of Brown, 436 N.Y.S.2d 132, 132-33 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1981).
213. Id. The opinion reflects no objection to original probate in New York by an interest-
ed party. See id.
214. In re Goldstein's Will, 310 N.Y.S.2d 602, 603 (App. Div. 1970) (per curiam); see
also In re Estate of Harrison, 366 N.Y.S.2d 755, 755-56 (Sur. Ct. Bronx Cnty. 1974). In In re
Estate of Harrison, original probate of the Florida decedent's estate was not sought. Id. at
756. However, the surrogate opined that based on the facts, he would have granted it, had it
been sought. Id. The decedent moved from New York to Florida, leaving most of her wealth
in New York. Id. at 755. Her will named her spouse, her attorney, and her accountant as co-
executors. Id. at 755-56. The attorney and accountant were ineligible to serve under Florida
law. In re Estate of Harrison, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 756. The surrogate explained his disagree-
ment with Florida law, stating:
It appears that decedent's relationship with both her attorney and her accountant was one of
long standing and represented the type of trusted relationship upon which people normally
seek to depend for the administration of their estates. The duties of an executor do not involve
the practice of any profession that is ordinarily subject to state licensing provisions. It is a per-
sonal responsibility which individuals confer on those they trust without regard to any fixed
professional training. The only disqualification to serve as executors under the Florida statute
imposed upon the attorney and the accountant is their lack of residence in that State, coupled
with their lack of required blood relationship to the decedent. The injustice of this restriction
to executors who are neither related to a decedent or residents of Florida is exceeded by the in-
equitable restriction it imposes upon residents of Florida. The right to choose one's own ex-
ecutors represents a fundamental property right of a competent adult having testamentary ca-
pacity. There is no logical basis for imposing upon a party seeking to become a resident of the
State of Florida a forfeiture of their freedom of choice in naming an executor as a pre-
condition to residence.
Id.
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Original probate of a non-domiciliary's estate in New York was allowed,
over the objections of the decedent's widow, when the decedent's will refe-
renced New York laws, litigation involving the decedent was pending in
New York at his death, one of two executors nominated in the will lived in
New York, three of the four attesting witnesses resided in New York, and
everyone other than the decedent's estranged wife desired that administration
occur in New York.2 15 Similarly, original probate of a non-resident's estate
in New York was permitted where ninety percent of the probate assets were
in New York, the decedent's will was executed in New York, the will di-
rected that administration occur in New York and that New York law apply,
two of the three attesting witnesses were New York residents, as was the
attorney who drafted the will and was named an executor, and no probate
proceeding was pending elsewhere.2 16 In part this decision reflected the sur-
rogate's determination that, regardless of where decedent was domiciled, it
would be overly expensive for the parties if the New York court declined
jurisdiction.217
In contrast, where the decedent's will was already admitted to probate
in the jurisdiction of the testator's domicile before original New York pro-
bate is sought, the general rule is that New York original probate will be de-
nied.218 It is in this situation that the New York statute creates the three ex-
ceptions noted previously.219 New York courts will also deny probate "if a
court in the testator's domicile has denied probate for a reason which would
215. Will of Nelson, 475 N.Y.S.2d 194, 196-97 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1984). In that case
there was no indication that estate administration was commenced in Pennsylvania, the state
of decedent's domicile. See id. at 195-96.
216. In re Estate of Vischer, 280 N.Y.S.2d 49, 51 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1967). The dece-
dent in that case resided in New Hampshire at his death, according to his widow who resided
in Vermont. Id. The widow commenced probate in New York in accordance with decedent's
will, despite his ownership of real estate in Vermont and Switzerland. See id. The decedent's
daughter resided in Spain, and objected to estate administration in New York as she claimed
decedent was domiciled in Switzerland. Id.
217. See id. at 52. The court was not persuaded by arguments of the decedent's daughter
that a treaty prevented the New York court from exercising jurisdiction. In re Estate of Visch-
er, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 53-54.
218. Estate of Nevai, 788 N.Y.S.2d 843, 844 (Sur. Ct. Westchester Cnty. 2005). In that
situation, ancillary administration in New York is appropriate if the decedent owned real
property in New York State. Id.
219. N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 1605(2) (McKinney 1995 & Supp. 2011). The statute
authorizes a New York original probate, rather than merely ancillary administration, if the
New York court determines ancillary administration "would be unduly expensive, inconve-
nient or impossible" or the testator's will directs that estate administration occur in New York,
or "the laws of [the] testator's domicile discriminate against" New York domiciliaries as fidu-
ciaries, beneficiaries, or both. Id.
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also constitute grounds to deny probate in New York." 22 0 It is more difficult
to convince a New York surrogate to allow original probate in New York
when a proceeding was instituted and remains pending in the state of the
decedent's domicile, particularly where an interested party objects to original
probate in New York.22 1
Although a Florida resident died while in New York, the vast majority
of her wealth was in New York,222 her will was signed in New York, the de-
cedent was buried in New York, the attesting witnesses were in New York,
thirty percent of the beneficiaries under the will (including two charities)
were in New York, one of four nominated executors lived in New York, and
two of the nominated executors would not qualify in Florida, the New York
court declined to exercise its discretion to permit original probate in New
York.223 In reaching its decision, the court was influenced by the fact that
Florida counsel drafted the will, the will did not direct probate administration
in New York, two of the four persons nominated personal representative
would qualify in Florida,224 probate had already been commenced in Florida,
and a will contest was being litigated there.225 Because the will had not yet
been admitted to probate in New York, the court declined to rely on Florida's
discrimination against non-resident personal representatives as a basis for
original New York probate.226 Recognizing that half of a decedent's nomi-
nees were eligible to serve as personal representatives, that original probate
in New York could require the parties to litigate the same will contest in two
jurisdictions with the possibility of inconsistent results, and having no evi-
220. Estate of Nevai, 788 N.Y.S.2d at 845; N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 1605(3). Exam-
ples of application of this provision are where a will is not properly executed, where a will
was the product of fraud or undue influence, or where a testator lacked testamentary capacity
when the will was signed. See FLA. STAT. §§ 732.501-02, .5165 (2011).
221. See Estate of Nevai, 788 N.Y.S.2d at 845.
222. Id. at 844. Of decedent's $38,000,000.00 estate, $29,500,000.00 in assets, including
real estate, were in New York. Id.
223. Id. at 844-45.
224. Id. at 844. The nominees included the decedent's son, an Arizona resident; the dece-
dent's accountant, a Florida resident; the decedent's niece by marriage, a New York resident;
and the niece's son, a New Hampshire resident. Estate of Nevai, 788 N.Y.S.2d at 844. The
niece and her son, who would not be eligible to serve as personal representatives in Florida,
filed the petition seeking New York original probate. Id.
225. Id. at 845. In Florida, the decedent's son and accountant were appointed curators due
to the institution of a will contest by the decedent's grandson. Id. at 844. The grandson con-
tested the validity of will provisions benefiting the decedent's niece and her son who sought
original probate in New York. Id.
226. Estate of Nevai, 788 N.Y.S.2d at 845.
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dence that petitioners would otherwise be injured by original estate adminis-
tration in Florida, the New York court denied relief.227
Similarly, the New York court declined to allow original probate there
despite the request of two individuals, who were not beneficiaries, when a
decedent's widow objected.228 The decedent was a U.S. citizen residing in
France at his death. He was survived by his widow and minor child, who
likewise lived in France.230 The decedent's will was signed in New York,
stated that the testator resided in New York when the will was signed, and
named a New York bank to serve as executor.2 31 The decedent's only assets
in New York were bank accounts with less than $1000 on deposit, but his
will requested that probate occur in New York and be governed by New
York law.232 Prior to commencement of proceedings in New York, court
action was instituted in France questioning the validity of a deed of donation
executed by the decedent in France disposing of wealth at his death.233 As
the majority of the decedent's assets were in France and Switzerland, a con-
test pertaining to the estate was being actively litigated in France, it was
more convenient and less costly for the beneficiaries to proceed in France,
and potential problems were foreseen in enforcing any judgment of a New
York court over assets overseas, the petition seeking original probate in New
York was denied.234
Parties are nevertheless at times successful in instituting original pro-
bate in New York, even if estate administration was2 35 or is pending else-
227. Id.
228. Estate of Brunner, 339 N.Y.S.2d 506, 507, 511 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1973).
229. Id. at 507.
230. Id. at 510.
231. Id. at 507.
232. Id. at 507-08. In Estate of Brunner and other cases referenced in this article, the
courts place emphasis on the fact that a will directs estate administration in New York and
states that New York law should apply. Estate of Brunner, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 508. As the wills
were signed while the testator was a New York resident prior to the testator's move to another
jurisdiction, these provisions may be boilerplate, rather than indicative of a wish that wherever
the testator may reside at death, estate administration occur in New York. See id.
233. Id. The court explained that a deed of donation "is an instrument which is somewhat
akin to an inter vivos deed of gift which is to take effect upon death of the donor." Id.
234. Id. at 509, 511. The deed of donation signed by the decedent was inconsistent with
his New York will. Estate of Brunner, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 508. Questions also existed about the
widow's rights under New York law as opposed to French laws applicable to estates. Id. at
508-09. The court concluded: "In times like ours of peripatetic families and multi-national
situses for family property, original protective decisions should be left in doubtful cases to the
domicile of the living rather than that of the deceased." Id. at 510 (citations omitted).
235. See In re Estate of Siegel, 373 N.Y.S.2d 812, 814 (Sur. Ct. Erie Cnty. 1975).
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where.236 Thus, even where Florida probate administration was completed,
original probate in New York may be available to enable fiduciaries ap-
pointed by the testator to serve.237
Disputes about commencing original probate may involve a determina-
tion about where a decedent was domiciled at death. 238 A dispute about
whether a decedent's domicile was New York or Florida, or the fact that the
decedent was domiciled in Florida, does not preclude original probate in
New York.239 Where original probate in New York and the decedent's domi-
cile were contested and probate had already been commenced in Florida,
New York original probate was permitted. 240 The testatrix maintained homes
and driver's licenses in both New York and Florida, the majority of her pro-
bate assets were in New York, her will was drafted in New York by New
York counsel, signed by the testatrix and attesting witnesses in New York,
the will acknowledged that the testatrix was a New York resident when the
will was signed and provided for New York law to apply, beneficiaries en-
titled to a majority of the estate lived in New York, and the person nominated
as executor in the will was not eligible to serve under Florida law. ' He was
the testatrix's friend and attorney, and a resident of New York." Although
236. See In re Estate of Gadway, 510 N.Y.S.2d 737, 740 (App. Div. 1987); Heller v. Mat-
tern (In re Will of Heller-Baghero), 302 N.Y.S.2d 235, 237 (App. Div. 1969); Estate of Re-
nard, 417 N.Y.S.2d 155, 165 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1979). In In re Estate of Siegel, a testate
decedent was a Florida resident. In re Estate of Siegel, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 813. His widow
instituted and completed estate administration in Florida. Id. After an order of discharge was
entered in Florida, she sought original probate of the will in New York because the decedent's
will named a New York bank trustee of a testamentary trust, and the bank could not qualify as
trustee in Florida. Id. at 813-14. All interested parties consented to original probate in New
York. Id. at 813. Concluding that Florida law improperly discriminated against the bank, and
desiring to give effect to the testator's wishes, original probate in New York was granted. Id.
at 814.
237. See, e.g., In re Estate of Siegel, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 814.
238. See In re Estate of Donahue, 692 N.Y.S.2d 225, 226 (App. Div. 1999); In re Schwar-
zenberger, 626 N.Y.S.2d 229, 229 (App. Div. 1995); In re Estate of Gadway, 510 N.Y.S.2d
737, 739 (App. Div. 1987). A discussion of a determination of domicile of a decedent is
beyond the scope of this article. The foregoing cases all involve decedents initially domiciled
in New York, who thereafter were alleged to have maintained homes in Florida. In re Estate
of Donahue, 692 N.Y.S.2d at 226; In re Schwarzenberger, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 229; In re Estate
of Gadway, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 739. Where a dispute arose about whether a decedent changed
her domicile, the party claiming a change occurred has the burden of proving this by clear and
convincing evidence. In re Estate of Gadway, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 739-40.
239. See In re Estate of Gadway, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 740.
240. Id.
241. Id.at739-40.
242. Id. at 740.
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there was objection to original New York probate, beneficiaries entitled to a
majority of the estate consented.243
Similarly, New York original probate was allowed for a non-resident
decedent's estate at the request of her attorney, a New York resident nomi-
nated personal representative in her will, despite the fact that probate was
pending in France where the testatrix was admittedly domiciled.24 In that
case, the testatrix was once a New York resident.245 Prior to her death, the
testatrix executed a New York will to govern her assets in New York.2"4 This
will was drafted by New York counsel but signed in France.247 The testatrix
also executed a French will, ostensibly to dispose of her wealth in France at
death.248 At the testatrix's death, the French will was offered for probate in
France, before original New York probate was requested. 249 Because the
testatrix directed in her New York will that estate administration occur in
New York, an exception to New York Surrogate Court Procedure Act section
1605(2) allowed original probate to occur there.2 50 "[T]he fact that jurisdic-
tion has already been asserted at the [decedent's] domicile requires a careful
consideration before original probate will be permitted in this [New York]
court."2 5' The other facts recited above caused original probate in New York
to be authorized.252 New York original probate was also permitted when the
testator died a resident of Austria and a will was admitted to probate there
before relief was sought in New York.253 In that case, a later will executed
by the decedent in New York, while the testator was a New York resident,
was offered for probate there.254 The surrogate's decision was justified, as
the majority of the estate was in New York, the will was drafted and signed
243. Id. at 738, 740.
244. Estate of Renard, 417 N.Y.S.2d 155, 159, 165 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1979).
245. Id. at 156. While residing in New York testatrix worked as secretary to William
Nelson Cromwell, Esq., senior partner of the law firm of Sullivan & Cromwell. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Estate of Renard, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 156.
249. Id. at 156-57. The testatrix's adopted son, who lived in California, was engaged in
litigation based on his claim that he was entitled under French law to a larger share of the
estate than the decedent provided for him. Id. The clear implication was that the son con-
tested probate in New York because French law was more favorable to him. See id. at 157.
250. Id. at 158; N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 1605(2)(b) (McKinney 1995 & Supp. 2011).
251. Estate of Renard, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 159.
252. Id. at 165. The court analyzed the son's forced heirship claim and conflict of law
principles, concluding that they did not preclude the New York court's exercise of jurisdic-
tion. Id. at 162-65.
253. In re Will of Heller-Baghero, 302 N.Y.S.2d 235, 236-37 (App. Div. 1969).
254. Id. at 236.
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in New York and recited that the testator was a New York resident, and the
principal beneficiary under the will was in New York.255
VI. CONCLUSION
In the current global economic situation, it may be appropriate for the
Florida Legislature to reconsider the requirements to be met before a person
is eligible to serve as personal representative of a Florida decedent's estate.
Attorneys and their clients would benefit from clarification. The legislature
may see fit to eliminate the residency requirement. If not, a duty needs to be
imposed on the court to assure that ineligible persons are not inadvertently
appointed or allowed to retain their fiduciary positions.
255. Id. It was not clear in Heller whether the court in Austria considered the later New
York will and found it invalid, or if the existence of that will was even brought to the attention
of that court. See id. at 236-37. What was abundantly clear was that inconsistent decisions
about the disposition of the decedent's assets were likely. See id. at 236.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Atypically, the Supreme Court of Florida was not active during the past
year, deciding no cases in the juvenile law field. On the other hand, the in-
termediate appellate courts were active both in the delinquency area and in
the dependency field.' As in the past, decisions in the delinquency area in-
volving generic issues of criminal procedure not unique to juvenile delin-
quency are not covered in this article.
II. DEPENDENCY
"A parent's right to counsel in a dependency case in Florida is purely
statutory."2 The Supreme Court of Florida had held in 1980 in In re Interest
of D.B., that parents did have the right to appointed counsel if indigent in
termination of parental rights (TPR) cases but not as an absolute right in de-
pendency cases4 Initially, as a result of the decision in In re Interest of D.B.,
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center. This
survey covers cases decided during the period from July 1, 2010 through June 30, 2011. The
author thanks Nikki Dividze for her assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. See, e.g., K.J.F. v. State, 44 So. 3d 1204, 1205, 1209-11 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
2010); S.D. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs. (In re Interest of J.D.), 42 So. 3d 938, 938-
40 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2010); W.S. v. Dep't of Children & Families (In re Interest of C.S.),
41 So. 3d 433, 433 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (per curiam); W.G. v. S.A. (In re Interest of
A.G.), 40 So. 3d 908, 909-10 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
2. Michael J. Dale & Louis M. Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for Children in Depen-
dency and Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings in Florida: The Issue Updated, 35
NOVA L. REV. 305, 336 (2011); see FLA. STAT. § 39.402(5)(b)(2) (2011).
3. 385 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1980).
4. Id.at9O-91.
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parents were required to be given counsel in all TPR cases and under certain
situations in dependency cases.' Subsequently, the Florida Legislature
passed a law codifying the opinion and then, as a result of a series of rever-
sals in the appellate courts for failure to assign counsel in dependency pro-
ceedings pursuant to In re Interest of D.B., the Legislature in 1998 amended
chapter 39 to provide for the "appointment of counsel for parents in depen-
",6dency as well as TPR cases.
The issue of whether a non-offending parent should be appointed coun-
sel in a dependency case came before the Third District Court of Appeal in
W.G. v. S.A. (In re Interest of A.G.). 7 In that case, the father of a child who
was the subject of a dependency proceeding sought "certiorari review of an
order denying his motion for appointment of counsel."8 The mother, the
custodial parent, had been charged in a dependency proceeding with abuse,
although no charges were brought against the father.' The appellate court
held that as a matter of statutory construction, the reference to parents for
purposes of appointment of counsel did not make a distinction between of-
fending and non-offending parents.'o The court recognized that if a parent
was non-offending, there would be no logical grounds, and in fact, it would
be frivolous to charge that parent." The court held that "as a matter of com-
mon sense, the non-offending parent may need, and indeed [would] be en-
titled to take action" with regard to the possible relief ordered by the court. 2
Finally, as the court said, "a 'non-offending,' indigent, non-attorney parent
can hardly be expected to navigate through such proceedings without coun-
sel. At any juncture, failure to act could prejudice the non-offending parent's
rights in intervention." 3 For these reasons, the court granted the petition and
quashed the court order below denying the right to counsel.14
Evidentiary issues come up regularly in dependency proceedings in
Florida. 5 In W.S. v. Department of Children & Families (In re Interest of
C.S.),1 6 the parents appealed from an order adjudicating their child depen-
5. Id.
6. See FLA. STAT. § 39.013(1) (1999); Dale & Reidenberg, s
7. 40 So. 3d 908, 909 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. In re Interest ofA.G., 40 So. 3d at 910.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See Michael J. Dale, 2009 Survey of Juvenile Law, 34
(2009).
16. 41 So. 3d 433 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (per curiam).
upra note 2, at 336-37.
NOVA L. REV. 199, 201-02
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dent.'7 They argued that the court relied upon inadmissible hearsay to make
its finding.'8 The Department of Children and Families (DCF) and the Guar-
dian ad Litem Program conceded error.'9 The hearsay was testimony from
an investigator describing what other foster children in the home said about
the parents' care.20 "The investigator did not personally observe any of the
[reported] abuse . . . ."2  Nor did any other witnesses testify as to the physi-
cal abuse.22 The trial court finding was based entirely on hearsay testimony
which demonstrated the "probability of prospective abuse." 23 The appellate
court held that the Florida Rules of Evidence "applicable in civil cases also
apply in adjudicatory hearings under [c]hapter 39."24 There being no excep-
tion to the hearsay rule, and the trial court having relied almost entirely on
the inadmissible hearsay, the appellate court reversed and remanded.25
In S.D. v. Department of Children & Family Services (In re Interest of
J.D.),26 a mother appealed from an order adjudicating her child dependent on
the ground that the evidence "was legally insufficient to sustain the determi-
nation."27 One of the witnesses was a child protection investigator who gave
his opinion that the bruises that he saw often look like those resulting from a
"struggle and attempted choke."2 ' At issue in the case was whether the father
had a history of domestic violence and whether the mother was a victim of
domestic violence.29 When the protective investigator met with the mother,
"she had scratches on her neck and chest."30 She replied that "she sometimes
scratche[d] herself around her throat when she [was] anxious." 31 The appel-
late court held that "the only evidence of domestic violence was the child
protective investigator's opinion as to the cause of the scratching and bruis-
ing on the [m]other's neck." 3 2 Without addressing the question of whether
the opinion testimony was admissible as either expert testimony or proper lay
17. Id. at 433.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. In re Interest of C.S., 41 So. 3d at 433.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 433-34.
25. Id. at 434.
26. 42 So. 3d 938 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
27. Id. at 938.
28. Id. at 939.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. In re Interest of J..D., 42 So. 3d at 939.
32. Id.
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testimony,33 the court held that in any event there was no evidence "that the
child saw or heard any alleged violence or was otherwise . . . [present for]
such violence" as required by Florida law.34 Thus, the appellate court re-
versed.
Dependency determinations may be based on what the Florida courts re-
fer to as "prospective neglect." 36 The Florida courts have regularly ruled on
the question of prospective neglect 37 beginning with the supreme court opi-
nion in Padgett v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services. In R.M.
v. Department of Children & Family Services (In re Interest of J.B.), 39 a
mother appealed from a dependency adjudication on abuse of discretion
grounds where the finding was based on prospective neglect.40 The trial
court had found a significant danger posed to the child by the mother's per-
sistent anger management problems. 41 To make a finding of prospective
neglect, the court must find "a nexus between the parent's problem and the
potential for future neglect." 42 The testimony from family members as to the
mother's chronic use of marijuana, her impairment, her failure to pay atten-
tion to her son, and that her marijuana use put her in danger were "predictive
of a risk of harm to [the] child."43
A significant procedural issue arose in C.R. v. Department of Children
& Family Services,44 where a dependency adjudication was based upon the
mother's consent and where there was an administrative finding that the
child had no legal father.45 In its dependency order, the trial court withheld
adjudication as to the mother.46 When the father came forward, the trial
court vacated its order of disposition and then adjudicated the child depen-
33. See FLA. STAT. §§ 90.701, .702 (2011).
34. In re Interest of J.D., 42 So. 3d at 940.
35. Id.
36. 1 MICHAEL J. DALE, REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT I 4.14[4][d] (MB 2011). For a
discussion of the subject nationally, see id.
37. Michael J. Dale, 2005-2006 Survey of Florida Juvenile Law, 31 NOVA L. REV. 577,
594-95 (2007); Michael J. Dale, 2004 Survey of Florida Juvenile Law, 29 NOVA L. REV. 397,
413-14 (2005).
38. 577 So. 2d 565, 565 (Fla. 1991).
39. 40 So. 3d 917 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
40. Id. at 917-18.
41. Id. at 918.
42. Id. (emphasis added) (citing N.D. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs. (In re Interest
of T.B.), 939 So. 2d 1192, 1194 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006)).
43. Id.
44. 53 So. 3d 240 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
45. Id. at 241.
46. Id.
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dent as to the father and issued a subsequent order of dependency.4 7 The
mother appealed, contending that the trial court erred when it vacated the
initial order withholding adjudication as to the mother.48 The appellate court
held that "the trial court should have allowed the [w]ithhold [a]djudication
[o]rder to stand and then, [should have] held a subsequent evidentiary hear-
ing to determine the father's status" because the Florida statue allows a sup-
plementary decision to be entered which, in the case at bar, would have al-
lowed a determination of the father's status.49
In Florida, there is a procedure known as a private dependency action."o
A.N.B. ex rel. J.TN. v. Department of Children & Families" is a case in
which maternal grandparents brought a dependency proceeding, and the
mother appealed from an order of adjudication of the child "who was nine-
teen days short of [the] seventeenth birthday when the order was entered."5 2
The appellate court found that there were adequate grounds for a finding
"that there was no parent capable of supervision and care" under the Florida
statute.53 In addition, the mother appealed on the ground that the "court im-
properly based its ruling on the child's preference."' The appellate court
held "that the child's preference is not a valid basis for a finding of depen-
dency, but [in the case at bar], this was not the sole basis for the court's . . .
finding.""
When there are placements of children in other states or other interstate
issues arise in dependency cases, the Interstate Compact for the Placement of
Children (ICPC) comes into play.56 Issues can arise concerming proper im-
plementation of the ICPC as in Department of Children & Families v. .T ex
rel. M.R. 7 In a per curiam opinion, the appellate court reversed a trial court
order that reunited children with their mother, as well as dismissed a depen-
dency proceeding, terminating the trial court's jurisdiction for failure to
comply with the ICPC."' The children had been adjudicated dependent be-
47. Id. at 241, 243.
48. Id. at 241-42.
49. C.R., 53 So. 3d at 243; see FLA. STAT. § 39.507(7)(b) (2011).
50. See FLA. STAT. § 39.501; see, e.g., A.N.B. ex rel. J.T.N. v. Dep't of Children & Fami-
lies, 54 So. 3d 1049, 1050 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (per curiam).
51. 54 So. 3d 1049 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (per curiam).
52. Id. at 1050.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See FLA. STAT. § 409.401, art. 1 (2011).
57. 42 So. 3d 962, 963 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (per curiam).
58. Id.
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cause of "domestic violence between their mother and her paramour."" Sub-
sequently, the mother and father "moved out-of-state to Georgia and Ohio
[and] sought reunification."' "[T]he trial court directed DCF to obtain or-
ders of compliance with [the] ICPC for home studies on both parents."6 1
"DCF did not submit the ICPC orders to [either state's] compact administra-
tors" for a period of time.62 Despite the lack of compliance, the trial court
ordered reunification. 63 The appellate court noted that while "[t]he trial court
was understandably frustrated," a trial court, it held, cannot return the child
to a receiving state without compliance of all of the requirements of the
ICpC.64
Dependency cases occasionally arise involving immigrant children.65
Two such cases are In re Interest of T.J.' and L.T. ex rel. K.S.L. v. Depart-
ment of Children & Families.67 In In re Interest of T.I., "[r]epresentatives of
the Florida International University College of Law Immigrant Children's
Justice Clinic, as next friends of [the child], . . . appeal[ed] a circuit court
order summarily denying [an] amended petition for an adjudication of de-
pendency."68 The child, who had been "born in Turks and Caicos and came
to Florida at the age of four months, . . . lived [in Florida] continuously since
then" and was to turn eighteen relatively shortly after the dependency pro-
ceeding began. 69 The child had been cared for by her mother, but when her
mother passed away, and as the whereabouts of the father, who had left the
child and the mother when the youngster was an infant, were unknown, a
volunteer provided her with a place to stay. 70 The volunteer did "not have
any judicially-conferred status as a custodian or guardian of [the child]," and
thus a dependency proceeding was brought.7' The appellate court held that,
based on earlier case law, the child had no legal custodian.72 The child,
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. T.T. ex rel. M.R., 42 So. 3d at 963.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 963-64 (citing Dep't of Children & Families v. Fellows, 895 So. 2d 1181, 1185
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005)).
65. See, e.g., In re Interest of T.J., 59 So. 3d 1187, 1188 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2011);
L.T. ex rel. K.S.L. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 48 So. 3d 928, 929 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 2010).
66. 59 So. 3d 1187 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
67. 48 So. 3d 928 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
68. In re Interest of T.J., 59 So. 3d at 1188.
69. Id.at1189.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1190, 1194.
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therefore, "ha[d] made a prima facie case that she [was] dependent."" In a
two to one opinion, the court majority also concluded in dicta that the depen-
dency issue was not a "back door route to naturalization."74 The child quali-
fied for a declaration of dependency under the Florida Statutes, and thus
"'the child's motivation to obtain legal residency status from the United
States Attorney General [was] irrelevant.'" 7  The court then remanded on the
ground that the petitioner must demonstrate making a diligent search to find
the father.
In L.T., relied upon by the court in In re Interest of T.J., the child had
been rescued from a boat that capsized off the coast of Florida.77 The child's
uncle filed a dependency proceeding on the child's behalf.78 "[A]n adjudica-
tion of dependency would allow [the child] to petition as a special immigrant
juvenile." 79 The child's parents were deceased and the child was close to
eighteen years of age.80 The uncle had been the youngster's caregiver for
nine months and continued to do so.8' Over the objections of DCF, the court
reversed and remanded to the trial court, which had dismissed the petition for
dependency."
In Florida, when foster children age out of the child welfare system, as
adults, they may be entitled to educational and vocational training under the
state's Road to Independence Program (RTI). In Department of Children
& Family Services v. K.D.,8 DCF appealed from a trial court order that a
child was eligible for RTI funds even though "she had been living with a
non-relative court-approved guardian rather than in foster care." The trial
court decided "that the statute's eligibility provisions violated equal protec-
tion by unfairly [providing] services to foster children but not to [those]
children [who were] living in non-relative placements."8 The appellate
73. In re Interest of T.J., 59 So. 3d at 1190 (citing L.T. ex rel. K.S.L. v. Dep't of Children
& Families, 48 So. 3d 928, 930 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2010); F.L.M. v. Dep't of Children &
Families, 912 So. 2d 1264, 1268-69 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (per curiam)).
74. Id. at 1191 (quoting Id. at 194-95 (Wells, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
75. Id. (quoting F.L.M., 912 So. 2d at 1269).
76. Id.at1192,1194.
77. Id. at 1190 (citing L.T. ex rel. K.S.L., 48 So. 3d at 929).
78. L.T. ex rel. K.S.L, 48 So. 3d at 929.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 929-31.
83. FLA. STAT. § 409.1451(5)(b) (2011).
84. 45 So. 3d 46 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 49 So. 3d 747 (Fla. 2010).
85. Id. at 47.
86. Id.
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court held that as a matter of statutory construction, the term foster care
means licensed foster care home. A person or a family providing foster
care must be licensed.88  The court reversed and remanded, although it
granted a motion for certification to the Supreme Court of Florida on the
issue of the definition.89
A second case involving RTI is Wade v. Florida Department of Child-
ren & Families.90 There, the appellant was notified by DCF services that it
planned to terminate her RTI scholarship because she failed to attend school
full-time or make satisfactory progress during the prior year.9' She was noti-
fied of her right to request a fair hearing, which she did.92 A fair hearing
followed, and the hearing officer entered an order affirming DCF's decision
to terminate the scholarship.9 3 The order was entered as a "final order."94 It
also included a notice of right of appeal.95 The appellate court held that the
order was not a final order in the sense of it being final agency action be-
cause the decision was not reviewed by the secretary of DCF, and "it is the
secretary's decision that is the final agency action [which is then] subject to
judicial review."96 For this technical reason, the appeal was dismissed.97
III. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
Florida, like other states, provides multiple grounds for termination of
parental rights in its statutes.98 One of these grounds is where a "parent. . . is
incarcerated in a state or a federal ... institution." 99 In a case of first impres-
sion recently decided in the Second District Court of Appeal, the question
was whether the provision that there be no "commission of [a] new law vi-
olation[] constitutes a valid case plan task," which may then support a deci-
sion to terminate a parent's parental rights when the parent's imprisonment
results in "a new law violation, [which makes] it impossible for [the parent]
87. Id. at 48 n.2 (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 39.01(31),409.175(4)(a) (2009)).
88. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 409.175(4)(a)).
89. K.D., 45 So. 3d at 48-49.
90. 57 So. 3d 869, 870 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Wade, 57 So. 3d at 870.
96. Id. at 872.
97. Id.
98. FLA. STAT. § 39.806 (2011); see also DALE, supra note 36, at I4.14[4][a]-[h].
99. FLA. STAT. § 39.806(l)(d).
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to complete . . . other case plan tasks within the allotted time."'" In M.N. v.
Department of Children & Family Services (In re Interest of C.N.),'0 ' the
appellate court held "that the statutory scheme for ... termination of parental
rights," which includes a provision for termination based upon imprison-
ment, is "the exclusive method for . . . termination . . . based [upon] the fact
of [the] parent's incarceration." 0 2 Thus, inclusion of a provision in a case
plan that the "parent [not] commit [a] new law violation[] . . . may not prop-
erly be included as a case plan task. The breach of such a task that results in
the parent's incarceration," the court held, by itself, is not "a proper ground
for the termination of parental rights." 03 The court noted that there is "a
comprehensive and detailed list of twelve [distinct] grounds for . .. termina-
tion of parental rights" in Florida.'"0 The commission of a crime is not
among them.'0o Finally, the court noted, a chapter 39 case plan "was [not]
intended to be a form of criminal probation." 0 6 For these reasons, the court
reversed.'07
The termination of parental rights sometimes occurs on the basis of
consent documents signed by the parents in which case a specific statutory
requirement as to their filing with the court is required.'0 8 In T.H. v. Depart-
ment of Children & Families,'" the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed
the trial court because it failed to receive the proper documentation.o"0 In the
underlying case, a mother consented to termination of parental rights "condi-
tioned upon [her children] being adopted by her sister who lived in Tennes-
see."'" When that adoption did not go forward, the mother moved for recon-
sideration of the termination of parental rights which was denied and her
rights were terminated." 2 She then appealed." 3 The appellate court found
that the trial court had erred in terminating parental rights "because the writ-
ten surrenders [of parental rights] were neither filed, nor examined [by the
court], to determine [whether] they comported with statutory require-
100. M.N. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs. (In re Interest of C.N.), 51 So. 3d 1224,
1225 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
101. 51 So. 3d 1224 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
102. Id. at 1225-26.
103. Id. at 1232; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.806.
104. In re Interest of C.N., 51 So. 3d at 1232.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1233; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.001(1).
107. In re Interest of C.N., 51 So. 3d at 1234.
108. FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(a)(1).
109. 56 So. 3d 150 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
110. Id. at 155.
Ill. Id. at l51-52.
112. Id. at 154.
113. Id. at l51.
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ments."ll4 Statutory grounds not having been met, the appellate court re-
versed."'
It is not uncommon for termination of parental rights to involve parents
who have mental health problems."'6 The question, however, in a termina-
tion of parental rights case, as in I.Z. v. B.H.," was whether the mother's
mental health issues "pose[] a risk to the child's well-being" in order to justi-
fy termination of parental rights under the Florida statute."'8 Among the
grounds for termination of parental rights is "section 39.806(1)(c), which
provides ... that the parent's conduct towards the child ... demonstrates . . .
continu[al] involvement of the parent . . . [with the child] threatens the life,
safety, well-being, or . .. health of the child irrespective of the provision of
services.""9 The appellate court reversed on this ground and on others, find-
ing that the only evidence of mental health issues that threatened the child's
well-being were at a visit where "the mother began to raise her voice and
told the child she was 'spoiled.' [Whereupon] workers told the mother she
was scaring the child and removed the child to safety." 20 That event oc-
curred three years earlier, and on that ground and others, the appellate court
reversed.121
IV. CRIMINAL CHILD NEGLECT
Under Florida law, as is true in other jurisdictions, the State may charge
a parent with criminal child neglect as well as charge the parent through the
DCF with civil child neglect.12 2 In State v. Nowlin,123 a seventeen-year-old
mother was at home babysitting a neighbor's two-year-old daughter when it
was alleged that a pit bull she owned, and which had bitten another neigh-
borhood child, mauled the two-year-old child.124 "The State charged [the
seventeen year-old] with neglect of a child causing great bodily harm, a
second-degree felony . . . ."125 The trial court held that the seventeen-year-
old could not be held criminally liable as she was a juvenile when the event
114. T.H., 56 So. 3d at 154.
115. Id. at 155.
116. DALE, supra note 36, at [4.14[4][b].
117. 53 So. 3d 406 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
118. Id. at 409.
119. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(c) (2011).
120. I.Z., 53 So. 3d at 409-10.
121. Id. at 410.
122. See FLA. STAT. § 827.03; id. § 39.001(8)(a).
123. 50 So. 3d 79 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
124. Id. at 80-81.
125. Id. at 81.
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occurred, and was thus not a caregiver as defined by section 39.01(10) of the
Florida Statutes.126 Over a dissent, the appeals court held that the seventeen-
year-old indeed was a caregiver, and that the State had made a prima facie
showing thereof by demonstrating the seventeen year-old regularly, if not on
a daily basis, took care of the two year-old victim.127 The dissent argued that
the term "other person" in the statute governing caregivers is ambiguous and,
therefore, did "not give fair notice that a child may be held criminally liable
for negligent care of another child." 28
V. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
A very important Florida case involving the interpretation of the state
sex offender statute in the context of a juvenile delinquency case is K.J.F. v.
State.12 9 In that case, "a child appeal[ed] a final disposition entered after he
pled guilty to . . . sexual battery" and other sexual charges whereupon the
"court withheld adjudication of delinquency, placed [the child] on probation,
and [also] ordered [the child] to register as a sex[] offender.""o The appel-
late court reviewed the Florida juvenile delinquency statute.' and the sexual
offender statute 32 and found that a "plain-language interpretation of the defti-
nitions of a 'sexual offender' and 'convicted"' in the law demonstrate that
the statutory obligation of a juvenile to register as a sex offender "does not
apply to juveniles for whom adjudication of delinquency is withheld." 33 The
appellate court thus reversed.134
In 1975, the Supreme Court of the United States held, in Breed v.
Jones,135 that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment applied to
juvenile delinquency proceedings.136 The issue before the Fourth District
Court of Appeal in V.M.S. v. State,137 was whether, when a circuit court
withheld adjudication and placed a juvenile on probation, it could subse-
quently modify the probation order to require the juvenile to attend a non-
126. Id. at 81-82; FLA. STAT. § 39.01(10).
127. See Nowlin, 50 So. 3d at 83.
128. Id. at 84 (Padovano, J., dissenting).
129. 44 So. 3d 1204, 1205 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
130. Id. at 1205.
131. FLA. STAT. § 985.4815 (2011).
132. Id. § 943.0435.
133. K.J.F., 44 So. 3d at 1206-07, 1211.
134. Id. at 1205.
135. 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
136. See id. at 531; see also V.B. v. State, 944 So. 2d 1185, 1186 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
2006) (per curiam); Lisak v. State, 433 So. 2d 487, 489 (Fla. 1983).
137. 43 So. 3d 938 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
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public school and impose a fifty dollar charge under Florida's Crimes Com-
pensation Trust Fund.138 The appellate court found that a trial court may not
"enhance a defendant's probation without the state first charging, and the
court determining, that the defendant violated [the] probation."1 39 Because
the trial court in the case at bar "modified [the child's] probation without [the
youngster] having been found in violation of it, [t]he requirement that [the
juvenile] attend the PACE School was an enhancement [of] the original sen-
tence [making] the sentence more severe" and thus constituted double jeo-
pardy.'40 Further, the addition of the sentence assessing a fifty dollar pay-
ment obligation was also deemed an enhancement.'41 Thus, the appellate
court reversed. 142
A second double jeopardy case is ZC.B. v. State.143 In that case, the ju-
venile "challenge[d] [a] disposition order adjudicating him delinquent on a
charge of possession of cannabis."" Specifically, he claimed that the error
was in "adjudicating him delinquent after having dismissed the petition [and
subsequently] . . . imposing $115 [in] court costs." 4 5 When the State was
unable to twice proceed because witnesses were not present, the court dis-
missed the charge against the juvenile with prejudice.14 6 When the State,
later in the day, advised the court that the witnesses were present, the court
went ahead with the case, denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, and ac-
cepted a no contest plea subject to the right of appeal.'47 The appellate court
held that double jeopardy did not apply because the order of dismissal, as a
result of the State's failure to present evidence, is not an adjudicatory find-
ing.148 Thus, jeopardy had not attached when the court began the hearing on
the merits although it had previously dismissed the case.149 The court re-
versed the imposition of the $115 court costs because the child was only ad-
judicated on a misdemeanor offense.'
138. See id. at 939-40.
139. Id. at 940 (citing Lippman v. State, 633 So. 2d 1061, 1064-65 (Fla. 1994)).
140. Id. at 941.
141. See id.
142. V.M.S., 43 So. 3d at 941.
143. 40 So. 3d 36, 37 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 37-38.
148. ZC.B., 40 So. 3d at 38.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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An important issue of sequestering witnesses in delinquency cases arose
in L.E.D. v. State.'-' A child appealed from a finding of burglary of a dwel-
ling and grand theft on the grounds that the trial court abused its discretion in
sequestering the child's mother. 15 2  "At the beginning of the trial, [the
child's] defense counsel invoked the rule of sequestration of witnesses."'
However, the lawyer argued that the mother, who was a party to the case,
should not be sequestered.'5 4 The trial court disagreed, and the mother was
"sequestered until she was called as a witness [for] the defense."' 5  Under
Florida law, because a parent may be legally responsible for restitution, ser-
vice of process is to be made upon parents, and Florida law "contemplates
[that] parents' participation at both detention . . . and final disposition hear-
ings" are necessary;15 6 the parent is viewed as a party. The appellate court
held that it is not harmless error to sequester a parent who is a party, and that
under Florida law a parent, him or herself a party, is entitled to be present at
the adjudicatory hearing.'
Sometimes matters are heard by appellate courts involving issues that
ought to be, at first glance, obvious. One such case is R.O. v. State.'"' In
R.O., the State filed a delinquency petition charging the child with posses-
sion of cocaine and other offenses. 5 9 "[T]he State put on one police officer,
who testified [to the] charges." 60 Then, the defense put the child on "who
testified that he did not realize that the men stopping him were police, and
[that] he ran because he was afraid [of somebody] trying to rob him."' 6 ' The
defense asked the child no further questions.162 The court then began asking
questions in matters covered neither by the direct examination of the police
officer nor the direct examination by defense counsel, especially the cocaine
charge.163 "After the court questioned [the child], the State commenced
151. 48 So. 3d 167, 168 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 90.616 (2011) (governing sequestration).
156. L.E.D., 48 So. 3d at 169 (citing FLA. STAT. § 985.219; FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.010(a),
8.030(b)).
157. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 985.319; J.R. v. State, 923 So. 2d 1269, 1272 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 2006)); L.B. v. State, 675 N.E.2d 1104, 1107 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)); see Interest of
Hopkins v. Youth Court of Issaquena Cnty., 227 So. 2d 282, 284 (Miss. 1969). But see
People v. Akers (In re Interest of Akers), 307 N.E.2d 630, 631-32 (111. App. Ct. 1974).
158. 46 So. 3d 124 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
159. Id. at 125.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. R.O., 46 So. 3d at 125.
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cross-examination [as to the cocaine charge]."'6M On appeal, the child argued
"that the trial court departed from [its] role of neutrality when questioning
[the child] about the cocaine possession."s65 The appellate court held, citing
earlier authority, that "[a] court may not ask questions or make comments in
an attempt to supply essential elements to the State's case."1 66 The appellate
court held that the trial court, "sua sponte questioned [the child] to supply
essential elements of the prosecution's case. "l67 The trial court went to the
ultimate issue of guilt on its own.168 Thus, as the appellate court said, "the
trial court became an advocate for the prosecution, thus depriving [the child]
of his right to a fair and impartial trial." 1 69 The court thus reversed.o
In D.F.J. v. State,'7' the child appealed an adjudication of delinquency
for aggravated battery and robbery with a weapon. 7 2 The child contended on
appeal that the only evidence against him presented by the State was that "he
was present at the scene of the commission of the crimes and that he fled." 7 1
There was no evidence that the child assisted in the perpetration of the
crimes or that he had intent to join.174 Thus, the child "argu[ed] that the State
[had] failed to present evidence from which the judge could exclude the rea-
sonable hypothesis that [the child] was merely a witness" and thus not guilty
of the charges."' The appellate court recognized that the trial court evidence
was circumstantial. 7 6 However, despite the strength of the circumstantial
evidence pointing toward guilt, the appellate court held that such "evidence
must, nonetheless, rebut any hypothesis of innocence, including [the fact]
that [the child] was present [but] was merely a witness." 77 "[T]he only wit-
ness to the crime was the victim and he could not definitively state who at-
tacked him . . . .. 17 Thus, "the State was unable to overcome [the respon-
dent's] reasonable hypothesis of innocence," and reversal was required.179
164. Id. at 126.
165. Id.
166. Id. (citing Sears v. State, 889 So. 2d 956, 959 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2004)).
167. Id. (alteration in original).
168. R.O., 46 So. 3d at 126.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. 60 So. 3d 1183 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
172. Id. at 1184.
173. Id. at 1185.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. D.F.J., 60 So. 3d at 1185.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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The need for vigorous representation by defense counsel on behalf of
juvenile defendants is demonstrated in the second district case, Henderson v.
State.'80 There, a sixteen year-old was convicted of both battery on a person
over sixty-five and robbery.' 8 ' He appealed the judgment and sentence in-
cluding the trial court's failure to transfer him to the Department of Juvenile
Justice for dispositional placement.'82 The Department of Juvenile Justice
Multidisciplinary Panel recommended that the child remain in the juvenile
justice system, but the trial court rejected that alternative.'8 1 In affirming the
adult sanction of ten years in prison, the appellate court noted that the trial
lawyer did not advocate strenuously for the juvenile sentence.'8 The appel-
late court then affirmed, finding that "[t]he presumption of appropriateness
of adult sanctions compels us to conclude that this record provides no basis
for reversal on direct appeal."'8 One might infer from the court's language,
its reference to the trial lawyer's lack of strenuous representation, the de-
tailed nature of the Department of Juvenile Justice Multidisciplinary Panel
report, and the appellate lawyer's citation to Anders v. California,'86 that had
there been vigorous representation, its appellate ruling might have been dif-
ferent.'8 7
Practitioners know that cases are often continued because of the inabili-
ty of parties to proceed for a number of reasons, including lack of witness
availability. The issue of court discretion to therefore dismiss the charges in
juvenile delinquency cases came before the Fifth District Court of Appeal in
two cases: State v. S.M.M.'" and State v. A.D. C.,' 89 both involving problems
in the same circuit.' 90 In A.D.C., the State appealed an order denying its mo-
tion to continue a restitution hearing.' 9' In that case and in others, the State
did not have witnesses present at the trial, duly noticed on evidentiary hear-
ing time.192 In A.D.C., the appellate court held "that the State was diligent in
its [efforts] to prepare for the hearing and secure the attendance of its neces-
180. 61 So. 3d 494, 495 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Henderson, 61 So. 3d at 496 (emphasis added).
186. 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967) (setting forth the method for appellate brief filing when
counsel does not believe there is a meritorious issue on appeal).
187. See Henderson, 61 So. 3d at 495-96.
188. 59 So. 3d 1210 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
189. 59 So. 3d 1209 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
190. Id. at 1209; S.M.M., 59 So. 3d at 1211.
191. A.D.C., 59 So. 3d at 1209.
192. Id.
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sary witnesses" and that it had not sought a prior continuance of the case.193
Furthermore, the respondent did not establish that he was "suffer[ing] any
prejudice as a result of [the] resetting."1 94 For these reasons, the appellate
court held that it was abuse of discretion to deny the motion to continue. 95
However, in S.M.M., a case involving an order dismissing a delinquency
petition, the appellate court held there was no abuse of discretion and thus
affirmed the dismissal.19 6 In that case, while recognizing that "dismissal is
an extreme sanction that should be employed only when lesser sanctions" are
not available, the appellate court held that the facts in that case did not in-
volve an isolated incident.19 7 There was "a systemic problem involving a
pattern of repeated failures by the State to [provide] witnesses for properly
noticed trials [and] other evidentiary hearings," and in the case at bar, there
had been at least one prior continuance of the date of trial, and "almost three
hours after the trial was scheduled to start the State had no definitive estimate
of when its witnesses might appear," nor any "explanation [for] why they
had not appeared." 98 The court thus affirmed the dismissal.' 9
In Florida, when a discovery violation occurs, the trial court is required
to hold what is known as a Richardson hearing.2m' Richardson v. State201
provides a test to determine whether a discovery violation is harmless or
whether there is a reasonable probability that the discovery violation proce-
durally prejudiced the defense.202 In T.J. v. State,203 the issue was whether
the trial court complied with Richardson where a juvenile was charged as a
"delinquen[t] with burglary of an unoccupied dwelling, third degree grand
theft, and criminal mischief."204 The juvenile appealed seeking to reverse the
adjudication on the ground that there was a Richardson violation in that the
State, on the first day of trial, listed two witnesses that were not known to the
defense.205 He argued that the late submission was error and not harmless. 206
The witnesses were a crime scene investigator and a latent fingerprint analyst
193. Id. at 1210.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. State v. S.M.M., 59 So. 3d 1210, 1211 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
197. Id. at 1212.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771, 775 (Fla. 1971).
201. 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971).
202. Id. at 775.
203. 57 So. 3d 975 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
204. Id. at 976.
205. Id.
206. Id.
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and expert witness.20 7 The appellate court reversed on the grounds that "the
trial court [had] failed to hold an adequate Richardson inquiry" by failing to
ask "whether the discovery violation was willful or inadvertent, whether it
was substantial or [minor], and whether [it] had a prejudicial [impact] on the
defense's trial preparation.""' "[F]ailure to make an adequate inquiry is not
harmless error," the appellate court held.209 It thus reversed. 210
Timely filing of motions to suppress is required under the Florida Rules
of Juvenile Procedure.21 1 In C.M. v. State,212 a child appealed from an adju-
dication of delinquency for possession of cannabis on the ground "that the
trial court erred [in] denying his oral motion to suppress."2 13 When at trial,
the State attempted to admit into evidence the cannabis, which was found
near the child, counsel for the child objected on grounds of lack of chain of
custody and that the search was illegal.214 The State responded that the
child's counsel had not filed a motion to suppress.2 15 "The trial court refused
to consider [the] oral motion to suppress . . . [as] no written motion to sup-
press had been filed."216 The appellate court affirmed on grounds that in the
absence of the "lack[] [of] opportunity to make a motion to suppress prior to
the date of the adjudicatory hearing," it was not an abuse of discretion to
deny the motion.2 17
Being a disrespectful teenager is not grounds for adjudication as a de-
linquent for resisting a police officer without violence.218 In M.M. v. State219
this was exactly the issue. 220 A juvenile who was "neither under arrest nor
being detained when he refused to give his name or identification to [a] re-
questing officer" appealed his adjudication for resisting without violence
when the youngster walked away slowly from the officer, subsequently "re-
fused to give his name and claimed he had no identification on him." 221 At
no time was the child "under arrest or otherwise lawfully detained when he
207. Id.
208. TJ., 57 So. 3d at 977 (citing Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771, 775 (Fla. 1971)).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.085(a)(5) (2011).
212. 51 So. 3d 540 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
213. Id. at 541.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. C.M., 51 So. 3d at 541.
218. See M.M. v. State, 51 So. 3d 614, 615 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
219. 51 So. 3d 614 ( Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
220. See id. at 615-16.
221. Id. at 615.
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[refused] to give [the officer] his name or provide identification."222 The
appellate court reversed the adjudication finding that the youngster "did not
obstruct the officer in executing a legal duty."223
VI. OTHER MATTERS
Two other cases require analysis in this survey. The first is Statewide
Guardian ad Litem Office v. State Attorney Twentieth Judicial Circuit.224
The specific issue before the appellate court in Statewide Guardian ad Litem
Office was whether the circuit court in the Twentieth Judicial Circuit could
order the Guardian ad Litem Program to act as guardians ad litem in criminal
proceedings where children, allegedly "victims or witnesses of abuse [and]
22
neglect or sexual offenses," were expected to testify as witnesses.225 Appar-
ently, this had been an ongoing procedure in that circuit for some time pur-
suant to a local administrative order.226 Initially, the policy applied while the
Guardian ad Litem Program "was under the jurisdiction of the judiciary." 227
However, in 2003, the Statewide Guardian ad Litem Program was placed
within the Justice Administrative Commission of the State of Florida, an
office of the executive branch of government.2 28 As the appellate court put
it:
When the guardian ad litem program was under the auspices
of the circuit court, no one disputed that the court had authority to
appoint guardians from its own program to represent any child that
needed a guardian ad litem under any statute authorizing such an
appointment. Now that the Statewide [Guardian ad Litem] is an
office in the executive branch, we conclude that the circuit court
can no longer compel the Statewide [Guardian ad Litem] to appear
and assist children in the absence of a statute that gives the court
such authority over an agency in another branch of government.229
222. Id. at 616.
223. Id.
224. 55 So. 3d 747 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
225. Id. at 748.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 749.
228. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.8296(2) (2011)).
229. Statewide Guardian ad Litem Office, 55 So. 3d at 750.
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As things now stand, both the Guardian ad Litem Program and DCF ex-
ist in the executive branch, both with roles that would appear at first glance
to be quite similar in the context of dependency proceedings.230
The second case is Department of Children & Families v. D.B.D.2 3 1
that case, DCF appealed from "an order dismissing an ex parte injunction
entered against a father of minor children" under Florida's dependency sta-
tute.232 The appellate court held that the father was denied due process be-
,,233
cause "DCF failed to justify the continuation of the injunction. The un-
derlying facts are disturbing. In D.B.D., the mother who was an attorney for
the DCF in Miami-Dade County and the father, also an attorney, had what
the appellate court described as "an ongoing, contentious divorce case in
Broward County." 2 34 The family court in the divorce case had "ruled against
the mother on some of the allegations she made against the father." 235 Six
months after the family court "denied the mother an injunction she had
sought on behalf of her children, . . . the mother filed a pro se emergency
motion to suspend visitation, . . . [but] never called [the] motion up for hear-
ing before the family court judge."2 36 A month later, DCF filed a petition
seeking an injunction under Florida's dependency statute, making many of
the same allegations contained in the DCF attorney mother's pro se emer-
23
gency motion to suspend visitation. 2 On the day the dependency petition
was filed, "a hearing was held before [a judge] who was not the family court
judge familiar with the hostile dynamics of this family." 23 8 The father re-
ceived two hours notice of the hearing, but was in the Florida Keys and
asked to appear by telephone.239 When DCF objected, the court would not
allow the appearance. 240 Present were the mother, two lawyers, and three
DCF representatives. 241 None of them, all professionals according to the
appellate court, "advised [the judge] of the pending proceedings in the family
court," nor did he ask.242 At a short hearing, the DCF attorney sought and
received "an injunction that remained in effect until further order of the court
230. See Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 2, at 327, 333.
231. 42 So. 3d 916 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
232. Id. at 917 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.504).
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. D.B.D., 42 So. 3d at 917.
237. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.504(1) (2011)).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 918.
241. D.B.D., 42 So. 3d at 918.
242. Id.
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without . . . any further hearing."243 The trial court entered the injunction
which took effect immediately so that, according to the Fourth District Court
of Appeal, "the mother could leave [the] court with it in hand." 2" According
to the appellate court, although the trial court "had never seen [n]or heard
from the father, the injunction also ordered the father to undergo two evalua-
tions-for substance abuse and by a psychologist."245
A month later, before the family court judge,
[t]he judge found that the DCF petition for injunction was filed in
bad faith, and [that] the mother used her position as an attorney
with [DCF] to bypass [the] proceeding before [the family] court
[in order to] obtain an injunction before a dependency [court]
246judge who ha[d] no knowledge [of] the history of the parties.
The trial court dismissed the injunction and DCF then appealed, claiming
that the trial judge in the family court "improperly placed the burden of proof
on the Department to maintain the injunction [and] that the father was not
entitled to an immediate hearing to dissolve the injunction. [B]ecause the
husband had 'actual notice,' the injunction did not qualify as an immediate
injunction."247 The appellate court rejected these arguments, finding first
,,248that DCF's position "ignore[d] basic principles of due process. Citing an
expansive body of law which rejects the positions asserted by DCF, the ap-
249pellate court affirmed the family court dissolution of the injunction. In
rendering its opinion, the appellate court was unusually blunt:
To anyone familiar with the concept of due process, the abbre-
viated September 18 "hearing," consuming but eight pages of tran-
script, is shocking. Three attorneys were present-Ali Vazquez,
on behalf of DCF, Lee Seidlin, for the Guardian Ad Litem
[P]rogram, and the mother. None of the[se] attorneys made Judge
Rebollo aware of the ongoing proceedings in family court. None
of the[se] attorneys mentioned the mother's August 21 emergency
motion. None of the attorneys brought up the mother's previous
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. D.B.D., 42 So. 3d at 919-20.
247. Id. at 920.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 920-21.
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attempt to secure an injunction on behalf of the children, which
was denied.25 o
The appellate court then added: "A primary focus of DCF's attorney at
the hearing was how to avoid further scrutiny of the injunction at a time
when the person enjoined could have a meaningful opportunity to be
heard." 251
Perhaps to emphasize the severity of the attorneys' failure to act proper-
ly, the appellate court cited to the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct
concerning ex parte proceedings, which state that "[i]n an ex parte proceed-
ing, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the law-
yer that [would] enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether
or not the facts are adverse."252
VII. STATUS OFFENSES-CHILDREN IN NEED OF SERVICES
Chapter 984 of the Florida Statutes governs intervention in the lives of
families and children in need of supervision, known commonly as status of-
fenders.25 3 Cases involving status offenders do not come up regularly in the
254 255
appellate case law in Florida.254 A.B.S. v. State is an exception. In that
case, a juvenile who was charged as a delinquent for possession of a con-
trolled substance "admitted . .. the charge while reserving the right to appeal
[based upon] the denial of his motion to suppress."2 56 The child had been
"taken into custody as a possible runaway in need of services," one of the
status offense categories under chapter 984.257 The police officer took the
youngster into custody, told him that he would take the child home, but be-
fore he placed the child into the police cruiser, he handcuffed and searched
the child as was the officer's practice. 25 8 He found a key chain in the
youngster's pocket with "an aluminum screw-top container" which the police
officer believed was of the "type [usually] used to store illegal drugs." 25 9
250. Id. at 918.
251. D.B.D., 42 So. 3d at 919.
252. Id. at 919 n.2 (quoting FLA. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 4-3.3(c) (2010)).
253. FLA. STAT. ch. 984 (2011); see generally DALE, supra note 36, at 15.02.
254. Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law in Florida in 1998, 23 NOVA L. REV. 819, 831 (1999)
(discussing the rarity of opinions regarding the Children in Need of Services/Families in Need
of Services Statute).
255. 51 So. 3d 1181 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
256. Id. at 1182.
257. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 984.13(1)(a).
258. A.B.S., 51 So. 3d at 1182.
259. Id.
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When the officer shook it, it rattled. 2 60 That made the police officer suspi-
cious, and when the officer opened the container, the officer found a con-
trolled substance. 26' The appellate court reversed the denial of the motion to
suppress "because the [police] officer did not have a legal basis to search."262
It held that the circumstances under which "a juvenile [may] be taken into
custody [pursuant to] section 984.13 are not crimes." 2 6 3 "[T]herefore, [a]
search incident to [an] arrest exception to the warrant requirement d[id] not
apply." 264 There having been "no indication that [the child] was in posses-
sion of either a weapon or contraband when [the police officer] searched
[him] . . . the search was conducted without a legal basis, [and] the trial court
erred in denying the motion to suppress."265
V. CONCLUSION
The intermediate appellate courts were quite busy during the past sur-
vey year in the areas of dependency, termination of parental rights, and juve-
nile delinquency, ruling on a number of procedural matters as well as refin-
ing definitional language within the relevant statutes. The courts decided
one important case outside of these areas, affirming the proposition that the
Guardian ad Litem Program, like the DCF Services, is a division within the
Executive Department. 266 And, in one particularly troubling case, casting a
shadow on the legal profession, one appellate court castigated attorneys with-
in the DCF Services and Guardian ad Litem Program for their behavior in an
ill-conceived dependency matter.267
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. (citing L.C. v. State, 23 So. 3d 1215, 1218 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
263. A.B.S., 51 So. 3d at 1182 (citing L.C., 23 So. 3d at 1218; FLA. STAT. § 984.13 (2011).
264. Id. (citing L.C., 23 So. 3d at 1218).
265. Id.
266. Statewide Guardian ad Litem Office v. State Att'y Twentieth Judicial Circuit, 55 So.
3d 747, 749 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
267. Dep't of Children & Families v. D.B.D., 42 So. 3d 916, 917-20 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2010).
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I. INTRODUCTION
On April 14, 2011, the Supreme Court of Florida made a final decision
on Jardines v. State (Jardines III),' ending an issue split in the Florida Dis-
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1. 36 Fla. L. Weekly S147 (Apr. 14, 2011).
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trict Courts of Appeal. 2 Jardines III stemmed from an appeal by the defen-
dant seeking to quash evidence that was seized due to a search warrant.3 In
its holding, the court held that, contrary to other decisions by the First and
Third District Courts of Appeal of Florida, a "sniff test" conducted at the
front door of a home is a search that is protected under the Fourth Amend-
ment.4 In order for the test to be conducted, probable cause-and not rea-
sonable suspicion-must be met for any search to be constitutional.
In the lower court decision by the Third District Court of Appeal, which
was overturned by the Supreme Court of Florida, the court held that a person
does not have a right of privacy involving contraband, and therefore, a "sniff
test" does not fall under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 6 The split
had been created between the third district and the fourth district, which
found in State v. Rabb (Rabb II)' that a "sniff test" is a search under the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.8 However, the Supreme Court of the
United States reversed and remanded Rabb II back to the fourth district in
light of its decision in Illinois v. Caballes.'o In its holding in Caballes, the
Supreme Court stated that during a lawful traffic stop, the use of a narcotics-
detection dog is not a search under the Fourth Amendment when conducted
by a newly arrived officer to the scene." This case was part of a line of deci-
sions by the Supreme Court of the United States to hold that the use of a nar-
cotics dog to sniff out narcotics is not a search under the Fourth Amendment
because a person has no legitimate privacy interest in contraband.12
At the same time, in some lower courts' eyes, there have been decisions
by the Supreme Court of the United States that have created a different im-
pression of a dog sniff test, especially of a private residence from the front
step.13 In particular, the key decision of Kyllo v. United States 4 has been
seen by lower courts as a reinforcement of the protection of the inside of a
2. Id. at SI 47.
3. Id.
4. Id. at S147, S148 n.3.
5. Id. at SI47.
6. See State v. Jardines (Jardines 1), 9 So. 3d 1, 4 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008), review
granted, 3 So. 3d 1246 (Fla. 2009), and quashed by 36 Fla. L. Weekly S147 (Apr. 14, 2011).
7. 920 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
8. Id. at 192; see also Jardines 1, 9 So. 3d at 10.
9. Florida v. Rabb (Rabb 1), 544 U.S. 1028, 1028 (2005), substituted by, 920 So. 2d
1175 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
10. 543 U.S. 405 (2005).
11. Id.at410.
12. Id. at 409 (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983)).
13. Rabb II, 920 So. 2d at 1182-83 (interpreting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29-
31 (2001)).
14. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
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home from arbitrary government intrusion." However, the Supreme Court
of the United States distinguished Caballes from Kyllo, which has caused
many lower courts to come to completely different conclusions on a dog
sniff of a private residence, including the different appellate courts of Flori-
da.16
This article will first discuss the cases decided by the Supreme Court of
the United States that evolved the law of the Fourth Amendment and the
legality of a dog sniff for contraband. The next section will analyze the dif-
ferent decisions by the appellate courts in Florida on whether a dog sniff is a
search under the Fourth Amendment. The third section will dissect the deci-
sion by the Supreme Court of Florida that ended the district court split. Fi-
nally, the last section will explain why this is probably not in accord with
what the Supreme Court of the United States would decide if and when the
Court finally accepts a case involving a dog sniff of a private residence from
the front step.
I. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
The decisions by the highest court of the United States have had an im-
pact on the diverging results of lower courts on the issue of a dog sniff of a
private residence from the front step of the home." The Supreme Court of
the United States has only addressed the issue of a dog sniff of areas not in-
volving the home.' 8 Because of this, when resolving the issue of a dog sniff
of a private residence, lower courts have combined the holdings of multiple
cases in order to formulate specific rules for these new cases.'
A. Initial Fourth Amendment Cases
Before Katz v. United States, 20 the Supreme Court of the United States
used a trespass theory to decide if a person's rights under the Fourth
Amendment had been violated. 2' The Court would ask if an individual's
15. Rabb II, 920 So. 2d at 1182-83 (citing Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29-31).
16. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409-10; Jardines 1, 9 So. 3d at 10.
17. See Jardines I, 9 So. 3d at 10.
18. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410; United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
19. See Rabb II, 920 So. 2d at 1183-85.
20. 389 U.S. 347 (1967), superseded by statute, Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520.
21. Timothy C. MacDonnell, Orwellian Ramifications: The Contraband Exception to the
Fourth Amendment, 41 U. MEM. L. REv. 299, 304 (2010).
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person, papers, house or effects had been physically invaded.22 In Olmstead
v. United States, 23 the Court addressed the issue of "whether the use of evi-
dence of private telephone conversations between the defendants and others,
intercepted by means of wire tapping, amounted to a violation of the Fourth .
. . Amendment[]." 24 The Court focused on how the Fourth Amendment spe-
cifically mentions only "material things," and therefore, the wiretapping was
not a search because it only involved use of the senses to detect a non-
material item.25
"In Katz, the Supreme Court overruled the trespass theory and replaced
it with the reasonable expectation of privacy theory."26 The majority focused
on the idea that the Fourth Amendment does not create "constitutionally pro-
tected area[s]- . the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places."27
However, it was Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz that created the
presently used test for Fourth Amendment searches and seizures.28 The test
has a two-fold requirement: First, the person needs to have shown an actual
and subjective expectation of privacy, and second, this expectation must be
recognized as reasonable by society. 29 This two-fold test has been asked in
the shorthand: "Did the defendant have a reasonable expectation of priva-
cy?"30 One of the unusual times in which the Court has considered whether
an action is a search under the Fourth Amendment is when a dog sniff was
used to detect for narcotics.
B. Supreme Court Cases Relied Upon by Lower Courts
1. First Dog Sniff Case
The Court first addressed the issue of a dog sniff as a search in United
States v. Place.32 "[The] Court addressed the issue of whether police, based
on reasonable suspicion, could temporarily seize a piece of luggage at an
22. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
23. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
24. Id. at 455.
25. Id. at 464.
26. MacDonnell, supra note 21, at 304.
27. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
28. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
29. Id.
30. MacDonnell, supra note 21, at 307-08.
31. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 699 (1983).
32. 462 U.S. 696, 699 (1983).
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airport and then subject the luggage to a 'sniff test' by a drug detection
dog."33 In Place, federal agents met the defendant at the La Guardia Airport
on information they received from the Miami police. 34 However, upon the
request for his luggage, Place refused the search.35 Still, the agents retrieved
the bags from him and told him they would obtain a search warrant for the
luggage. 36 The agents held the bags for ninety minutes as they drove to
another airport for a drug detection dog to sniff the luggage, which alerted
the dog positively to the presence of narcotics." On Monday, the agents
received a probable cause warrant to open and physically search the lug-
gage.38 The Court held the retention of the luggage for ninety minutes was
impermissibly long.39
However, the Court went further and analyzed the dog sniff of the lug-
gage in dicta.40 In her article, Leslie Lunney points out that Justice
O'Connor's majority opinion gives a two paragraph citation-less statement
saying, a dog sniff of the luggage did not reveal non-contraband items to the
public. 4 ' This is the first time the Court used the phrase sui generis to de-
scribe a dog sniff.42 The Court stated a dog sniff is sui generis because it "is
so limited both in the manner in which the information is obtained" and the
manner in which the information is revealed.4 3 According to Timothy Mac-
Donnell, this dictum carved out the "contraband exception" to the Fourth
Amendment, which is also known as the binary search doctrine." These
names refer to the Court's reasoning that the dog sniff only reveals the pos-
session of contraband and therefore does not violate any legitimate privacy
interest. 45 Since the Supreme Court of the United States related in dicta the
nature of a dog sniff, lower courts have been using this reasoning that a dog
sniff is per se a non-search.46
33. Jardines III, 36 Fla. L. Weekly S147, S148 (Apr. 14,2011).
34. Place, 462 U.S. at 698.
35. Id. at 699.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Place, 462 U.S. at 710.
40. See id. at 707 (dictum).
41. Leslie A. Lunney, Has the Fourth Amendment Gone to the Dogs?: Unreasonable
Expansion of Canine Sniff Doctrine to Include Sniffs of the Home, 88 OR. L. REv. 829, 844
(2009).
42. See Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
43. Id.
44. MacDonnell, supra note 21, at 302.
45. Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
46. Lunney, supra note 41, at 831.
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2. The Illegitimacy of Contraband
In 1984, the Supreme Court of the United States further addressed the
illegitimacy of an interest in contraband.47 Employees of a freight carrier
discovered a suspicious white powder in a damaged package.48 While United
States v. Jacobsen49 did not involve the use of a narcotics dog to reveal the
presence of contraband, the Court affirmed this thinking by holding that a
chemical field test is not a search because there is no legitimate private inter-
est in contraband.o The Court explained by stating, "Congress has de-
cided-and there is no question about its power to do so-to treat the interest
in 'privately' possessing cocaine as illegitimate; thus governmental conduct
that can reveal whether a substance is cocaine, and no other arguably 'pri-
vate' fact, compromises no legitimate privacy interest.""1 Since there is no
legitimate interest in cocaine, there was no legitimate interest in privacy
compromised. 52 However, not every Justice agreed with this holding.53 In
his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan stated, "we have always looked to the
context in which an item is concealed, not to the identity of the concealed
item."54 Yet, the majority's reasoning of an illegitimate interest in contra-
band still remains in effect today.
3. The Privacy of the Home
Another more recent decision that has centered on the possible illegiti-
macy of contraband is Kyllo. The Court addressed the issue of "whether
the use of a thermal-imaging device aimed at a private home from a public
street to detect relative amounts of heat within the home constitutes a
'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."5 7 The Court ans-
wered by holding that, "[w]here, as here, the Government uses a device that
is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would pre-
viously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is
47. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984).
48. Id. at 111.
49. 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
50. See id. at 123.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 133-34 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
54. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 139 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
55. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410 (2005).
56. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001).
57. Id.
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a 'search' and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant."18 In Kyllo,
a federal agent came to suspect that the respondent was using his house to
grow marijuana, and to determine this, the agent used a thermal imager to
scan the home of the respondent. 9 The scan "took only a few minutes and
was performed from [a car] across the street."' The majority opinion, writ-
ten by Justice Scalia, gave an extensive discussion of the special nature of
the home afforded by the Constitution.6 1 "'At the very core' of the Fourth
Amendment 'stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there
be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion."' 62 Justice Scalia noted
that with very few exceptions, the warrantless search of a home is unconsti-
tutional.63 He stated, "[w]e have said that the Fourth Amendment draws 'a
firm line at the entrance to the house.'"" The "scan was a 'search' because it
made technology-assisted inferencing about the interior of a home possi-
ble." 65 However, the dissent did not believe that intimate details were stolen
from the home.66
Justice Stevens began by reminding the Court that it held .'.[w]hat a
person knowingly exposes to the public' is not protected by the Fourth
Amendment. 67  For a simpler argument, he pointed out that the Fourth
Amendment states, "'secure in their. . . houses."' 68
Just as "the police cannot reasonably be expected to avert their
eyes from evidence of criminal activity that could have been ob-
served by any member of the public," so too public officials
should not have to avert their senses or their equipment from de-
tecting emissions in the public domain such as excessive heat,
traces of smoke, suspicious odors, odorless gases, airborne particu-
lates, or radioactive emissions, any of which could identify hazards
69to the community.
Justice Stevens believed the Court did not exercise judicial restraint and
crafted a new rule that encompassed too much, including a dog sniff being
58. Id. at 40.
59. Id. at 29.
60. Id. at 30.
61. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29, 31.
62. Id. (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 40 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980)).
65. Lunney, supra note 41, at 855.
66. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 43 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 42 (quoting California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986)).
68. Id. at 43 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
69. Id. at 45 (quoting California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41 (1988)).
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allowed at a home.70 In response to Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion,
Justice Scalia stated, "[t]he Fourth Amendment's protection of the home has
never been tied to measurement of the quality or quantity of information
obtained."7  Furthermore, to say the device only picks up the heat coming
from the walls would be to say the eavesdropping device in Katz only picked
up sound waves coming off the phone booth.72 This decision would become
the case most relied upon by opponents of a warrantless dog sniff at a private
residence.73
4. The Clashing of Caballes
The most recent decision by the Supreme Court of the United States ad-
dressing a dog sniff is Caballes.74 In this case, the Court held "[a) dog sniff
conducted during a concededly lawful traffic stop that reveals no information
other than the location of a substance that no individual has any right to pos-
sess does not violate the Fourth Amendment."7 ' The respondent was pulled
over by an officer for speeding, and while the respondent waited in the offic-
er's car, a second officer arrived at the scene and conducted a sniff test with
a narcotics dog that lasted less than ten minutes around the outside of the
respondent's car.76 The Court started off by noting "that a seizure that is
lawful at its inception" can become unlawful by an execution that violates a
protected interest. However, the Court found the dog sniff did not violate
any protected interest because there is no legitimate privacy interest in con-
traband.7 1 "[G]ovemmental conduct that only reveals the possession of con-
traband 'compromises no legitimate privacy interest.'" 79 The Court also ad-
dressed the issue of a false positive by the dog.80 The Court responded to
this contention raised by the respondent by saying that the tests are designed,
70. Id. at 47, 51.
71. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37.
72. Id. at 35.
73. Jardines III, 36 Fla. L. Weekly S147, S154 (Apr. 14, 2011); Rabb II, 920 So. 2d
1175, 1183 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
74. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005).
75. Id. at 410.
76. Id. at 406.
77. Id. at 407.
78. Id. at 408.
79. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123
(1984)).
80. Id. at 409.
[Vol. 36208
208
Nova Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol36/iss1/1
2011] AN ANALYSIS OF THE END OF A DISTRICT COURT SPLIT
if done properly, to only reveal the presence of contraband and no other in-
terests.
The Court recognized the potential misinterpretations by lower courts of
Kyllo as applied to a dog sniff.82 In its opinion, the Court points out that the
central factor in Kyllo was the ability of the technology to detect intimate
details of a home other than contraband. As stated previously, when done
right, a dog sniff only detects the presence of contraband; therefore, the deci-
sion of Caballes is consistent with Kyllo because no intimate details were
invaded.84 However, the dissent believed there was more than a possibility
for a false positive than the majority believed. Justice Souter pointed out
that an erroneous alert is the triggering factor if there is a search that turns up
nothing but intimate details of a person's home.86
When combining these decisions by the Supreme Court of the United
States, lower courts have been left at a fork in the road, needing to decide
which path they will take.8 ' Lower courts can follow the general rule for
contraband laid out in the dog sniff cases and in Jacobsen,88 or they can fol-
low the Kyllo decision that "the Fourth Amendment draws 'a firm line at the
entrance to the house"' which the Court believes "must be not only firm but
also bright."89
III. FLORIDA DISTRICT COURT CASES
By using the above analyzed decisions by the Supreme Court of the
United States, lower courts across the United States have come to varying
conclusions on cases that involve a dog sniff of a private residence. 90 The
State of Florida is no exception to this. 9'
81. Id.
82. See id. (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29-31 (2001)).
83. Id. at 409-10 (citing Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38).
84. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409-10.
85. See id. at 411 (Souter, J., dissenting). "Justice Souter documented cases in which
dogs were accepted by a court as reliable with an accuracy rate of 71 %, an error rate of 8%
over a dog's entire career, and an error rate of between 7% and 38%." Lunney, supra note 41,
at 862 n.155 (citations omitted).
86. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 413 (Souter, J., dissenting).
87. See Lunney, supra note 41, at 854.
88. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984); Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410;
Unite States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
89. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573, 590 (1980)).
90. See Jardines 1, 9 So. 3d 1, 10 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008), review granted, 3 So. 3d
1246 (Fla. 2009), and quashed by 36 Fla. L. Weekly S147 (Apr. 14, 2011).
9 1. See id.
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A. The Beginning of a Split
In State v. Griffin (Griffin I),92 the First District Court of Appeal of Flor-
ida held, while a positive alert by a narcotics detection dog in a dog sniff of
the defendant's car was probable cause to search the car, it was not enough to
search his person." However, the court reluctantly held this way.94 The first
district certified a question to the Supreme Court of Florida, which stated,
"[w]hether, under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, a
trained narcotics-detection dog alert of a vehicle provides probable cause to
search the vehicle's driver who is also the sole occupant of the vehicle?"95
The court was required to follow precedent established by Williams v.
State,96 but felt the recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States
in Caballes conflicted with the holding of Williams.97 "Our constitution re-
quires us to construe the right to be free from unreasonable searches or sei-
zures 'in conformity with the [Fourth] Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court."' 9 The court
certified the question to the Supreme Court of Florida because it felt that
Caballes intended for incidences like this to not be searches, but thought that
the Supreme Court of Florida should decide since it is an issue that has not
been analyzed by the highest court yet." The First District Court quoted the
Supreme Court of the United States which stated in Maryland v. Pringle'to
that the "standard of probable cause protects 'citizens from rash and unrea-
sonable interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges of crime,'
while giving 'fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community's protec-
tion."' The Supreme Court of Florida denied review on this appeal. 10 2
92. 949 So. 2d 309 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
93. Id. at 312.
94. See id. at 314.
95. Id. at 315 (emphasis omitted).
96. 911 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (per curiam).
97. Griffin 1, 949 So. 2d at 310. The Williams court held that a positive alert by a drug
detection dog did not allow probable cause to search the suspect's person. Williams, 911 So.
2d at 861. The court based this decision on two Second District Court of Appeal's decisions
that held a dog sniff was not probable cause to conduct a search. Id.
98. Griffin 1, 949 So. 2d at 314 (quoting FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 12).
99. Id. at 310, 314.
100. 540 U.S. 366 (2003).
101. Griffin 1, 949 So. 2d at 312 (quoting Pringle, 540 U.S. at 370).
102. State v. Griffin (Griffin II), 958 So. 2d 920, 920 (Fla. 2007).
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B. The Controversial Rabb Decision
Like the First District Court in Williams, the Fourth District Court of
Appeal of Florida held a dog sniff for the detection of narcotics of a private
residence from the outside of the home is a search under the Fourth Amend-
ment in Rabb 11.103 This court ruled on Rabb twice-on the first appeal and
then on remand from the Supreme Court of the United States.'0 The first
decision was vacated and remanded back to the fourth district "for further
consideration in light of . .. [Caballes.]"os The case centers around the dog
sniff of a private residence for a probable cause warrant.106 Information was
gathered from a confidential source that the defendant was cultivating mari-
juana.1 07 The police pulled the defendant over in his car after watching him
leave his home.os Upon pulling him over, the police noticed marijuana cul-
tivation books and videos on his front seat.' 09 The officer performed a dog
sniff on the outside of the defendant's home, and after a positive alert, re-
ceived a probable cause warrant to search the home."o
While the State insisted the warrant was based on the totality of the cir-
cumstances and not just the dog sniff, the district court still did not believe
all the circumstances combined would allow a search of the home."' Fur-
thermore, the court held the dog sniff of a private residence performed on the
doorstep of a person's home is a search under the Fourth Amendment." 2 By
this holding, the court relied on United States v. Thomas' from the Second
Circuit.1 4 As in Kyllo, the court strongly focused on the sanctity of the home
in Anglo-American law."' "[T]he 'physical entry of the home is the chief
evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.""' 6
The court further focused on the holding of Kyllo by analogizing the heat
emanating from the home and the smell of marijuana that reached the ca-
103. Rabb II, 920 So. 2d 1175, 1192 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Williams v. State, 911
So. 2d 861, 861 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (per curiam).
104. Rabb II, 920 So. 2d at 1177.
105. Rabb 1, 544 U.S. 1028, 1028 (2005), substituted by 920 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 2006).
106. Rabb II, 920 So. 2d at 178.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1179.
111. Rabb II, 920 So. 2d at 1179-80.
112. Id. at 1192.
113. 757 F.2d 1359 (2d Cir. 1985).
114. Rabb II, 920 So. 2d at 1184.
115. Seeid.at1182-83.
116. Id. at 1182 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980)).
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nine's nose on the doorstep.'" In the court's view, the smell of marijuana
originating from the inside of the home was just an intimate a detail as the
heat emanating from the home in Kyllo."'
Because of precedent set by the Supreme Court of the United States and
prior decisions of the Florida district courts of appeal, the fourth district was
forced to distinguish multiple cases that held a dog sniff of the outside of a
private residence was not a search under the Fourth Amendment.' 19 First, the
court distinguished this case from Place.120 While the subject of the dog
sniff in Place was luggage, the court thought that a private residence is very
different both in physical characteristics and in protection granted by law,
especially historically.12' A decision by the Fifth District Court of Appeal of
Florida was slightly harder to overcome.122 Nelson v. State2 3 1involved a dog
sniff in a hotel hallway.124 The court distinguished this case from the one at
hand by stating that a hotel guest expects people to be in the hallways more
than one expects a person to be on the doorstep of his or her private resi-
dence.125
However, the most important distinction the Rabb II court was forced to
make relates to the reason the Supreme Court of the United States re-
manded.126 The Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida felt this was dif-
ferent from Caballes because the issue was not a dog sniff performed on a
car, as it was in Caballes, but the issue was a dog sniff performed on a
home.127 Most importantly, the Rabb II court believed that case law is "not
developed in a vacuum."' 2 ' Every case is situation-sensitive.129 As the ma-
jority opinion pointed out, the expectation of privacy is analyzed based on
the place, not the item being retrieved from inside, as the dissent did.'30 Both
of those actions, looking at the expectation of privacy of the item and not
evolving case law as it pertains to special circumstances, will lead to a slip-
pery slope in the majority's view.131
117. Id. at 1183.
118. Id. at 1184-85.
119. Rabb 11, 920 So. 2d at 1185-86.
120. Id. at 1183-84.
121. Id.at1l84.
122. Id. at 1185.
123. 867 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
124. Id. at 535.
125. Rabb II, 920 So. 2d at 1187.
126. See id. at 1189.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Rabb II, 920 So. 2d at 1190.
131. Id.
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Believing the majority created a "schizophrenic" law, the dissent had
much to say.13 2 "[B]ecause a house is neither luggage in an airport nor a car
by the side of the road, a dog sniff at the front door of a house is a Fourth
Amendment search." 33 Just as the majority believed the dissent was focus-
ing on the incorrect area, the dissent believed the majority misinterpreted the
turning factor in the decisions of dog sniff cases by the Supreme Court of the
United States.134 "Neither of the Supreme Court's dog sniff cases turns on
the location of the sniff. Both cases are based on the unique nature of the
canine nose."' 35 While the Supreme Court of the United States did state the
place in its ruling, such as luggage or a car, the main reasoning for the Su-
preme Court of the United States in these prior decisions of dog sniff was the
fact that a sniff only discloses the presence of contraband. 3 6 "If the posses-
sion of narcotics in an automobile or a suitcase is illegitimate, so too is the
possession of narcotics in a home."' 3 7 Moving beyond the dog sniff cases
considered by the Supreme Court of the United States, the dissent also
brought up Jacobsen.'3 8 In that case, the Court defined a search as occurring
"when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasona-
ble is infringed." 9 "A chemical test that merely discloses whether or not a
particular substance is cocaine does not compromise any legitimate interest
in privacy."l 40 Lastly, the dissent wanted to draw attention to the lack of
critical analysis the majority gave to the Caballes decision.14' The Supreme
Court of the United States distinguished Caballes from Kyllo by focusing on
the fact that the thermal-imaging device could detect lawful activity.14 2 As
stated before by the Court in the federal dog sniff cases, a drug detection dog
does not detect lawful activity-it only detects the unlawful possession of
contraband. 143
132. Id. at 1203 (Gross, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 1193.
134. Id. at 1197.
135. Rabb II, 920 So. 2d at 193.
136. See id.
137. Fitzgerald v. State, 837 A.2d 989, 1030 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003).
138. Rabb II, 920 So. 2d at 1197 (Gross, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Jacobsen,
466 U.S. 109 (1984)).
139. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113.
140. Id. at 123.
141. Rabb II, 920 So. 2d at 1199 (Gross, J., dissenting).
142. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409-10 (2005) (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27, 35-36 (2001)).
143. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
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C. Post-Rabb Decision
The different outcome in Rabb II incited another certified question to be
sent to the Supreme Court of Florida.'" The First District Court of Appeal of
Florida certified a conflict with Rabb II in Stabler v. State.145 In Stabler,
officers initiated a surveillance based on a tip and followed the suspect as he
was leaving his home.'" Upon stopping the suspect in his car, the officers
performed a dog sniff around the exterior of the car, whereupon a bottle of
liquid codeine was found.147  At the same time, officers at the suspect's
girlfriend's home had a detection dog sniff the outside of the home from the
front door of the apartment.'4 8 The dog alerted positively to the presence of
narcotics in the private residence.149 Based on these two happenings, the
officers obtained a probable cause search warrant and physically searched
the home.150 The deference given to the dog sniff cases decided upon by the
Supreme Court of the United States and by the court in Stabler was much
greater than that of the court in Rabb II.'5 ' The court stated, "[c]onsidering
that Caballes and Place represent the only two cases in which the Court has
endeavored to address the dog sniff issue, the reasoning espoused therein is
controlling and must guide this Court's ruling in th[is] instant case." 5 2 Also,
the court did not believe Kyllo was a controlling factor.'53 "'Critical to that
decision was the fact that the device was [also] capable of detecting lawful
activity ....
These cases represent an established pattern in the appellate courts of
Florida.'"' These cases represent two sides that interpreted very binding and
valid precedent established by the Supreme Court of the United States.156
144. See Stabler v. State, 990 So. 2d 1258, 1263 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
145. 990 So. 2d 1258, 1263 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Rabb II, 920 So. 2d at
1192).
146. Id. at 1258-59.
147. Id. at 1259.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Stabler, 990 So. 2d at 1259.
151. Compare id. at 1261 with Rabb II, 920 So. 2d 1175, 1184 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2006).
152. Stabler, 990 So. 2d at 1260.
153. See id. at 1261-62.
154. Id. at 1261 (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005)) (alteration in
original).
155. See id.; Griffin I, 949 So. 2d 309, 315 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007); Rabb II, 920 So.
2d at 1192.
156. See Griffin I, 949 So. 2d at315; Rabb II, 920 So. 2d at 1192.
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Eventually, these views would come head to head and a winner would be
chosen-at least a winner in the State of Florida.157
IV. THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA AND JARDINES
Finally, the Supreme Court of Florida accepted a certified conflict.'
This time it was between Rabb II and State v. Jardines (Jardines I).19
A. The District Court Decision
In Jardines I, a crime stoppers tip led two police officers to approach
the defendant's door.) When the officers stood at the door, they noticed the
air conditioner was continuously running.' 6 ' A drug detection dog, which
was "positively alerted to the odor of narcotics approximately 399 times" in
his career, was alerted to the presence of narcotics from the front door.16 2 In
his defense, the defendant relied on Rabb I. 163
The Third District Court of Appeal of Florida held that "a canine sniff is
not a Fourth Amendment search."'64 The court relied on Caballes and Place
to come to this usual conclusion.165 Furthermore, the court utilized the rea-
soning from Jacobsen.'66 Because a dog only detects contraband and be-
cause there is no "'legitimate' privacy interest in contraband," a canine sniff
is not a Fourth Amendment search.167 Because Kyllo is the case most cited
by courts that find a dog sniff of a private residence is a search, the district
court needed to explain why it found it to not apply to the dog sniff of a
home.'6 8 The court first began by stating that a dog is not technology-it has
no modifications.16 That is why the Supreme Court of the United States
described dogs as sui generis.70 As contrasted to the thermal imager in Kyl-
157. See Jardines 111, 36 Fla. L. Weekly S147, S147 (Apr. 14, 2011).
158. Jardines v. State (Jardines II), 3 So. 3d 1246, 1246 (Fla. 2009), quashed by 36 Fla. L.
Weekly S147 (Apr. 14, 2011).
159. 9 So. 3d I (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008), review granted, 3 So. 3d 1246 (Fla. 2009),
and quashed by 36 Fla. L. Weekly S147 (Apr. 14, 2011).
160. Id. at 3.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 4.
164. Jardines 1, 9 So. 3d at 4.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984)).
168. See id. at 5.
169. Jardines 1, 9 So. 3d at 5.
170. Id.
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lo, a dog sniff "does not indiscriminately detect legal activity." 7 ' "Just as
evidence in the plain view of officers may be searched without a warrant,172
evidence in the plain smell may be detected without a warrant."1 73 Further-
more, in order to use this plain smell doctrine, the officer and the dog must
be there lawfully.174 The court addressed this by citing, "one does not harbor
an expectation of privacy on a front porch where salesmen or visitor may
appear at any time." 75
Judge Cope wrote an opinion that concurred in part and dissented in
part.17 6 He gave a different take on the dog sniff of a private residence that
not many have considered in the discussion. 177 He believed the court should
hold that a dog sniff can be performed "if there is a reasonable suspicion of
drug activity." 78 Most courts that hold that a dog sniff of a private residence
is a search require probable cause.179 Judge Cope dictated three schools of
thought on the issue of a dog sniff of a home. 8 0 The first school of thought
holds in accord with the general idea given by the Supreme Court of the
United States: a dog sniff of a private residence is not a search.' 8 ' Logically,
a search warrant is not required. 82 The second school of thought is the evi-
dent counterpart of the first-the government must have a probable cause
warrant in order to perform a dog sniff from the outside of a private resi-
dence.83 The last category is somewhere in the middle.'" Rather than prob-
able cause, an officer only needs reasonable, articulable suspicion in order to
perform the dog sniff of a private residence from the front door step.'85 This
idea centers on the idea that "a free society will not remain free if police may
use this, or any other crime detection device, at random and without rea-
son." 86 This is the position that Judge Cope advocated.'87 He finished by
171. Id.
172. Id. at 6 (citing Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968) (per curiam)).
173. Id. (citing United States v. Harvey, 961 F.2d 1361, 1363 (8th Cir. 1992) (per cu-
riam)).
174. Jardines 1, 9 So. 3d at 6 (quoting People v. Jones, 755 N.W.2d 224, 228 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2008)).
175. Id. at 7 (quoting State v. Morsman, 394 So. 2d 408, 409 (Fla. 1981)).
176. Id. at 10 (Cope, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
177. See id. at 12.
178. Id. at 10.
179. Jardines 1, 9 So. 3d at 12 (Cope, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
180. Id. at 12-13.
181. Id. at 12.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Jardines I, 9 So. 3d at 12-13.
185. Id. at 13.
186. Id.
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adding, "[w]hile the denial of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court
has no precedential effect, it certainly indicates that the Court has decided to
leave this dog sniff question open for decision another day."' 88
B. The Supreme Court Decision
This decision was expressly overruled by the Supreme Court of Flori-
da.189 The court addressed two issues when deciding Jardines Ill. 90 First,
"whether a 'sniff test' by a drug detection dog conducted at the front door of
a private residence is a 'search' under the Fourth Amendment." 9' Second,
"whether the evidentiary showing of wrongdoing that the government must
make prior to conducting such a search is probable cause or reasonable sus-
picion." 9 2 The court answered the first question with a resounding yes.' 93
Given the special status accorded a citizen's home under the
Fourth Amendment, we conclude that a "sniff test", such as the
test that was conducted in the present case, is a substantial gov-
ernment intrusion into the sanctity of the home and constitutes a
"search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.' 94
The court focused its discussion on the home and the privacy it should
be afforded.' 95 "[W]herever an individual may harbor a reasonable 'expecta-
tion of privacy,' he is entitled to be free from unreasonable government in-
trusion."l 96 After analyzing the federal drug sniff cases-Place, City of Indi-
anapolis v. Edmond,'9 ' and Caballes-the court concluded those instances
were less intrusive than the case at hand.' 98 The sniffs in the previous cases
involved luggage or a car, whereas a home was more special to this court.199
More importantly to the court, the majority opinion believed the case at hand
created more of a public spectacle and caused more harassment and embar-
187. Id. at 10.
188. Id. at 14 (Cope, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
189. Jardines 111, 36 Fla. L. Weekly S147, S147 (Apr. 14, 2011).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at S154.
194. Jardines III, 36 Fla. L. Weekly at S152.
195. See id. at S150.
196. Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968)).
197. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
198. Jardines III, 36 Fla. L. Weekly at S150.
199. Id.
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rassment to the suspect than the previous federal cases. 2' The court believed
the situation was a much larger affair than a "subtle" sniff test.201 The court
listed the players involved to fabricate the drama: multiple police vehicles,
multiple law enforcement personnel, a dog handler, and a trained detection
dog "engaged in a vigorous search effort on the front porch," all viewed by
the general public. 20 2 The court further commented on the whole scene by
adding that if the resident were home, the sniff could be a "frightening and
harrowing experience that could prompt a reflexive or unpredictable re-
sponse."203 Above all, the court did not believe that the prior decisions by
the Supreme Court of the United States that involved dog sniffs applied to a
sniff at a home.20
What the Supreme Court of Florida was most worried about was police
abuse of a dog sniff.205 The court felt that if the sniff was not treated as a
search then there would be "nothing to prevent the agents from applying the
procedure in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner, or based on whim and
fancy, at the home of any citizen."206 Therefore, the court believed that a
warrant should be required to perform a dog sniff of a private residence from
the front door.207 "'With few exceptions, the question whether a warrantless
search of a home is reasonable and hence constitutional must be answered
no."' 20 8 Furthermore, anything short of a probable cause warrant would not
suffice for the highest court of Florida.2 0 As opposed to Justice Cope's opi-
nion in the lower court's decision,2 10 the majority did not think reasonable
suspicion is enough. 21 l The court pointed to the Warrant Clause of the
Fourth Amendment and said a balancing of interests-governmental and
private-for reasonable suspicion is only used when there are needs that go
200. Id. at S152.
201. See id. at S150-51.
202. Id. at S151-52.
203. Jardines III, 36 Fla. L. Weekly at S 152.
204. Id. at S150.
205. See id. at S152.
206. Id.
207. Id. at S153. Lunney thinks this is the right choice and further combats naysayers by
pointing out that it does not conflict with the idea that having probable cause would defeat the
purpose of the dog sniff and lead straight to a search of the home. Lunney, supra note 41, at
891. Rather, the probable cause is for the dog sniff, not the physical search inside the private
residence. See id.
208. Jardines III, 36 Fla. L. Weekly at S152 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27,
31 (2001)).
209. See id. at S153.
210. Jardines 1, 9 So. 3d 1, 10 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008), review granted, 3 So. 3d
1246 (Fla. 2009), and quashed by 36 Fla. L. Weekly S147 (Apr. 14, 2011).
211. Jardines 111, 36 Fla. L. Weekly at S153.
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beyond the typical law enforcement.2 12 By citing to the Warrant Clause of
the Fourth Amendment, the court is saying this is a search and nothing
less. 213
The concurring opinion written by Justice Lewis takes the majority opi-
nion one step further.2t 4 He believed the court did not focus on the home
enough. 215 He continued by poking fun at the idea that the police officers
could use a continuously running air conditioner as a factor for reasonable
suspicion by stating that most persons in South Florida run their air conti-
nuously. 2 16 Furthermore, he analogized the aromas a dog could potentially
sniff with the intimate details the thermal imaging device in Kyllo could
detect.217 There is the aroma of cooking, a scent from an air freshener, and
even more unpleasant smells originating inside a home. 2 18 "[I]t is inescapa-
ble that the air and the content of the air within the private home is inextrica-
bly interwoven as part of the protected zone of privacy to which the expecta-
tion of privacy attaches."219 While the majority opinion did not focus on the
intimate details of the home, Justice Lewis thought this should have been
emphasized more.220
As the courts before that relied on the dog sniff cases by the Supreme
Court of the United States, so too did the dissenting opinion in this
groundbreaking case from the Supreme Court of Florida.22 1 "[D]espite
statements about privacy interests in items and odors within and escaping
from a home, the United States Supreme Court has ruled that there are no
legitimate privacy interests in contraband under the Fourth Amendment." 2 22
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Polston lays out two reasons why his view
is correct, and these two reasons are rules set out by the Supreme Court of
the United States. 223 First, a search does not occur "unless 'the [person] ma-
nifested a subjective expectation of privacy."' 2 24 Second, and lastly, the Su-
preme Court of the United States has held that, "because [a dog sniff] only
212. Id.
213. See id. at S152.
214. Id. at S154 (Lewis, J., specially concurring).
215. Id. at Sl55.
216. Jardines III, 36 Fla. L. Weekly at S 155.
217. See id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See id.
221. Jardines III, 36 Fla. L. Weekly at S157 (Polston, J., dissenting).
222. Id. at Sl57.
223. Id. at Sl58.
224. Id. (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001)).
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reveals contraband, . . . there is no legitimate privacy interest" that can be
infringed upon.225
Justice Polston addresses the issue of a dog sniff detecting legitimate in-
terests or even alerting a false positive by saying, "'as in Place, the likelih-
ood that official conduct of the kind disclosed by the record will actually
compromise any legitimate interest in privacy seems much too remote to
characterize the testing as a search subject to the Fourth Amendment."' 2 26
Along this line, Justice Polston distinguished Kyllo from the situation at
hand. 227 The Supreme Court of the United States held in Kyllo that the ther-
mal imager was a search under the Fourth Amendment, because it detected
lawful activity that does have a legitimate privacy interest.228 Furthermore,
even though Kyllo is the case relied upon by courts finding a dog sniff is a
search, this dissenting opinion reasons that the dog sniff of a private resi-
dence does not matter.22 9 Neither Jacobsen, Place, nor Caballes center on
what was being searched, such as the luggage or the car.230 The cases center
on the capability of the dog to detect only a contraband item in which a per-
son has no legitimate interest. 231 Moreover, the Supreme Court of the United
States specifically distinguished Kyllo in Caballes as a case that involved a
home, so that the dog sniff would not be applied to that as Justice Stevens
worried in Kyllo.232 It is precisely these two different views of decisions by
the Supreme Court of the United States that lead to varying outcomes which
may not be in accord with what the Supreme Court of the United States
would choose.233
V. ISSUES ARISING FROM JARDINES
According to article I, section 12 of the Florida Constitution, the Su-
preme Court of Florida is allowed to grant higher protection in the absence of
a precedent established by the Supreme Court of the United States that is
225. Id.
226. Jardines III, 36 Fla. L. Weekly at S158 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S.
109, 124 (1984)).
227. Id.atSl59.
228. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
229. See Jardines III, 36 Fla. L. Weekly at S159 (Polston, J., dissenting).
230. See id. at S157. Justice Polston also addresses the humiliation issue that the majority
felt was a major part of its decision. Id. at S159. "Place, Edmond, and Caballes all involved
law enforcement activity by multiple officers." Id.
231. Id.
232. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409-10 (2005); Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 47 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
233. Jardines III, 36 Fla. L. Weekly at S154, S159 (Polston, J., dissenting).
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directly on point to the contrary. 23 Some states have extended protection to
citizens in their homes beyond that of the Fourth Amendment because these
states' constitutions allow them to do that.235
The Rabb court could not avoid the issue as other courts had by
declaring that the state constitution provided greater protection
than the United States Constitution. Article I, section 12 of the
Florida Constitution, which provides Florida citizens the right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, also states sec-
tion 12 "shall be construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment
of the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United
States Supreme Court." . . . The Rabb court focused its analysis on
distinguishing Caballes from Kyllo and explaining why Kyllo was
more applicable to the case at bar.236
Therefore, the Supreme Court of Florida can only ignore precedent es-
tablished by the Supreme Court of the United States when the precedent is
contrary to the case at hand.237 The Supreme Court of Florida, in Jardines
III, tried to do just that-first, by stating that neither Caballes nor Place in-
volved dog sniffs of a home, and second, by stating that Kyllo's use of a
thermal imager is more on point because it involved a home.238
A. Kyllo Should Not be Applied to the "Dog Sniff" Cases
Kyllo is not the proper case to be used for comparison to the dog sniff of
a home. 23 9 The use of the thermal imager in Kyllo was a search under the
Fourth Amendment because the device revealed intimate details of a home
other than the illegitimate interest from the heat produced by the growing
lamps.240 While the concurring opinion in Jardines III tried to take the fact
234. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12.
235. MacDonnell, supra note 21, at 336. For example, Indiana's constitution has the same
written language as the Fourth Amendment, but an appeals court of Indiana has interpreted its
constitution as allowing greater protection. Id. The court states the highest court of Indiana
'explicitly rejected the expectation of privacy as a test of the reasonableness of a search or
seizure."' Id. (quoting Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 359 (Ind. 2005)). In this case, the
greater protection is treating a dog sniff of a private residence from the front porch of the
home as a search under the Fourth Amendment. Id.
236. Id. at 341-42 (quoting FLA. CONST. art I, § 12).
237. MacDonnell, supra note 21, at 341.
238. Jardines III, 36 Fla. L. Weekly at S 150.
239. Id. at S159 (Polston, J., dissenting).
240. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409-10 (2005) (citing Kyllo v. United States 533
U.S. 27, 38 (2001)).
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that a dog can smell the presence of other items in a home, such as air fre-
sheners or cooking, Justice Lewis failed to remember one thing: this is a
dog."' The heat that was intimate in the home in Kyllo was revealed to a
person.242 A person had to evaluate the heat scan to determine if there was
extra heat radiating from the home.243 The person who must read the scan is
invading a privacy interest, whereas when a dog is detecting the intimate
smells of a home, it is not telling a human: They are baking an apple pie in
there.2'
The rule established by the Kyllo court should be considered when de-
ciding if Kyllo should be applied to a dog sniff performed at a private resi-
dence. 245 "Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in gener-
al public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been
unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a 'search' and is
presumptively unreasonable without a warrant." 24 6 This standard raises mul-
tiple issues. 247 First, is a dog technology?24 8 Second, would a dog sniff be
considered a physical intrusion? 249 Third, is a narcotics detection dog consi-
dered in "general public use"? 250 The first and last questions can be consi-
dered similarly. 25 1 Dogs have been used throughout history for hundreds of
years.2 52 However, Leslie Lunney cites to the White House's Office of Na-
tional Drug Control Policy, which lists detection dogs as "Non-Intrusive
Technology."253 While this may seem to create conflict, the focus then
should be on the non-intrusive part of the title, which leads to the second
254 TeJriquestion. The Jardines III court relied on this language in Kyllo to relate
241. Jardines III, 36 Fla. L. Weekly at S155 (Lewis, J., specially concurring).
242. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29-30.
243. See id. at 30. The federal agent was the person to conclude that Kyllo was using heat
to grow marijuana in his home. Id.
244. Id.; see United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (stating a dog only detects
the presence of contraband).
245. Lunney, supra note 41, at 898-900.
246. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
247. Lunney, supra note 41, at 893, 898-900.
248. Id. at 893.
249. Id. at 898.
250. Id.
251. See id. at 897.
252. See Debruler v. Commonwealth, 231 S.W.3d 752, 758 (Ky. 2007).
253. Lunney, supra note 41, at 893 (citing THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL
STRATEGY: COUNTERDRUG RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT BLUEPRINT UPDATE, at C-1 (2002),
available at https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=343 1.
254. Id. (stating this would create a problem for an attorney general who is arguing the
dog is not technology when the White House labels it as such).
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the dog sniff of the private residence to the use of the thermal imager.255 The
Supreme Court of Florida stated that the information gathered by the dog
sniff could not have otherwise been obtained without physical intrusion.256
On the other hand, the Place court called the act of a dog sniff less intrusive
than a physical search because a dog sniff does not require the opening of a
car door.m Just the same, neither would the dog sniff of a home require the
opening of a door.258
B. Caballes as the Controlling Precedent for "Dog Sniff' Cases
Furthermore, Caballes addressed the issue of a false positive, which
would reveal to humans a privacy interest that should have been protected.259
The Supreme Court of the United States pointed out that when done right, a
dog sniff should not jeopardize any privacy interests in a home. 2 60 This
seems to say the Court recognized that there is a potential, but that it is too
remote.261 In the same opinion, Justice Stevens responded to the false posi-
tive argument raised by the respondent by stating that a false positive does
not, in and of itself, reveal any legitimate privacy interest.26 2 While some
may read this as completely discarding the issue of a false positive,263 this is
probably not what Justice Stevens was hinting at.26 Justice Stevens was not
saying a false positive does not reveal any legitimate interests because clear-
ly, it would.265 What Justice Stevens was probably implicating is the fact that
the physical intrusion will actually be the cause of invasion of a legitimate
interest, rather than the dog sniff.26 6
Some have criticized the Caballes court for going "beyond what was
strictly necessary" by explaining "why the Caballes decision was 'entirely
consistent with' Kyllo." 267 MacDonnell believes that the majority in Ca-
balles changed the meaning of Kyllo from the home being protected to what
255. Jardines III, 36 Fla. L. Weekly S147, S149 (Apr. 14, 2011) (citing Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001)).
256. Id. at S150.
257. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
258. See Jardines 111, 36 Fla. L. Weekly at S151.
259. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005).
260. Id.
261. See id.; United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 124 (1984).
262. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409.
263. See Lunney, supra note 41, at 871 (calling this an "artificial conclusion").
264. See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409.
265. See id.
266. See id.
267. MacDonnell, supra note 21, at 316 (citing Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409).
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is being protected-or not, in the dog sniff case.268 However, the distinction
between Caballes and Kyllo could be seen as directly in accord with other
previous decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States.269 In Cal or-
nia v. Ciraolo,27 0 the Court stated, "[t]he Fourth Amendment protection of
the home has never been extended to require law enforcement officers to
shield their eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares." 27 1 Just
as an officer need not close his eyes when he is approaching a home, he need
not block his other senses, such as smell.272 While some believe that a nar-
cotics dog should not be equated to an officer, dogs have been used in law
enforcement since the constitution was created.273
Furthermore, the protection of the Fourth Amendment allows "the right
of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable
governmental intrusion."274 Similarly, the rule from Justice Harlan's concur-
ring opinion in Katz asks whether the person has a reasonable subjective
expectation of privacy.2 75 Both of these statements from the Supreme Court
of the United States involve a reasonable expectation.2 76 The Court has held
that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in contraband.277 There-
fore, a person should have no expectation of privacy in respect to contra-
band, even if that item is located within a private residence.278 Protectors of
the home worry that allowing a dog sniff of a home will allow officers to
begin arbitrarily sniffing anytime at any home. 279 However, while Anglo-
American law may afford the home more protection, it does not afford that
protection to contraband.280
The Supreme Court of the United States even remanded a case back to
the Supreme Court of Florida in light of its decision in Caballes.28 1 The Su-
preme Court of the United States reviewed a decision by an appellate court
268. Id. at 317.
269. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409-10.
270. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
271. Id. at 213, 215 (holding that aerial surveillance is not a search).
272. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 45 (2001) (quoting California v. Greenwood,
486 U.S. 35, 41(1988)).
273. See Debruler v. Commonwealth, 231 S.W.3d 752, 757 (Ky. 2007).
274. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).
275. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring), superseded
by statute, Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520.
276. Id.; see also Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511.
277. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
278. Fitzgerald v. State, 837 A.2d 989, 1031 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003).
279. Jardines 111, 36 Fla. L. Weekly S 147, S147 (Apr. 14,2011).
280. Id.; Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
281. Rabb 1, 544 U.S. 1028, 1028 (2005), substituted by 920 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 2006).
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of Florida on the issue of a dog sniff of a private residence and remanded it
back to the appeals court in order for the Florida court to reevaluate the deci-
sion.282 If the Supreme Court of the United States felt like it was the right
decision, it probably would not have remanded the case back to be reeva-
luated. The Rabb II court distinguished the two cases by stating that Rabb I
did not involve a dog sniff of a car.28' By stating this, it seems to imply that
the Supreme Court of the United States did not read the issue before it. 28
Kyllo was before Caballes; if the Supreme Court of the United States wanted
Kyllo to apply to Caballes, the Court would have explained that.28" After
quickly dismissing Caballes, the Rabb II court then relied on another cir-
286cuit's opinion, a case by the Supreme Court of the United States, not in-
volving a dog sniff, 287 and a dissenting opinion from Caballes,28 8 instead of
the majority opinion that the Supreme Court of the United States was intend-
ing the Florida court to reconsider.289
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Florida has held that a dog sniff performed on a
private residence from the front step is a search under the Fourth Amend-
ment of the Florida Constitution. 29 According to the Florida Constitution,
the highest court of Florida is allowed to make decisions in the absence of
precedent to the contrary by the Supreme Court of the United States. 291 Feel-
ing that none of the federal "dog sniff' cases pertained directly to a private
residence, the Supreme Court of Florida made an unprecedented decision in
the theater of the Fourth Amendment. 292
However, by focusing so strongly on the importance of the privacy of a
home, the Supreme Court of Florida, overlooked-and noticeably ignored-
282. Id.
283. Rabb II, 920 So. 2d 1175, 1189 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
284. See id.; Rabb I, 544 U.S. at 1028.
285. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005).
286. United States. v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359 (2d Cir. 1985). The second circuit is the
only federal circuit to decide that a dog sniff of a home from the outside is a search under the
Fourth Amendment. Lunney, supra note 41, at 887-88. The seventh circuit criticized Tho-
mas by pointing out that even if Thomas had a subjective expectation of privacy, society is not
ready to consider that expectation to be reasonable in contraband. United States v. Brock, 417
F.3d 692, 697 (7th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 762 (2009).
287. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
288. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 411 (Souter, J., dissenting).
289. Rabb I, 544 U.S. at 1028.
290. Jardines 111, 36 Fla. L. Weekly S 147, S154 (Apr. 14, 2011).
291. See FLA. CONST. art I, § 12.
292. See Jardines 111, 36 Fla. L. Weekly at S152.
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the holdings of the Supreme Court of the United States that a person has no
legitimate privacy interest in contraband.293 Still, as long as there is no bind-
ing decision by the highest court of this nation on a case involving a dog
sniff of a private residence, the Supreme Court of Florida's decision will
stand in its jurisdiction.29 4
293. Id.; United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
294. See FLA. CONST. art I, § 12.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The current trying economic times have put added stress on the lives of
many Americans. This was not an overnight change; it was a change that
happened over years that adjusted the economic condition. The banking
industry is one sector that has direct and indirect effects on the economy as a
whole.' In fact, part of the banking system and its actions has even been
* The author is a J.D. Candidate, May 2013, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard
Broad Law Center. Ashley received her Bachelor of Arts from Florida International Universi-
ty with a major in International Relations and a minor in Criminal Justice and Geography.
The author wishes to thank Mr. Raul Garcia, Mr. Alex Sanchez, and Mr. Jorge Triay for their
assistance in the development of this article. In addition, she would like to thank the faculty
of the Law Center and the members of Nova Law Review. Most importantly, Ashley would
like to thank her family and friends for the love and encouragement during the development of
the article, and always.
1. See John J. Byrne, The Bank Secrecy Act: Do Reporting Requirements Really Assist
the Government?, 44 ALA. L. REv. 801, 803 (1993).
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blamed for the economic hardship.2 However, if blame is going to be doled
out, another thing to blame is the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), along with other
bank regulations that impair banks' lending capabilities and hurt the com-
munities which they are a part of.3 The BSA was enacted with good inten-
tions; however, it has evolved over its forty years of existence and has grown
to have a negative impact on the economic system.'
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has recently proposed a regulation
that would compound the effects that the BSA has had on the banking indus-
try and the economy.' This would have particularly detrimental effects on
the South Florida banking industry and economy.6 The main focus of this
article is to assess the effects that the BSA has had on the South Florida
banking system and economy, and how the proposed IRS regulation could
compound those effects and worsen our economic position. The second sec-
tion of this article discusses the BSA. It discusses the history of the BSA and
the effects that it has had on the South Florida banking industry and the
economy. The third section of this article discusses the proposed IRS regula-
tion. It discusses the past versions of similar propositions by the IRS. Then
it goes on to discuss how the most recent proposed regulation could impact
the South Florida banking sector and the economy. Lastly, this article dis-
cusses how the BSA could be changed to help the economy and some pro-
posed solutions of how the goals of the proposed IRS regulation could be
achieved without this particular proposed regulation.
II. THE BANK SECRECY ACT
The Bank Records and Foreign Transactions Act was signed into law on
October 26, 1970.7 "The . . . Bank Secrecy Act imposes reporting, record
keeping, and anti-money laundering requirements on financial institutions . .
. . For many decades, some form of the BSA has existed.9 However, the
2. See Jennifer Mattern, Who's to Blame for the Recession?, DIRECTORY JOURNAL (July
24, 2009), http://www.dirjournal.com/business-journal/whos-to-blame-for-the-recession/.
3. See Byrne, supra note 1, at 802.
4. See id. at 801-02.
5. Remy Farag, Proposed Regs. Expand Bank Deposit Interest Reporting for NRAs, J.
INT'L TAX'N, Mar. 2011, at 9, 9.
6. Brian Bandell, Foreign Deposits May Be Scrutinized, S. FLA. Bus. J. (Feb. I1, 2011,
6:00 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/southflorida/print-edition/2011/02/11/foreign-deposits
-may-be-scrutinized.html.
7. Byrne, supra note 1, at 801.
8. THOMAS H. OEHMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 92:22.50, at 182 (3d ed. 2009).
9. Interview with Raul Garcia, Chairman of the Exec. Comm., First Bank of Miami, in
Miami, Fla. (July 21, 2011). Mr. Raul Garcia is currently the Chairman of the Executive
[Vol. 36228
228
Nova Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol36/iss1/1
EFFECTS OF BSA AND PROPOSED IRS REGULATION
BSA, as it is today, is a direct result of the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001.o While these measures came from good intentions, they have had
inadvertent negative effects on the international economic system."
A. The History of the Bank Secrecy Act
In 1970, the Bank Records and Foreign Transactions Act was enacted
into law.12 The second part-or Title 11-of the Bank Records and Foreign
Transactions Act is the part that has become known as the Bank Secrecy
Act.13 The original purpose of this law was to have financial institutions
keep records that could be useful in criminal or tax investigations or proceed-
ings.14 The BSA attempted to accomplish this goal by mandating that finan-
cial institutions create a paper trail of financial records." The BSA requires
financial institutions to file a Currency Transaction Report (CTR) for every
transaction-including a "deposit, [a] withdrawal, [an] exchange of currency,
or other payment or transfer"-made through the financial institution involv-
ing more than $10,000.16 The CTR must include the following information:
1) the legal capacity in which the person filing the report is acting;
2) the origin, destination, and route of the monetary instruments;
3) when the monetary instruments are not legally and beneficially
owned by the person transporting the instruments, or if the person
Committee of First Bank of Miami. Id. In addition, he is the President and Chief Executive
Officer of First Bank of Miami Shares, Inc., which is the only shareholder of First Bank of
Miami. Id. Before becoming an integral part of First Bank of Miami, Mr. Garcia was the
Executive Vice President of SG Private Banking for twenty-five years and head of its Latin
American division. Id. Prior to SG, Mr. Garcia was a branch administrator at Intercontinental
Bank. Id. In total, Mr. Garcia has forty-one years of experience in the banking industry, most
of which were spent in Miami, Florida. Interview with Raul Garcia, supra note 9.
10. Id.
11. Int'l Trade & Bus. Dev., Impact of Homeland Security Measures on International
Business in the State of Florida, ENTER. FLA., INC. 2 (Mar. 2005), available at http://www.feir.
org/images/Impact of_HomelandSecurityMeasuresonlorida.pdf.
12. Byrne, supra note 1, at 801; MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
7A-100 to 7A-101 (Rev. 2d ed. 2004).
13. SALTZMAN, supra note 12, at 7A-101.
14. Byrne, supra note 1, at 801.
15. Elizabeth A. Cheney, Special Project Note, Leaving No Loopholes for Terrorist Fi-
nancing: The Implementation of the USA Patriot Act in the Real Estate Field, 58 VAND. L.
REV. 1705, 1711 (2005).
16. Michael J. Parrish, Comment, The Burden of Currency Transaction Reporting on
Deposit Institutions and the Need for Regulatory Relief, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 559, 561
(2008); SALTZMAN, supra note 12, at 7A-101 to 7A-102; Cheney, supra note 15, at 1711; 31
U.S.C. § 5331(a) (2006).
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transporting the instruments personally is not going to use them,
the identity of the person that gave the instruments to the person
transporting them, the identity of the person who is to receive
them, or both; [and] 4) the amount and kind of monetary instru-
ments transported.'7
The CTR is filed with the Treasury Department Financial Crimes En-
forcement Network (FinCEN) and sometimes with the IRS.'" Additionally,
financial institutions must aggregate multiple transactions to determine if the
$10,000 threshold is met.' 9
The Money Laundering Suppression Act of 1994 established both man-
datory and discretionary exceptions to CTR filing requirements. 20 The sta-
tute stipulates that:
The Secretary of the Treasury shall exempt, pursuant to section
5318(a)(6), a depository institution from the reporting require-
ments of subsection (a) with respect to transactions between the
depository institution and the following categories of entities: A)
Another depository institution; B) A department or agency of the
United States, any State, or any political subdivision of any State;
C) Any entity established under the laws of the United States, any
State, or any political subdivision of any State, or under an inter-
state compact between [two] or more States, which exercises go-
vernmental authority on behalf of the United States or any such
State or political subdivision; D) Any business or category of
business the reports on which have little or no value for law en-
forcement purposes.21
Furthermore, a bank is entitled to exempt business customers who have
had a transaction account at the bank for more than one year and who regu-
larly make transactions over $10,000.22 However, in order for a bank to ex-
empt a business customer from CTR filings, the bank must go through an
extensive process.23 Once a customer becomes eligible for exemption, the
bank must file a form with the Department of the Treasury. 24 Then, the bank
17. 31 U.S.C. § 5316(b)(I)-(4).
18. Cheryl R. Lee, Constitutional Cash: Are Banks Guilty of Racial Profiling in Imple-
menting the United States Patriot Act?, 1l MICH. J. RACE & L. 557, 570 (2006).
19. Parrish, supra note 16, at 561.
20. SALTZMAN, supra note 12, at 7A-106.
21. 31 U.S.C. § 5313(d)(1).
22. Parrish, supra note 16, at 561; see 31 U.S.C. § 5313(c).
23. Parrish, supra note 16, at 561-62.
24. Id.
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must analyze the customer each year, monitor for any suspicious activity,
21and file an updated exemption form every two years.
In addition to CTRs, the BSA requires banks to file Suspicious Activity
Reports (SARs). 26  The Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act,
enacted in 1992 as part of the Housing and Community Development Act,
made SARs mandatory. 27 "The Secretary may require any financial institu-
tion, and any director, officer, employee, or agent of any financial institution,
to report any suspicious transaction relevant to a possible violation of law or
regulation."28 A SAR must be filed for a transaction-or transactions in the
aggregate-of $5000 or more, when the bank or its employee knows or sus-
pects that the transaction: 1) involves funds gained from illegal activity; 2) is
intended to escape the reporting requirement; 3) has no business or lawful
purpose, or is uncharacteristic of the customer and has no sensible explana-
* * 29tion; or 4) is aiding criminal activity.
When filing a SAR, it should include information about the financial in-
stitution, what the suspicious activity was, who the actor was, any witnesses
to the suspicious activity, and the person who prepared the report.0 The
financial institution is required to keep a copy of the SAR for five years.
Furthermore, the financial institution is not permitted to notify a person who
was involved in a transaction that has been reported as suspicious.32 A SAR
is sent to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the IRS, FinCEN, and other
government agencies that request SARs.33 FinCEN, which was created by
the Department of the Treasury in 1990, keeps a database of all CTRs and
SARs and makes the reports available to law enforcement officials. 34 "Un-
less requested by law enforcement or a firm's securities regulator, neither a
SAR nor any information in a SAR may be produced or disclosed, even
when faced with a subpoena." 35 SARs are privileged, and therefore, cannot
be compelled by courts.
25. Id. at 562; see 31 U.S.C. § 5313(e)(5).
26. Parrish, supra note 16, at 562.
27. SALTZMAN, supra note 12, at 7A-103; Matthew S. Morgan, Money Laundering: The
American Law and its Global Influence, 3 NAFTA L. & Bus. REV. AM. 24, 41, 44-45 (1997).
28. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(1).
29. OEHMKE, supra note 8, at 182; Parrish, supra note 16, at 562-63; SALTZMAN, supra
note 12, at 7A-107.
30. Morgan, supra note 27, at 45.
31. Id. at 46.
32. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(2)(A)(i); OEHMKE, supra note 8, at 182.
33. Lee, supra note 18, at 571.
34. Cheney, supra note 15, at 1712.
35. OEHMKE, supra note 8, at 182-83.
36. See id at 183.
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On top of CTRs and SARs, banks were expected to have a "know-your-
customer (KYC) program[]."37 The bank personnel had to take reasonable
care to know the identity of each of their customers, know the true owners of
all accounts, acquire identification information on all new customers, obtain
evidence of the identity of any person who wants to conduct a transaction,
and make a note of any unusual departure from a customer's normal activi-
ties.38 This KYC program was eventually withdrawn and later replaced with
customer due diligence.39
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 changed all facets of life in
America. This includes the banking industry.40 Following the September
11th terrorist attacks, on September 24, 2001, President George W. Bush
issued the Terrorist Financing Executive Order.4 1 The purpose of this execu-
tive order was to "'starve terrorists of funding, turn them against each other,
rout them out of their safe hiding places, and bring them to justice."' 4 2 The
executive order was codified as the Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism
Act-the Patriot Act.43 The main purposes of the Patriot Act "were '[t]o
deter and punish [domestic and foreign] terrorists acts . . . [and] to enhance
law enforcement investigatory tools."'" The Patriot Act augmented the re-
quirements of the BSA. 45 Before the Patriot Act, the BSA "was not as for-
malized as it [became after] the Patriot Act."4 6 The Patriot Act was meant to
eradicate money laundering because Congress had uncovered that money
laundering had helped to fund the terrorist activities. 47 The Patriot Act ex-
panded the reporting requirements that were already required by BSA.48
37. See Morgan, supra note 27, at 47.
38. Id.
39. JEFFREY TORP, CUSTOMER IDENTIFICATION COMPLIANCE TOOLKIT 3.10 (rev. ed. 2009).
40. See, e.g., Cheney, supra note 15, at 1715.
41. Id.
42. Id. (quoting Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, Fact Sheet on Terrorist Fin.
Exec. Order (Sept. 24, 2001) available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/
releases/2001/09/print/20010924-2.html).
43. Norma J. Williams, 2007 Update on the USA Patriot Act and Executive Order 13224
in, COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE FINANCING 2008: WHAT BORROWERS & LENDERS NEED TO
KNoW Now, at 43, 49 (PLI Real Estate L. & Prac. Course Handbook Ser. No. 549, 2008);
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 1, 115 Stat. 272-402 (2001) [hereinafter
Patriot Act].
44. Williams, supra note 43, at 49 (alteration in original) (quoting Patriot Act, at 272).
45. Cheney, supra note 15, at 1707; Patriot Act § 302.
46. Interview with Raul Garcia, supra note 9.
47. Cheney, supra note 15, at 1707.
48. See Interview with Raul Garcia, supra note 9; Patriot Act § 302.
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Additionally, the Patriot Act required banks to have programs that allowed
them to confirm customer identity.49 The banks are required to confirm the
identity of anyone who opens an account.o Furthermore, the banks have to
keep records of this information and cross-reference it with "lists [supplied]
by the government to [ascertain] whether the customer is a known or sus-
pected terrorist."5'
The banks must each create and maintain an anti-money laundering de-
partment of their own.52 This includes, at the very minimum: "A) the devel-
opment of internal policies, procedures, and controls; B) the designation of a
compliance officer; C) an ongoing employee training program; and D) an
independent audit function to test programs."53
Another challenging requirement for banks is "due diligence."5 4 The
statute states:
Each financial institution that establishes, maintains, administers,
or manages a "private banking account"55 or a correspondent ac-
count in the United States for a non-United States person, includ-
ing a foreign individual visiting the United States, or a representa-
tive of a non-United States person shall establish appropriate, spe-
cific, and, where necessary, enhanced, due diligence policies, pro-
cedures, and controls that are reasonably designed to detect and
report instances of money laundering through those accounts.56
The KYC program was replaced with this requirement for "customer
due diligence." 57 Under this program the bank employee must "verify[] the
customer's identity and [gauge] the risks [related to] that customer."" In
49. Williams, supra note 43, at 50; Patriot Act § 326.
50. Williams, supra note 43, at 50-51.
51. Id. at 51.
52. Id. at 50.
53. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h)(1)(A)-(D) (2006).
54. See id. § 5318(i)(1).
55.
The term "private banking account" means an account (or any combination of accounts) that-
(i) requires a minimum aggregate deposits of funds or other assets of not less than $1,000,000;
(ii) is established on behalf of I or more individuals who have a direct or beneficial ownership
interest in the account; and (iii) is assigned to, or is administered or managed by, in whole or in
part, an officer, employee, or agent of a financial institution acting as a liaison between the fi-
nancial institution and the direct or beneficial owner of the account.
Id. § 5318(i)(4)(B).
56. Id. § 5318(i)(1).
57. TORP, supra note 39.
58. Id.
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addition, the due diligence is ongoing for high-risk customers.5 9 The en-
hanced due diligence required for a non-U.S. person is stringent.60
If a private banking account is requested or maintained by, or on
behalf of, a non-United States person, then the due diligence poli-
cies, procedures, and controls required under paragraph (1) shall,
at a minimum, ensure that the financial institution takes reasonable
steps-(A) to ascertain the identity of the nominal and beneficial
owners of, and the source of funds deposited into, such account as
needed to guard against money laundering and report any suspi-
cious transactions under subsection (g); and (B) to conduct en-
hanced scrutiny of any such account that is requested or main-
tained by, or on behalf of, a senior foreign political figure, or any
immediate family member or close associate of a senior foreign
political figure, that is reasonably designed to detect and report
transactions that may involve the proceeds of foreign corruption. 61
The bank must also have "an understanding of normal and expected ac-
tivity" for the account. 62 This can be confirmed in many ways, one of which
is visiting the site of a business accountholder.63 "[T]he Secretary may re-
quire any domestic financial institution or domestic financial agency to take
such steps as the Secretary may determine to be reasonable and practicable to
obtain and retain information concerning the beneficial ownership of any
account opened or maintained in the United States by a foreign person . . .
."64 In addition, the Secretary may make more stringent requirements de-
pending upon the geographic location.6 ' Furthermore, the bank must period-
ically monitor each high-risk relationship to determine whether any changes
to the business operation occurred.'
Financial institutions face the possibility of civil money penalties if they
violate provisions of the BSA.6 ' The federal regulators and FinCEN can seek
civil money penalties due to noncompliance. If the regulator determines
that there has been a "willful violation of the SAR reporting [requirements]
59. Id.
60. See 31 U.S.C. § 5318(i)(3).
61. Id.
62. TORP, supra note 39.
63. Id.
64. 31 U.S.C. § 5318A(b)(2).
65. Id. § 5326(a).
66. TORP, supra note 39.
67. STEVEN MARK LEVY, FEDERAL MONEY LAUNDERING REGULATION: BANKING,
CORPORATE AND SECURITIES COMPLIANCE § 10.09 (Supp. II 2011).
68. Id.§7.11.
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by a financial institution or by any of [the institution's] officers, directors,
partners or employees," a civil penalty may be ordered. 9 The penalty can be
"up to $25,000 or the amount of the transaction (up to $100,000)."70 A will-
ful violation is not just deliberate wrongdoing." A willful violation also
includes any shortcomings of BSA compliance procedures which are insuffi-
cient to discover a major kind of "suspicious activity, or internal controls and
due diligence procedures" that are inadequate to substantially comply "with
the financial institution's BSA policies."72 Willful violations can lead not
only to fines, but also to criminal prosecution by the Department of Justice.7 3
A willful violation of a SAR reporting requirement may be subject to a "fine
of up to $250,000, or imprisonment of up to five years" upon criminal con-
viction.74 If the violation of a SAR reporting requirement is in conjunction
with a violation of another federal law or within a pattern of illegal activity
involving more than $100,000 in a one-year interval, the person in violation
may be fined up to $500,000 or be imprisoned for ten years, or both.75 Gen-
erally, a financial institution can avoid criminal prosecution by agreeing to
pay civil money penalties and agreeing to make the policies and procedures
stronger.76
If the violation is merely a negligent violation, FinCEN can apply a civ-
il penalty up to $500.77 However, "[i]f the negligent violation is part of a
pattern of negligent activity, an additional penalty of up to $50,000 may be
assessed."78 Furthermore, "[e]ach failure to timely file a suspicious activity
report can lead to a civil penalty of the greater of the amount involved in the
transaction (up to $100,000) or $25,000."79 The consequences for any mis-
take by a financial institution or its employees can have serious conse-
quences for both the financial institution and the individual.so
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. LEVY, supra note 67, § 7.11.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See id.
77. LEVY, supra note 67, § 7.11.
78. Id.
79. Id. § 5.14.
80. See id.
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B. Effects of BSA on South Florida Banking Industry & Economy
The reporting requirements have cost the banking industry enormous
amounts of money.8' These reports were "intended to provide information
with 'a high degree of usefulness.'" 82 Nevertheless, FinCEN and the Gov-
ernment Accountability Office (GAO) reported that many of the CTRs and
SARs filed have no value to law enforcement, and thirty to forty percent of
CTRs filed yearly are only regular, daily transactions by customers who have
had long relationships with their banks.83 In 1975, American banks filed
3418 CTRs." In 1992, 9,200,000 CTRs were filed.8 1 In 1990, it was esti-
mated that banks spent $129,000,000 on BSA compliance.8 6 "In 2006, fi-
nancial institutions submitted 15,994,484 CTRs . .'." As many as seventy-
five percent of those CTRs filed in 2006 were only related to innocent busi-
ness transactions. 88 "FinCEN estimate[d] that [a] CTR requires twenty-five
minutes .. . to fill out and submit ....
The SAR relies heavily on bank employees' judgment. 90 Because of
this, extensive training is required for employees to detect suspicious activi-
ty.9' Additionally, banks are concerned that due to the fact that many differ-
ent government agencies are reviewing SARs, and that they are all reviewing
SARs for different reasons, their demands about what information should be
included makes filing these reports confusing.92 Furthermore, because of the
threat of civil money penalties and even criminal prosecution, banks may
encourage their employees to file a report even if it might not be completely
necessary, just to cover themselves so they do not get cited in a review.93
Moreover, the bank employees themselves are most likely fearful of the pos-
sibility of being fined personally and even criminally prosecuted for not
complying with reporting requirements. 94 With the worry of personal penal-
81. Parrish, supra note 16, at 561, 564.
82. Id. at 559 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(a)(1) (2006)).
83. Id.
84. Byrne, supra note 1, at 803.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 818.
87. Parrish, supra note 16, at 564.
88. Id. at 565.
89. Id. at 564.
90. Id. at 563.
91. Id.
92. Lee, supra note 18, at 575.
93. See SALTZMAN, supra note 12, at 7A-1 05 to 7A-1 14.
94. See id. at 7A-104.
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ties hanging overhead, bank employees may even waste their time-and
therefore the bank's resources-by filing unnecessary reports.9 5
There are considerable costs associated with training employees to
submit the filings and purchasing the technology required for flagging the
suspicious transactions or transactions over the threshold.96 The software
necessary to comply with the BSA ran between $30,000 and $50,000, plus
$5000 per month for maintenance as of 2006.97
Mr. Garcia, the Chairman of the Executive Committee of First Bank of
Miami, a community bank, stated that he believed that:
[T]he government['s] train of thought was that they were going to
monitor terrorist activity by following the money. In doing so,
they, [the U.S. government], turned around and decided that the
banks were going to be cops. And if the banks were not willing to
be cops, which is not the job of the financial sector, then huge pe-
nalties were created and for a period [of four to five] year[s], you,
[the bank], would get examinations and all they were focus[ed] on
were BSA, anti-money laundering, and compliance.
Banks who did not take the initiative and didn't set up the neces-
sary compliance departments, BSA departments, monitoring, [and]
the IT to follow unusual transactions, paid dearly because they
were given cease [and] desist orders-very, very serious penal-
ties.98
If a financial institution does not file a required report, "the person re-
sponsible is subject to civil penalties and [even] criminal prosecution."9 9
This potential penalty to bank employees may even scare them into filing
SARs when they might not be necessary, throwing more resources into re-
port filings.'" This, of course, leaves less for lending, which is what should
be infused into the market for small business owners to help move the econ-
omy and help with unemployment levels.'o
"[A]fter [September 11th], the [P]atriot [A]ct came out, and it basically
restructured the way we did business," Mr. Jorge Triay said of the major
changes that the banking industry underwent after the enactment of the Pa-
95. See, e.g., id.
96. Parrish, supra note 16, at 563.
97. Id. at 565.
98. Interview with Raul Garcia, supra note 9.
99. SALTZMAN, supra note 12, at 7A-104.
100. See id. at 7A-107.
101. See Parrish, supra note 16, at 564.
2011] 237
237
: Nova Law Review 36, #1
Published by NSUWorks, 2011
NOVA LAW REVIEW
triot Act and its changes to the BSA.10 2 Mr. Triay found that after the Patriot
Act was enacted, the banks had to invest enormous amounts of money and
intellect in order to comply with the new stringent requirements. 10 3
In order to set up a strong compliance program, a bank must be willing
to give up a substantial percentage of its yearly earnings.'0 Mr. Garcia said
that setting up the technology necessary, along with adding staff to comply
with the BSA costs his bank anywhere from $400,000 to as much as
$500,000 per year. 05 This amounted to roughly a third of his annual profit,
which now must be added to the operating cost of the bank.1" The First
Bank of Miami, a community bank of $250,000,000, spends between seven
and ten percent of its total expenses on compliance alone. 07
In addition to the costs of setting up a strong compliance department,
banks must pay for their employees to have BSA training.'08 Depending on
the year and the type of training necessary the bank could spend as little as
$900 per day, per person, to be trained if the conference is local.,"9 Howev-
er, if the bank has to send its employees to get trained elsewhere, this cost
could increase exponentially.
Enhanced due diligence is another area of compliance that can cost a
bank incredible amounts of money."o It may even require special visits by
the bank for "high-risk customers."1 . High-risk customers include interna-
tional customers."12 After enhanced due diligence was required, banks some-
times had to make site visits to their high-risk customers, no matter how
far.'13 This actually eliminated a group of customers because it was too dif-
ficult and costly to go visit some of these international customers in hard to
reach or even dangerous regions.114 Some banks actually had to close these
customers' accounts because they would rather lose the customer than run
102. Interview with Jorge Triay, President & Chief Exec. Officer, First Bank of Miami, in
Miami, Fla. (July 27, 2011). Mr. Jorge Triay is the current President and Chief Executive
Officer of First Bank of Miami. Id. Prior to First Bank of Miami, Mr. Triay was the President
and Chief Executive Officer of Ready State Bank. Id. In all, Mr. Triay has thirty-five years
of experience in the banking industry. Id.
103. Id.
104. See Interview with Raul Garcia, supra note 9.
105. Id.
106. See id.
107. Interview with Jorge Triay, supra note 102.
108. Id.
109. See id.
110. Id.
Ill. Id.
112. Interview with Jorge Triay, supra note 102.
113. See id.
114. See id.
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the risk of getting penalized for not visiting these high-risk, international
customers."'5 So, not only did the BSA requirements after the Patriot Act
force banks to spend enormous amounts of money on compliance staff, IT,
and training, but its due diligence requirements also forced banks to choose
between letting some customers go and losing capital, or just spending more
on traveling to some hard to reach places. 16
III. THE PROPOSED IRS REGULATION REGARDING REPORTING OF INTEREST
EARNED BY NONRESIDENT ALIENS
"The [United States] has long allowed foreigners to deposit money,
which earns interest tax free."'"7 Both parties-the nonresident alien and the
U.S. bank-benefit from this relationship."'8  The bank has the benefit of
capital that can be lent, and the nonresident alien (NRA) depositor has a safe
place to invest money." 9 At this time, "foreigners do not have to pay taxes
[in] the [United States] on interest earned" on deposits in this country.120
Currently, under the regulation now in effect-Reg. 1.6049-8(a)-American
financial institutions are only required to report to the IRS annually interest
earned on deposit accounts belonging to Canadians.12 ' The financial institu-
tion must file form 1042-S with the IRS for any Canadian who earns interest
in a U.S. financial institution, even though interest paid to a Canadian NRA
is not subject to taxation.12 2 In addition, the financial institution must send a
copy of form 1042-S to the Canadian depositor.123
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Alex Leary, Florida Delegation Implores Obama: Hands Off Foreign Deposits in
U.S. Banks, THE Buzz FROM THE STAFF OF THE ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Mar. 3, 2011, 1:34
PM) http://www.tampabay.com/blogs/the-buzz-florida-politics/content/florida-delegation-imp
lores-obama-hands-foreign-deposits-us-banks.
11 8. Id.
119. Id.
120. Bandell, supra note 6; David M. Balaban et al., Proposed Regs. Reduce Reporting
Burden for Interest Paid to NRAs, J. INT'L TAX'N, Oct. 2002, at 62, 62; Cynthia Blum, Sharing
Bank Deposit Information with Other Countries: Should Tax Compliance or Privacy Claims
Prevail?, 6 FLA. TAx REV. 579, 581 (2004).
121. Fla. S. Comm. on Banking and Insurance, SM 1344 (2011) Bill Analysis and Fiscal
Impact Statement 1 (Mar. 10, 2011), [hereinafter Mar. 10, 2011 Bill Analysis and Fiscal Im-
pact Statement], available at www.myfloridahouse.gov/sections/Documents/loaddoc.asp
x?FileName=20 I1sI 344.pre.bi.Docx&DocumentType=Analysis&BillNumber- I 344&Session
=2011; Farag, supra note 5, at 9; Balaban, supra note 120, at 62; Blum, supra note 120, at
581.
122. Mar. 10, 2011, Bill Analysis and Fiscal Impact Statement, supra note 121, at 1.
123. Id.
2392011]
239
: Nova Law Review 36, #1
Published by NSUWorks, 2011
NOVA LAW REVIEW
A. Evolution of Proposed IRS Regulations Regarding Reporting of Interest
Earned by Nonresident Aliens
The IRS has proposed, time after time, ways in which U.S. banks
should report interest earned by foreign accountholders.124 The last three
examples were proposed in 2001, 2002, and 2011.125
1. The 2001 Proposition
In 2001, the IRS proposed a regulation, REG-126100-00, that would re-
quire U.S. banks to report annually to the IRS interest earned by any NRA
through a deposit account. 12 6 The 2001 proposed regulation, which was one
of the last acts of the Clinton Administration, was heavily criticized by the
banking community.127 The biggest concern "was that the administrative
burden . . . would . . . outweigh any benefits."l 28 Furthermore, the banking
community was concerned that there would be a negative impact on U.S.
banks, especially those banks with a high percentage of NRA depositors.129
At the time of this proposition, Florida banks claimed they would be particu-
larly susceptible because a considerable percentage of the banks' deposits
were held by foreigners who could move their money to accounts in the Ca-
ribbean or Panama.'3 0 Moreover, some feared that the information attained
under the proposed regulation could be misused.'3 1 Bankers and organiza-
tions, such as the Center for Freedom and Prosperity, and former Governor
of Florida Jeb Bush expressed opposition.13 2
2. The 2002 Proposition
On July 30, 2002, the IRS withdrew the proposed regulation from 2001
and issued a new proposed regulation. 13 3 The 2002 proposed regulation,
REG-133254-02, would have required financial institutions to report interest
124. See Farag, supra note 5, at 9.
125. Id.
126. I.R.S. Reporting of Bank Interest Paid to NRAs, INT'L TAX BLOG (Mar. 29, 2011)
http://intltax.typepad.com/inttax-blog/2011/03/irs-reporting-of-bank-interest-paid-to-
nras.html; Farag, supra note 5, at 9.
127. See Balaban, supra note 120, at 62; Blum, supra note 120, at 581.
128. Balaban, supra note 120, at 62.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Blum, supra note 120, at 581-82.
133. Balaban, supra note 120, at 62.
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earned by NRAs of sixteen countries." The proposed regulation would
have become effective for interest paid after December 31st of the year that
the final form of the regulation was published.'35 The IRS acknowledged
that the 2001 proposed regulation was too broad in requiring banks to report
interest paid to any NRA.'36 To lessen the load on the banks, the 2002 pro-
posed regulation required reporting interest paid to NRAs of sixteen coun-
tries, rather than all countries.'37 These countries were Australia, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.'3
The reason the IRS chose these countries was because it decided to reduce
the reporting requirement to those countries that had a bilateral tax treaty
with the United States.139 In addition, financial institutions could report all
interest earned by NRAs of any country if the financial institution chose to
do so.140 The IRS believed that the proposed regulation would increase com-
pliance with U.S. tax laws and would not put too much of a burden on U.S.
banks. 141
One of the purposes of this proposed regulation was to reduce the pos-
sibility for U.S. citizens to evade taxes by claiming foreign status. 42 Prior to
this proposition, banks were only required to report interest earned on depo-
sits kept by U.S. citizens.14 3 Banks were not required to report interest
earned by foreigners.'" Therefore, a U.S. citizen could attempt to avoid pay-
ing taxes on interest earned by claiming foreign status.145 One problem that
this regulation did not seek to fix was the problem of a U.S. citizen giving
money to a foreign owned corporation that made a deposit in a U.S. bank.'46
Another purpose for the proposed regulation was to facilitate informa-
tion sharing with other countries.147 The theory was that it would encourage
134. Farag, supra note 5, at 9; see also Mar. 10, 2011 Bill Analysis and Fiscal Impact
Statement, supra note 121, at 2.
135. Balaban, supra note 120, at 62.
136. Id. at 62, 64.
137. See id. at 64; see also Farag, supra note 5, at 9.
138. Farag, supra note 5, at 9.
139. Balaban, supra note 120, at 64.
140. Mar. 10, 2011 Bill Analysis and Fiscal Impact Statement, supra note 121, at 2; Farag,
supra note 5, at 9.
141. See Balaban, supra note 120, at 64.
142. Blum, supra note 120, at 584.
143. See id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 584-85.
146. Id. at 586-87.
147. Blum, supra note 120, at 587.
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voluntary compliance by U.S. citizens.14 8 If the proposition had been put into
order, the sixteen countries included in the list above could have exchanged
information with the United States.149 Those sixteen countries could have
learned information about interest paid by U.S. banks to their own citizens,
allowing the countries to impose taxes on that interest."so Likewise, the
United States could have learned about U.S. citizens who earned interest in
other countries that were not paying U.S. taxes on that interest.' '
After the IRS proposed this regulation, it was met with much opposi-
tion.'52 There were many who were concerned that if the regulation were
implemented, then NRAs would not want to keep deposits in U.S. banks.153
Jay Cochran, an economics professor at George Mason University, estimated
that $88.1 billion in U.S. deposits could be withdrawn from U.S. financial
institutions if this proposed regulation were enacted.'" One of the reasons
that a NRA would remove his or her money from the United States, if this
regulation was implemented, is the worry that once the IRS had the informa-
tion, it would communicate that information to the tax authorities of the
NRA's country of origin.'55 Furthermore, if the NRA's home country was
oppressive, corrupt, or unstable, there could be horrible consequences for the
NRA.'56 Wealthy persons from countries like these could face persecution,
robbing, or kidnapping if the information fell into the wrong hands.157
3. The 2011 Proposition
The newest of the IRS proposed regulations, if finalized, would require
U.S. financial institutions to report all interest of more than ten dollars
earned on deposits by all NRAs, of all countries, to the IRS using form
1042-S.'5' Banks would have to report interest earned after December 31st
148. Id.
149. Id. at 588.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Mar. 10, 2011 Bill Analysis and Fiscal Impact Statement, supra note 121, at 2; see
Letter from Bill Posey, Member of Cong., to Barack Obama, President of the United States,
(Mar. 2, 2011) (on file with Nova Lw Review), available at http://posey.house.gov/Upload
edFiles/IRS-DelegationLetter-March3-201 1.pdf.
153. See Blum, supra note 120, at 623.
154. Heather Landy, Fight Over Reporting of Foreigner Interest Returns, 176 AM.
BANKERS 1, 1 (2011).
155. Blum, supra note 120, at 624.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 624-25.
158. Mar. 10, 2011 Bill Analysis and Fiscal Impact Statement, supra note 121, at 2 (em-
phasis added); Farag, supra note 5, at 9 (emphasis added).
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of the year that the regulation is finalized.'59 There are several purposes for
this proposed regulation.6' One of these purposes is to increase information
sharing with other countries.' 6 ' The idea is that this will help to establish
agreements with other countries to exchange information on interest earned
by each country's citizens.162 The IRS wants to receive information regard-
ing interest paid to U.S. citizens and residents by banks in other countries.'6 3
Another purpose of the regulation is to minimize tax evasion by U.S. citizens
who are keeping deposits in U.S. banks but are claiming to be NRAs.'6 Yet,
another purpose of the proposed regulation is to discover foreign companies
that are controlled by American citizens.' 65
B. Effects of the 2011 Proposed IRS Regulation on South Florida Banking
Industry & Economy
Currently, wealthy foreigners have accounts in the United States and
Florida because of the privacy ensured by the banks and the relative stability
of the political system and economy.166 This is particularly true for "people
from [South] America, where there has been corruption and economic col-
lapse[]."66 According to the Commerce Department, foreigners have rough-
ly $3.6 trillion in U.S. banks and securities combined.'68 Furthermore, fo-
reigners have an estimated "$35 billion to $50 billion in Florida banks."' 69
Banks are concerned that the newly proposed IRS regulation will drain capi-
tal from the U.S. banks and the economy.170
159. Farag, supra note 5, at 9.
160. Mar. 10, 2011 Bill Analysis and Fiscal Impact Statement, supra note 121, at 2.
161. Id.; Bandell, supra note 6; Clemente L. Vazquez-Bello, U.S. Banks Fear Loss of
Foreign Deposits Due to Proposed IRS Regulation, GUNSTER'SBOARDROOMBRIEF.COM (Feb.
17, 2011), http://boardroombrief.com/theblog/2011/02/17/u-s-banks-fear-loss-of-foreign-dep
osits-due-to-proposedregulation/.
162. Mar. 10, 2011 Bill Analysis and Fiscal Impact Statement, supra note 121, at 2.
163. I.R.S. Reporting of Bank Interest Paid to NRAs, supra note 126; Vazquez-Bello,
supra note 161.
164. Mar. 10, 2011 Bill Analysis and Fiscal Impact Statement, supra note 121, at 2; Farag,
supra note 5, at 9.
165. Bandell, supra note 6; Vazquez-Bello, supra note 161.
166. Bandell, supra note 6; Vazquez-Bello, supra note 161.
167. See Telephone Interview with Alex Sanchez, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Fla.
Bankers Ass'n, Tallahassee, Fla. (Aug. 1, 2011).
168. Zachary Fagenson, Looming IRS Rule Could Drain Billions in Foreign Deposits from
Florida Banks, MIAMITODAYNEWS.COM (Week of June 2, 2011), http://www.miamitoday
news.com/news/lI 0602/story4.shtml.
169. Id.; see Interview with Raul Garcia, supra note 9 (stating that roughly half of the
deposits at First Bank of Miami are from NRAs).
170. Landy, supra note 154.
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The tradition is that deposits and certain government securities
have been offered to NRAs tax-free. They would have to meet
certain criteria-they would have to fill out forms that [are] ex-
cepted by [the] IRS, where they declare themselves foreigners, and
they are foreigners-not [just] trying to pass as one. And as a re-
sult of that, monies that could have gone to Panama, Nassau,
Cayman, and other international centers, came to the U.S. Banks
were [then] able to use those funds, [and] lend them domestically.
The attraction was always that you are playing on an equal playing
field. Meaning, if you have a deposit in Panama, Panama may pay
you a quarter of a point more than an FDIC insured deposit in the
U.S., but the tax consequences would be the same. Most of the
clients don't mind getting a quarter of a point less if they know
the[y] have the U.S. government behind their investment. And this
is something that made banks in South Florida thrive.'71
Lobbyists for banks have been speaking to people on Capitol Hill re-
garding their opposition to the proposed regulation.172 This includes Mr.
Alex Sanchez, the President of the Florida Bankers Association.17 3 Mr. San-
chez told Miami Today that "[i]t was basically three bureaucrats from the
IRS and they wanted to listen to comments. . . . I suspect, and I'm being
very frank, the people at the hearing are not the ones who are going to make
the decision. It's the Obama administration policy decision-makers."l 74 In
May 2011, Mr. Sanchez went to Washington where he testified before an
IRS panel on the impact that the proposed regulation could have if it were to
take effect.'7 5 The Florida Senate has even released a bill analysis and fiscal
impact statement in response to the proposed IRS regulation, REG-146097-
09.176 In addition, Congressman Bill Poseyl 77 had a letter signed by'all of the
Florida Delegation of U.S. Congressmen in opposition to the regulation. 7 8
Congressman Posey stated, "[t]his IRS proposal is a bad idea that will drive
tens of billions of dollars out of U.S. banks and our economy."l179 He went
on to say, "[a]t a time when we're trying to improve the balance sheets of
171. Interview with Raul Garcia, supra note 9.
172. Landy, supra note 154.
173. Fagenson, supra note 168.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See Mar. 10, 2011 Bill Analysis and Fiscal Impact Statement, supra note 121, at 1.
177. Congressman "Bill Posey [is] a Florida Republican [and] sits on the House Financial
Services Committee." Landy, supra note 154.
178. Mar. 10, 2011 Bill Analysis and Fiscal Impact Statement, supra note 121, at 2.
179. Landy, supra note 154.
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U.S. financial institutions, this proposal undermines that very goal."180 At
another time, Congressman Posey said, "[t]his rule has the potential to be
very damaging to our already struggling economy.... The current confiden-
tiality practice is a major incentive for wealthy foreigners to invest their
money here in the United States, making capital more available for loans to
businesses for expansion and job creation.""s'
The biggest concern is that this regulation would lead to a loss of these
foreign deposits.182 In addition to Florida, eleven other states' congressmen
and women have written letters in opposition to the proposed regulation.183
Florida bankers fear that the regulation could chase away foreign deposi-
tors.'" Mr. Alex Sanchez said, "[ilt's the wrong idea at the wrong time . . .
especially when the [P]resident himself has called for the infusion of capital
to help create jobs . . . . This is money deposited in banks that they lend to
small businesses."18' The Institute of International Bankers is also preparing
to fight the proposed regulation. 18 6
Miami banking attorney, Clemente Vazquez-Bello said, "[t]hey want to
take away our banking business offering privacy and confidentiality," and
also said, "[t]his is unnecessary overkill without regard to the impact it
would have to our businesses and economy." 87
Local Florida banks hold a large amount of deposits from foreigners. 1
These banks include BAC Florida Bank, Espirito Santo Bank, BBU Bank,
and Pacific National Bank.189
Jay Cochran says that he expects the withdrawal of deposits to be mag-
nified because of his estimation of $88.1 billion in response to the 2002 pro-
posed regulation.190 He also said, "given the precarious nature of the U.S.
economy, now does not seem like a good time to be damaging the U.S. credit
markets.".'
The proposed IRS regulation could lead to these foreign depositors
moving deposits to another tax free country that will not report the interest
180. Id.
181. Leary, supra note 117.
182. Mar. 10, 2011 Bill Analysis and Fiscal Impact Statement, supra note 121, at 2.
183. Fagenson, supra note 168.
184. Bandell, supra note 6.
185. Fagenson, supra note 168.
186. Landy, supra note 154.
187. Bandell, supra note 6.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Landy, supra note 154.
191. Id.
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earned to the country of origin of the NRA. 192 If NRA depositors withdrew
their deposits from U.S. banks this could create a problem of the solvency for
banks.19 3 Florida, in particular, would suffer a great level of withdrawalS.194
The departure of foreign deposits could have noteworthy repercussions on
Brickell Avenue in Miami due to its lively international banking sector.'95
This withdrawal of money by NRAs would decrease the amount that could
be lent by banks.19 6 If the banks have less money to lend, then the banks will
make less money, which would force the banks to let employees go.19 7 The
deposits, which are lent by South Florida banks, often to local businesses,
create jobs locally.'98 If NRA depositors withdrew their money from South
Florida banks, this money would no longer be available for lending to local
businesses, and the South Florida economy may be stunted. This stunted
economy would keep the "circle" of bad economic times going as less people
would have jobs, less people would have money to spend, and then business-
es would make less money, forcing them to lay off more people and the cir-
cle goes round and round.
In addition, when NRAs have deposits in the United States, it is proba-
ble that the NRAs will spend some of this money in the United States on
U.S. products and services, helping to stimulate the economy.' 99 However, if
the money is removed from the United States and deposited in another coun-
try, it is extremely unlikely that any of the NRA's money will be spent in the
United States. 200
In addition to the negative effects that the regulation would have on
Florida, it could have personal negative effects on these NRA depositors who
could face kidnapping and extortion if their country of origin knew of their
foreign deposits.20' "'A wealthy family from another country could be wor-
ried about the government seizing their businesses or criminals learning
192. Leary, supra note 117.
193. Letter from Lilly Thomas, Vice President & Regulatory Counsel, Indep. Cmty. Bank-
ers of Am., to Dep't of the Treasury, IRS (Apr. 1, 2011) (on file with Nova Law Review),
available at www.icba.org/files/ICBASites/PDFs/tr06021 a.pdf.
194. Mar. 10, 2011 Bill Analysis and Fiscal Impact Statement, supra note 121, at 2.
195. Bandell, supra note 6.
196. Mar. 10, 2011 Bill Analysis and Fiscal Impact Statement, supra note 121, at 3; see
also Bandell, supra note 6.
197. See Bandell, supra note 6.
198. Id.
199. Mar. 10, 2011 Bill Analysis and Fiscal Impact Statement, supra note 121, at 3.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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about their wealth and kidnapping them ... .'2 In a letter from the mem-
bers of the Florida Delegation, it was written that:
Many nonresident alien depositors are from countries with unsta-
ble governments or political environments where personal security
is a major concern. They are concerned that their personal bank
account information could be leaked by unauthorized persons in
their home country governments to criminal or terrorists groups
203
upon receipt ....
If wealthy foreigners are concerned about their safety or the safety of their
families, they may likely withdraw their money from U.S. banks and deposit
them somewhere else where their privacy could be ensured.
If foreign depositors withdrew their money from the United States, like
many Florida bankers fear, there would be less capital in the United States
for lending and spending.20 Patricio Perez, managing director for RSM
McGladrey's bank accounting practice said, "[i]f a bank lost a certain per-
centage of deposits, it is obviously going to diminish its lending opportuni-
ties and it obviously has to cut down on the staff to service those deposits
and loans."2 05 Additionally, this would create "quite a liquidity problem."2 06
Rafael F. Saldafia, the president and chief executive officer of BBU Bank, a
bank based in Coral Gables, Florida, added, "[w]e use that money to lend
locally to business people who create economic development and jobs here
in South Florida . . .. Money that could be available for local lending won't
be available."207 It would also give an edge to competitors over the United
States.208 It would "put U.S. banks, and in particular, banks in ... Florida, at
a disadvantage."20 International areas like Panama, Switzerland, and the
Caribbean are competing with the United States to take foreign deposits. 2 10
The proposed regulation would give them a competitive edge.2 1 1
The Independent Community Bankers of America (ICBA) wrote to the
Senator with their concerns for what the proposed IRS regulation could do to
202. Bandell, supra note 6 (quoting Alex Sanchez, president of the Florida Bankers Asso-
ciation).
203. Letter from Bill Posey to Barack Obama, supra note 152.
204. Bandell, supra note 6; see Interview with Raul Garcia, supra note 9.
205. Bandell, supra note 6.
206. Interview with Jorge Triay, supra note 102.
207. Bandell, supra note 6.
208. Id.
209. Interview with Raul Garcia, supra note 9.
210. Bandell, supra note 6; Fagenson, supra note 168.
211. Bandell, supra note 6.
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the community banks throughout the country.2 12 The ICBA said that Florida
would have significant "economically damaging reductions in bank capital"
because of its high concentration of NRA deposits.2 13 This would jeopardize
bank safety and soundness, and banks, many of which are already having
issues, would be at risk for failure.214 The probable effects of the proposed
IRS regulation are in opposition to the orders of regulators for the banks to
have more capital available.2 15 Beyond this, the proposed IRS regulation
would be in opposition to the longstanding policy decision of Congress not
to tax foreigners to promote "an inflow of capital that would benefit our
economy."2 16 The ICBA "urge[d] all policymakers to recognize that this
onerous new IRS reporting requirement would be an unwarranted burden on
community banks and would have a direct, adverse impact on investment,
lending, and the economic recovery."217
ICBA also wrote to the IRS at the Department of the Treasury in oppo-
sition of the proposed regulation.21 8 The letter stated:
[The] reporting requirement would likely result in significant
shifts of foreign deposits to banks located in countries that give
more reverence to depositors' privacy. It would not only discou-
rage nonresident aliens from depositing their assets in U.S. finan-
cial institutions but also encourage the withdrawal of existing de-
posits. Foreign deposits in U.S. banks are largely a function of the
confidentiality, privacy, and stability of our banking system.
These deposits are generally a stable source of funds, which banks
use to support their lending activities. Such significant withdraw-
als, particularly in small and mid-sized banks in border states,
would reduce the availability of capital needed for lending to con-
sumers and small businesses. Reducing credit flow and thwarting
economic development in these communities is contrary to the
President's and Treasury's goal to stimulate lending to the small
219business sector, recharge our economy and create jobs.
212. Letter from Camden R. Fine, President & Chief Exec. Officer, to Marco Rubio, U.S.
Senator, (June 2, 2011) (on file with Nova Law Review), available at www.icba.org/files/
lCBASites/PDFs/1tr06021 I a.pdf.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Letter from Camden R. Fine to Marco Rubio, supra note 212.
218. Letter from Lilly Thomas to Dep't of the Treasury, supra note 193.
219. Id.
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Marco Rubio, U.S. Senator for Florida, wrote a letter to President Ba-
rack Obama, and captured the enormity of the effects the proposed regulation
could have by writing:
At a time when unemployment remains high and economic growth
is lagging, forcing banks to report interest paid to nonresident
aliens would encourage the flight of capital overseas to jurisdic-
tions without onerous reporting requirements, place unnecessary
burdens on the American economy, put our financial system at a
fundamental competitive disadvantage, and would restrict access
to capital when our economy can least afford it.220
IV. CONCLUSION
"The State of Florida, . . . due to its geographic position, large volume
of international trade and investment activity, our role as a hemispheric en-
trepot, and our position as a leading tourism destination, is particularly vul-
nerable to . . . negative consequences." 22 1 If the proposed IRS regulation
passes, it would burden the banking system during a very challenging eco-
nomic time.222 It could entice international clients to move their deposits to
other countries, which would be a terrible loss for South Florida and to the
overall financial system at a time when the United States simply cannot af-
ford it.223
One important thing that must happen in order to make the system run
better and to waste less time and money is to streamline the filing require-
ments to remove the burden on financial institutions and reduce filing of
valueless reports.2 24 One way of doing this is by raising the CTR filing thre-
shold. 225 The current threshold of $10,000 was established in 1970.226 The
threshold should be increased to account for inflation of forty-one years. 2 27
Because the threshold has not been increased to account for inflation, CTRs
filed today are based on a relatively lower value than CTRs filed in the
1970s.228 "As the CTR filing threshold has not been updated to reflect the
220. Letter from Marco Rubio, U.S. Senator, to Barack Obama, President of the United
States, (Apr. 4, 2011) (on file with Nova Law Review), available at www.floridabankersass
ociation.com/docs/links/IRS-NRA.Rubio.pdf.
221. Int'1 Trade & Bus. Dev., supra note 11, at 2.
222. Vazquez-Bello, supra note 161.
223. Interview with Raul Garcia, supra note 9.
224. Parrish, supra note 16, at 564-66.
225. Id. at 568.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 568-69.
228. Id. at 569.
2011] 249
249
: Nova Law Review 36, #1
Published by NSUWorks, 2011
NOVA LAW REVIEW
financial reality of inflation, the filing requirement has become watered
down to include transactions of much lower relative value than those origi-
nally captured by the $10,000 threshold in 1970.",229 FinCEN and financial
industry associations' data shows that if the CTR filing threshold was in-
creased, there would be immediate relief of some of the compliance burden
for financial institutions.230
The proposed IRS regulations are not necessary to achieve the purposes
of the proposed regulation.23 1 One of the purposes that the IRS stated was to
improve voluntary compliance of paying taxes.232 There are already practic-
es in order to verify tax evasion by "false claims of alien status."233 Banks
already must conform to documentation requirements to guarantee that per-
sons claiming alien status and exemption from taxes qualify for this excep-
tion.2 3 So, one of the purposes stated for the proposed IRS regulation is
already being fulfilled by a less burdensome practice.235
One option is to withdraw the proposed IRS regulation and to allow the
Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) implementation.236
Vazquez-Bello said the IRS proposal is not needed in light of
a new law, the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FACTA)
[sic], set to start in 2013. It would force all foreign banks that
maintain an account in the U.S. to either say they have no U.S. de-
positors or provide the IRS with information on their U.S. deposi-
tors. Since most foreign banks need an account here to conduct
business, that law would have a broad impact and halt a lot of the
tax evasion .... 237
Congress enacted FATCA on March 18, 2010.238 FATCA was enacted
as part of the Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment (HIRE) Act.239
FATCA "targets noncompliance by U.S. taxpayers through foreign ac-
229. Parrish, supra note 16, at 569.
230. Id.
231. Letter from Lilly Thomas to Dep't of the Treasury, supra note 193.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. See id.
236. Bandell, supra note 6.
237. Id. (emphasis added).
238. Niels Jensen, Note, How to Kill the Scapegoat: Addressing Offshore Tax Evasion
with a Special View to Switzerland, 63 VAND. L. REv. 1823, 1849 (2010).
239. Treasury and IRS Issue Guidance Outlining Phased Implementation of FATCA Be-
ginning in 2013, IRS.Gov, http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=242164,00.html (last
updated July 14, 2011).
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counts."240 FATCA will be implemented in phases due to implementation
challenges to financial institutions and because it is a "major undertaking for
financial institutions."24' FATCA requires U.S. taxpayers to report informa-
tion on foreign assets greater than $50,000 on a new IRS form (Form
8938).242 This applies to assets held on March 31, 2011 or later.243 If a tax
payer fails to report the required information on Form 8938, there will be an
initial $10,000 penalty, followed by penalties up to $50,000 after notification
by the IRS. 244 Additionally, if the taxpayer underpays due to non-disclosed
foreign financial assets, there could be a penalty of up to forty percent.245
"FATCA requires [foreign financial institutions] to report to the IRS in-
formation about financial accounts held by U.S. taxpayers, or by foreign
entities in which U.S. taxpayers hold a substantial ownership interest."246
The foreign financial institutions must enter into an agreement with the IRS
by June 30, 2013.247 Foreign financial institutions must agree to 1) identify
accounts and have certain due diligence procedures; 2) report information to
the IRS about the U.S. accountholders or foreign entities with substantial
U.S. ownership; and 3) withhold and pay to the IRS thirty percent on certain
payments to non-participating foreign financial institutions and account
holders who are unwilling to provide information.248 Foreign financial insti-
tutions that refuse to agree with the IRS would be subject to withholding of
certain payments, such as "U.S. source interest and dividends, gross proceeds
from ... U.S. securities, and passthru payments." 249
Therefore, there is an incentive for the foreign financial institutions to
enter into the agreement with the IRS because if the institution chooses not to
enter into the agreement, the institution would be taxed on all investments
earned in the United States despite the client's nationality. 2 0 In other words,
if the foreign financial institution chooses not to enter into the agreement
with the IRS, it would be subjecting all clients to a thirty percent tax on in-
240. Id.
241. Id. (quoting IRS Commissioner Doug Shulman).
242. Summary of Key FATCA Provisions, IRS.Gov, http://www.irs.gov/businesses/corp
orations/article/0,,id=236664,00.html (last updated Aug. 18, 2011).
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Treasury and IRS Issue Guidance Outlining Phased Implementation of FATCA Be-
ginning in 2013, supra note 239.
247. Summary of Key FATCA Provisions, supra note 242.
248. Treasury and IRS Issue Guidance Outlining Phased Implementation of FATCA Be-
ginning in 2013, supra note 239; Summary of Key FATCA Provisions, supra note 242.
249. Treasury and IRS Issue Guidance Outlining Phased Implementation of FATCA Be-
ginning in 2013, supra note 239.
250. See Jensen, supra note 238, at 1849-50.
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come earned in the United States.25' While the foreign financial institutions
would give up U.S. citizens' privacy if the institution chose to comply with
the IRS agreement, the institution's other clients would not be affected in any
way.252 Rather than finalizing the proposed IRS regulation, and causing fur-
ther economic hardship to South Florida, the government should instead just
wait for FATCA to begin applying.253 After FATCA has been active for a
while, the IRS should re-evaluate the situation and see if FATCA is in fact
helping to force U.S. citizens who have deposits in foreign financial institu-
tions to pay taxes on that money.
Another way to minimize the burden on banks would be to change the
proposed IRS regulation to only list some countries, rather than have the
banks report interest earned by residents of all countries.254 Mr. Alex San-
chez, who is the President and Chief Executive Officer of the Florida Bank-
ers Association, which is a lobbying group for Florida banks, offered this
suggestion to the IRS.255 He explained that it would not be useful to even
collect the information on countries such as Mexico or Venezuela, because
very few Americans even have accounts in those countries.256 Therefore,
these countries, which have high level of kidnappings and extortion of their
wealthy, and which have many citizens with accounts in the United States
whom would likely withdraw their money if their interest was going to be
reported, should be left off the list of countries which banks should have to
report interest on.257 Instead, the IRS should include countries such as
France, the United Kingdom, and Germany, which have better relations with
the United States and would be more likely to reciprocate the information.258
There are other methods to achieve the goals of the proposed IRS regu-
lation, which have less destructive impacts to the South Florida economic
market; therefore, these methods should be exhausted before putting any
more stress than necessary on an already sunken market.259
251. Id.
252. Id. at 1850.
253. See id.
254. See Telephone Interview with Alex Sanchez, supra note 167.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. See id.
258. Id.
259. See Telephone Interview with Alex Sanchez, supra note 167.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The State of Florida has passed legislation requiring welfare appli-
cants to undergo drug testing in order to receive cash benefits.' Florida is the
first state since Michigan to enact such a law.2 This controversial law is be-
ing vehemently challenged by many groups and organizations around the
country and by the welfare recipients themselves.3 The American Civil Li-
berties Union (ACLU) filed suit on September 6, 2011 in federal court in
Orlando on behalf of Luis Lebron, a temporary cash benefit applicant.'
This note will focus on how this Florida legislation can withstand a
Fourth Amendment constitutional challenge. First, the background section
will dissect the current Florida legislation and the state of welfare in Florida
including statistics of the recipients and the effects of drugs on children, fam-
ilies, and employment. Next, the legislation's biggest hurdle, the Fourth
Amendment, will be explained and examined including an in depth look at
the evolution of the special needs doctrine and how it has been applied in the
suspicionless drug testing setting. This evolution of the suspicionless drug
testing law will be demonstrated through cases from the Supreme Court of
the United States and various lower courts across the United States. Fur-
thermore, part IV examines why the Michigan legislation was ruled unconsti-
tutional, focusing on the decision in Marchwinski v. Howard (Marchwinski
I),5 continuing with a detailed application of the special needs doctrine to the
current Florida legislation. Finally, this note concludes that Florida's legisla-
* J.D. Candidate May 2013, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern Universi-
ty; B.S., 2009, Economics, Florida State University. The author would like to thank his fami-
ly for their tremendous and continuous support. In addition, he would like to thank the mem-
bers of Nova Law Review and the law school faculty, especially Professors Joseph Hnylka and
Amanda Foster for their encouragement and guidance.
1. FLA. STAT. § 414.0652(1) (2011).
2. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 400.571 (1999), invalidated by Marchwinski v. Howard
(Marchwinski 1), 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (E.D. Mich. 2000), rev'd, 309 F.3d 330 (6th Cir.
2002), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, 319 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2003).
3. See, e.g., ACLU Files Suit in Federal Court Challenging Mandatory Drug Testing of
Temporary Assistance Applicants, ACLU (Sept. 7, 2011), http://www.aclu.org/criminal-law-
reform/aclu-files-suit-federal-court-challenging-mandatory-drug-testing-temporary.
4. Id.
5. 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (E.D. Mich. 2000), rev'd, 309 F.3d 330 (6th Cir. 2002), and
vacated and reh'g en banc granted, 319 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2003).
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tion falls within the special needs exception of the Fourth Amendment and
therefore, the legislation is constitutional.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Florida's Legislation
Florida's legislation on the drug screening of welfare recipients went in-
to effect on July 1, 2011.6 Under this act, every applicant for Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) seeking cash assistance under the
Temporary Cash Assistance (TCA) program will be required to undergo test-
ing for illegal drugs.' Drug testing will not be required when applying for
food assistance and Medicaid programs. The applicant will be responsible
for the initial cost of the drug test, but if passed, the cost will be returned to
them in their first assistance check.9 The cost of a drug test is estimated to be
between ten and thirty-six dollars, depending on the facility; a list of all of
the approved facilities is on the Florida Department of Children and Families
(DCF) website or can be provided to applicants in person.'o To the contrary,
if the applicant fails the drug test, he or she will bear the cost of the test
without a refund." Further, the applicant will not be able to reapply for
TANF for a period of one year from the date the applicant tested positive or
three years if this is his or her second failed attempt.12 The applicant may
also reapply six months after the successful completion of a drug rehabilita-
tion program.13 The rehabilitation option is only available to the applicant
one time.14
6. FLA. LEGIS., FINAL BILL ANALYSIS, 2011 REG. SESS., SUMMARY ANALYSIS at 1, CS for
HB 353 [hereinafter SUMMARY ANALYSIS, CS for HB 353].
7. FLA. STAT. § 414.0652(1) (2011); Drug Testing Policy, FLA DEP'T OF CHILDREN &
FAMILIES (Oct. 13, 2011, 2:31 PM), available at http://www.alldeaf.com/war-political-
news/93871-2-positive-welfare-drug-testing-5.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2011) (stating drugs
tested for are: Amphetamines, methamphetamines, cannabinoids (THC), cocaine, phencycli-
dine (PCP), opiates, barbiturates, benzodiazepines, methadone, propoxyphene).
8. See Food Assistance & SUNCAP: Eligibility Requirements, FLA. DEP'T OF CHILDREN
& FAMILIES, http://www.dcf.state.fl.us/programs/access/foodstamps.shtm (last visited Nov.
13, 2011); Access Florida Food, Medical Assistance and Cash, FLA. DEP'T OF CHILDREN &
FAMILIES, http://www.dcf.state.fl.us/programs/access/medicaid.shtml (last visited Nov. 13,
2011).
9. FLA. STAT. § 414.0652(2)(a) (2011).
10. Drug Testing Policy, supra note 7.
11. FLA. STAT. § 414.0652(l)(b), (2)(a), (h).
12. Id.
13. Id. § 414.0652(2)(j).
14. Id.
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If an applicant fails the drug test and is a parent, there are two options to
ensure that the dependent child still receives benefits." First, DCF may as-
sign a "protective payee" who will receive the cash benefits on behalf of the
child.16 Alternatively, the second option is that the parent may designate an
immediate family member, which is undefined by the act, to receive the ben-
efits on behalf of the child." Both the protective payee and the immediate
relative will have to undergo and pass a drug screen."
When a TANF applicant tests positive for an illegal substance, the DCF
must provide the applicant with information regarding drug addiction, abuse,
and treatment programs in the area, although neither DCF nor the State will
be responsible for providing or paying any part of a rehabilitation program.'9
At the time of the application, DCF must provide the applicant with a sum-
mary of the legislation, the procedures adopted by it, and all potential out-
comes.20 After being told of the drug screening policy, the applicant can
choose not to continue with the application at that time and return at a later
date.2 ' Additionally, DCF is required to have the applicant sign a form indi-
cating that he or she has received notice of the drug screening policy and, at
that point, the applicant can voluntarily disclose the use of any legally ob-
tained prescriptions or over-the-counter medications that may have an effect
on the outcome of the test.2 2 If the applicant does not feel comfortable dis-
closing prescription medication information at the time of application, the
applicant can have a medical review officer privately review any prescrip-
tions, over-the-counter medicines, or recent medical procedures that would
cause the applicant to fail the drug test.23 The medical review officer will
just provide the applicant's caseworker with the negative result and no fur-
ther personal medical information. 24 This drug screening policy will apply to
everyone receiving cash benefits who is included in the family except child-
ren under the age of eighteen.25
15. Id. § 414.0652(3).
16. FLA. STAT. § 414.0652(3)(b).
17. Id. § 414.0652(3)(c).
18. See id.
19. See id. § 414.0652(2)(i).
20. See id. § 414.0652(2)(a).
21. FLA. STAT. § 414.0652 (2)(a).
22. Id. § 414.0652 (2)(d)-(e).
23. See Drug Testing Policy, supra note 7.
24. Id.
25. FLA. STAT. § 414.0652(2)(a).
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B. Welfare in Florida
The welfare reform legislation of 1996 created the Personal Responsi-
bility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PWRORA).26 This act
created the TANF program, replacing the previous welfare platform of Aid
to Families with Dependent Children.27 PWRORA terminated any federal
entitlement to government welfare assistance and created TANF, granting
federal funds to states each year.2 8 These federal funds cover expenses in-
curred by the state from benefits, administrative expenses, and services ren-
dered to needy families. 29 Additionally, the federal government cannot pro-
hibit states from drug testing welfare recipients or taking away benefits be-
cause of a positive drug test.30 Furthermore, TANF became effective in
1997, was reauthorized in 2006," expired again on September 30, 2011, and
must be reauthorized by Congress in order to continue distributing benefits. 3 2
TANF is not a governmental hand-out, but a program designed to help
people become independent and self-sufficient.33 States receive funding for
TANF in order to accomplish four main goals. 34 The first goal is "assisting
needy families so that children can be cared for in their own homes." 35 The
second purpose is "reducing the dependency of needy parents by promoting
job preparation, work, and marriage." 36 Third is "preventing out-of-wedlock
pregnancies," and fourth is "encouraging the formation and maintenance of
two-parent families."37
The only section of TANF that will be affected by the drug screening
procedures is the TCA program.38 The TCA program was set up in order to
provide cash to families with dependent children under the age of eighteen.3 9
A person applying for TCA under TANF must comply with every require-
26. SUMMARY ANALYSIS, CS for HB 353, at 2.
27. About TANF, ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/tanf/about.htmi (last visited Nov. 13, 2011).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. 21 U.S.C. § 862b (1996).
31. About TANF, supra note 27.
32. SUMMARY ANALYSIS, CS for HB 353, at 2.
33. See About TANF, supra note 27.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See Temporary Cash Assistance: Eligibility Rules, FLA. DEP'T OF CHILDREN &
FAMILIES, http://www.dcf.state.fl.us/programs/access/tca.shtml (last visited Nov. 13, 2011).
39. Id.
257
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ment before cash assistance will be disbursed.4 0 Cash assistance will only be
provided to applicants for a lifetime total of forty-eight months unless the
applicant is a child, in which case, there is no time limit.4 1 Unless an excep-
tion is met, TCA recipients will be required to participate in work activities
or some equivalent.42 The exceptions include having a child under the age of
three months, being disabled, being deemed not work eligible, or an exemp-
tion from the time limit.43 The income of the applicant must be less than
185% of the poverty level, and once an individual is receiving benefits, he or
she will receive an earned income deduction in order to incentivize getting
and keeping a job." Additionally, applicants must either be a citizen of the
United States or qualify as a non-citizen; no matter which category the appli-
cant is in, he or she must reside in the State of Florida and provide a valid
social security number, or at minimum, proof of application for one.45
In the 2010 fiscal year, which was from October 2009 through Septem-
ber 2010, DCF received an average of 39,715 applications for TANF assis-
tance per month.4 6 Of the nearly 40,000 applications received, DCF ap-
proved an average of 6828 per month. 47 The total number of TANF reci-
pients each month in the State of Florida for the fiscal year of 2010 was an
average of 107,023 recipients per month.4 8 As of January 1, 2011, DCF re-
ported that roughly 113,346 people were receiving TCA.49
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. FLA. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES
STATE PLAN RENEWAL, OCT. 1, 2008-SEtr. 30, 2011 18 (effective Oct. 1, 2008).
44. Temporary Cash Assistance: Eligibility Rules, supra note 38.
45. Id.
46. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., TANF:
AVERAGE NUMBER OF APPLICATIONs RECEIVED (Fiscal Year 2010), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/p
rograms/ofa/data-reports/caseload/applications/tanf-fy-tappsrec_2010.htm (last updated May
16,2011).
47. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., TANF:
AVERAGE NUMBER OF APPLICATIONS APPROVED (Fiscal Year 2010), http://www.a
cf.hhs.gov/programs/ofaldata-reports/caseloadlapplications/tanf-fy-tappsapprv_2010.htm
(last updated May 16, 2011).
48. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., TANF:
TOTAL NUMBER OF RECIPIENTS (Fiscal and Calendar Year 2010), http://www.acf.hhs
.gov/programs/ofaldata-reports/caseload/2010/2010_recipient tan.htm (last updated May 16,
2011).
49. SUMMARY ANALYSIS, CS for HB 353, at 2 n.5.
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C. Substance Abuse and Welfare Recipients: The Statistics and General
Information
The TEDS Report is a publication that is published by the Center for
Behavioral Health Statistics and Quality of the Substance Abuse and Mental
Health Services Administration (SAMHSA).s SAMHSA is a governmental
organization "established in 1992 and directed by Congress to target effec-
tively substance abuse and mental health services to the people most in need
and to translate research in these areas more effectively and more rapidly
into the general health care system."5 1 The "mission [of SAMHSA] is to
reduce the impact of substance abuse and mental illness on America's com-
munities."5 2 One of the main goals of the SAMHSA organization is to "pro-
vide[] . . . the public with the best and most up-to-date information about
behavioral health issues and prevention/treatment approaches."5 3 The infor-
mation compiled by SAMHSA seems to be the most comprehensive, relia-
ble, and up-to-date. A majority of the statistics presented in this section and
throughout this note will come from this governmental organization.
In 2008, 7.5% of all people admitted into a substance abuse treatment
facility aged eighteen to fifty-four reported that their main source of income
was public assistance.54 The patients receiving public assistance were rough-
ly 6% more likely to abuse heroin and roughly 5% more likely to abuse co-
caine. Patients receiving public assistance were also nearly 10% less likely
to have completed treatment upon discharge and roughly 8% more likely to
drop out of treatment.
SAMHSA also publishes data about substance use and abuse within
families who receive government assistance. This publication is called the
National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, which is more commonly
known as the NHSDA Report." Their research indicated that roughly 14%
50. Substance Abuse Treatment Admissions Receiving Public Assistance, THE TEDS
REP., I (Jan. 20, 2011), http://oas.samhsa.gov/2kl 1/300/300PubAssist2kl 1.htm.
51. About the Agency, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., http://ww
w.samhsa.gov/about/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2011).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Substance Abuse Treatment Admissions Receiving Public Assistance, supra note 50,
at 2.
55. Id. at 3-4. "[H]eroin (19.0 vs. 13.7[%]) or cocaine (17.7 vs. 12.4[%])." Id.
56. Id. at 4. "[C]omplete[d] treatment (39.2 vs. 48.8[%]) ... drop[ped] out ... (28.3 vs.
20.5[%])." Id.
57. See generally Substance Use Among Persons in Families Receiving Government
Assistance, THE NHSDA REP., (Apr. 19, 2002), http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/2k2/GovAid/Gov
Aid.htm.
58. Id.
259
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of people between the ages of twelve and sixty-four lived in homes with fam-
ilies assisted by the government.59 The focus of the report was to determine
the percentage of members of families receiving government assistance who
used illicit drugs within the past month. 0 Roughly 7.2% of all people aged
twelve to sixty-four receiving government assistance reported using illicit
drugs in the past month.' When the focus is turned to persons in families
receiving government assistance, the numbers go up; 9.6% of persons in
government assisted families reported using illicit drugs, compared to only
6.8% of persons in families that did not receive assistance.62 Additionally,
the study found drug use among persons in families receiving cash assistance
is higher than in families that do not benefit from cash assistance.
D. How Parental Substance Abuse Affects Child Welfare
In 2007, DCF issued a training bulletin concerning child welfare and
substance abuse.M This training bulletin compiled numerous statistical dis-
coveries, which prompted DCF to draft this bulletin for their caseworkers.65
DCF reports that "[c]hildren of substance-abusing parents are almost three
times more likely to be abused and more than four times more likely to be
neglected than children of caregivers who are not substance abusers."66 Ad-
ditionally, "[c]hildren's mental health problems are closely related to paren-
tal substance abuse, maltreatment, and other forms of family violence."6 1
Furthermore, nearly two-thirds of violence from a spouse occurs when the
perpetrator is inebriated. 6 8 There is a lasting impact of spousal domestic vi-
olence on the children who are watching because they are then "50% more
likely to abuse drugs and/or alcohol" after growing up in a home where do-
* 69mestic violence is a regular occurrence.
59. Id.
60. Id. "[I]llicit drug[s] [include] marijuana, cocaine, heroin, hallucinogens, and inha-
lants and non-medical use of prescription-type pain relievers, tranquilizers, stimulants, and
sedatives." Id. at n.2.
61. Substance Use Among Persons in Families Receiving Government Assistance, supra
note 57.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Child Welfare & Substance Abuse: Known Factors That Increase Risk, DCF OFFICE
OF FAMILY SAFETY TRAINING BULLETIN, Aug. 2007, at 1.
65. See id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Child Welfare & Substance Abuse: Known Factors That Increase Risk, supra note
64, at 1.
[Vol. 36260
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DCF gives numerous examples of potential risk of harm to children
when their parents or guardians abuse or are dependent on drugs. 70 The par-
ent may leave the child unattended while seeking out drugs or partying, plac-
ing the child in possibly unsafe conditions to fend for himself or herself.7
Even when the parent is home, the parent might neglect the essential dietary,
clothing, and sanitary needs of the child because of the parent's altered state
of mind due to drug use.72 More importantly, such parents who abuse illegal
substances are more likely to use funds to buy alcohol or drugs, rather than
food and clothing for the child, thus placing the need for the illegal drug over
the child's necessities.73 Additionally, 75% of welfare professionals have
reported that children are much "more likely to enter foster care" when their
parents are addicts. 74
Drug abuse by children is strongly correlated with parental drug abuse.
A child who witnesses his or her parents doing drugs is likely to perceive
that his or her parents are "permissive about the use of drugs," and therefore,
the child is more likely to use drugs in the future. 76 In fact, children are gen-
erally going to take drugs in their future if they witness their parents taking
drugs, because studies show that children who use drugs, more often than
not, have parents who use drugs. 77
DCF gives a long list of ways for a case manager, while on an in-home
examination, to determine if the parents are abusing drugs.7 ' This list in-
cludes numerous and obvious factors such as finding drug paraphernalia or a
parent admitting to substance abuse, however, "[a]lcohol and drug use often
are under-recognized" by caseworkers who interview parents.
70. Id. at 2.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Children of Addicted Parents: Important Facts, HOPE NETWORKs, http://www.hopen
etworks.org/addiction/Children%20of%2OAddicts.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2011).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Child Welfare & Substance Abuse: Known Factors That Increase Risk, supra note
64, at 3.
79. Id.
261
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E. Substance Abuse and the Workplace
Anyone who is attempting to get a new job in the private sector should
prepare to take a drug test."o A study performed by the Society for Human
Resource Management (SHRM) concluded that roughly 83.5% of employers
administer drug tests as part of their pre-employment procedure and about
73.3% of employers will drug test employees upon reasonable suspicion after
they have been hired.8 ' These employers drug test their applicants and em-
ployees because it is estimated that there is roughly eighty-one billion dollars
in lost productivity among American businesses each year because of drug
and alcohol abuse.82 Drug abuse by employees can result in "[r]isk, safety,
and liability issues; [f]oss of production; [h]igher absenteeism . . . consistent
tardiness; . . . [i]ncreased incidences of theft [and] embezzlement; . . .
[h]igher employee turnover; [and] [e]mployee behavior issues that affect a
company's morale, culture, and image." 83 The SHRM reports that employer
drug testing is working in the United States.8 According to the annual Drug
Testing Index, positive drug test results fell from 13.6% in 1988 to roughly
3.8% in 2006. Drug testing by employers appears to be a successful tactic
in reducing employee drug use and increasing company efficiency and will
likely be a continued tactic among American businesses.
F. Recipients' Diminished Level of Privacy and Lack of Entitlement
Prior to being faced with the instant issue of suspicionless drug testing,
the Supreme Court of the United States faced a similar issue in Wyman v.
James.86 Specifically, the issue in Wyman was whether a welfare caseworker
has the right to enter the home of a recipient and whether the refusal of ad-
mission is sufficient grounds to terminate benefits. The holding, which was
that welfare recipients have a reduced expectation of privacy, is essential to
the instant issue.
80. See Kathy Gurchiek, Employer Testing Credited for Drop in Worker Drug Use,
Soc'Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT. (Apr. 18, 2007), http://www.shrm.org/publications/HRNEWS/
pages/CMS_021232.aspx.
8 1. Id.
82. For Employers, EXPERTOX.COM, http://www.expertox.com/html/services/employers.p
hp (last visited Nov. 13, 2011).
83. Id.
84. See Gurchiek, supra note 80.
85. Id.
86. 400 U.S. 309, 310 (1971).
87. Id. at 310.
88. See id. at 317-18.
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In Wyman, the Supreme Court analyzed the issue of whether a welfare
recipient can refuse a home visit by a caseworker and still retain his or her
benefits.8 9 The plaintiff, Mrs. James, denied her caseworker access to her
home even though the caseworker told her that she was required by law to let
her in and that if she did not let her in, her benefits would be terminated.90
About a week after denying the caseworker entry into her home, Mrs. James
received a letter stating that her benefits were going to be discontinued and
was granted a hearing before a review officer.9' The review officer stated
that the termination was proper and Mrs. James would no longer be receiving
benefits unless she opened her home to the caseworker.92 Mrs. James then
brought a civil rights suit on behalf of herself and everyone else in her situa-
tion.93
The Court did not consider the home intrusion a violation of the Fourth
Amendment rights of Mrs. James.94 It was noted that a visitation to the home
is neither compelled nor forced and denying the caseworker access does not
result in a criminal act.95 This instance was not considered a search because
it did not reach the threshold of a search; if the caseworker is denied access,
she does not enter and therefore, does not conduct a search.96 Additionally,
even if the caseworker was to enter the home, the visit is not unreasonable
and still does not fall within the Fourth Amendment, as the Fourth Amend-
ment only protects against unreasonable searches.97 The Court stated many
reasons why the home visit is not unreasonable.9 8 The most noteworthy rea-
sons being: first, there is a large public interest in protecting the children of
these families;99 second, the agency, by using state and federal tax funds, is
satisfying a public trust, and the "agency has appropriate and paramount in-
terest[s] and concern[s] in seeing" that the funds go to the intended party for
the intended use;'" third, the public is providing this funding in a purely cha-
ritable nature and has the right to know how its funds are put to work;"o
fourth, the goals of the program are to help the recipient's family become
89. Id. at 310.
90. Id. at 313-14.
91. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 314.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 318.
95. Id. at 317.
96. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 317-18.
97. Id. at 318.
98. See id. at 318-24.
99. Id. at 318.
100. Id. at 318-19.
101. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 319.
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self-sufficient, to make sure the family has what it needs to live, and to make
sure that the recipient is not merely exploiting a child for personal gain; 10 2
fifth, there is only a minimum burden upon the recipient because the reci-
pient is notified of the visit well in advance;'O3 and sixth, there are no crimi-
nal consequences involved in any part of the initial visit.'" Furthermore, the
Court said that Mrs. James seemed to want the government agency to pro-
vide her family with "the necessities for life . . . upon her own informational
terms, to utilize the Fourth Amendment as a wedge for imposing those terms,
and to avoid questions of any kind."'05
Although the Court did not consider this a search under the Fourth
Amendment, it is still an important case when analyzing the instant issue.
The Court ultimately determined the required visit to be constitutional be-
cause "there is no search involved in this case [and] even if there were a
search, it would not be unreasonable; and that even if this were an unreason-
able search, a welfare recipient waives her right to object by accepting bene-
fits." 06
Additionally, as vital to the analysis of suspicionless drug testing of
welfare recipients, the language of 42 U.S.C. § 601 provides for "block
grants to states for [TANF]."'ov 42 U.S.C. § 601(b) states: "[t]his part shall
not be interpreted to entitle any individual or family to assistance under any
State program funded under this part."' 08 This section removed the previous
entitlement to government assistance funds and sets out further requirements
and limitations of the funds throughout various sections of the statute.1"
Ed. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. In General
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the people of the United States that
they will be free from unreasonable searches and seizures conducted by gov-
ernment officials.' 0 This "Amendment guarantees the privacy, dignity, and
102. Id.
103. Id. at 320-21.
104. Id. at 323.
105. Id. at 321-22.
106. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 338 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1996).
108. Id. § 601(b).
109. Id. § 601.
110. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no [wiarrants shall issue, but
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security of persons against certain arbitrary and invasive acts by officers of
the Government or those acting at their direction.""' "[T]he Fourth
Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional right to priva-
cy," and only covers certain intrusions by the Government.1 2 A search, un-
der this Amendment, is defined as a government invasion of a person's pri-
vacy, and the specific invasion must be no greater than necessary under the
circumstances of the case." 3 The Fourth Amendment only bars those
searches that are considered unreasonable." 4 Reasonableness is determined
by viewing the entirety of "the circumstances surrounding the search or sei-
zure"' and "a careful balancing of governmental and private interests.""l6
In general, searches conducted without a warrant by government officials
require an "unquestionabl[e] showing [of] probable cause""' because the
Constitution requires "'that [a] deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial
officer. . . be interposed between the citizen and the police."" 8
Justice Harlan, concurring in Katz v. United States,"' laid out a two-part
test that emerged from the compilation of prior case law to determine if a
person has a legitimate right to privacy in a given instance. 20 First, in order
to have such a right, a person must "exhibit[] an actual (subjective) expecta-
tion of privacy, and second, that [person's] expectation [must] be one that
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable."'21 Justice Harlan stated as an
example, that a person's home is a place where privacy is to be expected, but
on the contrary, a conversation with someone in public cannot be protected
from being heard by others and thus, there would be an unreasonable expec-
tation of privacy in that instance.122
upon probable cause, supported by [o]ath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
I 11. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 613-14 (1989).
112. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967), superseded by statute, Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
113. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984).
114. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985).
115. United States v. de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985).
116. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985).
117. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
118. Id. (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1963)).
119. 389 U.S. 347 (1967), superseded by statute, Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520.
120. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
121. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
122. Id.
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The Fourth Amendment applies to state and local governments through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 12 3 Additionally, the
Fourth Amendment's "prohibition against 'unreasonable searches and sei-
zures' must be interpreted 'in light of contemporary norms and condi-
tions."'l 24 Justice Black, in Katz, noted that the Fourth Amendment was
originally enacted in order to prevent government officials from breaking
into, ransacking, or seizing a person's personal effects without a warrant.125
The Supreme Court of the United States has often stated that because the
Fourth Amendment "must be interpreted 'in light of contemporary
norms,"'26 the "Bill of Rights' safeguards should be given a liberal construc-
tion." 27 As a result of changing times and technology, the courts are faced
with new types of searches and seizures and must adapt accordingly.
28
B. The Special Needs Doctrine
The special needs exception was first articulated by Justice Blackmun in
his concurring opinion in New Jersey v. T.L.O.129 Justice Blackmun stated
that this exception is only applicable to "exceptional circumstances in which
special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the war-
rant and probable-cause requirement impracticable." 30 In such instances,
governmental and privacy interests are balanced to see if requiring the offi-
cial to have probable cause or a warrant is unreasonable.13 ' When a search or
seizure by the government is found to be within the realm of the special
needs doctrine, there is no need to show probable cause, reasonable suspi-
cion, or to obtain a warrant. 3 2 In fact, "'the Fourth Amendment imposes no
irreducible requirement of [individualized] suspicion."'l 33  Special needs
cases involve:
123. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
124. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 217 n.10 (1981), review granted sub nom.
United States v. Gaultney, 664 F.2d 1242 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573, 591 n.33 (1980)).
125. Katz, 389 U.S. at 367 (Black, J., dissenting).
126. Steagald, 451 U.S. at 217 n.10 (quoting Payton 445 U.S. at 591 n.33).
127. Katz, 389 U.S. at 366 (Black, J., dissenting).
128. See id. at 357-58.
129. 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
130. Id.
131. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,619 (1989).
132. Neumeyer v. Beard, 421 F.3d 210, 214 (3d Cir. 2005).
133. T.LO., 469 U.S. at 342 n.8. (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543,
561 (1976)).
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1) an exercise of governmental authority distinct from that of mere
law enforcement-such as the authority as employer, the in loco
parentis authority of school officials, or the post-incarceration au-
thority of probation officers; 2) lack of individualized suspicion of
wrongdoing, and concomitant lack of individualized stigma based
on such suspicion; and 3) an interest in preventing future harm,
generally involving the health or safety of the person being
searched or of other persons [affected] by that person's conduct,
rather than [an interest in] deterrence or [in] punishment for past
wrongdoing.134
The Supreme Court of the United States has used the special needs ex-
ception four times to rule suspicionless drug testing constitutional13 ' and
once to rule it unconstitutional.13 6
This section will discuss the evolution of the special needs doctrine in
Supreme Court suspicionless drug testing cases. Additionally, this section
will delve into the expanding application of the special needs doctrine by
various lower courts across the country.
I. The Supreme Court of the United States Cases
a. The Beginning: Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n l3 is a case where the Su-
preme Court of the United States granted certiorari to decide the issue of
whether the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) could drug test certain
employees without any sort of suspicion after an accident.' 38 The FRA was
attempting to drug and alcohol test their employees pursuant to the Federal
Railroad Safety Act of 1970, which gives the FRA permission to "'prescribe,
as necessary, appropriate rules, regulations, orders, and standards for all
areas of railroad safety."" 39 The Court held that the Fourth Amendment did
apply to the drug and alcohol testing that the FRA wanted to implement, but
that the testing was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment even though it
134. Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1213-14 (10th Cir. 2003).
135. See Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S.
822, 838 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton ex rel. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664-65
(1995); Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 679 (1989); Skinner, 489
U.S. at 634.
136. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 318, 322 (1997).
137. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
138. Id. at 606.
139. Id. (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 431(a) (1970)).
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did not require a warrant, probable cause, or any suspicion of use." The
Court did not need further evidence of a drug epidemic at this particular
railway station; thus, a finding of drug use by railroad employees nationwide
was enough to subject their employees to suspicionless testing.141
To validate the drug testing of the railroad employees, the Skinner Court
used the special needs doctrine.142 When a court is faced with a special need,
it "balance[s] the governmental and privacy interests to assess the practicali-
ty of the warrant and probable-cause requirements in the particular con-
text."l 43 Here, the Court determined that the Government had an interest in
ensuring the safety of the passengers, the railway employees, and surround-
ing property because many of the railway employees that would be drug
tested had safety sensitive tasks.'" The FRA proved to the Court that it
would be counterproductive to require a warrant or probable cause when
performing the drug tests.145 The burden of obtaining a warrant on such oc-
casions would frustrate the purpose because alcohol and other drugs exit the
system at a constant rate and when a test is triggered, the FRA needs imme-
diate results.146 Additionally, the Court stated that requiring the FRA to get a
warrant for each drug test is unreasonable because the FRA employees are
not familiar with the law surrounding warrants, and would therefore be un-
familiar with the requisite procedures involved in obtaining a warrant.147
In its analysis, the Court in Skinner first determined whether the drug
tests themselves amount to a search and seizure under the Fourth Amend-
ment.14 8 The Court stated that the Fourth Amendment is always relevant at
many different stages and levels when the Government is trying to get physi-
cal evidence from a person.149 The Fourth Amendment will apply from the
initial detention required to obtain the sample.150 It will be particularly rele-
vant where the detention itself interferes with the free movement of the per-
son, if the actual method of obtaining the evidence is intrusive, or if taking
the evidence "infringes [on] an expectation of privacy that society is pre-
pared to recognize as reasonable." 5 ' The Court found that the railroad em-
140. Id. at 617-18, 634.
141. See id. at 632-34.
142. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 620-21.
145. Id. at 623 (citing Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967)).
146. Id.
147. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 623-24.
148. Id. at 614.
149. See id. at 616.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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ployees would only have to give urine samples and that urine testing did not
involve any surgical intrusion like blood testing.152
Next, the Court made mention of privacy issues that could be infringed
upon; for example, the tester learning private medical facts about the person,
as is the case in blood testing.'53 The Supreme Court ultimately decided that
urinalysis "intrudes upon expectations of privacy that society has long rec-
ognized as reasonable" and the testing must be considered a search under the
Fourth Amendment.154 The FRA made it clear to the Court that privacy is
not an issue because they would not be using the urinalysis results to assist in
any prosecution or discover any medical conditions; but only to ensure that
the employees are not intoxicated on the job or after an accident occurs.15
Additionally, the urine sample was not required to be collected under the
direct supervision of a monitor, even though the integrity of the sample could
be compromised, and "the sample [was] collected in a medical environ-
ment," not by an employee of the railroad company.15 6
The Court reiterated its previous stance on the Fourth Amendment that
a "showing of individualized suspicion is not a constitutional floor, below
which a search must be presumed unreasonable." 5 7 Limited instances arise
during a search where the privacy interests that are infringed upon are mi-
nimal, and an important governmental interest is furthered by that minimal
privacy infringement.'5 8 The Court found the suspicionless testing of the
railroad employees to fall within this category because urinalysis is unobtru-
sive and there is a compelling governmental interest in keeping the railroad
employees drug free because of the safety sensitive jobs that they hold.159
The Court concluded "the compelling Government interests served by
the FRA's regulations would be significantly hindered if railroads were re-
quired to point to specific facts giving rise to a reasonable suspicion of im-
pairment before testing a given employee."'a The Court ended its opinion
with a final, powerful statement:
The possession of unlawful drugs is a criminal offense that the
Government may punish, but it is a separate and far more danger-
ous wrong to perform certain sensitive tasks while under the influ-
152. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 620-21.
156. Id. at 626-27.
157. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 626-28.
160. Id. at 633.
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ence of those substances.. . .The Government may take all neces-
sary and reasonable regulatory steps to prevent or deter that ha-
zardous conduct, and since the gravamen of the evil is performing
certain functions while concealing the substance in the body, it
may be necessary, as in the case before us, to examine the body or
its fluids to accomplish the regulatory purpose.161
b. The Skinner Companion: National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari in National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raabl62 to determine whether the United
States Customs Service can require urine testing from employees seeking to
transfer or get promoted without violating the Fourth Amendment.'63 The
Customs Service is "responsible for processing persons, carriers, cargo, and
mail into the United States, collecting revenue from imports, and enforcing
customs and related laws."'"4 Additionally, the Customs Service has the re-
sponsibility of seizing contraband, including illegal drugs that people attempt
to smuggle into the United States.165 Many of the agents employed by the
Customs Service use firearms while on duty because they come in contact
with many dangerous criminals in charge of major drug operations who may
use violence or threats against the agent.166 In 1985, the Commissioner of
Customs implemented a drug-screening program after extensive research led
them to the conclusion that "drug screening through urinalysis is technologi-
cally reliable, valid and accurate."1 67 The Commissioner of Customs vali-
dated his drug-screening program by reasoning that he does not believe illeg-
al drug use to be a major problem amongst Customs agents but that "unfor-
tunately no segment of society is immune from the threat of illegal drug
use." 6" The Commissioner made drug testing a requirement for placement
within jobs that meet any of three criteria: first, any job directly related to
drug enforcement; second, any position which requires the employee to carry
a firearm; and third, if the employee handles any classified materials.'69 Af-
ter it is determined that the employee falls within one or more of these cate-
161. Id.
162. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
163. Id. at 659.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 659-60.
166. Id. at 660.
167. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 660.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 660-61.
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gories, he or she is contacted by an independent drug testing facility to coor-
dinate a time and place for the screening." 0 The employee has the option of
either producing the sample behind a partition or in a stall."' The main re-
quest of the testing facility is that the person being screened remove all of his
or her personal belongings and any additional clothing that is not necessary;
for example, a jacket.7 2
The laboratory in Von Raab tested only for standard illegal drugs, not
for additional medical conditions or prescription medications.7 3 This labora-
tory has two levels of tests, and if the specimen fails the first test, it must be
confirmed by the second test.174 The result of a screen that is confirmed posi-
tive for illegal drugs is sent to a medical review officer at the Customs Ser-
vice, who is a licensed physician.'7 ' The employees who test positive must
have a valid explanation for their tests coming up positive or they can be
dismissed from their position.176 The Customs Service ensures that any posi-
tive results will not be turned over to any other agency for criminal proceed-
ings without the express written consent of the employee.177
It is noteworthy that Von Raab was decided on the same day as Skinner;
thus, the Court relied on the finding in Skinner that a governmental require-
ment of urinalysis drug testing is a search under the Fourth Amendment and
therefore, the Customs Service's testing must meet the necessary level of
reasonableness required by the Fourth Amendment. 78 The Court identified
the government's purpose, which was to prevent and deter drug use among
employees with sensitive employment positions, as a substantial governmen-
tal interest.179 It stated that the substantial governmental interest presented an
instance where the special needs doctrine might obviate the need for a war-
rant or probable cause.'80 Additionally, the Court noted that a warrant will
only provide the employee with little or no additional protection of his or her
privacy because a warrant will merely tell the employee that a neutral magi-
strate has authorized a narrow intrusion of privacy.' 8 ' The drug screening
policy in Von Raab is already narrowly and specifically defined, and all em-
170. Id. at 661.
171. Id.
172. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 661.
173. Id. at 662.
174. Id.
175. See id.
176. Id. at 663.
177. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 663.
178. Id. at 665; Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-18 (1989).
179. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 666.
180. See id.
181. Id. at 667.
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ployees are put on adequate notice of the testing.182 The Court reasoned that
the "Service does not make a discretionary determination to search based on
a judgment that certain conditions are present, there are simply 'no special
facts for a neutral magistrate to evaluate."' 8 3 Additionally, cases that require
a warrant also require probable cause, and probable cause is prominently
related to criminal investigations.M
The Court ultimately found that the government's need to conduct sus-
picionless drug tests of its employees outweighs the privacy interests of those
employees.'18 In the holding, it reasoned that "[t]he Customs Service is our
Nation's first line of defense against one of the greatest problems affecting
the health and welfare of our population." 86 The great problem that the
Court spoke of is, of course, the smuggling of illegal drugs into the United
States.'18  Additionally, the Customs employees who are directly involved in
the handling of illegal drugs or the carrying of firearms, have "a diminished
expectation of privacy in respect to the intrusions occasioned by a urine
test."'88
The Court focused on two of the petitioner's contentions.189 First, the
petitioner argued that the drug-testing program is unjustified because there is
no belief by the Customs Service that it will actually find any employees
using illegal drugs.' 90 Second, the petitioner argued that the method em-
ployed by the Customs Service is not sufficiently productive to justify its
Fourth Amendment infringement because employees who are on illegal
drugs can avoid the detection of those drugs by temporarily abstaining or by
tampering with their sample.'9 '
In addressing the first, it is undisputed that drug abuse is one of the
worst problems facing society and that no office is immune from potential
illegal drug use.19 2 Given this reasoning and the government's compelling
interest, the urinalysis requirement for a few narrowly defined jobs cannot be
looked at as unreasonable. 9 3 The mere possibility that a Custom's employee
182. Id.
183. Id. (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 383 (1976) (Powell, J., con-
curring)).
184. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 667.
185. Id. at 668.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 672.
189. Von Raab, 489 U.S at 673.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 674.
193. Id.
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uses drugs and thus becomes more susceptible to taking bribes to let drugs
illegally enter the country safely or steals seized drugs is reason enough to
allow the government to drug screen certain employees.194 The fact that all
but a few of the tested employees will test negative does not obviate the need
of the drug testing program or the government's compelling interest.19 5
With regard to the petitioner's second argument, the Court stated that
addicts may not even be able to abstain from the use of illegal drugs for even
a short period of time.'96 The court of appeals found that illegal drugs can
stay in the blood system for widely varying amounts of time, depending on
the person.197 Therefore, the Court rejected the petitioner's argument be-
cause "no employee reasonably can expect to deceive the test by the simple
expedient of abstaining after the test date is assigned."' Additionally, it is
not likely that the employee will be able to tamper with the sample, due to
the facility's safeguards.'"
The Court concluded that despite both of the petitioner's arguments,
"the program bears a close and substantial relation to the Service's goal of
deterring drug users from seeking promotion to sensitive positions."2a Fur-
ther, it found that employees seeking promotions that are covered by the drug
testing policy had to go through background investigations, medical exams,
and other possible intrusive requirements before being hired, all of which can
be expected to lower their privacy expectations when dealing with urinaly-
sis. 20 1 Ultimately, the Court's final holding was that even though urinalysis
is considered a search under the Fourth Amendment, the drug policy em-
ployed by Customs was reasonable because the government's compelling
interest in preventing the promotion of drug users to sensitive positions out-
weighed the privacy interests of those employees.202
c. Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton ex rel. Acton
The Vernonia School District adopted a student athlete drug policy that
allows random drug testing of all student athletes in the school district.203 A
194. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 674.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 676.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 676.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 677.
202. Id. at 679; U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
203. Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton ex rel. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 648 (1995).
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student and his parents unsuccessfully challenged this policy.204 The Verno-
nia School District decided to implement its drug policy because students
began to speak out about their drug use and bragged about the school's ina-
bility to address it.205 In the Vemonia School District, the student athletes
were some of the heaviest users of drugs in the school. 206 This finding
sounded alarms for the Vernonia School District because the use of drugs is
related to an increase in sports injuries.207 This relation was supported by
expert testimony at trial, which demonstrated that there are "deleterious ef-
fects of drugs on motivation, memory, judgment, reaction, coordination, and
performance." 208 The Vernonia School District even implemented classes
and speakers designed to deter students from using illicit drugs, but nothing
worked.20
The drug testing policy implemented by the Vernonia School District
applied to all students wishing to participate in sports programs through the
school. 210 The testing was done without suspicion at the beginning of the
season, and additionally, there was a random drawing of ten percent of the
athletes on each team, each week, to be tested. 2 1' The student was required
to reveal all prescription drugs before the test and then enter an empty locker
room with a monitor of the same sex and provide a sample for testing.212 The
monitor would stand about twelve to fifteen feet away from the student pro-
viding the sample and watch to make sure there was no tampering and listen
for normal urination sounds. 213 The female students were in a closed stall
and could not be seen by the monitor.2 14 In order to ensure the privacy of the
student being tested, the laboratory did not know the identity of the student
and "[o]nly the superintendent, principals, vice-principals, and athletic direc-
tors" received the results, which were kept for no more than a year.2 15 If the
student tested positive, a second test was immediately given, and if the
second test was negative, there was no further action; however, if the second
test was positive, the student and his or her parents were notified immediate-
204. Id. at 651, 666.
205. See id. at 648.
206. Id. at 649.
207. Id.
208. Acton, 515 U.S. at 649.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 650.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Acton, 515 U.S. at 650.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 651.
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ly.216 The student and his or her parents then had two options: first, the stu-
dent could participate in a six week program which involved being drug
tested every week; or second, the student could choose suspension for the
remainder of the season and the following season.2 17
The Court in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton ex rel. Acton 218
made it clear from the beginning of its analysis that a state-compelled urina-
lysis is a search that must conform to the Fourth Amendment or one of its
exceptions. 21 9 The Court stated that reasonableness is "the ultimate measure
of the constitutionality of a governmental search."220 In order to determine
whether the search in Acton was reasonable, the Court balanced the intrusion
on the Fourth Amendment rights of the student against the search's promo-
tion of a legitimate government interest.2 21 The Court pointed out that there
were no criminal issues, and when law enforcement officers do a search pur-
suant to discovering evidence of a crime, reasonableness requires a warrant,
and a warrant is obtained by a showing of probable cause.222 The Court fur-
ther stated that a warrant is not required in all searches done by the govern-
ment and that in such cases where no warrant is required, there is also no
requirement of probable cause.223 A search that is done without a warrant
and without probable cause can be constitutional "'when special needs,
beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and proba-
ble-cause requirement impracticable."'
224
"The first factor [that must] be considered [in a Fourth Amendment
search case] is the nature of the privacy interest upon which the search . .. at
issue intrudes." 225 The Fourth Amendment only protects legitimate privacy
interests, not just subjective ones.226 Additionally, "the legitimacy of certain
privacy expectations vis-h-vis the State may depend upon the individual's
legal relationship with the State." 227 The Acton Court began its examination
of this factor by pointing out that the people subject to the drug policy were
children, and thus while in school, they were temporarily under the custody
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
219. Id. at 652.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 652-53.
222. Id. at 653 (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989).
223. Acton, 515 U.S. at 653.
224. Id. (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)).
225. Id. at 654.
226. Id.
227. Id.
275
275
: Nova Law Review 36, #1
Published by NSUWorks, 2011
NOVA LAW REVIEW
of the State and more specifically, the schoolmaster.228 The students did not
lose all constitutional rights at the door of their school, however, and for
many purposes, the school acted in loco parentis, which allows the school to
do what is reasonable in instructing the students to act and behave civilly. 229
The determination of reasonableness cannot ignore "the schools' custodial
and tutelary responsibility for children." 230 The Court reasoned that students
are already subjected to "'a lesser expectation of privacy than members of
the [general population]"' because attending school requires numerous vac-
cinations and exams that ensure the safety of other children.231' Furthermore,
student athletes choose to try out for and join a team, and by doing so, "they
voluntarily subject themselves to a degree of regulation even higher than that
imposed on students generally." 23 2 The student athletes must obtain: addi-
tional physicals, which include urinalysis; "they must [have] adequate insur-
ance coverage;" they must "maintain a minimum grade point average;" and
finally, they must adhere to any other dress, practice, and conduct rules set
by the athletic director.233 The Court compared students who participate in
sports to adults who work in a heavily regulated industry, finding that both
"have reason to expect intrusions upon normal rights and privileges, includ-
ing privacy."234
The Acton Court then examined the character of the intrusion.23 5 The
Court reiterated what the Skinner Court previously stated: "that the degree
of intrusion depends upon the manner in which production of the urine sam-
ple is monitored."236 In Acton, the Court determined that there were negligi-
ble privacy interests that were compromised by the way the urine sample was
collected.237 An additional privacy issue that the Court raised when deter-
mining the character of the intrusion was the additional private medical in-
formation that could be discovered about the student through urinalysis. 238
The school board in Acton only looked for illegal drugs and not medical con-
ditions such as pregnancy, epilepsy, or diabetes. 239 Additionally, the tests did
228. Acton, 515 U.S. at 654.
229. See id. at 655-56.
230. Id. at 656.
231. Id. at 657 (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 348 (1985) (Powell, J., con-
curring)).
232. Id. at 657.
233. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 657.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 658.
236. Id. (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 626 (1989)).
237. Id.
238. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 658.
239. Id.
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not vary depending on the student, and the school board could only test for
the standard illicit drugs.240 Finally, the test results were only to be released
to a very limited number of school officials who needed to know the results,
and it was made clear that the results were not to be used in any criminal
investigation. 241 The Court did not find the release of prescriptions that were
being taken to be "'a significant invasion of privacy"' because the results
could be given to the testing center and not released to anyone who personal-
ly knew the student.242
The final factor examined by the Acton Court was "the nature and im-
mediacy of the governmental concern at issue . . . and the efficacy of [the]
means for meeting it."243 The Courts in Skinner and Von Raab both held that
the government interests were compelling, and the district and court of ap-
peals in Acton both took that to mean that the governmental interest must be
compelling.2" The Court in Acton pointed out that the lower courts were
mistaken to think that a compelling governmental interest was a fixed floor,
and that a case would be disposed of unless the government could prove it
had a compelling interest.24 5 The Court stated that there must be "an interest
that appears important enough to justify the particular search at hand, in light
of other factors that show the search to be relatively intrusive upon a genuine
expectation of privacy."2 46 The Court reasoned that the Vernonia School
District had a very important and perhaps compelling interest in keeping
their schoolchildren off of drugs. 247 Additionally, the Court called to atten-
tion that when students use drugs, the effect is felt across the entire school,
from the other students to the faculty members. 248 Finally, the Court rea-
soned that this drug screening was narrowly directed to athletes, where "im-
mediate physical harm to the . . . user" himself or to the opposing team's
players was very high.249 The Court additionally mentioned the role model
effect that the athletes had on the other students, and how this important is-
240. Id.
241. See id. (citing Acton ex rel. Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp 1354,
1364 (D. Or. 1992)).
242. See id. at 659-60 (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 626 n.7
(1989)).
243. Acton, 515 U.S. at 660.
244. Id. at 660-61 (citing Acton, 796 F. Supp at 1363).
245. See id. at 661.
246. Id. (emphasis omitted).
247. See id. at 660-61.
248. Acton, 515 U.S. at 662.
249. Id.
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sue was addressed by the athletes being drug tested so they were not able to
use illicit drugs.250
The Court stated in Acton that it has "repeatedly refused to declare that
only the 'least intrusive' search practicable can be reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment." 2 5' The petitioners in Acton argued that the better alter-
252
native was suspicionless testing.22 The Court quickly rejected this alterna-
tive for numerous reasons. 253 First, the proposal for suspicionless testing has
the attached risk that teachers and coaches will be able to arbitrarily impose
drug testing on students who are "troublesome but not drug-likely." 254 This
risk, as the Court pointed out, could open the school to numerous lawsuits
that would be very costly to defend, and further, expensive procedures would
need to be put in place before accusatory drug screening could be imposed
on a student.255 Additionally, the Court stated that the already busy school
teachers would need to add a new responsibility to their already demanding
job: spotting drug users.256 Teachers, in general, are not prepared to take on
this additional task because "a drug impaired individual 'will seldom display
any outward signs detectable by [a] lay person or, in many cases, even [a]
physician." 25
7
The Court in Acton took into account all of the necessary factors and
concluded that the drug testing policy imposed by the Vernonia School Dis-
trict was reasonable and constitutional.258 The Court did point out that there
will always need to be a full analysis of the above factors in every suspicion-
less drug testing case and that future cases will not automatically pass consti-
tutional muster. 259 The Court concluded by reiterating that when the gov-
ernment is acting as someone else, such as an employer or a guardian, as in
Acton, "the relevant question is whether the search is one that a reasonable
guardian [or employer] might undertake."260
250. Id. at 663.
251. Id. (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 629 n.9 (1989)).
252. Id.
253. Acton, 515 U.S. at 663.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 663-64.
256. Id. at 664.
257. Id. (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 628 (1989)).
258. Acton, 515 U.S. at 664-65.
259. Id. at 665.
260. Id.
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d. Chandler v. Miller
In Chandler v. Miller,26 ' Georgia enacted a law requiring political can-
didates for designated state office positions to pass a drug test.2 62 This law
did not require an individualized suspicion of the candidates. 263 Georgia was
the first and only state to enact such a law, and the Supreme Court of the
United States ultimately held the law to be unconstitutional.2 6
The Georgia regulation required political candidates to submit to a drug
test thirty days prior to their qualification as a candidate.265 This test was to
be done at an approved facility and only tested for five standard illicit
drugs.266 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held
that this was a constitutional drug testing procedure. 267 That court found that
there was a special need in performing this type of drug testing, bringing this
search into the realm of the special needs doctrine.2 68 The Eleventh Circuit
then proceeded to balance the individual potential candidate's privacy expec-
tations against the governmental interest to see if the need for individualized
suspicion would be impractical in this context.26 9 The court found there was
no record of any kind of drug abuse by any elected officials in Georgia and
no reason to believe any users or addicts would be uncovered by the test-
ing.270 The court still found the testing was reasonable because the citizens
of Georgia place a lot of trust in their elected officials, and those officials are
in charge of many important things such as economics, safety, and law en-
forcement.271 The court also noted that a high-ranking government official
needs to be honest, clear sighted, and clear thinking, and illegal drug use
could cause a candidate to lose those important qualities.272 Additionally, the
court stated that high-ranking government officials can be very susceptible to
bribes and blackmail, and an illegal drug habit would make an official even
more susceptible.m
261. 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
262. Id. at 308.
263. See id.
264. Id. at 309.
265. Id.
266. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 309 (explaining that the standard illicit drugs tested for are
marijuana, cocaine, opiates, amphetamines, and phencyclidines).
267. Id.
268. Id. at 311.
269. Id.
270. See id.
271. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 3t1.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 311-12.
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Upon review, the Supreme Court of the United States first noted that
this is a case that falls within the Fourth Amendment analysis because urina-
lysis has previously been held to be a search under the Fourth Amendment. 274
Then, it proceeded to discuss the reasonableness of the search.275 For a
search to be considered reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, an indivi-
dualized suspicion is usually required unless there is a special need for the
search and it is outside of the normal need for law enforcement involve-
ment.276 The Court then re-examined the balancing of the private and go-
vernmental interests.277 Ultimately, the Court decided that although the gov-
ernment does have a substantial or important interest, there is no "concrete
danger demanding departure from the Fourth Amendment's main rule," the
threats and dangers were only hypothetical. 278 The Court did point out that a
demonstrated problem is not necessary in all cases, but that the proof of a
problem could help to clarify and validate specific hazards.279
An additional focus of the Court was that the legislation does not credi-
bly deter illegal drug use.280 Under the Georgia law, the potential candidate
has ample notice that he would need to submit a clean drug test result within
thirty days of being approved to run for office. 2 81 There was no secret as to
the date of the test.282 The Court stated that as long as a candidate is not pro-
hibitively addicted to illegal drugs, he or she will be able to abstain long
enough to pass a scheduled drug test, and those who are not able to abstain
are very unlikely to become a candidate.283 The Court reasoned that, unlike
in Von Raab where it was not feasible to subject the agents to standard office
scrutiny, public officials are constantly scrutinized by the public, media, and
other government officials. 284
The Court ultimately conceded that this testing procedure was relatively
noninvasive, and therefore it was not an excessive intrusion on the candi-
dates, and that the government had a significant and important governmental
interest.285 Despite this concession, the Court still held that because public
274. Id. at 313; U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
275. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 313.
276. See id. at 313; U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
277. See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 314, 318.
278. Id. at 318-19.
279. See id. at 319.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 309.
282. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 319-20.
283. Id. at 320.
284. Id. at 321 (citing Nat'I Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 674
(1989)).
285. Id. at 318.
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safety is not genuinely in jeopardy, this kind of suspicionless search will be
barred by the Fourth Amendment even if the search is done in the most con-
venient way possible.286 The Court stated that this drug testing was merely a
symbol and not a special need.287
i. The Chandler Dissent
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a very compelling dissent and stated that
he would rule the Georgia regulation constitutional.288 Chief Justice Rehn-
quist began by declaring that Georgia should not be faulted, and it should not
be held against Georgia that it is the only state to enact a law like the one at
issue because it takes one state to step up in order to bring about change or a
new, nationwide enactment of similar legislations.289
Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that there are very few people, if any,
that would be able to honestly say that illegal drug use is not a major issue
that the United States is facing, and a person would have to be very bold to
state that illegal drug use could not extend to candidates for public office. 290
Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the record did not show any illegal drug
use problems among candidates or high-ranking officials, but that the State
of Georgia should not have to wait until illegal drug use among candidates
becomes a problem to actually attack it.29 1 If the State was to wait until there
was an issue, it could mean that a drug addict was running for a high-ranking
official position or that one actually was elected to a position.292 Such a sce-
nario could have devastating effects on the integrity of the electoral proce-
dures or on the office itself. Chief Justice Rehnquist cited to the majority in
Von Raab to demonstrate that the Supreme Court of the United States had
already held a drug testing procedure to be constitutional without the need
for a perceived drug problem. 2 93
Additionally, Chief Justice Rehnquist found that the majority in Chand-
ler applied the special needs doctrine differently than they had in Von Raab
and Skinner.294 He stated that the majority incorrectly relied on the notion
286. Id. at 323.
287. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 322.
288. Id. at 328 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
289. See id. at 323-24.
290. Id. at 324.
291. Id.
292. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 324.
293. See id. (citing Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 673-74
(1989)).
294. Id. at 325 (citing Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 669; Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass'n, 489
U.S. 602, 620 (1989)).
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that a candidate is already subject to high levels of scrutiny by the public
thereby allowing the public to easily spot his or her drug use.295 Chief Justice
Rehnquist pointed out the strangeness of such a holding296 by comparing the
candidates to the workers in Skinner and the Customs officials in Von Raab
and stating that it could be easily said that those two groups are under the
same sort of scrutiny from their employees and supervisors who work very
closely with them on a daily basis. 297 Specifically, he stated:
[T]he clear teaching of those cases is that the government is not
required to settle for that sort of a vague and uncanalized scrutiny;
if in fact preventing persons who use illegal drugs from concealing
that fact from the public is a legitimate government interest, these
cases indicate that the government may require a drug test.298
Additionally, the privacy interest that is infringed upon by a urinalysis of this
kind is negligible just as in the previous cases before this Court.299
Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded his dissent by stating that the Court
had previously held that preventing drug use by Customs employees-even
off duty-was compelling because they are susceptible to bribery and
blackmail. 300 The risks for bribery and blackmail are just as high among
high-ranking government officials, especially officials who engage in the use
of illegal drugs.30' Specifically, "when measured through the correct lens of
our precedents in this area, the Georgia urinalysis test is a 'reasonable'
search; it is only by distorting these precedents that the Court is able to reach
the result it does." 0 2
e. Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawa-
tomie County v. Earls
In Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Potta-
watomie County v. Earls,30 3 the Board of Education of Pottawatomie County
in Oklahoma implemented a drug-testing requirement for students who
295. Id.
296. Id. at 326.
297. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 326 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. See id.
302. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 327 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
303. 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
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wished to participate in extracurricular activities.30 There were three parts
that all students wishing to participate had to consent to: first, a drug test
before signing up for an activity; second, "random drug testing while partici-
pating;" and third, a drug test anytime there was reasonable suspicion of drug
use.305 All tests would only screen for illegal drugs and not for prescription
medication or medical conditions of any kind."
The Supreme Court of the United States' Fourth Amendment analysis
began with the reasonableness of the governmental search and determined
that the search was not related to criminal proceedings, and thus, probable
cause was not required. 307 The respondents' argument relied on the fact that
there was no individualized suspicion required in the testing of the stu-
dents.308 The Court answered by stating that the Supreme Court had long
held that "'the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of
[individualized] suspicion."' 309 Therefore, when there is a "'special need[]
beyond the . .. need for law enforcement,"' and probable cause is impractic-
able, a suspicionless search could be legal if safety is an issue.31 o
The Court quickly dismissed the privacy issue because a public school
is considered a unique and special setting.311 The Court reasoned that, "[a]
student's privacy interest is limited in a public school environment where the
State is responsible for maintaining discipline, health, and safety. School-
children are routinely required to submit to physical examinations and vacci-
nations against disease." 3 12 Additionally, the Court stated that public school
students are subject to fewer privacy rights than people outside of the school
in order to maintain order within the school.' Finally, the Court stated that
extracurricular activities are regulated beyond that of normal school regula-
tions, and thus, students who participate have a lesser expectation of priva-
cy. 314
The Court then examined the character of the intrusion.1 Urinalysis is
a testing procedure that is usually covered by the Fourth Amendment, but the
304. Id. at 825.
305. Id. at 826.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 828-29.
308. Earls, 536 U.S. at 829.
309. Id. at 829 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543, 561 (1976)).
310. Id. (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)).
311. See id. at 830-31.
312. Id. (citing Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton ex rel. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995)).
313. Earls, 536 U.S. at 831.
314. Id. at 832 (citing Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995)).
315. Id.
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level of the intrusion depends upon the manner in which the urine sample is
collected.3 16 Here, a faculty member waited outside of a closed bathroom
stall in order to "'listen for the normal sounds of urination"' and to make
sure that the student was not tampering with the sample. 317 The Court consi-
dered this method to be a clearly negligible intrusion. 318 Additionally, the
school kept all of the results private and separate from all other records the
school had on the child.3 19 Only faculty members who needed to know the
results were given the results. 32 0 The Court ultimately concluded that the
intrusion was minimal because of the nature of the sample collection and
because the results were used very limitedly. 32 1
Finally, the Court looked to the nature and immediacy of the school's
concerns and the effectiveness of the drug policy in meeting those con-
cerns.32 2 The evidence before the Court suggested that drug use among
children had gotten worse since the Court previously faced this issue seven
years prior to this decision.323 The Court, relying on precedent, concluded
that although a demonstrated problem of drug abuse is not required in all
cases, the fact that the school board proved the existence of even some drug
use in the school was enough to "'shore up an assertion of special need for a
suspicionless general search program."' 3 24 Additionally, in this context, in-
dividualized suspicion is unnecessary for preventing, deterring, and detecting
drug use by students. 325 Teachers are already faced with the difficult task of
keeping order and disciplining the students, and therefore, a test which re-
quired individualized suspicion would be unnecessarily burdensome.326 Ad-
ditionally, an individualized suspicion-based policy could lead to the target-
ing of certain students and open the school up to further litigation.327 The
Court concluded that "it would make little sense to require a school district to
wait for a substantial portion of its students to begin using drugs before it
was allowed to institute a drug testing program designed to deter drug
316. Id. (citing Acton, 515 U.S. at 658).
317. Id. (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 67a, n.35, Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch.
Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (No. 01-332)).
318. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 833.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 834.
322. Id.
323. Earls, 536 U.S. at 834.
324. Id. at 835 (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 319 (1997)).
325. Id. at 837.
326. Id.
327. Id.
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use."328 The Court found the school district's policy to be "a reasonable
means of furthering [its] important interest in preventing and deterring drug
use among its schoolchildren," and therefore, the suspicionless drug testing,
although falling within the Fourth Amendment, was not in violation.3 29
2. Trends Among the Lower Courts
Courts around the United States are not shying away from upholding
suspicionless drug testing under the special needs doctrine.330 Since 1989,
courts around the country have upheld suspicionless testing of Department ofTransportatio teces 332  moeTransportation employees, teachers, city employees whose jobs impli-
cate public safety,333 and government employees who work with at risk
youths.334
In 1989, just a few months after the Supreme Court of the United States
decided Skinner and Von Raab, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit upheld suspicionless drug testing for certain
employees of the Department of Transportation (DOT).335 There, the court
used the same analysis as in Skinner and Von Raab.336 The court determined
that "[t]here can be little doubt . .. that the testing plan serves needs other
than law enforcement, and therefore need not necessarily be supported by
any level of particularized suspicion."337 It was ultimately found by the court
that the balance of the DOT employees' privacy interests against the impor-
tant governmental interest of public safety issues involved with their jobs
were identical to those in Skinner and was therefore easy to uphold.3 3 8
Nine years later, in a lengthy Fourth Amendment analysis, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld suspicionless drug test-
328. Earls, 536 U.S. at 836.
329. Id. at 838.
330. See Knox Cnty. Educ. Ass'n v. Knox Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 158 F.3d 361, 384 (6th Cir.
1998); Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emps. v. Skinner, 885 F.2d 884, 889, 898 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Nat'1
Fed'n of Fed. Emps.-IAM v. Vilsack, No. 10-1735(BAH), 2011 WL 1296859, at *19 (D.D.C.
Apr. 6, 2011); Crager v. Bd. of Educ. of Knott Cnty., Ky., 313 F. Supp. 2d 690, 697 (E.D. Ky.
2004); Robinson v. City of Seattle, 10 P.3d 452, 470 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).
331. See Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emps., 885 F.2d at 886, 898.
332. See Knox Cnty. Educ. Ass'n, 158 F.3d at 363, 384; Crager, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 691,
697.
333. See Robinson, 10 P.3d at 470.
334. See Vilsack, 2011 WL 1296859, at *1, *19.
335. Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emps., 885 F.2d at 886, 898.
336. Id. at 888.
337. Id. at 889.
338. Id. at 889, 898.
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ing for school employees applying for positions that are safety sensitive.339
The school board defined safety sensitive positions as ones "where a single
mistake by such employee can create an immediate threat of serious harm to
students and fellow employees." 340 This "include[d] principals, assistant
principals, teachers, traveling teachers, teacher aides, substitute teachers,
school secretaries, and school bus drivers." 341 The lower court found that
because there was a lack of evidence or history of drug abuse among the
positions tested and there were not the same disastrous harm implications as
in previous cases, the suspicionless policy should not be upheld.342 Further-
more, the lower court found the urinalysis to be fairly intrusive and "rejected
the argument that teachers [have] a diminished expectation of privacy."34 3
The Sixth Circuit disposed of the lower court's decision finding in favor
of suspicionless testing. 3" The Sixth Circuit stated that little or no evidence
of drug abuse was not an issue because a showing of a problem is not neces-
sary.345 The analysis turned to an examination of the competing privacy in-
terests of the teachers and the government's interest in child safety.' The
court stated, "[wie can imagine few governmental interests more important
to a community than that of insuring the safety and security of its children
while they are entrusted to the care of teachers and administrators."347 Addi-
tionally, teachers have a direct influence on children and are serving in loco
parentis.348 The court noted that even a momentary lapse in attention or
judgment during recess on the playground, or while eating in the cafeteria, or
just while the children are engaging in general horseplay can cause serious
harm to the children because "children are active, unpredictable, and in [the]
need of constant attention and supervision."
The court distinguished this case from Chandler.350 It noted that be-
cause "teachers are not subject to the same [level of] day-to-day scrutiny as
[the] candidates for public office" in Chandler, there is a greater need for
339. Knox Cnty. Educ. Ass'n v. Knox Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 158 F.3d 361, 363, 384 (6th
Cir. 1998).
340. Id. at 367.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 370.
343. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
344. Knox Cnty. Educ. Ass'n, 158 F.3d at 384.
345. Id. at 374.
346. See id. at 373-84.
347. Id. at 374-75.
348. Id. at 375.
349. Knox Cnty. Educ. Ass'n, 158 F.3d at 378.
350. Id. at 374-75.
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suspicionless testing. 1' Moreover, teachers work in a very special environ-
ment where they are mostly surrounded by students for roughly six hours a
day, and the majority of their daily contact is with students who might not be
able to detect drug use or abuse.352 If a student does suspect drug use, it is
unlikely that he or she would report it because a drug use allegation is very
serious and there can be numerous consequences or fear of retaliation.5
Finally, "unlike candidates for public office who may indirectly affect the
lives of children as role models and policymakers, teachers directly influence
and supervise children daily."3 5 4
The court concluded that suspicionless drug testing of teachers is justi-
fied because of "the unique role they play in the lives of school children and
the in loco parentis obligations imposed upon them." 3 55 Additionally, the
court pointed out that this urinalysis testing is fairly nonintrusive because
there is no random element to this testing.356 All the information collected by
the test is protected by extensive privacy safeguards, and privacy levels of
teachers are significantly diminished because of the high level of regulation
of their jobs and the nature of the work itself.
Two years later in 2000, a Washington appellate court upheld a Seattle
law requiring the drug testing of city employee applicants whose duties can
implicate public safety.358 There, the court found a compelling governmental
interest in the safety of its citizens that outweighed the minimal privacy in-
trusions of the urinalysis and that the testing was narrowly tailored.
In 2004, the case of suspicionless drug testing of teachers was addressed
by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. 3 1
There, the court set aside an injunction to stop the suspicionless testing be-
cause it said that the plaintiff would not suffer irreparable injury if he were
forced to undergo drug testing.36' Specifically, the court held:
The justifications for permitting the suspicionless drug testing
of teachers (as discussed in Knox County), the fact that random
351. Id. at 375; Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 321 (1997).
352. Knox Cnty. Educ. Ass'n, 158 F.3d at 375.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id. at 380.
357. Knox Cnty. Educ. Ass'n, 158 F.3d at 379-80.
358. Robinson v. City of Seattle, 10 P.3d 452, 470 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).
359. Id.
360. Crager v. Bd. of Educ. of Knott Cnty., Ky., 313 F. Supp. 2d 690, 691 (E.D. Ky.
2004).
361. Id. at 703.
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tests were upheld in Earls and Vernonia, the language in Chandler
and Skinner, and the significant drug problem facing Knott Coun-
ty, support the right of the Board to protect its school children and
employees through the use of random testing.362
As recent as April 6, 2011, the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia granted summary judgment for the government in favor of
the suspicionless drug testing of government employees that work with at
risk youths and economically disadvantaged youths.3 63 The court held that
the employees had a diminished expectation of privacy because of the reali-
ties of the work that they were involved in.3 6 Additionally, the testing pro-
cedures were identical to the ones previously upheld in Von Raab, therefore
the court held them to be negligibly intrusive.365 Ultimately, the court held
that the governmental interest outweighed the Fourth Amendment privacy
interests of the employees.366
These cases only represent a few of the many suspicionless drug-testing
cases that have been decided by courts around the country. This sample de-
monstrates the willingness to apply the special needs doctrine and the consis-
tency in the findings once the test is applied.
3. The Test
A general test for the special needs doctrine has emerged from the five
cases that the Supreme Court of the United States has decided on suspicion-
less drug testing. 367 First, it must be stated that urinalysis is considered a
search under the Fourth Amendment because it "intrudes upon expectations
of privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable."6 Once it is es-
tablished that the search falls within the Fourth Amendment, the search must
362. Id. at 702.
363. See Nat'l Fed'n of Fed. Emps.-IAM v. Vilsack, No. 10-1735(BAH), 2011 WL
1296859, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 6, 2011).
364. Id. at *13.
365. Id. (citing Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668-74 (1989)).
366. Seeid.at*17.
367. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313 (1997) ("[P]articularized exceptions to the
main rule are sometimes warranted based on 'special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement."' (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989))); see
also Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822,
829 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton ex rel. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995); Von
Raab, 489 U.S. at 679; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619-20 (discussing several cases that recognize a
special needs exception).
368. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617.
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then be looked at to see if it is reasonable.369 Reasonableness of a search
"depends upon all of the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and
the nature of the search or seizure itself."370 Generally, to be considered rea-
sonable, the search or seizure must be "based on [some] individualized sus-
picion of wrongdoing" 37 1 unless the search or seizure can be said to fall with-
in the scope of the special needs doctrine.m' This special need must be
something other than that of crime detection, and obtaining a warrant or
gaining probable cause would be impracticable.373 The privacy intrusion of
the drug testing must be examined and then balanced against the recipient's
interest in performing the drug testing.374 The Supreme Court of the United
States stated that there must be "an interest that appears important enough to
justify the particular search at hand, in light of other factors that show the
search to be relatively intrusive upon a genuine expectation of privacy."
Once it is determined that the governmental interest is very important and
outweighs the privacy interests of the individual being tested, the intrusion
on the privacy is justified and does not require any form of individualized
suspicion.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Florida vs. Michigan
This section will demonstrate how the Michigan legislation should have
passed constitutional muster, but did not, due to a split court. The section
begins by showing why the Michigan legislation failed. Next, the Florida
legislation will be analyzed by applying the special needs test presenting the
constitutionality of the legislation when analyzed correctly.
369. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 313.
370. United States v. de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985) (citing New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337-42 (1985)).
371. Acton, 515 U.S. at 653 (emphasis omitted).
372. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619.
373. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
374. Nat'1 Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989).
375. Acton, 515 U.S. at 661 (alteration in original).
376. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668.
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1. Why the Michigan Legislation Failed
In 1999, Michigan attempted to enact a suspicionless drug-testing pro-
gram of welfare recipients; 37 7 however, the legislation was immediately chal-
lenged. The Michigan legislation required that all new applicants be re-
quired to submit to a drug test and "[a]dditionally, after six months, twenty
percent of [parents]" who are up for redetermination would be randomly
selected for testing.379 If an applicant or recipient tested positive, he or she
was required to undergo a substance abuse assessment, and if the assessment
determined he or she needed treatment, the applicant would have to comply
with a treatment plan. 380 The applicant could still receive funding without
going through treatment if he or she had a debilitating illness or injury, had
become exempt, or gave credible information about an unplanned event or
factor that was the reason why he or she tested positive.
The district court held that the State did not show that public safety
would be placed in jeopardy if the recipients and applicants of welfare assis-
tance were not drug tested. 382 The court noted that the-goal of Michigan's
government assistance program is to help families become financially self
sufficient, but substance abuse is a persistent problem and is a major barrier
to employment and thus, self sufficiency. This finding was discarded by
the district court as not concerning public safety, but was noted as an unders-
tandable concern. 384 The State argued that there is strong evidence that
shows parents who are substance abusers are more likely to abuse and neg-
lect their children, and the State has a strong interest in protecting the child-
ren from abuse or neglect, especially when a main goal of the assistance pro-
gram is to assist so that children can remain safe in their own homes .3 " The
court quickly decided to refute this argument by stating that a drug test is not
aimed at actually addressing the issue of child abuse or neglect.386 The court
made a case analogy to Chandler and stated that both applying for welfare
and running for state office were voluntary activities, even more so when
377. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 400.571 (1999), invalidated by Marchwinski 1, 113 F. Supp. 2d
1134, 1144 (E.D. Mich. 2000), rev'd, 309 F.3d 330 (6th Cir. 2002), vacated and reh'g en banc
granted, 319 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2003).
378. Marchwinski 1, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1144.
379. Id. at 1136.
380. Id.
381. Id. at 1137.
382. Id. at 1140.
383. Marchwinski 1, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1140.
384. Id.
385. Id. at 1141.
386. Id.
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running for state office, and the Chandler Court held the testing in its case
was unconstitutional.8 The ultimate holdings, in both Chandler and Mar-
chwinski I, were that suspicionless drug testing in those cases was unconsti-
tutional because the State did not show a special need grounded in public
safety."'
The case was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, which granted review of the case, ultimately reversing the dis-
trict court's decision.3 89 The court pointed out that the program eligibility
manual for the Michigan assistance program states that having strong family
relationships is made harder by substance abuse, and there are more barriers
to employment when substance abuse is involved; therefore, the State of
Michigan will drug test their recipients.3 90 On appeal, the petitioner heavily
pushed the argument that Michigan's interest in preventing child abuse and
neglect was enough of a special need to warrant suspicionless drug testing. 39
The court emphasized that "although public safety must be a component of a
state's special need, it need not predominate." 392 The court found that the
district court erred in holding that only a public safety concern is sufficient
for a special need.393 The proper standard, as the court set out, for reviewing
this type of case is "whether Michigan has shown a special need, of which
public safety is but one consideration."394
The Sixth Circuit laid out numerous reasons as to why there was a suf-
ficient special need for Michigan to engage in suspicionless testing.395 The
court was presented with a multitude of studies that supported the notion that
the use and abuse of controlled substances negatively impacts the ability of a
person to gain and preserve employment and be a responsible and capable
parent.396 Additionally, the studies presented to the court showed that the use
of controlled substances was higher among welfare recipients than the gener-
al public. 397 Furthermore, substance abuse greatly contributes to child abuse
and neglect, and illegal drugs are a significant barrier to financial self-
387. Id. at 1143.
388. Marchwinski I, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1143.
389. Marchwinski v. Howard (Marchwinski II), 309 F.3d 330, 332 (6th Cir. 2002), va-
cated and reh'g en banc granted, 319 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2003).
390. Id.
391. Id. at 333.
392. Id. at 335.
393. Id.
394. Marchwinski 11, 309 F.3d at 335.
395. Id. at 335-36.
396. Id. at 335.
397. Id. at 335-36.
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sufficiency. 3 98 The court had "no doubt that the safety of the children of fam-
ilies in Michigan's Family Independence Program is a substantial public
safety concern that must be factored into the determination of whether Mich-
igan has shown a special need to this drug testing program." 39 Finally, the
court pointed out the public safety concerns that are inherently attached to
illegal drug use and trafficking.4" The court stated that it is "beyond cavil"
that the State has a sufficient special need of ensuring that taxpayers' money
does not go to the promotion of illegal activity, especially when that activity
"undermines the objectives of the program ... [and] directly endangers both
the public and the children the program is designed to assist."4 0 1
When conducting the standard balancing test involved in any special
needs analysis of the plaintiffs privacy versus the government's interest, the
Sixth Circuit stated that it must evaluate the "asserted privacy interest of the
plaintiffs by looking at the character and invasiveness of the privacy intru-
sion and the nature of the privacy interest. "42 The court further stated, be-
fore conducting the balancing, that "[i]mportant to the determination of the
reasonableness of the expectation of privacy is the extent of [the] regulation
of the welfare 'industry,' the pervasiveness of the testing practice in other
areas of life and the voluntary or involuntary nature of the procedure."403
First, the court found that the privacy intrusion is limited because the sample
is collected in private without observation, the test is only for illicit drugs
and no additional information, only those who need to know the results can
obtain them, and the results are not used for any criminal proceedings.404
Second, when the court examined the nature of the privacy interest, it con-
cluded that the plaintiffs have a clearly "diminished expectation of privacy"
because welfare is heavily regulated and recipients are required to "relin-
quish important and . . . private information" in order to receive benefits,
which makes the recipients aware that a condition of receiving benefits
comes with a diminished privacy expectation. 4 05 The court concluded by
stating that it does not matter whether it views this drug testing procedure as
a requirement to receive benefits or as enforcing the requirement that reci-
398. Id. at 336.
399. Marchwinski II, 309 F.3d at 336.
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. Id. (citing Veronica Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton ex rel. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995)).
403. Id. at 336 (citing Acton, 515 U.S. at 657; Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass'n, 489
U.S. 602, 627 (1989); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 325 (1971)).
404. Marchwinski II, 309 F.3d at 336-37.
405. Id. at 337.
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pients not use illegal drugs, the State had shown sufficient cause for the test-
ing.406
After being reversed at the appellate level, an en banc review of the case
was granted." The members of the en banc review court were equally di-
vided on the issue and pursuant to a previous Sixth Circuit ruling, the district
court judgment was affirmed. 408 This case was not appealed any further and
died due to a split circuit court.40 It was a case that would have surely been
granted certiorari to be heard by the highest court in Michigan and was well
primed to be argued before the Supreme Court of the United States due to its
controversial and important nature. The Sixth Circuit decision should have
been affirmed for the same reason that the Florida law is constitutional,
which will be discussed in length in the next section.
2. Why the Current Florida Legislation Is Constitutional
In order to determine if the current Florida legislation is constitutional,
the special needs test will be applied in a five step process. First, it must be
determined that the search in question actually falls within the Fourth
Amendment's grasp. Second, it will be determined that the search is reason-
able. Third, the extent of the invasion on the welfare applicant's privacy will
be analyzed. Fourth, the significant or important governmental interest will
be analyzed. Finally, the privacy interest and the interest of the government
will be balanced to ultimately determine that the search is constitutional.
a. The "Special Needs" Test Applied
i. Does the Search Fall Within the Fourth Amendment?
The first step is the easiest step to analyze in the instant case. The Flor-
ida legislation is requiring urine samples when applying for government
funds,41 0 and it is well settled case law that urinalysis is considered a search
on two levels. 4 1  First, the actual taking of the sample of urine, and second,
the examination of the urine are both normally protected under the Fourth
406. Id. at 338.
407. Marchwinski v. Howard (Marchwinski III), 60 F. App'x 601, 601 (6th Cir 2003) (en
banc).
408. Id.
409. See id.
410. FLA. STAT. § 414.0652 (2011).
411. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989).
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Amendment.412 Florida will be taking the urine samples from all welfare
recipients who wish to receive cash benefits and then will examine the urine
for any illicit drugs.4 13
ii. Is the Search Reasonable?
The drug testing of Temporary Cash Assistance recipients is reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment's special needs doctrine. The method used by
the government does not need to be the least intrusive in order to be consi-
dered reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.4 14 Suspicion based testing is
the alternative to suspicionless testing and this alternative can have devastat-
ing effects. As stated by the court in Acton, suspicion based testing can re-
sult in caseworkers arbitrarily imposing testing on applicants, which can
open the DCF to unwanted and very costly lawsuits from applicants who feel
as if they were discriminated against in the application process because they
were chosen by a caseworker to receive a non-mandatory drug test.415 Fur-
thermore, the caseworkers are supposed to further the goals of the TANF
program, not play detective during the application process to try to determine
if an applicant might be using illegal drugs. 416 The Skinner court duly stated
that to a lay person or even a doctor, some drug users are very hard to dis-
cover, because often, users will not show any signs of use.4 17 Because use is
so hard to detect, the caseworkers, who already have limited interactions
with the families they are assigned to, will lose focus on the important issues
of making sure that the dependent children in the home are well nourished,
not abused or neglected, and the home is in livable condition, because they
will be concerned with detecting minute signs of drug use by the parent reci-
pients.4 18 DCF lists ways that a case manager, while on an in-home visit, can
determine the presence of drug use in the home, but they are hardly effective
or likely.41 9 DCF tells the case managers to look for such signs as drug para-
phernalia, the parents admitting to using drugs, or the parent showing physi-
cal signs of drug use. 420 These obvious signs are highly unlikely during a
412. Id.
413. FLA. STAT. § 414.0652.
414. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton ex rel. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 663 (1995) (citing
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 629 n.9).
415. See id. at 663-64.
416. About TANF, supra note 27.
417. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628.
418. See Child Welfare & Substance Abuse: Known Factors that Increase Risk, supra
note 64, at 3.
419. See id.
420. Id.
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scheduled home visit in which the recipient has ample notice and time to
hide any signs of drug use in the home. DCF admits that drug use is very
often under-recognized by caseworkers who interview the parents. 4 2' These
minimally effective alternatives are not an efficient way of combating the
problem of finding drug abuse among people seeking government assistance.
This legislation is very narrowly defined because it only applies to ap-
plicants who wish to receive cash assistance.422 Applicants will be able to
receive food stamps, Medicaid, Medicare, disability, and any other govern-
ment benefit except temporary cash assistance without taking a drug test.4 23
This lets the families still have their medical benefits, food, subsidized hous-
ing, and any other government assistance they are receiving while the appli-
cant who tested positive is working to get off drugs. 4 24 Additionally, the ap-
plicant's family will still be able to receive cash assistance because the legis-
lation allows an applicant who fails a drug test to assign the benefits to
another family member or an approved government agent.425
Reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment usually requires indivi-
dualized suspicion unless there is a special need outside of the normal need
for law enforcement. 426 It is in the best interest of the applicant for law en-
forcement or the courts to not get involved in the drug testing proceedings.
If DCF was required to obtain a warrant, it would have to go before a judge
to explain the facts surrounding the applicant and present evidence that the
applicant is using illicit drugs. 427 This procedure goes against the legisla-
tion's commitment to privacy, its firm stance on not getting law enforcement
involved, and not using the results in any sort of criminal proceeding. 428 Fur-
thermore, probable cause is not required in cases that do not involve criminal
proceedings.42 9 Therefore, it is not reasonable to require a finding of proba-
ble cause in the instant case because no criminal proceedings are involved.430
The Chandler Court stated, when talking about the plaintiffs in Von
Raab, that it was not feasible for the Customs agents to be subjected to a
421. Id.
422. See FLA. STAT. § 414.0652 (2011).
423. Drug Testing Policy, supra, note 7.
424. See id.
425. Id.
426. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989).
427. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963).
428. See FLA. STAT. § 112.0455(1 1)(a)-(c) (1989).
429. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S.
822, 828-29 (2002).
430. See id. at 829.
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standard level of daily scrutiny like that of an office.43 ' A family who is re-
ceiving cash assistance is also not subject to any standard level of daily scru-
tiny; they are merely visited occasionally by a caseworker and subject to
very limited scrutiny.432 The Chandler Court found it unreasonable to test
potential government candidates because of the high level of scrutiny inhe-
rent in the position.433 This level of scrutiny is not present in the case of ap-
plicants for cash assistance, just as the high level of scrutiny was not present
in Von Raab, Skinner, Acton, or Earls.434 TCA recipients, unlike the plain-
tiffs in Chandler, will not be in the public eye and will not be subjected to
anything but minimal scrutiny.435 This minimal level of scrutiny makes the
alternative-suspicion based testing-impracticable because the caseworkers
would only detect the most obvious of addicts or users. Furthermore, the
individuals that will have a significant amount of interaction with the reci-
pients of the cash assistance are their children, and as the court in Knox
County Education Ass'n v. Knox County Board of Education436 stated, child-
ren are unlikely to be able to tell whether an individual is using illicit drugs
and might be scared to say something because of the unwanted conse-
quences.437
Finally, the drug test, just as the home visitation in Wyman, is neither
compelled nor forced upon the applicant and the applicant is given ample
notice of the requirement to be drug tested prior to choosing whether to pro-
ceed with their TCA application.4 38 DCF notifies the applicant of the drug
test requirement and then gives them ten days to get the test.4 39 If the appli-
cant chooses not to take the drug test, the benefits will simply not be granted;
nothing else happens and the applicant is free to reapply or apply and assign
the benefits.4 0 Just as the Court in Wyman held, not complying with the
rules of the government assistance program is a reasonable basis for the gov-
ernment to terminate benefits, and an applicant who is using drugs is not
431. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 321 (1997) (citing Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v.
Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 674 (1989)).
432. See Child Welfare & Substance Abuse: Known Factors That Increase Risk, supra
note 64, at 3.
433. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 321.
434. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 825; Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton ex rel. Acton, 515 U.S.
646, 665 (1995); Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 679; Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass'n, 489 U.S.
602, 634 (1989).
435. See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 321.
436. 158 F.3d 361 (6th Cir. 1998).
437. Id. at 375.
438. See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 320-21 (1971).
439. Gabi Rodriguez, DCF Holds Workshop on Drug Testing for TCA Recipients,
TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, June 30, 2011, at B2.
440. See id.
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complying with the drug free policy of the government assistance programs
and therefore a drug test is a reasonable means of detecting such non-
compliance."' The Wyman Court appropriately states that the Fourth
Amendment should not be used as a wedge by the applicant to impose his or
her own terms of the benefits and avoid any questions of any kind, while the
government is willing to provide the applicant the means necessary to obtain
life necessities.442
iii. The Extent and Character of the Privacy Intrusion
The intrusion on the privacy of the individuals receiving cash assistance
is minimal. The Florida legislation requires that the drug testing be done in
accordance with the Drug Free Workplace Act (Act) which provides numer-
ous safeguards for the privacy of the people being tested." 3 The Act states
that "[a] sample shall be collected with due regard to the privacy of the indi-
vidual providing the sample, and in a manner reasonably calculated to pre-
vent substitution or contamination of the sample."" The actual sample and
private medication information is taken by a trained professional who will
not disclose any of the private information without the patient's written ex-
pressed consent." Most institutions and collection centers do not have any-
one in the room when the patient is urinating in the sample cup unless there
are extenuating circumstances such as in a jail or drug treatment center.446
This sample collection method of unsupervised sample collection in a medi-
cal environment by a trained professional was already held by the Court in
Skinner to not trigger any privacy issues."7 Furthermore, the Court in Acton
stated that a drug testing policy where males stand at a urinal, fully clothed,
with a monitor fifteen feet back and where women are in a closed stall with a
monitor outside the stall' was a negligible privacy invasion.449 The Acton
drug testing method with negligible privacy implications 450 is more intrusive
on the privacy of the individuals than the current TANF method, because,
unlike the Acton method, there is no one in the sample collection room with
441. See Wyman, 400 U.S. at 318-19.
442. Id. at 321-22.
443. See FLA. STAT. § 414.0652 (2011).
444. Id. § 112.0455(8)(a) (1989).
445. Id. § 1 12.0455(8)(d), 11(b).
446. See Drug Test, ABOUT DRUG TESTING, http://aboutdrugtesting.org/drug-test.htm (last
visited Nov. 13, 2011).
447. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 633 (1989).
448. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton ex rel. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 650 (1995).
449. Id. at 658.
450. Id.
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the applicant, giving him or her one of the most private collection methods
possible.451
The testing information gathered from the drug tests is confidential and
will not be shared with anyone except the people who need to know the in-
formation, such as the DCF which approves the applications.45 2 Similar to
the drug testing performed in Acton, which looked only for illegal drugs and
not medical conditions, and did not vary from person to person,453 the test
that TANF applicants will have to take will only test for a set list of drugs,
not for any medical conditions, and will not vary from applicant to appli-
cant.454 Additionally, the information that is gathered from the applicant,
such as prescription medication that might change the outcome of the test
will not be conveyed to the applicant's caseworker at DCF; a medical review
officer will simply tell the caseworker that the applicant either passed or
failed the drug test, leaving the private prescription medication usage in-
tact.455 Just as in Acton, no one who personally knows the applicant will be
informed of any prescription drug usage or medical condition.4 56 Further-
more, just as the test results obtained in Von Raab, Acton, and Earls, any of
the results obtained by the DCF will not be used in any form of criminal pro-
ceedings.457 If a positive test result is attempted to be used against an appli-
cant, the result will be automatically deemed inadmissible as evidence. 45 8
Welfare recipients have a special relationship with the State of Florida
when they apply for TANF, which in turn diminishes their expectation of
privacy. By applying, an applicant is essentially saying that he or she is una-
ble to financially care for his or her family at the current time and needs the
assistance of the government.45 9 Just as the student athletes in Acton, who
"voluntarily subject[ed] themselves to a degree of regulation even higher
than that imposed on students generally," 460 welfare applicants voluntarily461
451. See FLA. STAT. § 1 12.0455(8)(a) (1989); Drug Test, supra note 446.
452. FLA. STAT. § 112.0455(1 1)(b).
453. Acton, 515 U.S. at 658.
454. See Drug Testing Policy, supra note 7.
455. See id.
456. See id.; see also Acton, 515 U.S. at 659-60.
457. FLA. STAT. § 112.0455(11)(c) (1989); Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of
Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829 (2002); Acton, 515 U.S. at 658; Nat'l Trea-
sury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 663 (1989).
458. FLA. STAT. § 112.0455(11)(c).
459. See Temporary Cash Assistance: Eligibility Rules, supra note 38.
460. Acton, 515 U.S. at 657.
461. The applicants will not lose their food stamps, Medicaid, or subsidized housing bene-
fits, so the risk of becoming homeless and starving is not an issue when the applicant is unable
to directly receive cash benefits. See FLA. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, TEMPORARY
ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMLIEs STATE PLAN RENEWAL, OCT. 1, 2008-SEPT. 30, 2011, 17
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apply for assistance from the government and have many additional require-
ments placed on them that are not placed on individuals who do not receive
assistance.42 The Acton Court compared students who participate in sports
to adults who work in a heavily regulated industry, and welfare applicants
can be added to the comparison because they all "have reason to expect in-
trusions upon normal rights and privileges, including privacy." 463 Adults in
families that receive cash assistance are required to "work or participate in
work related activities for a specified number of hours per week depending
on the number of work-eligible adults in the family and the age of the child-
ren"46 and supply the DCF with personal information such as their social
security number, assets and income, proof of their relationship with the de-
pendent children, and proof of their children's immunizations and school
attendance.4 65 This mandatory work participation and required divulgence of
personal information is analogous to the additional requirements of a mini-
mum grade point average, specific dress code, required practices, and addi-
tional conduct rules required of the student athletes in Acton, which led the
Court to state that because of the additional requirements set in place there is
a "reason to expect intrusions upon normal rights and privileges, including
privacy."466
iv. The Governmental Interest and Public Safety Implications
The State of Florida has numerous important and even compelling in-
terests in drug testing welfare applicants, and as stated by case law, these
interests do not need to be compelling, just "important enough to justify the
particular search." 467 The important interests of the State of Florida can be
broken down into five different interests: first, combating the higher use of
drugs among people receiving government assistance;468 second, preserving
(effective Oct. 1, 2008). Additionally, the applicant can assign his or her benefits to another
person for their children, which will ensure that their children are able to be clothed properly
and have a home to live in. FLA. STAT. § 414.0652(3)(c) (2011).
462. See Florida TANF Program Assistance Overview, TANF.US, http://www.tanf.us/flori
da.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2011).
463. Acton, 515 U.S. at 657 (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 620-
21 (1989).
464. Florida TANF Program Assistance Overview, supra note 462.
465. Temporary Cash Assistance: Eligibility Rules, supra note 38.
466. Acton, 515 U.S. at 657 (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 627).
467. Id. at 661.
468. Substance Use Among Persons in Families Receiving Government Assistance, supra
note 57.
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the safety of the dependent children in the families;469 third, removing the
barrier to self sufficiency that drugs places on recipients; 47 0 fourth, helping to
assure that the children in these families are not at an increased risk of devel-
oping future drug use or addiction;471' and fifth, the public safety implications
of drug use.472
The first governmental interest is combating the documented problem
of drug use among people receiving governmental assistance.473 Although
proof of a problem is not a necessary factor, such evidence can be used to
help in the analysis.474 As stated by Chief Justice Rehnquist in his compel-
ling dissent of the Chandler decision, very few people would be able to ho-
nestly say that illegal drug use is not a major problem in the United States.475
Statistically, drug use is higher among recipients of government assistance
than those not receiving government assistance.476 By implementing this
drug screening program, the government is trying to combat a well docu-
mented epidemic of illegal drug use that is even more prevalent among
people receiving government assistance. In 2008, 7.5% of all people aged
eighteen to fifty-four admitted into a substance abuse treatment facility re-
ported that their main source of income was government assistance.477 By
blindly distributing government funds, the government is simply subsidizing
the habits of a group that is statistically more likely to abuse drugs. People
receiving government assistance are also more likely to abuse some of the
most serious drugs such as heroin and cocaine.478 Additionally, recipients of
government assistance are 10% less likely to successfully complete a drug
rehab program than people who are not on government assistance.479 One
way to try to prevent the continued use of illegal drugs by people receiving
469. See Child Welfare & Substance Abuse: Known Factors That Increase Risk, supra
note 64, at 1.
470. See Substance Abuse Treatment Admissions Receiving Public Assistance, supra note
50.
471. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S.
822, 825 (2002).
472. See Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emps. v. Skinner, 885 F.2d 884, 890, 892 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
473. Substance Use Among Persons in Families Receiving Government Assistance, supra
note 57.
474. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 319 (1997).
475. Id. at 324 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
476. Substance Use Among Persons in Families Receiving Government Assistance, supra
note 57.
477. Substance Abuse Treatment Admissions Receiving Public Assistance, supra note 50,
at 1.
478. Id.
479. Id.
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government assistance is to do what Florida is doing, condition the govern-
480ment assistance on successfully passing a drug test.
The Court in Chandler ruled against suspicionless drug testing because
it could not discover a concrete danger that required the Court to depart from
the standard rule of the Fourth Amendment. 481 This is not the case among
the recipients of government assistance because, as stated above, there is
concrete evidence of a drug problem among the recipients that is statistically
higher than that of the general population that does not receive government
assistance. 482 Those statistics of higher drug use among people receiving
government assistance is an example of the proof of a concrete problem that
the Chandler Court needed to help clarify and validate specific hazards.483
This is not a problem that is going to solve itself, and as Chief Justice Rehn-
quist stated in his compelling dissent in Chandler, the government should not
have to wait to act until the problem is large enough that it has an even great-
er devastating effect on the country and the people involved.484
The second governmental interest is child safety.4 " Every applicant for
TANF cash assistance has at least one dependent child under his or her
care.48 6 The Court in Wyman stated:
The focus [of the assistance program] is on the child and, further,
it is on the child who is dependent. There is no more worthy ob-
ject of the public's concern. The dependent child's needs are pa-
ramount, and only with hesitancy would we relegate those needs,
in the scale of comparative values, to a position secondary to what
the mother claims as her rights. 487
Additionally, the court in Knox County Education Ass'n stated that
there are "few governmental interests more important to a community than
that of insuring the safety and security of its children."4 88 The Knox County
Education Ass'n court deemed drug testing people who apply for teaching
positions to be constitutional because teachers have a lot of interaction with
480. See FLA. STAT. § 414.0652 (2011).
481. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 318-19 (1997).
482. Substance Use Among Persons in Families Receiving Government Assistance, supra
note 57.
483. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 319.
484. See id. at 324 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
485. See Child Welfare & Substance Abuse: Known Factors That Increase Risk, supra
note 64, at 1.
486. Florida TANF Program Assistance Overview, supra note 462.
487. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 318 (1971).
488. Knox Cnty. Educ. Ass'n v. Knox Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 158 F.3d 361, 374-75 (6th Cir.
1998).
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the children in their classes and have a major influence on them.489 Courts
continuously compare teachers to parents, holding teachers to a drug-free
standard which should also be placed on parents.490 It would be impractical
to implement a nationwide drug testing procedure for all parents, but not
impractical to test parents who apply for cash assistance. Families who are
receiving government assistance are statistically more likely to have recently
used serious drugs than families who are not receiving government assis-
tance. 491 The parents who apply for assistance are asking the government to
give them money to help support their children, and the more children a fam-
ily has, the more money they will receive.492 The government needs to en-
sure that the money that is given for each child is actually going to help that
child and not used to subsidize a drug habit.
When parents are using drugs, the effects are devastating. One of the
main goals of the TANF program is to have children be cared for in their
own homes,493 and this goal is not accomplished when parents are using or
abusing drugs. Children who live in homes where their parents abuse drugs
are "three times more likely to be abused, . . . four times more likely to be
neglected," and more likely to develop mental health problems.494 A child
who is being abused and neglected is not being cared for and should be im-
mediately removed from his or her home, which completely goes against the
important goal of the TANF program of having children be cared for in their
own homes. To achieve this goal of a child having a safe home to grow up
in, it is essential that his or her parents not use or abuse illicit drugs.
The third governmental interest is to help the families receiving go-
vernmental assistance become self sufficient, which is hindered by illegal
drug use.495 Parents who come to the DCF and ask for TANF assistance have
fallen on hard times and are seeking the assistance of the government with
the goal of becoming self sufficient in order to be able to adequately provide
for their children.496 Just as an employer who pays an employee to do a job
for him, the government expects something in return for its temporary finan-
cial assistance. The government can be said to be acting as an employer, a
guardian, or simply a provider for the families in need of cash assistance.
489. Id. at 375.
490. See id.
491. Substance Use Among Persons in Families Receiving Government Assistance, supra
note 57.
492. See Temporary Cash Assistance: Eligibility Rules, supra note 38.
493. SUMMARY ANALYSIS, CS for HB 353, at 2.
494. Child Welfare & Substance Abuse: Known Factors That Increase Risk, supra note
64, at 1.
495. See About TANF, supra note 27.
496. See id.
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The Court in Acton posed the important question that must always be asked
in cases of this nature, which is "whether the search is one that a reasonable
guardian, [employer, or provider] . . . might undertake."497 It is very likely
that reasonable guardians or providers would request proof that someone
seeking financial help from them is not on drugs to make sure that their
money is not going to waste on the purchase of drugs and that the children of
the family are not subjected to drug use in their home. It is also reasonable
and very common for employers to ask potential employees to submit to a
drug test to ensure that they will not be under the influence of illegal drugs
while performing the tasks they were hired to perform, which would increase
the risk of error and have devastating physical and/or financial impacts on
the company and other employees.
There is no longer an entitlement to government assistance,498 and there-
fore the government set time limitations and requirements on the part of the
recipients. 499 The point of the current TANF funds are to ensure that the ap-
plicant's family can become self sufficient, and a major part of becoming self
sufficient and no longer requiring government cash assistance is having and
maintaining a job.'" The likelihood of getting a job decreases tremendously
when the applicant uses drugs, even casually, because roughly eighty-four
percent of jobs require some form of drug testing.50' By allowing TANF
cash assistance recipients to continue to receive benefits while using illicit
drugs, the government is not helping them achieve their ultimate goal of self
sufficiency. In Florida, cash assistance is limited to a lifetime total of only
forty-eight months, and if a recipient is still not self sufficient after those
forty-eight months have expired, the recipient is on his or her own and will
no longer receive cash assistance.502 This will only make the recipient's situ-
ation worse because he or she will still have a drug problem, which will con-
tinue to act as a major barrier to employment, but will no longer have cash
benefits from the government. A person who is under the influence of drugs
while receiving cash benefits will likely not use all of the money for its in-
tended purpose and will no longer have it in the future if it is needed again.
Under the new Florida legislation, the local DCF office will assist an appli-
cant who has tested positive to get the help needed by directing him or her to
497. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton ex rel. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995).
498. 42 U.S.C. § 601(b) (1996).
499. Florida TANF Program Assistance Overview, supra note 462.
500. See id.
501. See McGuire Woods, But I Have a Prescription!-Employee Drug Tests in the Age of
Medical Marijuana, SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, July 1, 2011, http://w
ww.shrm.orglegalissues/stateandlocalresources/pages/butihaveaprescription.aspx.
502. Temporary Cash Assistance: Eligibility Rules, supra note 38.
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the proper facilities, and assisting in assigning the cash benefits to someone
who is drug free and capable of utilizing the cash assistance for the depen-
dent children.o 3 Additionally, any applicant who does test positive has free
access to the Florida Abuse Hotline, which will help them along the long and
difficult path to sobriety.
The fourth governmental interest is keeping children off drugs.o5 In
Acton, the Court determined that keeping children off of drugs was a very
important interest.c Children whose parents use drugs are more likely to do
drugs themselves.507 Parents are the most prominent figure in a young
child's life and the parents' actions are often emulated by their children.
When parents are viewed by their children using drugs, the children may
look at this as a sign that the parents have a permissive attitude about drug
use, and therefore, the child is more likely to use drugs.0 Children who live
in homes where their parents are addicted are statistically the highest risk
group to become future addicts.0" Nearly two-thirds of spousal violence is a
result of substance abuse, and when children witness domestic violence, or
are recipients of abuse, they are 50% more likely to abuse drugs and alcohol
in their future.5 " The connection is clear: When parents abuse drugs their
children are much more likely to become addicted to drugs.
Finally, the fifth interest of the government is public safety implica-
tions.512 Public safety implications must be present in the analysis, but they
do not need to be a dominating factor.' 13 In addition to the safety implica-
tions that the children of parents who use drugs face, crime and drug use go
503. FLA. STAT. § 414.0652(j)(3)(c) (2011); see About the Agency, supra note 51.
504. See Rodriguez, supra note 439.
505. See Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton ex rel. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995).
506. Id.
507. See Child Welfare and Substance Abuse: Known Factors That Increase Risk, supra
note 64, at 1.
508. See id.
509. See id.
510. Id.
511. Marchwinski II, 309 F.3d 330, 336 (6th Cir. 2002), vacated and reh'g en banc
granted, 319 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2003).
512. See, e.g., Drug Related Crime, THE NAT'L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, http://www.n
cvc.org/ncvc/main.aspx?dbName=DocumentViewer&DocumentlD=32348 (last visited Nov.
13, 2011).
513. See generally Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989)
(upholding suspicionless drug testing because of potential bribery and blackmail, not public
safety); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (holding the search of a doctor's office at a
state hospital without a warrant as reasonable due to efficiency reasons, not public safety);
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (upholding a search of a student's purse as reason-
able without requiring a public safety implication).
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hand in hand.514 Drug users are statistically more likely to commit crimes
than people who do not use drugs. 5 " Additionally, people who are arrested
in connection with a crime are often under the influence of some drug or at
least test positive for illicit drugs.516 The trafficking and distribution of
drugs, which is a necessary part of the drug industry, generates serious vi-
olence within communities and the United States as a whole.5 " As previous-
ly stated, it is much harder for a family to become self sufficient when the
parents are using drugs because drugs are a barrier to employment and a very
expensive habit that could force the continuance of the family's reliance on
governmental assistance. The public safety implication lies in the time after
the family has exhausted their lifetime cash assistance benefits and no longer
has money coming in but still has an expensive drug habit.' 18 Studies show
that many addicts commit crimes in order to purchase drugs when they do
not have a source of income or if that income source is not sufficient to fuel
their habit.519 The government, by implementing this drug testing procedure,
will assist in helping those who test positive with planning a recovery pro-
gram and avoiding the potential of the person turning to a life of crime to
support a drug habit.5 20
The Skinner Court noted that the mere possession and use of illegal
drugs is criminal and can be punished, but the more dangerous effects are the
tasks that the user performs while on the drugs.5 2' The Court stated that the
government is able to take all reasonable and necessary steps to prevent or
deter users of illicit drugs from performing those sensitive tasks while under
the influence.522 The problem lies that the drug that inhibits the user is con-
cealed within the body and the Court stated that it may be necessary to ex-
amine the excrements in order to uncover the existence of that substance. 5 23
There are fewer tasks more sensitive than that of safely raising a family, es-
pecially when young children are involved and this task should not be per-
formed while under the influence of illicit drugs, especially when the family
is unable to survive without government assistance.
514. See Drug Related Crime, supra note 512.
515. Id.
516. Id.
517. Id.
518. See id.
519. See Drug Related Crime, supra note 512.
520. FLA. STAT. § 414.0652(2)(i) (2011).
521. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 633 (1989).
522. Id.
523. Id.
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v. The Balancing of the Interests
The final step of the special needs analysis is the balancing of the priva-
cy interests of those who apply for temporary cash assistance and the impor-
tant governmental interests present.5 24 The Skinner Court concluded that the
compelling governmental interest in their case would be hindered if the
plaintiffs could only be drug tested if facts were present that gave rise to rea-
sonable suspicion525 and the same is true with the Florida legislation.526 The
already proven diminished privacy expectations of people receiving govern-
ment assistance does not outweigh the potential catastrophic implications
that drug use and abuse can have on a family, especially the children and the
barrier that the drug use places in front of employment.
The Von Raab Court reasoned that the Nation's first line of defense
against drug importation is the Customs employees and the important gov-
ernment interest of those workers performing that job well outweighs the
worker's privacy.52' The parents in families who receive government assis-
tance are on the front line of getting that family off of government assistance
and on to the path of self sufficiency. The important governmental interest
in helping families succeed on their own and ensuring a safe environment for
the children of that family is severely hindered by the use of drugs. There-
fore, this governmental interest far surpasses that of the diminished expecta-
tion of privacy that the families have.
The showing of a strong public safety implication and statistical show-
ing of increased drug use by parents receiving government assistance were
just the kinds of facts that were missing from the analysis made by the Court
in Chandler.5 28 This showing of numerous public safety implications and
important government interests would have tipped the scales in the other
direction in Chandler because this is not a case of drug testing as a symbol; it
is a case of a documented special need.529
During the balancing step of the analysis, the Supreme Court of the
United States in Earls also looked at the nature and immediacy of the regula-
tion.3 o It was concluded that even some drug use was enough to establish an
assertion of a special need to implement a suspicionless drug testing pro-
524. Id. at 619.
525. Id. at 633.
526. FLA. STAT. § 414.0652 (2011).
527. Nat'1 Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989).
528. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997).
529. Id. at 313-14.
530. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S.
822, 834 (2002).
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gram, where the people being tested, students, already have a diminished
expectation of privacy.5 3' This is nearly identical to the problem facing Flor-
ida, except for the fact that there is a showing of increased drug use among
the group of people being tested, in addition to that group having a dimi-
nished expectation of privacy.532
The deterrence and effectiveness factors present in suspicionless drug
testing lend their weight to the government's side in this balancing test.5 33
The Court in Chandler wanted a showing of deterrence, which was not
present because potential candidates knew that they were going to be tested
and could prepare accordingly.'" A person does not plan to lose his or her
job and be unable to support his or her family, as a potential candidate plans
to run for office. Applying for government assistance is something that is
the result of unexpected hard times that have fallen on a family, and the par-
ents would have minimal time to get the drugs out of their systems before
needing the assistance of the government. There is no secret of the date of
the test in Chandler,53 5 but the date that a family needs to apply for govern-
ment assistance is not known and cannot be calculated in advance.36 This
lends to the effectiveness of the Florida legislation. People who are currently
receiving cash assistance will be grandfathered in and will not have to submit
to a drug test;537 but the next time they apply, they will need to be drug
free.3 Therefore, the legislation may have a major deterrent effect.
The scale clearly tips to the side of the government because the Su-
preme Court of the United States has continually held suspicionless drug
tests to be constitutional where the plaintiffs have diminished levels of priva-
cy and the government has valid important interests in conducting the
search.539
V. CONCLusioN
The drug testing program implemented by Florida is constitutional. The
testing is in response to statistical data that shows that people receiving gov-
531. Id. at 835 (citing Chandler, 520 U.S. at 319).
532. See id.
533. See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 629, 633 (1989).
534. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 319-20 (1997).
535. Id.
536. See Drug Testing Policy, supra note 7.
537. Id.
538. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 414.0652(l)-(2) (2011).
539. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls,
536 U.S. 822, 837 (2002); Nat'1 Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 679
(1989); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 634 (1989).
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emnment assistance are more likely to use drugs. This program is not a class
animus, or an attack on the poor; it is simply the government addressing a
known problem and being accountable to the tax payers by not subsidizing
the drug habits of people receiving government assistance. This program
promotes accountability among the potential applicants by forcing them to
pass a drug test and in turn furthering the ultimate goal of self sufficiency.
The special needs doctrine has opened the door for the government to
try to alleviate the problem of government assistance funds being used for
the purchase of drugs and drug users receiving government funds. This nar-
rowly tailored legislation is satisfied by numerous important and even com-
pelling interests, which all justify the ultimate goal of the government pro-
viding assistance to families in order to keep the family safe and help them
become self sufficient. In light of all of the factors, the negligible intrusion,
the numerous important government interests, and the diminished expecta-
tion of privacy of people receiving government assistance, the search per-
formed by the State of Florida is justified under the special needs doctrine of
the Fourth Amendment. It must be stated that this analysis does not lend
itself to the notion that the special needs doctrine can be easily applied to any
form of suspicionless drug testing; an individual analysis of each case must
be made in order to uphold the integrity of the Fourth Amendment.
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